

PARAMĀRTHASĀRA

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EXTRA SERIES IV

THE PARAMĀRTHASĀRA OF ĀDI ŚESA

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THE
PARAMĀRTHASĀRA
OF
ĀDI ŚESA

(Transliterated Text, English Translation and Notes)

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FOREWORD

When we commenced the work of founding the *New Indian Antiquary* in 1937 we suggested to Mr M N Kulkarni, the enterprising Manager of the Karnatak Publishing House, Bombay, the desirability of starting an *Extra Series* of this monthly research journal, in which some publications bearing on Indology should be taken up for publication. Mr Kulkarni readily agreed to our suggestion and lost no time in acting upon it in the interest of Indological studies. In fact as a result of his enthusiasm in this direction, we have been able to bring out some useful volumes such as *Festschrift Dr F W Thomas*, *Festschrift Sir Demson Ross*, the *Śrīngāra Prakāśa of Bhoja* (1st Fascicule) etc. The present Critical Edition of the *Paramārthasāra* of Ādi Śeṣa was included in this Series two years ago but on account of the pressure of work of the volumes referred to above it could not be published earlier. We have, however, great pleasure in presenting it to the scholarly public now and in doing so feel confident that they will appreciate and patronize all the works in this *Extra Series* including the present volume. The responsibility of conducting and financing this Series, especially at a time when the greatest of the modern wars has now throttled all scholarly enterprises, is very great and but for the courage and capacity for sacrifice displayed by the Karnatak Publishing House we would have been compelled to abandon all our projects. We therefore take this opportunity of thanking our Publishers for their genuine interest in our work.

Poona 4
1st March 1941

S M KATRE
P K. GODL

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The present editor of the PARAMĀRTHASĀRA had his attention first drawn to the work by Mr P C DIVANJI, M A , LL M , Retired member of the Bombay Judiciary. In the revision of the translation and notes, he received much help from Dr T R CHINTAMANI of the Sanskrit Department, Madras University , another member of that Department, Dr. V RAGHAVAN, was of great service in the reading of the proofs. Mr S RAMAMURTY, M A , a former research student of the Department of Philosophy, helped in looking up the Telugu commentary and comparing the text in Telugu script , Dr. Saileswar SEN of Andhra University kindly brought to his notice the edition in Bengali script, and furnished a transliterated copy of it besides drawing his attention to the *Laghumañjūṣā* citations. MM Prof Kuppuswami SASTRI, M A , I E S (Retd), gave invaluable advice on topics referred to him, like the sad-asat-khyāti. To all these the editor takes this opportunity of expressing his gratitude in full measure. He trusts that the provision of the translation and notes will help to make the work very serviceable to all as an introductory manual of Advaita Vedānta.

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S S. S

INTRODUCTION

That Bhagavān Śeṣa, the author of the *Paramārthasāra*, was an authoritative writer on advaita, is evident from the reference to him twice in Vidyāraṇya's *Jīvanmuktiviveka*. The work itself is there called *Āryāpañcāśīti*, presumably because of the eighty-five verses in āryā metre, which constitute the doctrinal portion of the book. That other works were similarly known by titles referring to the number of verses is evident from nañes like the *Suvarṇasaptati*, denoting the Sāṅkhya-kārikās of Īśvara-kṛṣṇa. The suggestion may be hazarded that perhaps the present work was written on the analogy of Īśvara-kṛṣṇa's to perform for advaita the same function as the latter's work for Sāṅkhya; the suggestion will gain some support from the fact that the present work makes large use of Sāṅkhya concepts and terminology in its presentation of advaita, so much so that casual readers of Śeṣa's work conclude that it gives "in brief the most essential principles of the Sāṅkhya philosophy"¹. The affinity to Sāṅkhya presentation is so great that the suggestion of Patañjali as the author becomes very plausible. Patañjali as is well-known is reputed to be an incarnation of Ādiśeṣa; and this makes intelligible the ascription of the work apparently to two different authors.² The repeated references to Viṣṇu, Vāsudeva and Hari are also consistent with the author having been Ādiśeṣa. And since it is difficult to believe that that mythological personage gave out the work in his own person, the ascription to Patañjali gains some probability. There are still a number of difficulties to say nothing of the paucity of positive evidence. There has not been conclusively established the identity of the author of the *Yogasūtras* with the author of the *Mahābhāṣya*, and it is the latter who is reputed to be an incarnation of Ādiśeṣa. And at least in the days of the Jaina commentator, Guṇaratnasūri, the followers of Yoga would seem to have found affiliation with Śaiva religion,³ how far this is consistent with Patañjali's recognition of saguṇa brahman as Viṣṇu is a problem. That Guṇaratna has erred is not improbable; but unless that is established there will be one more difficulty in admitting the identity of the present author with the redactor if not the promulgator of the Yoga system.⁴

Whoever the author, the mythical Śeṣa or the only less mythical Patañjali, the work itself was found so valuable that, in the eleventh century, Abhinavagupta adapted it, and expanded it, while retaining the original title;

1. Dr K. C PANDEY in his *Abhinavagupta*, Vol I, p 56.

2. The work as published in the *Pandit*, Vol. V, is called the *Āryāpañcāśīti* of Patañjali, and a modern commentator on the *Jīvanmuktiviveka* refers to it as *Pātañjalasmṛiti* (see Ānandāśrama edition, p. 262).

3. See D. R. BHANDARKAR in an article on 'Lakulīśa', *Annual Report of the Archaeological Survey of India*, 1906-07.

4. The promulgator is reputed to be Hiraṇyagarbha.

to form a manual of the Pratyabhijñā system. The dividing line between Advaita-vedānta and this school of Śaivism is, as is well-known, very thin. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Kārikās of Śeṣa were adapted for the purpose of providing a brief, effective and attractive presentation of the Pratyabhijñā. Abhinavagupta himself makes no secret of his indebtedness to Śeṣa. In the second verse of his work he mentions his source as the *ādihāra-kārikās*, the verses composed by the *ādihāra* (support) of the world, viz, Śeṣa. This interpretation of "ādihāra" is supported not merely by Abhinavagupta's commentator, Yogarāja, but also by the use of the word in the Advaita work¹ to denote Śeṣa. A verse from the latter² is quoted as from a Śruti in Abhinavagupta's *Bhagavadgītārthasaṅgraha*³. By the beginning of the eleventh century A.D., the Advaita manual seems to have risen to the rank of Śruti.⁴ The distinction between Advaita and Pratyabhijñā lies not only in the adoption of names like Śiva, Śambhu, etc. and the enumeration of thirty-six categories in the latter system, but also in its adoption of certain special doctrines, such as that release consists in the manifestation not of consciousness, but of cognisership (*upalabhdhṛtāprakāśa*).⁵ In making the changes consequent on such doctrines Abhinavagupta increased the bulk of the work from eighty-five verses to one hundred. But there can be no shadow of doubt that Śeṣa's work was the basis of Abhinavagupta's redaction.⁶

A comparison with Gauḍapāda's *Māṇḍūkyakārikā*, reveals some noteworthy points of resemblance. Both are concerned with the three forms—Viśva, Taijasa and Prājña—as veiling the fourth, which is the real.⁷ Both refer to Māyā as the *śakti* or *vibhūti* or *svabhāva* of the Lord.⁸

The view that the Lord appears to delude himself as it were by his own Māyā is common to both.⁹ In both there is a clear declaration that in reality there is neither origination nor destruction, neither bondage nor release.¹⁰ The *jīvanmukta* in both works is said to be free to live as he wills, *yatheṣṭam*, without obligations, and comparable to a non-conscious being.¹¹

1. See vv VIII and LXXXVII.

2. V LXXXI

3. See PANDEY, *op cit*, p. 58, the verse is undoubtedly quoted, but it is questionable whether that is what is referred to by the word "pramāṇa-śruti"; the identical verse is cited by Abhinavagupta in the *Tantrāloka* (Ch XXVIII, vv. 312, 313) as from 'Anantakārikā'; the reading there is 'parityajed deham', not 'parityajat' &c., and the imperative suffix is justified in v. 315.

4. Dr. PANDEY (p. 9) mentions a tradition that Abhinavagupta was himself an incarnation of "Patañjali alias Śeṣa"; but see Dr. V. RAGHAVAN on "Abhinavagupta and the Bhāṣya on the Yoga Sūtras", *Annals of the Oriental Research Institute*, Madras University, Vol. III, part II.

5. V. 81. (K).

6. See further the present editor's article on *Paramārthasāra*, NIA, I, pp. 37-42.

7. See *Sāra*, v. XXXI, GK · v. I, 1, 11.

8. GK · I, 9, II, 12, *Sāra*, vv. XXX, XXXII, XXIII, LVI

9. GK, II, 19, *Sāra*, v. XXXII.

10. GK, II, 32, *Sāra*, v. LXIX

11. GK : II, 36, 37; *Sāra*, vv. LXXI, LXXVIII.

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Both declare the consistency of Advaita with all other schools though conflicting among themselves.¹ A less significant point of agreement is in the extensive use of the rope-snake, shell-silver and the ether analogies.* While our text seems undecided as to the unity or plurality of *jīvas*, Gauḍapāda seems more definitely against plurality. Hence he declares that analogies like those of clay and its products, fire and its sparks are purportful only as introducing the doctrine of non-difference, not as teaching difference.² Where there is not even an empirical plurality of *jīvas*, a differentiation of experiences among them such that when one enjoys or is bound, another suffers or is free, need call for no explanation; but Gauḍapāda does offer an explanation on the analogy of the defilement of a single pot-ether not affecting the ether in other pots; this is identical with the explanation given by Śeṣa.³ It seems plausible that Gauḍapāda was drawing on some earlier sources, agreeing in part, while rejecting in part, and that the rejection was not consistent or thorough. Such a hypothesis may well consider the *Paramārthasāra* the original drawn upon. The suggestion gains some slight additional support from another consideration. Gauḍapāda's words in *Kārikā*, III, 15, juxtapose the illustrations of clay and fire; the two occur in different Śruti texts, the first in the *Chāndogya* and the second in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* (also the *Mundaka*). Such a juxtaposition in one verse is not unintelligible; it would however be more plausible if conceived as referring to and rejecting a similar juxtaposition elsewhere. This is just what we find in the *Paramārthasāra*, where one verse (XLVI) refers to the clay-analogy, and the very next (XLVII) refers to the sparks issuing from the fire in a piece of heated metal. It is not improbable that the two verses together constituted the occasion for the refutation by Gauḍapāda in his verse.

In the course of the translation and notes, attention has been drawn to a number of points where this work makes large use of Sāṅkhya terms and concepts, like Puruṣa, Prakṛti, Kaivalya and so on. Even the verses where the preceptor (Śeṣa) is questioned by the disciple seem to presuppose knowledge of and discontent with the Sāṅkhya position. The question relates not to supreme reality or the termination of *samsāra* or sorrow, but to the possibility of spirit being related to *samsāra* and transmigrating. Such a question can have no meaning except for one who has been told that Puruṣa as such is omnipresent and taintless. How can there be *samsāra* for such a one? If somehow it comes about how can there be release? And if release comes by discriminative knowledge, as the Sāṅkhya claims, how can such knowledge prevent the attaching of merit and demerit? It is not illegitimate therefore to consider the present work as representing a transition from the Sāṅkhya to Advaita Vedānta⁴, it may therefore be ascribed to

1. GK : III, 17 ; IV, 5 *Sāra*, v. LXV

2. GK . III, 15.

3. GK : III, 5 , *Sāra*, v. XXXVI

4. The transition may have been only for an individual thinker or group of thinkers, without implying the historical priority of the Sāṅkhya system; a defi-

some period before Advaita Vedānta was clearly and fully formulated. The uncertainty as to whether there is one *jīva* or a plurality of *jīvas*, the recognition of *buddhi*, *manas* and *ahankāra* as distinct *tattvas* instead of different phases of working of a single *antah-karana*, all these would also serve to indicate an early age for the present work. Whether Gauḍapāda was indebted to it or not, we shall be safe in considering the *Paramārthasāra* to belong to the same, if not a slightly earlier, epoch in the development of Indian thought.¹

We shall give a short resumé of the contents of this work, and conclude with a brief comparison with the Pratyabhijñā system. The book commences with an invocation to Viṣṇu, who is superior to Prakṛti as its controller, who is the substrate of all beings and so on. We next have an expression of wonder that despite the pervasiveness of the self, the ocean of Bliss, creatures will not look at it but continue to revel in delusion and grief. The two verses, occurring as they do before the introduction of the pupil and his preceptor, Śeṣa, seem to be foreign to the scope of the work, they are missing from at least one edition and would seem to be from an alien hand devoutly providing the book with an auspicious invocation and a stimulus for the study thereof. With the third verse the work proper may be said to commence. The pupil sees all around him suffering consequent on birth, decay, death, etc., approaches a preceptor with faith and devotion, praises him as qualified to settle his doubts, and asks him for instruction as to Prakṛti and Puruṣa, how there can be *samsāra* or the acquisition of karma or release and how discriminative knowledge can make merit and demerit ineffective. The preceptor remarks on the difficulty of the question, offers obeisance to Viṣṇu, who out of Prakṛti makes a presentation of this non-real world as if it were real, and proceeds to instruct the pupil.

From the unmanifest (*avyakta*) as superintended by Supreme Consciousness came forth the Cosmic Germ (*anḍa*); thence Brahmā; thence the various beings. Prakṛti is inert; yet action in the empirical world really belongs to it, the conscious being is non-active. The activity of the inert is

nitive formulation of Advaita, however, would necessarily seem subsequent to the tentative approaches made in the present book.

1 Rai Bahadur Amarnath RAY writing on the Gauḍapāda Kārikās and the Bhāgavata Purāna (*Bulletin of the School of Oriental Studies*, London, VIII, i, 107-111) draws attention to several parallels between the two works and suggests that the *Purāna* is indebted to the *Kārikās*. In order to allow the *Kārikās* to become well-known to a writer in the extreme south of India he has to allow a sufficient interval, and for this purpose he has to dispute the accepted views that Śaṅkara was the author of the *Māndūkya-bhāṣya*, that Gauḍapāda was Śaṅkara's preceptor's preceptor and so on. Five out of the six parallelisms (i.e., all except the first) can be exhibited in respect of the *Paramārthasāra* too. The identical words are not repeated, but there is at least as much resemblance as to the *Gauḍapāda-Kārikās*. If we look to the *Paramārthasāra* as the source of inspiration for the *Purāna*, the difficulties mentioned above may be avoided. In any case, till a late date is definitely established for the *Paramārthasāra*, the parallelisms noticed in the article under reference can have little chronological significance.

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possible because of its being superinduced thereon by the conscious, like the motion of a piece of iron in the proximity of a lodestone, or like the activity of all beings on earth when the sun rises, these activities are not attributable to the sun, though in a measure due to its appearance. *Buddhi, manas, ahankāra*, etc. are evolutes of Prakṛti; when the *manas* is made the object of egoity (*ahankāra*) and the whole is illumined by consciousness, there arises even for the pure Self the conceit of being human, being happy or miserable and so on; this is the knot due to *avidyā*; it is the knot to be cut by realisation. The superposition of agency etc can be understood on the analogy of the crystal taking on colours of the objects around it. The sun which does not move appears to move with the motion of the water, etc, reflecting it; so too the unchanging Self appears to partake of the fluctuations of the *antahkarana*. Consciousness in truth cannot be made an object of consciousness, since it is all-pervasive; it can nevertheless be apprehended as present in a psychosis of the intellect (*buddhi-vṛtti*) just as Rāhu who is invisible as a rule can yet be seen in the lunar orb, during an eclipse. *Buddhi* which is the mirror should be kept clean if it is to reflect effectively. Brahman that can become an object of knowledge only thus is non-dual, all-pervasive and unparalleled bliss, this has to be realised. Prakṛti on the other hand, consisting of twenty-three *tattvas*, from *buddhi* down to the gross elements, is what is to be avoided.

The Self in reality is not subject to merit or demerit, birth or death, caste or duty, joy or grief. It is like the sun in all reflections, omnipresent like ether. It is free from all doubts as the witness thereof. It is pure, conscious, decayless and deathless, tranquil, taintless, ever-shining in the light that is itself, pervasive. Bondage is due to the conceit of the self in the not-self.

Just as the juice of the sugar-cane takes on several gross forms as molasses, sugar, crystals, etc, so does undifferentiated pure consciousness take on the forms of the internal ruler and *jīva* on the one hand, the collective cosmic body and individual bodies on the other. The One Spirit expands itself in three forms as *Viśva*, *Taijasa* and *Prājña*, by these three is hidden the fourth, the non-dual real. These manifestations and their re-absorption are due to *Vāsudeva*, sporting as it were with his own *māyāśakti*.

The world of duality and finitude is comparable to the mirage, shell-silver, rope-snake and the double moon. There is not in the rope any real cause of snake or a real origination of snake, yet there is fear due to delusion, the duality of the non-dual is similarly due to *avidyā*. Because of this and its product, the conceit of self in the not-self, the omnipresent *Vāsudeva* is not realised. It is this self which appears to delude itself as it were through its own *māyāśakti*. *Māyā* is like the smoke which though passing through ether (comparable to the self) cannot taint it. Serenity, exultation, dullness, these are *gunas*, of Prakṛti; but because of association with Prakṛti the Lord Himself appears as if serene, as exultant and so on; in truth He is no more affected by these *gunas* than ether by clouds and smoke.

The non-duality of the self is consistent with diversity in the experiences

of the *jīvas* ; when a single pot is filled with smoke, the ether as in that pot alone is affected, not as in other pots

Actions proceed from the not-self , he who does not identify himself therewith is not bound by action or its fruit. That karma which was acquired in another body and has begun to bear fruit by producing this body, will have to be worked out through experience of fruit. But other karma acquired prior to the dawn of knowledge becomes parched by the fire of knowledge and incapable of causing birth , and karma due to actions to be performed hereafter will no more cling to the self than water to the lotus-leaf ; for the knower has realised that while action belongs to body, speech or mind, he is not any of these and hence not the agent. The dispersal of karma is comparable to gossamer being dispersed in the wind. Continuance in the body will not lead to further identification with Prakṛti , the churned out butter cannot become one with milk again. Bondage due to association with Prakṛti is connate like the union of grain and husk ; when the husk is removed the grain can no longer germinate. The *jīva* suffers from bondage to action and fruit, just like an honest man who has fallen into the company of thieves.

The enlightened Self dispels *avidyā* like the sun dispelling darkness. It is homogeneous within and without , its unity is not inconsistent with the plurality of finite selves ; the one body has many limbs, one clay has many products, one fire has many sparks. The one self of all is devoid of birth and death, going and coming. It is unaffected by world presentation just as the rope is unaffected by the snake-presentation. The presentation is due to *avidyā*. Only he who pays heed to it and identifies himself with it is bound thereby. It is not something wholly alien , it is of the very nature of Viṣṇu as smoke is of fire, and snow, foam and bubbles of water. This has to be abandoned and the non-dual Brahman contemplated.

Contemplation leads to realisation of non-difference as of water from water, milk from milk and air from air. The world too is realised to be of the same nature as Brahman , whence then delusion or sorrow ? The Self then shines in its own light, like the crystal on the removal of adjuncts. It is no longer affected by body or instruments, joy or grief ; there is no longer any *abhimāna* in the body and organs , hence there is no agency. Release is simultaneous with the contemplative realisation of pervasiveness and non-duality. Contemplation of particular forms is also fruitful ; for the Lord bestows grace taking on those forms. And we have no differences with the conclusions of warring sects, since we hold that all of these derive from and attempt to reach the Self of all. But he who rises above these and knows himself as Nārāyaṇa, the cause of origination, sustentation and destruction, he becomes omniscient, omnipotent, lord of all , he transcends grief and fears none ; he has become one with the supreme eternal reality which knows no increase or decrease, killing or being killed, bondage or release ; everything else is unreal. Endowed with such knowledge of Prakṛti and Puruṣa, he delights in the Self, is calm and released (*kevalī*)

As the plantain, the bamboo and some species of reed perish (only) after

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producing their fruit, so do the body, etc. perish (only) after the fruit of *prārabdha* is experienced. (But) knowledge cuts the knot of nescience ; and with this the *jīva* is released. The destruction itself is release ; there is neither a place set apart for release nor a departure thereto. The *mukta* knows the non-real world to be a product of Viṣṇu's *māyā* ; he is unaffected thereby and is tranquil. Though present in *saṃsāra*, actions affect him no more than water clings to a lotus leaf. His tranquillity is as of the fire whose fuel has been consumed. He eats anything, wears anything, is content with anything, rests anywhere. Neither merit (as of a thousand horse-sacrifices) nor sin (as of a hundred thousand murders) can affect him. He has to offer neither prayers nor sacrifices. There is for him neither delusion nor anger, neither rejoicing nor grief, neither thought nor speech after having realised the Profound Brahman, he is thus to live like one inert. He lives as he pleases, he has become one with that pervasive, non-dual self. The place or manner of his death does not affect his release which is already attained ; the distinction of holy and unholy is related to the acquisition of merit and demerit ; that is of no concern to one who has risen above merit and demerit.

Release for the self-knower is as inevitable as a man falling to the ground when his foot slips from the top of a tree. But it is possible that after starting on the path one has not yet attained *yoga*, contemplative union. Such a person enjoys heavenly happiness, respected like a king by the gods, is reborn eventually as a human being, practises *yoga* and attains immortality.

Such in outline is the teaching of the *Paramārthasāra*. Its affinities to and divergences from the Sāṅkhya teaching, its uncertainties on some controversial points in the history of Advaita, these have been pointed out in the translation and notes.

A word may be mentioned in connection with the notions of *jīvanmukti* and the need for *abhyāsa*. It is clear from verses LXXXIV-LXXXVI that indirect or remote knowledge of Brahman as the Self will not suffice ; it is good in that it will secure heavenly enjoyment while preparing the way for realisation in a future birth. But of itself it falls short of the contemplative union (*yoga*) that alone is simultaneous with release. This *yoga* requires to be practised (*abhyāsa*), that is, persisted in repeatedly and uninterruptedly. There would thus seem to be a stress on the need for *prasankhyāna* (profound meditation) on something like the lines of Maṇḍana's teaching. There is of course no indication whether Śeṣa, like Maṇḍana, held *prasankhyāna* (as distinguished from Scriptural texts or the disciplined *manas*) to be the distinctive cause (*karana*) in realisation. But the mention of *abhyāsa* at least in an oblique way, while the other two come in for little notice, may be treated as of some significance.

That release is contemporaneous with knowledge is recognised and repeated quite a number of times in the work. It is only the cutting of the knot of nescience that constitutes release. This cutting results with knowledge ; release is then attained simultaneously with knowledge (*jñāna-samakālamuktaḥ*, v LXXXI). Karmas do not affect such a person ; *prārabdha* alone

persists since it has to be worked out through experience in this body (v XXXVIII) The continuance of the body is thus not inconsistent with release. And, as we see from vv. LXXVI-LXXIX the *jīvanmukta* has no restrictions as to the manner of his life or death. The time and the manner of physical disease are of no moment to him; he has become the eternal Brahman for which there is neither increase nor decrease, neither bondage nor release. The proper consequence of such a doctrine will treat the continuance of the body with indifference and not look for another stage of *mukti* called *videhamukti*. There will be no awaiting the dissolution of the body. And we are not told anywhere in the book that physical dissolution is a necessary part of *mukti* at any stage.

The question may arise, "Why then is the body dissolved?" A plausible answer is that the body came into existence for a certain purpose, the acquisition of wisdom, and that purpose being achieved, the body ceases to be.¹ This is what we are told in v LXXI, with the help of the analogy of the plantain and bamboo, alleged to perish as soon as they bear fruit (*naśyanti yathā svāpuspam āsādyā*). In the case of the plantain it is an observable fact that the tree bears fruit only once, that done, it dies out. It is not a fact, however, that it does not die prior to bearing fruit. Much less is it a fact that bamboos do not perish without bearing their alleged fruit, pearls; we are not familiar to-day with bamboo-borne pearls, though bamboos constantly perish.² There would therefore seem to be no justification for interpreting the verse as setting up a term to perfect release, such release being achieved only on death after the complete consumption of *prārabdha*. The words of the commentator, that those analogues do not perish until their offspring has been produced (*yāvan na janayanti tāvan na naśyanti*) are justified by neither the words nor the sense. And all the verses subsequent to LXXI speak of release in embodiment without any implication of the body continuing to be a bond, whose destruction is to be awaited. As is clear from v LXII, what is needed is the riddance of conceit in the body and organs (*dehendriya-dhī-vivarjitah*), the destruction of the body is for this purpose irrelevant. According to Advaita principles, release consists in the attainment of a proper outlook whereby both Self and other are envisaged as Brahmanmaya. In the case of one who has achieved this the *existence* of body and organs will not be cognised as such; if they exist as such objects

1 Both question and answer proceed on the assumption that all men including *muktas* are mortal. This is neither scientifically proved nor scripturally laid down. Some *muktas* at least, persons set in authority to give light and leading to lesser men, seem to be *cirañjīvis*. Their release has not been treated as imperfect or as inconsistent with the non-dissolution of their bodies.

2. A well-known Tamil verse groups the crab, the oyster, the plantain and the bamboo as creatures destroyed by their own offspring (*Nalvazi*, v 36). Another Tamil verse includes the Buddha's mother in a slightly longer list. In neither is there the restrictive implication that death occurs only after the production of the offspring.

of cognition for *others*, that is irrelevant to *his* release ; the setting up of a term for his release is unjustified.

What then happens to the view that *prārabdha* survives the onset of knowledge and has to be worked out? It is only a superstition surviving from non-absolutist systems which too recognise the disintegrative force of knowledge, but seek to save therefrom moral and religious obligations. It is also an inheritance from the Sāṅkhya, where *videhamukti* has to be recognised ; for the body having been evolved to produce enjoyment and *jñāna* for the Puruṣa, when both purposes have been attained, it must be resolved back into its cause, the unevolved Prakṛti. Since the objective world is independently real, not a superimposition on spirit, release calls for involution of the evolved, not a mere change in the spirit's outlook on itself and the evolved. Hence the need for recognising a certain measure of *kaivalya* when knowledge dawns, the perfection of this on physical decease and the postulation of *prārabdha* to account for the body surviving the onset of wisdom. The Advaitin has no such difficulties to face ; he seems to take them over, however, together with the solution, a procedure neither intelligible in theory nor justifiable in practice.

The present work, we repeat, does not postulate an expectance of physical dissolution for perfect release. The whole trend of the concluding portion in particular is against such a doctrine. What happens then to verse XXXVIII, which declares that *prārabdha* has necessarily to be experienced? We suggest that it is an interpolation. The words of verse XXXIX about karma acquired prior to the origination of knowledge (*prāg-jñānotpatti citam yat karma*) are sufficiently wide to cover both *prārabdha* and *sañcita* karma. Some orthodox Advaitin of the later day would seem to have been shocked at this and introduced verse XXXVIII, to make an exception in favour of *prārabdha*. That all three kinds of karma were meant to be excluded seems more than plausible from the use of '*karmāni*' in the plural (not dual) in verse XLIII. And a consideration of the number of verses makes the hypothesis of interpolation not plausible. We have noted that an alternative name for the work is *Āryāpañcāṣīti* ; it should therefore contain only eighty-five verses. Even the Trivandrum text (the basis of Rāghavānanda's commentary) contains eighty-seven verses ; and we have included two others numbered XVIIIa and LXXVa. The first at least of these has some claim to be considered genuine as its parallel is found in Abhinavagupta's work. If we add these two, we get eighty-nine verses of which we may neglect two verses at the beginning and one at the end as extraneous and probably the work of some other hand ; we are still left with one verse more than the recognised number ; and if we are to leave out any, there is a good case for omitting verse XXXVIII, which besides failing to square with the rest of the teaching, finds no counterpart in the Pratyabhijñā work. The latter is more elaborate than Śeṣa's work ; the author was not pressed for want of space and could have included this verse or the idea in it if he felt it necessary. Nor is it that the survival of *prārabdha* is less consistent with the Pratyabhijñā system

than with the Advaita Vedānta²

We may now consider some of the divergences between Advaita and Pratyabhijñā. The supreme reality for both is non-dual ; while the Advaitin calls it Brahman, the Śaiva calls it Śiva. The latter's position, however, is very different from that of later writers like Appayya Dīkṣita, who combined Śaiva religion with Advaita philosophy ; for, according to these, Śiva is the name of Saguna Brahman, not the highest reality.² Almost as a necessary consequence, the supreme being is conceived not as experience, but as the experient ; he is not knowledge (*jñāna*) but perfect knower (*pūrṇa-pramātā*). Unlike the imperfect, finite knowers, however, he does not stand contrasted with objects of knowledge ; the distinction of subject and object is evolved out of Him ; the conscious and the non-conscious, the viṣayin and the viṣaya proceed from Him ; He is present in all products, even the inert, as without Him they would not be manifest at all. The difference so far from Advaita would seem to be only in regard to terminology ; what the Vedāntin calls experience, the Śaiva designates as experient ; if the latter is less intelligible perhaps metaphysically, it has the merit of conserving individuality ; the *jīva* who realises himself as Śiva is neither annulled nor absorbed ; there is no loss of personality.

The next point to note is the interpretation of *anḍa*, the Cosmic Germ as referring to four-fold spheres, *anḍa-catuṣṭaya*, these are Śakti, Māyā, Prakṛti and Pṛthivī ; each preceding sphere envelopes those succeeding in the list. This is a refinement and elaboration of the Advaita doctrine of the world as an elaboration of *māyā*, itself a *śakti* of the Supreme. In either case, the *śakti* seems to be a capacity to negate and delimit oneself, in the Pratyabhijñā it is called *akhyāti*, consisting in the negation of the true nature of oneself as perfect knower and of the world as a feat of the perfect Ego (*parā-hantā-camatkāra*), its functioning is negative (*niśedha-vyāpāra-rūpā*). It envelopes the spheres of *māyā*, *prakṛti* and *pṛthivī*. *Māyā* is delusive ; it differentiates individuals and binds them ; it envelopes the next two spheres. *Prakṛti* is constituted of the three *gunas*, *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*, it provides bodies and objects of enjoyment. These in the gross form, however, are derived from *Pṛthivī*.

Śiva is one homogeneous mass of consciousness and bliss. Of His own

1 Verses 85, 86 (K) in disposing of the fear of fresh bondage for him who is released, envisage the possibility of the released self staying for a while in the midst of the material cloaks, this continuance, however, is considered to be due not to *prārabdha-karma* but its *saṃskāra*, residual impression. This is similar to Maṇḍana's position (*Brahmasūdhī*, p 131). It must be noted, however, that in the view of Yogarāja, physical decease marks a step up in release, thus the knower, even while alive takes on the form of the fourth ; after death, he transcends even the fourth (*jīvan eva turyārūpo dehābhāvāt turyāṭītarupah*)¹ Such a distinction is normally absent from Advaita. In the *Tantrāloka* (Ch. VIII, vv. 317-320), Abhinavagupta seems to hold that whereas the *jīvanmukta* is subject to a suspicion, on the part of himself or others, as to the persistence of a *saṃskāra* of duality, even this suspicion is removed at death.

2. See *Śivatattvaviveka*, v. 13, *Ratnatrayaparīkṣā*, vv. 1 and 4.

free-will He acts the part of a cogniser of the body, etc., the experiencer of joy and grief. He abandons his perfect form and attains *paśubhāva* consisting of subjects and objects of experience (*bhoktṛ* and *bhogyā*); He appears as the experient in all finite knowers.

The finite world thus manifest through the *śakti* called *akhyāti* is only a delimitation of the whole reality; it is not to be dismissed as a non-real illusion, as by the Brahmvādins. The positive immanence of the real in appearances is greatly stressed in the Pratyabhijñā. Like the crystal presenting diverse colours, Śiva supports the numerous differences of form created by Himself, as if non-different from Himself, He yet transcends them and cognises Himself as the one "I" abounding in impartite potency. The cognition is a case of identity-in-difference as in the cognition of a picture with many colours; the difference is subordinated to the unity of the whole, neither juxtaposed nor denied.

There is no real differentiation of Maheśvara; for whatever can differentiate—space, time, other objects—depends for its very existence on the light of consciousness that is Maheśvara; there is nothing apart from consciousness; hence nothing can effect a real diversification of consciousness. There is however presentation of diversity without loss of unity. The crystal appears as crystal even while presenting the colours of proximate objects. The unity is not inconsistent with the diversity any more than in the case of the moon and its reflections etc. Multiplicity and finitude owe their very existence to the one consciousness; how can they affect that unity?

Though Śiva is thus all-pervasive, some entities are manifested as cognisers and some as cognised, some as subjects, others as objects. This is comparable to one and the same planet, Rāhu, being invisible as it moves through space generally, but visible while obscuring the moon. Unlike the case in Advaita, there is no special importance attached to the manifestation being by the very light which is sought to be obscured; but the interpretation is in a sense more in line with Śeṣa's own use of the simile to show that what is not an object of knowledge can yet be such in certain cases, as reflected in *buddhi*. The mirror gives good or bad reflections according to the degree of its purity; the purity of the mirror i.e., the intellect, is due to *anugraha-śakti*, while the impurity is due to *trodhāna-śakti*.

Śiva is not comparable to an inert entity as in the śānta-brahmavāda; it is of the nature of *icchā-jñāna-kriyā-śakti*; innumerable names and forms find room therein, also the various *śaktis* like Brāhmī; though words find a place therein it is *nirvikalpa*, not *savikalpa*; in the case of finite entities like pot, etc., there is distinction from what are not these, e.g. non-pot, etc.; but Śiva who is *prakāśa* cannot be distinguished from anything else; *aparakāśa* if not manifest does not exist and, if manifest, is indistinguishable from *prakāśa*.

"Akhyātir yadi na khyāti khyātir evā 'vaśiṣyate
Khyāti ced khyātirūpatvāt khyātir evā 'vaśiṣyate".¹

1. See *Pratyabhijñāhṛdayam*, Adyar edition, p. 33.

The world is comparable to the reflection in a mirror ; the place of the mirror is occupied by intelligence, *citprakāśa* ; the difference is that the latter is both efficient and material cause of the world. The idea of a mirrored city is common to the *Dakṣiṇāmūrtyaṣṭaka* attributed to Śaṅkara.

Māyā, which is responsible for finitising and deluding, is *śakti*, not something other than Brahman, as for the Brahmavādins ; but its capacity is conceived just as in Advaita, viz., achieving the unintelligible, *durghaṭasampādanam*, e.g., the relation between the cogniser and the cognised, obscuration of one's own self and so on. All these forms of bondage—*ānava*, *karma* and *prakṛtimāyā*, are included under *māyā*, as contrasted with the Siddhānta usage which seeks to draw a sharp distinction between *ānava* and *māyā*, their functions respectively being obscuration and partial removal of obscuration.

The all-pervasive spirit becomes finite as it were and appears as the puruṣa enveloped by the six cloaks—*māyā*, *kāla*, *kalā*, *nyatī*, *rāga* and *avidyā* ; the characteristic form of expression is "Only now do I know just a little, viz., this much alone, in its entirety".

All varieties of the cogniser and the cognised are modifications of Śambhu, in the same way as the juice, jaggery, candy, etc are modifications of the sugar-cane. Unlike Śeṣa, however, Abhinavagupta seems to understand by *Vijñāna*, etc not-pure consciousness, the internal ruler, the *jīva*, the cosmic body and the individual bodies, but the conceptions of supreme reality entertained by rival schools ; thus, the *vijñāna* of the Yogācaras, the internal ruler (*āntaryāmin*) of the Brahmavādins, the *prāna* of the śabda-brahmavādins, the *virāt-deha* of other brahmavādins, *jātī* of the Vaiśeṣikas, the bare particular (*pinda*) maintained by others—all these have only relative reality ; they are not absolutely real (*paramārthena tu na santy eva*).

Merit, demerit, etc appear in the self though themselves unreal (*asat*) ; in so far as they are manifest, they are non-different from the light that is the self, else they would not appear at all ; but while appearing, they appear as if different from the self, because of *akhyātī*, the first work of *akhyātī* thus is the conceit of non-self in the self.¹ A further extension on top of this is the conceit of self in the non-self (*ganḍasyo 'pari mahān ayam sphoṭah*) The first process applied to all or none ; the second process makes a selection ; certain objects, e.g. the body, are treated as "I", certain others like colour, taste, etc are treated as "not-I", with the dual process we have *samsāra* in full measure. There would seem to be nothing analogous in the Advaitin's conception of superimposition (*adhyāsa*) He does speak of the reciprocal superimposition of the self and the not-self. He also distinguishes superimposition of attributes from that of substrates and treats the latter as preceding and underlying the former. He does not, however, appear to say anywhere that the first work of *māyā* is to cause the delusion of *anātman* in what is *ātman*. It is all the same a necessary implication of his doctrine. In order that there may be the conceit of self-hood in the not-self, there must

1. ātmany anātmābhīmāna-pūrvō' nātmany ātmābhīmāno bhavati—*Paramārthasāra*, Kashmir edition, p. 66.

be presented a not-self ; the perfect and infinite must appear as imperfect and finite ; what is really the self must appear as not-self And this would seem to be recognised by the Advaitin in his doctrine of primal nescience (*mūlāvidyā*). The one has to appear as many ; the supra-relational as relational , this is the work of *mūlāvidyā* , our identifications with the relational manifold are the work of *tūlāvidyā* (subsidiary nesciences), these are the big "pustules on the boil" The difference between the two systems in this respect too seems to be but apparent.

The self under the influence of *akhyāti* imprisons itself in webs of its own creation Not merely does it project physical worlds, but it creates concepts as well for its own delusion—like the *śūnya* (thus does Yogarāja interpret 'nabhas, ether' found in the verse) of the Bauddhas, or that adopted by the Brahmavādins after rejecting the concepts of other schools in the form "neti, neti" Whatever Abhinavagupta may have thought about it, a definite antagonism between Advaita and Pratyabhijñā seems thus to have been established by the time of Yogarāja, the commentator

The ether-simile both in a general way and as making intelligible the diversity of experience of the *jīvas*, is common to the Pratyabhijñā too

The destruction of *akhyāti* follows the reverse order , the conceit of self in the not-self has first to be destroyed, then the conceit of the not-self in the self¹ In the Advaita too, the removal of *mūlāvidyā* is the final stage What remains over is only the non-dual real, like gold when its different forms are abandoned , but according to the Pratyabhijñā, pure reality abides in *śakti*, since what is unrelated to *śakti* in one of its three forms—*icchā*, *jñāna* and *kriyā*—is as unreal as a sky-flower

The self that has attained *Śiva-sāmarasya* (homogeneity of being with Śiva), and realised itself as Maheśvara, though one reveals itself as many , though non-agent, it appears as agent , though no *pramānas* can apply to it, it creates a host of *pramānas* and revelations The *Śivasāmarasya* is as of water in water, milk in milk, etc

In the ascription of bondage to *mithyājñāna*, in the view that there is no grief for one who looks on the universe as of the nature of Brahman, in holding to the destruction of past karma and the non-clinging of future karma on the analogy of the incapacity of grains to germinate once the husk and bran have been removed, in holding that there is neither a separate place for release nor a departure thereto, in the view that release is simultaneous with knowledge that cuts the knot of nescience, and that the *jīvanmukta* has the fullest freedom in the manner of his living as well as of dying, in the declaration of heavenly enjoyments and realisation in a future birth for the *yoga-bhraṣṭa*—in all these respects there is agreement between the two texts Certain verses (74-81) are concerned with what may be considered the *homa*, *japa*, *vrata*, etc expected of the knower. These, however, bear no parallel to similar observances enjoyed on the bound. Thus, the *vrata* consists in

1. V. 39 (K).

steadily contemplating everything as non-different from the self, treating the entire cognisable world as a cremation-ground and oneself as the intelligence disporting therein, looking on one's own body as a skeleton, viewing the world of enjoyable objects as the skull, out of which is to be drunk the liquid essence of the world of objects, and so on. And as at the beginning, so at the end, we must remember that the yogin is manifest not merely as abundant bliss, but also as the experient (not experience) in all three states.

We have already noted that Abhinavagupta explains the *jīvanamukta's* continuance in the world, on the basis not of *prārābhā-karma*, but of *samskāra*. *Samskāra*, of course, has not, like its original, the power to bind. And while Abhinavagupta himself does not seem to attach any special 'virtue' to physical decease, his commentator marks two stages of release,¹ the attainment of the *turiya* and of the *turyātīta*, the latter occurring only at death.

In the treatment of bondage as due to *avidyā* and release as due to *vidyā* there is basic agreement between the two systems. In envisaging the relation of the Absolute to appearance, the Pratyabhijñā is more concrete. It seeks to transcend, not annihilate the particular and the imperfect. It seeks to conserve individuality, but it does not, like the pluralist systems, seek to perpetuate the particularity of the particular, for all division and imperfections are due but to the non-realisation of fullness consisting of a dual process, the conceit of not-self in the self and the conceit of self in the not-self. Bradleyan Absolutism affords, perhaps, a closer parallel to the Pratyabhijñā, than Advaita Vedānta. The latter, however, may well be proud of having furnished at least one text and, perhaps, the core of the whole ideology, to the system perfected and promulgated by Abhinavagupta.

NOTE

After the Ms. had been finished and sent to the publishers I came across the Chowkhamba edition of the *Paramārthasāra*. The text and commentary follow those of the Trivandrum edition, but the Benares editor, Sri Suryanarayana SHUKLA, has provided a gloss following Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa's comments in the *Laghumañjūṣā*. The main point of interest is the attempt to show that Śeṣa's view of error is *sada-satkhyāti*, not *anīrvacanīya-khyāti*. The attempt is *prima facie* unworthy of credence since even Śaṅkara, Śrī Harṣa and Vācaspati are sought to be included in this fold. The Advaita Vedāntin has steadily discountenanced the lumping together of *sat* and *asat* or *bheda* and *abheda*, for, opposites cannot be accepted together, whether they be contraries or contradictories, while they may be both rejected, if they are contraries. The failure to realise this and a persistent confusion of existence with reality have been responsible for this strange creation, *sad-asat-khyāti*. The formulators of this theory will not admit the creation of an indeterminable snake, much less of an indeterminable world, the world is without beginning and *sadasat* in the sense that it is *āropitasattāvat*, but *anāropitāsattāvat*. How is sense-contact possible with the *asat*? Because *sattā* of Brahman is superposed on the sense-content as also the sense-contact, which are both *asat*. This reminds one of the extravagant story of the unborn sons of the barren woman conquering a non-exist-

1. Verse 88 (K) speaks of release from *tanūpādhi*, but this need not mean anything more than release from nescience and the consequent conceit of self in the body, etc. See also *Tantrāloka*, Ch. VIII, vv. 317-320.

ent kingdom. In any case, if superposition is invoked because it is felt that sense-contact with the *asat* is impossible, how is superposition on the *asat* possible, either? And what is the status of the superposing? Is it *sat* or *asat*, or *sadasat*? What exactly can *asattāvat* mean? Is there a *jāti* called *asattā*? How is it related to its particulars? By inherence? Again, superposition is possible on the experience-able or on experience, not on that which is neither. Overlooking this difficulty, how is this view different from admitting creation? Creation is the endowment of what is not *sat* with *sattā*. The eternal *sat* is uncreate, the absolute *asat* cannot be produced. Wherever there is creation, whether in dream or waking, we say that it is a transformation of nescience, *avidyā-parmāma*, due to viewing as real what is non-real (neither real nor unreal). The position that reality is superposed on the unreal does not rise superior to the doctrine of the creation of the indeterminable; but we are up against the further difficulty of conceiving the unreal as the locus of superposition.

ABBREVIATIONS

- B* Edition of *Paramārthasāra* in Bengali script (1888)
- Bh.° Gīta* Bhagavad Gītā
- Bṛh.* Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad.
- Ch* Chāndogya Upaniṣad
- GK* Gauḍapāda's Kārikas on the Māṇḍūkya
- Īśa* Īśāvāsyopaniṣad
- JORM.* Journal of Oriental Research, Madras
- K.* Abhinavagupta's *Paramārthasāra*, Edition in *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* (1911) -
- Kaṭha.* Kaṭhopaniṣad
- LM* Laghumañjūsā of Nāgeśabhaṭṭa (edn. 1925).
- Munḍ* Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad
- NIA.* New Indian Antiquary.
- P* Edition of *Paramārthasāra* in the *Panḍit* Vol V .
- Sāra* Paramārthasāra. \
- SK* Sāṅkhyakārikā.
- SLS* Sīdhāntaleśasangraha
- S* Śukla's edition of the *Paramārthasāra* (Chowkhambha) .
- T* Edition of *Paramārthasāra* in the Trivandrum Sanskrit Series (No 12)
- Taitt* Taittirīya Upaniṣad
- TPH* Theosophical Publishing House, Adyar
- V* Edition of *Paramārthasāra* by Veṅkaṭeśvaruḍu in Telugu script (1907).
- Ved Sū* Vedānta Sūtras.

PARAMĀRTHASĀRA

I

param parasyāḥ prakṛter anādim¹ ekam niviṣṭam bahudhā guhāsu |
sarvālayam sarvā-carā-'carastham tvām eva viṣṇum² śaraṇam
prapadye ||

TRANSLATION

I

O Viṣṇu, who art more primal than primal nature (as responsible for the reality and manifestation alike of the latter),* who art beginningless and one, (yet art many as it were since thou) hast entered in manifold forms the caves (which are impenetrable, since they are fragments of the indeterminable and hence imponderable māyā), who art the substrate of all (as their ground, accounting for their existence and manifestation), who art present in all, movable and immovable, Thee alone (who art ever immediately present as the Self) do I seek as refuge.

NOTES

I

The invocatory verse introduces the reader to Brahman in both the saguna and nirguṇa aspects. The very appellation, Viṣṇu, indicates the saguna aspect. This same Viṣṇu, who is sought after as the refuge, is also the absolute substrate of the world, movable and immovable. Material diversity can no doubt be reduced to and understood as an evolution from homogeneous primal matter, prakṛti, as it is called in the Sāṅkhya system and also in the present manual. But matter being non-conscious and inert requires to be manifested, else it would not be cognised at all. Being non-intelligent, it has to be guided in its evolution by intelligence (caitanya). Further, it will be seen on inquiry that the acit depends on cit for its very existence, not merely for its manifestation. For, assuming an ultimate dualism of cit and acit, opposed to each other, as subject and object, how can the former ever know the latter? Knowledge implies and requires an intimacy, an identification, which cannot be secured so long as subject and object are merely left over each against the other. The difficulty may be exhibited in many ways, but the following may suffice. When A is said to know B, is B wholly unknown to A or wholly known? Not the latter, since knowledge is always of the novel; in the case of the already wholly known, a knowing process will be merely re-iterative and purposeless, there will be really no knowledge. Nor is B the wholly unknown, we just had to note that the knowing process is purposeful, how can there be a purpose, a desire to know, formed in respect of the wholly unknown? Evidently, we have to compromise and treat B as partly known and partly unknown. But with this we are no nearer a solution, since the questions we raised will recur

* The words in brackets in the translation are supplied here, as in the rest of the book, for the most part from the Commentary of Rāghavānanda (published in the Trivandrum Sanskrit Series, No. 12).

1. K . . parastham gahanād anādim.

2. K : śambhum

with regard to each part. In relation to the part known there can be no knowledge while in relation to the other part there cannot be the desire to know. This latter desire seems indeed to be inconsistent both with knowledge and with ignorance. The difficulty is persistent and insurmountable, so long as knowledge is conceived as an external relation between a subject and an object. Is knowledge at all possible? Certainly. The self knows itself, it cannot doubt or deny itself, since it is the self of him who doubts or denies. But the self is self-luminous, it is not known as an object to a subject, it is itself knowledge, neither the object nor the subject thereof. Whatever is cognised succeeds in being cognised, only in so far as there is revealed its identity with the intelligence which is knowledge, and this could not be the case, if the object were really independent. It is because object and subject are both abstractions from the one intelligence, it is because both alike are super-impositions on the basic infinite identity, that the knowing relation is at all possible.

A relation exists either between independent terms or between related terms. If they be independent, the relation would require other relations to connect it to the terms, thus there would be infinite regress. If already related, are they related by this same relation? If so there is the defect of self-dependence. If by another relation, with regard to that too our inquiry will arise, leading again to infinite regress. Relation thus presupposes a non-relational substrate. And this substrate must be self-luminous intelligence, since the non-intelligent, as dependent on intelligence for manifestation, cannot be non-relational. Thus the basic reality has to be of the nature of intelligence which accounts for both the existence and manifestation of the non-intelligent, called primal nature or *māyā*. Hence it is that Viṣṇu is said to be more primal than primal nature.

The real, being non-relational, is beginningless and one. What is not a term in a relation cannot be a member of a temporal series. Time is in it, like other relations. If it had a beginning it would be an effect, whereas the causal relation itself is but an appearance superimposed on the real, as will be evident from its failure to be intelligible in the last resort. The causal concept seeks to make change intelligible by discovering the element of identity in the change. It is because of the importance of identity and continuity that the creationist view of the effect as wholly new is condemned by the followers of the Sāṅkhya, Vedānta and allied schools, who maintain that the effect is pre-existent in the cause, requiring only to be manifested and not created. But the advocates of the effect as pre-existent (*satkāryavāda*) do but postpone the difficulty. The effect that is manifested, does it pre-exist as manifest or as non-manifest? Obviously not the former. If it exists as non-manifest, does the manifestation make any difference to the effect or not? If not, it is irrelevant, and an irrelevant factor cannot avail to make a fundamental difference between cause and effect. If it does make a difference, then the manifested effect is not the same as the non-manifested one and there is no justification for treating the effect as pre-existent in the cause. Further, this identity we seek between cause and effect, has it any limits? The effect is something produced, if the cause should be of like nature, should it not also be something produced, i.e. an effect in its turn? If we admit this, we are committed to an unending series of causes and effects, with no chance of an ultimate explanation. If so much identity is not required, why should we not admit as much discreteness between cause and effect as is involved in the creationist's view that the effect, prior to production, is non-existent? Because of these and other such difficulties we hold that the real is beginningless.

It is also one, since for the reasons mentioned it is non-relational, and a plurality is necessarily in a relation at least of separation. The usual dialectic of difference takes the following form. Ultimate plurality is unintelligible, since apart from difference there can be no manifold. Difference cannot be conceived either as an

attribute of the particulars or as their very essence. If particulars A and B are distinct as having difference for their attribute, then we have to admit that, at least in so far as they have this attribute in common, they are identical, i.e., non-different. In other words, the attribute of difference in so far as it is really possessed by the alleged differents, makes them non-different, this is absurd. Further, the quality of difference, is this different or not from the particulars alleged to be different? If not different, we merge the quality in the substance, thus A would be identical with difference-of-A-from-B and B identical with difference-of-B-from-A, A in other words would be identical with B. If the quality is different from the particulars, we have interposed, between the particular and its difference, another difference, this again will be separated from the terms by another quality of difference and so on *ad infinitum*. Nor can difficulties be avoided by treating difference as the essence of the particulars. That whose very nature is difference cannot be *one*, the doctrine of difference as essential cannot therefore allow of the recognition of any unit, not even a primal atom, since this too should fall apart into distinct parts, similarly of its constituents *ad infinitum*, and in the absence of any unit, there can be no manifold either, the very insistence on difference serves to abolish difference.

Multiplicity, however, is not unreal, for it is immediately experienced, and what is unreal, like the barren woman's son, cannot be an object of immediate cognition. Nor can it be real, as we have seen, since it fails to stand analysis. It is experienced, yet it is sublated, what is real, like the self, can never be sublated. Diversity therefore can be neither real nor unreal. It is a product of Nescience (*māyā* or *avidyā*), which obscures the unity and projects a multiplicity.

Such obscuration and projection constitute error, and error refuses to admit of explanation in terms of the real or the unreal. The rope-snake cognition is not of the real, for then the snake should continue to be perceived for all time and by all people, sublation would be impossible. Nor is it of the unreal, since the unreal cannot be immediately apprehended, much less can it cause trepidation and flight. Two possible ways suggest themselves out of this *impasse*. One is to admit the reality of the content of the erroneous cognition, but not as cognised, i.e., not here and now. The snake is real enough, but not as I perceive it, in the rope, it will be found in its own appropriate hole, ready to cause not only fear, but more serious damage to those who approach. What fails us in erroneous cognition, then, is not the content, but the mode. If we cognised the snake as in its hole and the silver as in the cash box, instead of perceiving them in the rope and in the nacre, there would be no delusion. Delusion is not the cognition of the unreal (*asatkhyāti*), but the cognition of the real as otherwise than it is (*anyathā khyāti*). Such a view has a good deal to commend it. It does not do violence by asking us to believe in immediate experience of the unreal. It is patently verified in those cases of delusion where there is a transference of properties because of proximity etc., e.g., in the erroneous cognition of a crystal as red, because of the proximity of a China rose, the crystal is real, but not as red, and redness is real, but not as a property of the crystal. In such cases, however, both constituents of the delusive cognition—the crystal and the red colour—are present before us, capable of immediate apprehension through sense-contact. But in the apprehension of nacre as silver, silver is not present here and now so as to be perceived, and yet there is immediate (*aparokṣa*) apprehension of the silver, for, we put out our hand to grasp it, and the inducement of such activity is intelligible only in the case of what is immediately apprehended. One may postulate some super-normal mode of sense-contact with even that which is not present. This, however, is an unproved and needless hypothesis. If its possibility be admitted for all, there would be no distinction between cognitions of the present and the not-present, if the capacity be restricted to a few, yogins and the like, the widespread phenomenon of delusion

would still have to be explained. Further, in the case of delusions, like the perception of a double moon, there is not a real second moon to serve as the content. Hence the admission of a real content, so long as it is not real here and now, does not go very far to solve our difficulty. And, if the content be real here and now, the cognition should not be erroneous.

The denial of error and the doctrine that all cognitions are valid constitute the other possibility. In what is called delusion one may distinguish a perceived and a remembered element, the glitter is perceived, the silverness is remembered. Either element is valid in itself and their mere combination cannot result in invalidity. What happens is that in the case of the remembered factor, the fact of its being a memory-impression is forgotten, its memory-ness is lost. We act as if the two factors are on a par, the result is error and confusion in practice (vyavahāra), though the cognition, as cognition, is all right. Such a valiant attempt to banish the elusive negative element deserves success, but does not achieve it. There is still the loss of memory-ness to be accounted for. A number of causes may be postulated, e.g., passion, fear, greed, sense-defect, etc., but the essential feature is still negative, a loss. To what does this negative element correspond in cognition? It will not avail to say that the negation and failure belong only to the realm of practice, not to cognition. We fail when we put out our hand to grasp the silver; but did we apprehend it *as silver* before the activity in question? If not, then, that and other similar acts would be unintelligible, not being prompted by the only adequate cause, viz., immediate cognition of the appropriate content. If, on the other hand, there is apprehension *as silver*, the negative element has entered into the cognition itself and coloured it. It can no longer be maintained that, while the cognition is valid, practice alone is faulty. Non-discrimination (akhyāti) is not merely a conative but also a cognitive defeat, and we have still to account for this defeat without admitting the reality or the unreality of the content.

Another variety of the last-mentioned view maintains that all cognitions are valid, since all contents are so mixed up in the course of evolution by quintuplication of the elements,* that every object contains in itself in fractions however small the natures of all other things. Where nacre is recognised as silver, the former contains in itself some infinitesimal amount of silver, as relating to this the cognition is valid, though as referring to a larger quantity of silver, it fails us in practice. It is not that the silver-cognition has any unreal content, the content is real though practically inadequate. Here too the negative factor is not suitably accounted for. Our cognition is of silver, not of infinitesimal silver, in the latter case, practical activity would not result. The real content (admitting quintuplication which is only a hypothesis) falls far short of the cognition, and the inadequacy is not merely practical; the negative element enters into the cognition and calls for explanation.

It is because of such difficulties that the advaitin postulates māyā or avidyā to explain error. Error has a content, but, for the reasons already noted, the content cannot be characterised as real (sat) or unreal (asat). Nor can it be a combination of the two, as that is self-contradictory. The content is māyā, which, not being exclusively determinable as real or unreal or real-and-unreal, is said to be imponderable, indeterminable (anirvācya), and spoken of as a cave.

* A process wherein each of the five elements is divided into two parts, and one of the parts subdivided into four, before there is intermixture and the production of the things as we know them, thus, one half of the earth-element combines with an eighth each of water, air, fire and ether before there results what we know as earth, similarly, one half of the water-element combines with an eighth each of earth, air, fire and ether, and so on. As a result, every object of cognition has in its composition fractional elements of all other objects, hence no cognition can wholly fail of its content.

II

ātmāmburāśau nikhilo 'pi loko magṇo 'pi nā 'cāmati ne 'ksate ca |
āścaryam etan mṛga-tṛṣṇikābhe bhavāmburāśau ramate mṛṣai 'va¹ ||

III

garbha-gṛha-vāsa-sambhava-janma-jarā-maraṇa-viprayogā-'bdhau |
jagad ālokyā nimagnam prāha gurum prāñjaliḥ śiṣyaḥ² ||

IV

tvam sāṅga-veda-vettā bhattā³ saṁśaya-gaṇasya ṛta-vaktā⁴ |
saṁsārā-'mṇava-taraṇa-praśnam⁵ pṛcchāmy aham bhagavan ||

II

The entire world (of conscious beings), though plunged in the ocean of Self, sips it not, nor even glances at it ; (yet) it delights but delusively in the mirage-presented waters of migratory existence ; lo ! mysterious is this.

III

Seeing the world sunk in the ocean, consisting of entry into the womb, birth, old age, death and parting, a certain disciple (desirous of knowing the real, approached and) said thus to a preceptor, with folded hands.

IV

Thou art the knower of the Vedas together with their aṅgas, the destroyer of the host of doubts (about the sense of the Scriptures), and the expounder

This nescience is collectively one, but each individual empirical self (jīva) has his own limiting adjunct, that is to say, his particular bit of nescience. Else when one slept all would sleep, and on the release of one, there would be universal release. Hence the reference in the verse to 'caves' in the plural.

The self-luminous single intelligence that is the substrate of diversity and the inner ruler of the apparently finite and multiple jīvas, is here addressed as Viṣṇu, since it is all-pervasive, because of this pervasiveness it is ever present ; hence the appropriateness of appealing to Viṣṇu as the sole refuge.

II

The first verse states the nature of the Self, the second verse that of matter or the non-self (Prakṛti). It is thus indicated that what is commenced here is the inquiry for discriminating puruṣa from prakṛti. The terminology and approach are characteristic of the Sāṅkhya system. Hence the plausibility of the ascription of the work to Patañjali.

III

This verse indicates the qualifications of the disciple—that through merit and study he should have learnt to distinguish the permanent from the impermanent, know that the apparent worldly pleasures do but occasion misery, turn away from them, desire to know the real Self alone, and possess the Scripturally declared qualifications of self-restraint, contentment, capacity to bear up against physical ills, desire for release &c. Such a one looks for a preceptor in a jīvan-mukta, and approaching him in the prescribed manner asks as follows.

1. This and the preceding verse are not found in B, P or V, nor does K have any verse to correspond to this.

2. This is the first verse in P.

3. P : chettā (v. 2)

4. P : ṛtam vaktā (v. 2)

5. P : taraṇam praśnam (v. 2)

V

dīrghe 'smin samsāre samsarataḥ kasya kena sambandhah |
kārma śubhā-'śubha-phaladam¹ anubhavatī (nu)² gatā-'gatair iha kaḥ ||

VI

kārma-guṇa-jāla-baddho jīvah samsaratī kośakāra iva |
mohā-'ndhakāra-gahanāt tasya katham bandhanān mokṣaḥ ||

VII

guṇa-puruṣa-vibhāga-jñe dharmā-'dharmāu na bandhakau³
bhavatah |
iti gadita-pūrva-vākyah prakṛtim puruṣam ca me brūhi⁴ ||

of the Truth To thee, O, revered one, I put this question relating to crossing over the ocean of migratory existence

V—VII

For him who migrates in this limitless samsāra (migratory existence), whereby is there relation thereto? Who is it that by passing and repassing here (in these three worlds) experiences the karma that gives fruit, auspicious and inauspicious? Who is the jīva that migrates (as some say) bound in the aggregate of karma and guṇa (sattva, etc.), like a silkworm ['spider' says the commentary] in a cocoon [web?] made of filaments of its own creation? How, for him, is there release from bondage which is difficult to overcome, being of the nature of the intense darkness of delusion? For him who knows the distinction between puruṣa and the guṇas, how is it that merit and demerit are not causes of bondage? Along with (the answers to) these questions, tell me about prakṛti and puruṣa.

IV

The 'angas' are the well-known subsidiary disciplines, viz. Phonetics, Liturgy, Grammar, Prosody, Etymology and Astronomy. The "Truth" is the real Self expounded in the entire Vedānta and denoted by terms like Bhagavān and Brahman.

V—VII

The Self is self-luminous intelligence, it is pervasive and infinite. What is it then that is subject to transmigration? Self-certitude belongs to my existence, while it is my own self that appears to be bound to suffering. How is this intelligible? If the suffering be said to be an appearance due to māyā that is constituted of the guṇas (strands, constituents) sattva, rajas and tamas, how is one to account for the association of the self with māyā? It may be set down to karma, i.e. the activity of the Self, and its consequences proximate and remote, patent and latent. But why should the perfect Self act at all? It has no needs to satisfy, no motives to prompt, no desires to fulfil. Activity must be due to avidyā, while the association with avidyā has itself to be accounted for by activity (karma). Assuming that the association has somehow come about (unintelligibility, the advaitin would claim, is an ornament, not a defect in the case of avidyā),

1 P phalam (v 3)

2 P reads "anubhavatī" without

the emendation suggested by the editor of T.

3 P bandhakau na (v 5).

4 P iti gaditam prakṛtim puruṣam
ca me brūhi (v. 5).

PARAMĀRTHASĀRA

VIII

ity ādhāro¹ bhagavān pṛṣṭaḥ śisyena tam sa ho 'vāca |
viduṣām apy atigahanam vaktavyam idam śṛṇu tathā 'pi tvam* |

IX

satyam iva jagad asatyam mūlaprakṛter idam² kṛtam yena |
tam praṇipatyo 'pendram vakṣye paramārthasāram idam³ ||

X

avyaktād andam⁴ abhūd andād brahmā tataḥ prajā-sargah |
māyā-mayī pravṛttiḥ samhriyata iyam⁵ punah kramaśah ||

VIII

The revered one, the support (of the world, i.e., Ādiśeṣa), being thus questioned by the disciple, said to the latter. This which is to be expounded to you is difficult even for the learned (to comprehend), yet (I shall expound it to you,) listen!

IX

I shall expound this *Paramārthasāra*, after rendering obeisance to Upendra (Viṣṇu), by whom, because of primal nature (i.e., his own energy), this non-real world is created, as if it were real.

X

From the unmanifest (as subjected to the glance of the Supreme Person) arose the Cosmic Germ, from the Germ (arose) Brahmā, thence (resulted

how can this whose origins are indeterminable have an assured end? What is the certainty of release? If you appeal to the evidence of persons alleged to have found release, the jīvanmuktas, how is it that they continue to live and act among us, in spite of their reported release? Will not action serve to bind them afresh? If not, whence their immunity? Such is the string of questions put by the reverent but inquisitive disciple

The word *guṇa* is used here, as in Sāṅkhya texts, to signify a constituent, not a quality. It is possible that the usage primarily derives from a doctrine according to which the qualities themselves constitute the substance, instead of inhering in 'a something I know not what' as their substrate. Such a view is clearly enunciated and defended by the Śaiva Siddhāntin*. However this may be, consistently with the general Sāṅkhya approach, our present text uses 'guṇa' in the sense of a constituent.

X

The Vedānta agrees with the Sāṅkhya in recognising a primal non-differentiated matter wherefrom the manifold evolves. The former insists, however, on intelligent guidance of the evolution, it is not a mere unconscious process, like the secretion of milk by the cow. Hence the commentator's reference to the "glance

* See further an article by the present writer on 'Substance and Attribute in the Śaiva Siddhānta' *JORM*, VIII, 97.

1. *P*: kṣityādhāro, in the reckoning of this text, this is the sixth verse, the second verse in *K* uses the words "ādhāram bhagavantam", which are explained by a commentator, Yoga Muni, as referring to Śeṣa.

2. *P*: omits "idam" (v. 7).

3. This verse is cited in *LM*, p. 280

4. The corresponding verse in *K* mentions four andas (andacatuṣṭaya), this is verse 1 in *B* and *V*.

5. *P*: māyā-mayaḥ kalpānte samhriyate (v. 8).

XI

māyā-mayo 'py acetā¹ guṇa-karaṇa-gaṇaḥ² karoti karmāṇi |
tadadhiṣṭhātā dehī sa cetano 'pi na karoti kiñcid api³ ||

XII

yadvad acetanam api san-nikatasthe bhrāmake bhramati loham |
tādvat karaṇa-samūhaś ceṣṭati⁴ cidadhithite dehe⁵ ||

the creation of beings (movable and immovable) ; the activity (of the Creator) is of the nature of māyā ; this (creation) is again re-absorbed in (reverse) sequence

XI

The aggregate of guṇa and karaṇa (i.e., the body), which is a product of māyā (as inspired by Īśvara), though non-conscious, performs deeds (good, bad and mixed), the controller thereof, the embodied one (the jīva), though he is intelligence, performs no (deed) whatsoever (since activity involving a change of nature is impossible in the case of him who is of the sole nature of intelligence).

XII

Just as iron, though inert, moves in the proximity of the lodestone, similarly, when the body is controlled by intelligence (through the adoption

of the Supreme Person" and the inspiration of Īśvara, in this verse and the next.

According to the commentary, the second line has to be rendered thus this creative activity of the Person who has māyā for adjunct is briefly expounded in this sequence by the learned, e.g., "nārāyaṇaḥ paro 'vyaktād aṇḍam avyakta-sambhavam" etc

XI

Activity is characteristic of intelligence, the non-intelligent, i.e., māyā, is *per contra* inert. But strangely enough, what we mean by activity in the empirical world is entirely a product of the body. It is the body which is born and dies, which longs and strives, which achieves and rejoices or is miserable, all these are characteristic expressions of the guṇas—sattva, rajas and tamas—compounded in varying proportions, and manifest through their own products, the organs, internal and external, the antahkaraṇas and the indriyas, spirit no doubt is active, but its functioning is free and not delimited in space and time, these latter being partial and defective manifestations of that intelligence. In that integral experience there is no distinction of cause or consequence, agent or act, hence intelligence, though the controller of activity as the substrate thereof, cannot be treated as the agent.

How can the inert be active? To this the answer is furnished in the next verse

XII

The analogy of iron and the lodestone is common to the Sāṅkhya too. The point of the comparison lies in the induction of change in what is proximate without any change in that which induces. The present text, however, goes a step further in treating intelligence as what is not merely proximate to, but is also the con-

1 P acetano, ninth verse in its reckoning

2 V ganam (v. 2); B. guṇa-kara-gaṇam.

3 V and B omit "api" (v 2)

4 P. ceṣṭate (v 10).

5 This verse corresponds to V-3 and B-3.

XIII

yadvad savitary udite karoti karmāṇi jīvaloko 'yam |
na ca tāni karoti ravir na kārayati tadvad ātmā 'pi¹ ||

XIV

manaso 'haṅkāra-vimūrchitasya² caitanya-bodhitasye 'ha |
puruṣā-'bhimāna-sukha-dukhā-bhāvanā bhavati mūḍhasya ||

of misconceptions like 'I am a man'), the aggregate of the organs (i.e., the body) becomes active

XIII

Just as this world of living beings performs deeds when the sun rises, and it is not the sun that performs them or causes them to be performed, so too is the Self (not an agent in any way)

XIV

Of these (māyā-products), for the manas, which has become the object of individuation (egoity) as illumined by intelligence (identified with manas),

troller of matter. Intelligence being infinite and pervasive, there is nothing wherefrom it is remote. Matter, for the advaitin, is not alien to spirit, but a superimposition on spirit, due to the failure of spirit to know itself; hence there is not for matter even as much foreignness as in systems like the Sāṅkhya. The problem which these systems have to face may be put thus. If mere proximity can induce matter to evolve, evolution would never cease and there would be no release (kaivalya), as the infinite spirit can never cease to be proximate, if some kind of control be admitted as necessary, it is not intelligible. What form of control could exist as between two wholly foreign entities? Some community of nature is necessary as between director and directed. The advaita concept of matter would thus seem to be in a more advantageous position. But here again it may be asked how matter can ever cease to evolve, inasmuch as spirit, to which matter is not foreign, is always, in proximity and presumably exercises control all the time. To that the reply is as follows: matter, which is neither real nor unreal, is proximate to spirit as a superimposition thereon, for superimposition there is needed identification of the self with the not-self, such identification is possible and actual because of beginningless nescience, what is called control by spirit consists just in this identification (appearing in such forms as 'I am a man, a brahmin, old, lame, blind of one eye,' etc.), this nescience is destroyed with the onset of knowledge, i.e., self-realisation, the control of matter as well as matter itself ceases therewith, and thenceforth there is neither evolution nor bondage. An obvious question is how the erroneous identification ever started, to which the equally obvious answer is that it did not ever start, as it is beginningless like time itself.

XIII

The commentator says that what binds the Self to saṃsāra is the body, the puryaṣṭaka, composed of the following eight factors. (1)* the five karmendriyas (2) the five Jñānendriyas, (3) the four beginning with manas, making up the internal organ, (4) the five vital airs, prāṇa etc, (5) the elements, ether etc., (6) kāma, (7) karma, and (8) tamas. The authority for this enumeration is not

1. This corresponds to V-4 and B-4

2. P mūrchitasya (v. 12), B: V. dvārā murchitasya (v. 5).

XV

kartā bhoktā drastā 'smi¹ karmanām uttamādīnām |
iti²tat 'svabhāva-vimalo 'bhimanyate³ sarvago 'py ātmā |

XVI

nānā-vidha-varṇānām varnam⁴ dhatte yathā 'malaḥ sphaṭikaḥ⁵ |
tadvad upādher guṇabhāvitasya⁶ bhāvam vibhur dhatte⁷ ||

XVI-A

ādarśe mala-rahite yadvad⁸ rūpam vicinvate⁹ lokāh |
ālokayati tathā 'tmā viśuddha-buddhau svam ātmānam¹⁰ ||

there comes about, in the case of the foolish, the conceit of being a person,
an enjoyer and a sufferer

XV

Therefore (because of this conceit), the Self, though pure and omnipresent by nature, entertains the conceit "I am a cogniser, I am the agent in respect of acts, good (i.e., enjoined by the Vedas) and otherwise, I am the experiencer (of the fruit) "

XVI

Just as a clear crystal takes on the colours of diverse coloured objects (in proximity), even so the all-pervasive (Self) takes on the nature of the adjuncts produced by the gunas (prakṛti)

XVI-A

Just as people in the world look for (their own) form in a mirror free from impurity, even so does the Self look for itself in the pure intellect

cited by name There is some similarity to the enumeration in Bhoja's *Tattva-prakāśikā*, v. 12.

XV

"Cognisership" is mentioned before "agency" in the translation, in conformity with the logical order adopted in the commentary

XVI

The adjuncts are explained as the state of a divine being, a human being etc., this is the sense of the second line of the corresponding verse in Abhinavagupta's work

XVI-A

Both in the Sāṅkhya and the Vedānta, the intellect (buddhi), as essentially of the nature of Sattva, is considered capable of reflecting the Self The Self in itself

- | | | | |
|---------|-------------|---|--|
| 1 | B, V | api (v. 6). | where, however, the latter half reads. |
| 2 | V and B | omit "iti" (v. 6) | "suramānuṣa-pāśu-pādapa-rūpatvam tad- |
| 3 | B. | vimalābhimanyate (v. 6). | vad iśo'pi " |
| 4 | P: | varṇān (v. 14) V varṇād | 8. B, V. yad (v. 10) |
| (v. 7). | | | 9. B, V. vicinvate (v. 10). |
| 5 | V and B | sphaṭikam (v. 7) | 10. This verse is found in P, as |
| 6 | P | gunato bhāvitasya (v. 14) | verse 17, not in T, the corresponding |
| 7 | Corresponds | to verse 6 in K, verse in K reads: | |
| | | ādarśe mala-rahite yadvad vadanam vibhāti tadvad ayam | |
| | | śivaśakti-pāta-vimale dhī-tattve bhāti bhā-rūpaḥ" | |

XVII

gacchati gacchati salile dinakara-bimbam¹ sthite sthitim yāti |
antah-karaṇe gacchati gacchaty ātmā 'pi tadvad iha² ||

XVIII

rāhur adṛśyo 'pi yathā śaśi-bimbasthah prakāśate jagati |
sarva-gato 'pi tathā 'tmā buddhistho dṛśyatām eti³ ||

XIX

sarvagatam nirupamam⁴ advaitam tac⁵ cetasā gamyam |
yad buddhigatam brahmo 'palabhyate śisya bodhyam tat ||

XVII

Here (in the world), the solar orb (reflected in water), moves (as it were) when the water moves, and attains quiescence (as it were) when (the water is) still, similarly, the Self too (reflected in the internal organ) moves (as it were) when the internal organ moves (and attains quiescence as it were, when that organ is still)

XVIII

Just as in the world, Rāhu, though invisible, becomes visible, as present in the lunar orb (it obscures), even so the Self, though omnipresent (and hence not an object), yet, as present in the intellect, comes to have visibility (i.e., the nature of an object of cognition)

XIX

That Brahman which is present (as reflected) in the intellect and is consequently cognisable by the intellect (through the I-cognition), that should be understood to be omnipresent (unlimited in respect of space, time, or other entities), unparalleled (bliss), and non-dual (consciousness, devoid of the three kinds of difference)

is essential knowledge, without distinctions of knower, known and knowing. Where it is knower, it is so in respect of cognition, i.e. itself as reflected in the intellect.

XVIII

The example of the perception of Rāhu is employed elsewhere by the advaitin with greater force and appropriateness to illustrate the cognition of nescience, as non-intelligent it cannot manifest itself, what can manifest is intelligence, which it obscures, yet in the very process of obscuration there is manifestation of itself as obscuring

XIX

Difference may be from another belonging to a wholly distinct genus (vijātiya bheda) or only to another species (sajātiya bheda), or it may be a plurality in the entity itself (svagata bheda)

1 K : himakara-bimbam (v. 7). The verse corresponds to V-8 and B-8
2 K tanukarana-bhuvana-varge 3 B, V : iti (v. 9).
tathā 'yam ātmā maheśānah (v. 7)
K : tadvat |
sarvagato 'py ayam ātmā viśayāśrayaṇena dhīmukure || (v. 8)
4 B, V tannirupamam (v. 11) 5 P : tac ca (v. 18), V (v. 11);
B (v. 11).

XX

buddhi-mano-'haikārās tanmātre-'ndriya-gaṇās ca bhūtagaṇaḥ¹ |
saṃsārā-sarga-parirakṣaṇa- kṣamā prakṛtā² heyāḥ ||

XXI

dharmā-'dharmau sukha-duḥkha-kalpanā³ svarga-naraka-vāsaś ca |
utpātti-nidhana-varṇā-'śramā na santī 'ha paramārthe⁴ ||

XXII

mṛga-trsṇāyām udakam śuktau rajatam bhujāṅgamo rajjvām |
taimirika-candra-yugavad⁵ bhrāntam nikhilam⁶ jagad-rūpam ||

XX

The intellect, manas, individuation (egoity), the aggregate of (five) subtle elements and (ten) organs (sensory and motor), and the aggregate of (five) gross elements, these products of prakṛti have the capacity to bring on and maintain the (cycle of) migratory existence, (hence) they are to be abandoned (as of the nature of the not-self, by those who seek release)

XXI

Here (in the Self), there is not in reality merit or demerit or the experience of (their fruit, viz) pleasure or pain, or residing in heaven or hell (for the sake of that pleasure or pain), nor is there birth or death, caste or order (of life).

XXII

Like water in the mirage, silver in nacre, serpent in a rope, and the double moon produced by (the optical defect) timira, the entire world-phenomenon is a delusion

XX

In the Sāṅkhya, prakṛti is assigned both the functions of binding and releasing, such an exalted notion of prakṛti is difficult to assimilate, and less acceptable than what is set forth here.

XXI

Here, again, there is an improvement on the Sāṅkhya view, which, while holding that in truth no one is ever bound or released (SK, v 62), yet maintains a plurality of spirits, because of the varying incidence of birth, death etc. (SK, v. 18).

XXII

The commentary sets forth the inference of illusionness based on being object of cognition, being finite, and being inert (non-self), the example (udāharaṇa) in each case is nacre-silver. Illusionness is defined as sublatability by knowledge of the

1. P : sabhūtagaṇaḥ (v. 19, V 3 P sukha-duḥkhe (v 20)
(v. 12); B (v 12). 4. Corresponds to verse 29 in K :

2. V. Prakṛtāḥ (v. 12).

tadvad dharmā-'dharma-svar-nirayo-'tpātti-marāṇa-sukha-duḥkham |
varṇā-'śramādi cā 'tmany asad apī vibhramabalād bhavati ||

5. B, V : candravat (v 14). version quoted by Nagesabhaṭṭa in LM.

6. P : akhilam (v. 21); this is the p. 259,

XXIII

yadvad dinakara eko vibhāti salilā-śayeṣu sarveṣu |
tadvat sakalo-padhiṣv avasthito bhāti paramātmā ||

XXIV

kham¹ iva ghaṭādiṣv² antarbahih sthitam brahma sarvapinḍeṣu³
dehe 'ham⁴ ity anātmani buddhih saṃsāra-bandhāya ||

XXV

sarva-vikalpana⁵ -hīnaḥ śuddho buddho⁶ 'jarā-'maraḥ śāntaḥ |
amalaḥ sakṛd-vibhātaś⁷ cetana ātmā khavad⁸ vyāpī⁹ ||

XXIII

Just as the one Sun appears in all sheets of water, so does the (one) Supreme Self appear as present in all adjuncts (i.e., aggregate of body and organs).

XXIV

Like ether in pots etc., is Brahman present in all bodies; (hence) the cognition "I" in respect of the not-self, the body, (is but a delusion which) serves to bind one to (the cycle of) migratory existence.

XXV

The intelligent one is (certainly) the (Supreme) Self; (for) it is free from all indeterminacy (being the witness of all doubts), it is pure (unlike the body, associated with diverse impurities), it is conscious (unlike prāna),

substrate, the illusoriness of illusoriness is discussed, and the inference of illusoriness is said to be ātmaghātaka (self-destructive) like āgama, as exemplified in "ne 'ha nānā 'sti", this text too is not real as a duality over against Brahman, self-destruction is illustrated by the faggot that starts a fire destroying itself as well as other things, the illusory does not have to make known the real, since the latter is self-manifest, the illusory can and does serve to remove the illusory, as when, in respect of a rope, the illusion that it is a stick may remove the prior illusion that it is a snake, practical efficiency is possible in respect of and with even a greater degree of reality, e.g., the use of a reflection of one's face in a mirror, imagining Viṣṇu in a śālagrāma etc.; if illusoriness be not granted, there is contingency of non-release, since what is non-illusory and cannot be sublated will persist as a cause of bondage, actual or potential.

XXV

The syllogism implied is "The jīva is but the Supreme Self, because of being free from indeterminacy, etc., pot etc. are the negative example." That is to

1. V. svam (v. 16), explained in Telugu as "tānuvalenē, like oneself", this is obviously due to a misreading of "kham" in Devanāgarī script.

2. B. khaṭṭādiṣu (v. 16)

3. P. sarveṣu pinḍeṣu (v. 23).

4. B. V. deho 'ham (v. 16).

5. B. V. vikalpanā (v. 17)

6. B. V. avṛddho 'jaro (v. 17).

7. V. sakṛd dhī (v. 17).

8. V. savat (v. 17)

9. The two lines are transposed in P (v. 24), in that form the verse is cited in LM, p. 281. Verse 11 in K reads thus.

sarva vikalpana-hinam śuddham śāntam vyayo-'daya-vihīnam |
yat paratattvam tasmīn vibhāti ṣaṭ-trīṃśadātmā jagat ||

XXVI

rasa-phāṇita-śarkarikā- guḷa-khaṇḍā¹ vikṛtayo yathai 've 'kṣoḥ⁶ ||
tadvad' avasthā-bhedāḥ paramātmāny³ eva bahu-rūpāḥ⁴ ||

XXVII

vijñānā-'ntaryāmi-prāna-virād- deha- jāti-pindā-'ntāḥ |
vyavahārās tasyā 'tmany⁵ ete avasthā-viśesāḥ⁶ syuḥ ||

it is decayless and deathless (unlike manas which lapses in sleep etc); it is quiescent (unlike the cognitional series subject to perpetual change), it is taintless (unlike the void which is obscured by the taint of saṃvṛti, obscuration, while the self is the witness even of that), it is ever-shining (unlike the self of the Logicians, which is itself inert and possesses cognition only as a quality), it is pervasive like ether (unlike the selves admitted by the pluralists)

XXVI-XXVII

As of the sugar-cane there are different forms (such as) the juice, molasses, sugar crystals, jaggery and pieces thereof, even so of the (one) Supreme Self there are diverse forms (as it were), viz, (Pure) Consciousness (which has not suffered distinction as intelligent or inert), the internal ruler, the prāna (the Jīva, who is Consciousness reflected in sattva-predominant prakṛti), the collective cosmic body, and individual bodies characterised by generic qualities (like humanity, etc), these diverse forms of that

say, what is not the Supreme Self, e.g. a pot, is not free from indeterminacy, being subject to alternative specifications, as to which there is always doubt. Empirical duality being granted, there is no dr̥ṣṭāntāsiddhi, hence, the opponent cannot ask "since there is nothing other than the Supreme Self, how can there be any example of what is not that Self and not free from indeterminacy?" Nor can supremacy as a probandum be denied, since what is non-established cannot be denied, as Maṇḍana says "labdha-rūpe kvacit kiñcit tādṛg eva niṣidhyate" That is to say, that which is denied and that in relation to which there is the denial should be already established, there can be no negation either of an unknown counter-correlate or in relation to an unknown locus. If the jīva be not the Supreme Self, there is the contingency of either of them being not-self (anātman), and this is not acceptable.

XXVI-XXVII

The internal ruler and the jīva are the intelligent modifications of Pure Consciousness, the collective body and the individual bodies are the inert forms. The illusory transformation of Consciousness into inert forms is possible, because of māyā, the relation of māyā is also due to māyā, this does not lay it open to the defect of self-dependence, as it is of the nature of māyā, in the last resort, not to be

1 P khaṇḍādyāḥ vikṛtayo yathe 'he sarve paramātmānaḥ śambhoḥ (v 26).
'kṣoḥ (v 25) 5 P vyavahārasthāsyā 'tmana (v
2 K khaṇḍādyā yathe 'kṣu-rasa 26), B (v 19), also LM citation
eva (v 26). (p 311)
3 P paramātmāna (v 25) 6. K vyahāra-mātram etat paramār-
4 V . bahu-rūpātmā (v 18), K thena tu na santy eva (v 27).

XXVIII

rajivām nāsti bhujāṅgaḥ sarpa-bhayam bhavati hetunā kenā |
tadvad dvaita- vikalpabhrāntir avidyā na satyam idam¹ ||

XXIX

etat tad andhakāram yad anātmany ātmatā bhrāntyā |
na vidanti vāsudevam sarvātmānam narā mūḍhāh² ||

XXX

prāṇādy-ananta-bhedair ātmānam samvitatya jālam iva³ |
saṃharatī⁴ vāsudevah svavibhūtyā⁵ 'krīḍamāna iva⁶ ||

self (which is pure consciousness) are different (only because of differences) in empirical usage

XXVIII

In the rope there is no snake, to what cause, then, is the fear of the snake due (if the illusory have no practical efficiency)? Even so, duality and its delusive presentation are but nescience (the consequence of ignorance of the non-dual self), (hence) this (duality) is not real

XXIX

This is the darkness (of nescience) whereby selfhood (is) delusively (ascribed) to the non-self, (hence it is that) foolish men (who have not enquired into the real Self) do not know Vāsudeva, the Self of all (to be such)

XXX

Vāsudeva (Brahman that is of the nature of Consciousness), as if desiring to sport (with himself) through his own energy (māyā), spreads him-

logically intelligible through and through, "durghaṭatvam avidyāyā bhūṣanam na tu dūṣanam."

XXVIII

The commentator quotes from *Iṣṭasiddhi* (p 47) "sattve na bhrānti-bādhau stām nā 'sattve" &c, there would be neither delusion nor sublation in either case, if the delusion were real or if unreal, for the real cannot be sublated, while the unreal, like the square circle, cannot be the object of immediate cognition.

XXX

Hence it is not as if there are independent real finite consciousnesses different from and apprehending Vāsudeva For the view that creation is an act of sport, as it were, see *Ved Sū.*, II, 1, 33

1 K trāsam kurute ca mṛtyu-paryantam |
bhrānter mahatī śaktir na vivektum śakyate nāma || (v 28).

2 K . bhāveṣu prakāśamānatayā |
ātmānatīkṣeṣv apī bhavaty anātmā-bhīmāno 'yam || (v. 30)

This and the preceding verse are cited in *LM*, p. 280

in *LM*, p. 296, with the substitution of, 4 P upasamharatī (v 29).

"janāh" for "narāh" in the last line. 5. P svabhūtyā (v. 29).

3 Cp K : jālena jālakāra iva (verse 32), P : indra-jālam iva (v. 29); the first half of this verse in the P version is 6 Cp. K . krīḍam pratanotī parama-śivaḥ (v. 33).

XXXI

tribhir eva viśva-taijasa- prājñaiḥ¹ ādi-madhya-nidhanā- 'khyaiḥ |
jāgrat-svapna-suṣuptair bhrama-bhūtais chāditam turyam² ||

XXXII

mohayati 'vā 'tmānam³ svamāyayā dvaita-rūpayā devaḥ⁴ |
upalabhate svayam evam guhā-gatam purusam ātmānam ||

XXXIII

jvalanād dhūmo- 'dgaṭibhir vividhā 'kṛtir ambare yathā bhāti |
tadvad⁵ viṣṇau sṛṣṭiḥ svamāyayā dvaita-vistarā⁶ bhāti⁷ ||

self out, as a (spider its) web, in endless diverse forms such as prāṇa (the internal ruler) and the rest (viz, all jīvas and bodies collective and individual), and destroys (ie, takes up all of them into himself, after destroying the ignorance about himself through the knowledge that is himself).

XXXI

(He spreads himself out) in the three forms, Viśva, Taijasa and Prājña, (related to three states of) waking, dreaming and sleep, which are called (respectively) origination, the intermediate stage (of preservation) and destruction ; by these same (three, though) delusive, is concealed (as it were) the fourth (the real light that is the Self).

XXXII

In this way, the shining one (the Self) himself deludes the Self, as it were, through his own māyā, and (again) realises (as it were) the Self, the person who had been hidden in the cave (of nescience).

XXXIII

Just as different forms (black, white, etc.) appear in the ether (which is colourless), because of (the colour of) the smoke rising from fire, even so does this creation, the expanse of duality, appear in Viṣṇu, through his own māyā

XXXI

For further light on the three states and the three forms of consciousness, reference may be made to the *Māndūkya Upaniṣad* and the first chapter of Gauḍapāda's *kārikās* thereon. Dreaming is referred to as the intermediate stage, compare the term "sandhiḥ" in "Sandhye sṛṣṭir āha hi" (Ved. Sū., III, 11. 1).

1. P inserts "taiḥ" (v 30, also B and V (v. 23)).

2. Cp K sṛṣṭi-sṭhiti- samhārā jāgrat svapnam suṣuptam iti tasmīn |
bhānti turye dhāmani tathā 'pi taiḥ āvṛtam bhāti ||
jāgrad viśvam bhedāt svapnas tejaḥ prakāśa-māhātmyāt |
prājñaiḥ svapnā-vaśṭhā jñāna-ghanatvāt tataḥ param turyam ||
(vs. 34, 35).

P reads turyam (v. 30), B, V tūryam (v 23).

3. P: ātmā na (v 31). (v 25).

4. P: devam (v. 31).

6. B and V dvaita-vistarā (v. 25).

5. V: tad (v. 25), B: tadviṣṇoḥ

7. This verse is cited in LM. p. 272.

XXXIV

śānta iva manasi śānte hr̥ṣṭe hr̥ṣṭa iva mūdha iva mūdhe |
vyavahārastho na¹ punaḥ paramārthata Iśvaro bhavati² ||

XXXV

jaladhara-dhūmo-'dgatibhir³ malinī-kriyate yathā na gagana-talam |
tadvat prakṛti-vikāraiḥ⁴ aparāmṛṣṭaḥ parah⁵ puruṣaḥ ||

XXXVI

ekasminn api ca ghaṭe dhūmādi-malā-'vr̥te śeṣāḥ⁶ |
na bhavanti malo-'petā yadvad⁷ jīvo 'pi tadvad iha⁸ ||

XXXIV

The Lord, while fixed in empirical usage, (i.e., in the condition of a jīva), is serene (sāttvika) as it were, when the manas is serene (sāttvika), excited (rājasa as it were) when (the manas is) excited (rājasa), and confused (tāmasa as it were) when (the manas is) confused (tāmasa); but then (the Lord is) not thus in reality (since for the guṇas which are objects of cognition, there can be no intelligible relation with consciousness).

XXXV

As the surface of the sky is unsullied by the passage of clouds or of smoke, even so is the Supreme (that has become) Puruṣa (a jīva) untouched by the modifications of prakṛti (pleasure, pain and delusion, though these may be cognised in it).

XXXVI

Even when (the ether in) a single pot is obscured by impurities like smoke, others (pot-ethers) are not associated with that impurity; in the same

XXXIV

The qualities of serenity, excitement and confusion are distinctive of the three guṇas, sattva, rajas and tamas respectively (see also SK, verses 13, 38). They seem to belong to the Self, only when the Self delusively identifies itself with them. There can be no real relation between the two, for, the guṇas are non-intelligent objects of consciousness, and we have already had occasion to see (in the notes to the first verse) that no intelligible relation can be established between self-luminous consciousness and other-illuminated objects of consciousness, except on the basis of the latter being a super-imposition on the former, with this of course disappears the ultimate reality of the guṇas, the Lord is not in reality serene, excited or confused.

XXXVI

We were told in v XXXII, that the Supreme One deludes Himself as it were by His own māyā and later beholds Himself, as it were, as transcending māyā. In

1 P: vyavahārastho 'pi (v. 33). 2 B and V: bhāti (v. 26).
K: 'śānte śānta iva 'yam hr̥ṣṭe hr̥ṣṭo vimohavati mūdhaḥ |
tattva-gaṇe sati bhagavān na punaḥ paramārthataḥ sa tathā || (v. 38).
3 K: jaladhara-dhūma-rajobhiḥ P: aśeṣāḥ (v. 35).
(v. 36). 4 K: tadvan māyā-vikṛtibhiḥ 5 P: parāmṛṣṭo 'malaḥ (v. 34). 6 B, V: ghaṭāḥ śeṣāḥ (v. 28),
(v. 36). 7 P: bandho (v. 35). 8 K: ekasmin ghaṭa-gaṇe rajasā
vyāpte bhavanti nā 'nyāni malināni
tadvad ete jīvāḥ sukha-duḥkha-bheda-
juṣāḥ (v. 37)

XXXVII

dehe-'ndriyeṣu niyatāḥ karma guṇāḥ kurvate svabhogārtham |
nā 'ham kartā¹ na mame 'ti jānataḥ² karma nai 'va badhnāti ||

way is this jīva too (unobscured, even when other jīvas are obscured as it were).

XXXVII

The gunas (i.e., Prakṛti), as pervasive of (i.e. evolved) into the bodies

the history of Advaita thought various views have been held as to the locus of māyā and its unity or plurality. In every case, the content of māyā (or avidyā¹), that of which there is non-knowledge, is certainly Brahman, the Supreme Self, the Absolute. But who is it that is ignorant? Not Brahman, since that would be to ascribe impurity to the Supreme. Brahman is Reality-Knowledge-Bliss in its very nature. Ignorance may find a place in it, since whatever is not wholly unreal, like a barren woman's son, must find a place in Reality, but it can be neither real as such nor be characteristic of the real. It is finite beings who are ignorant, and it is in them that there occurs the intuition of Brahman that destroys ignorance, hence nescience (avidyā or māyā) is located in the jīva, though its content is Brahman, avidyā is jīvāsṛita, but brahma-viṣayaka. Such a view makes it possible to recognise a plurality of avidyās, a plurality of jīvas wherein they reside, and the possibility of certain jīvas being pure while others are impure, just as even when the space in one pot is impure the spaces in other pots are not similarly defiled. The recognition of diversity in obscuration then calls for the recognition of a plurality of avidyās and the location of these in the jīvas, not in Brahman. This, however, seems to go against the teaching of v. XXXII, which treats māyā as if located in Brahman. The normal corollary of the latter doctrine is the acceptance of a single jīva. This jīva alone, identified either with Hiranyagarbha or the individual that is the inquirer, is granted empirical reality, the other individuals are more illusory, comparable to the vestments painted on the figures in a picture, they are prātibhāsika, merely phenomenal, not vyāvahārika. On such a view, the problem and the solution presented in v. XXXVI would not occur at all, for, the distinction offered here seems to be between different jīvas on the same (vyāvahārika) plane, rather than one between the single empirically real jīva and other jīvas who are only prātibhāsika. Such a view gains support from a consideration of verses XLVII and XLVIII lower down, where the different finite intelligences are compared to sparks issuing from the fire of the single, supreme intelligence, an illustration less compatible with strict Advaita than with the identity-in-difference doctrine of Bhāskara etc., and the multiplicity of avidyās seems expressly implied in their comparison to husks (in the plural) in v. XLVIII, indeed the commentator draws special attention to this plurality. The mixing up of different stand-points may lead to the inference of either a confusion in the author's mind or the ascription of the work to a period when the different varieties of Advaita thought had not evolved in their distinctness. The latter seems the more justifiable conclusion.

XXXVII

That which desires fruit here or hereafter and performs deeds is either the

1 For the present purpose we may ignore the distinction made by certain advaitins between māyā and avidyā, according to them, māyā is that wherein pure sattva is dominant, while in avidyā, sattva has become impure because of rajas and tamas, or again māyā is collective nescience, while avidyā is distributive. See SLS, ch. I

1. P karte 'ti (v. 36).

2 P vijānataḥ (v. 36); B. jñānataḥ (v. 29)

XXXVIII

anya-śarīreṇa¹ kṛtam karma² bhavad yena deha utpannaḥ |
tad avaśyam bhoktavyam bhogād eva kṣayo 'sya³ nirdiṣṭaḥ ||

and organs, perform deeds for the enjoyment of that (prakṛti) itself ; “ I am not the agent, nor is mine (the fruit to be enjoyed) ”, him who knows thus, the Deed does not bind (to another body)

XXXVIII

That deed whereby this body has been created should have been done through another (earlier) body, (so that there is no question of reciprocal dependence as between embodiment and the Deed) ; that (earlier Deed) should necessarily be enjoyed (as to its fruit), since the consumption of that is taught to be only through enjoyment.

inert body or that body which has acquired freedom of action through the entry of the Self into it through erroneous identification, hence it is the body that enjoys the fruit

As to the form of the cognition “ I am not the agent ” &c, compare SK, v 64 “ Thus, from the repeated study of the truth, there results that wisdom ‘ I do not exist (as an evolvent), naught is mine, I am not (the agent), ’ ” &c.

XXXVIII

Karma, here rendered as Deed, falls into two classes as relating to the past and to the future. What has been acquired in the past is again of two kinds, that which has begun to take effect through producing the present body and the experiences of pleasure, pain, etc therein, and that which has been merely accumulated to take effect in the future. The onset of knowledge and the removal of nescience can avail, it is usually held, to remove only the non-effective accumulated (sañcita) and the not-yet-accumulated (āgāmi) karma*. The already-effective-accumulated Deed (prārabdha karma) must work itself out till the decease of the present body, it must exhaust itself in the natural course, just as a discharged arrow must pursue its flight until the momentum fails. This is not an unintelligible view, but for the emphatic declaration ‘ that knowledge destroys all nescience and all karmas (karmāni, in the plural, not in the singular or dual)† and the impossibility of reconciling the survival of bondage in any kind or degree with the dawn of wisdom. The questions which arise in this connection relate to the experience of him who is said to be released, not to the experience of onlookers. The latter may imagine him to be still bound ; but that is of no consequence if he himself has no feeling of bondage or of continuing to be embodied. Is the jīvanmukta conscious of being embodied? If he is not, he is really not bound, and since karma is to explain the bondage of the bound, not the appearance of bondage to others, there is no justification for postulating the persistence of prārabdha after release. If, on the other hand, the released one is conscious of embodiment, this can only be because he continues to have some conceit in (i.e., erroneously identifies himself with) the body, that is to say, there is continuance of at least a trace of nescience. Such a trace or residual impression (vāsanā) may not serve to bind, being comparable to the continuance of physical trembling even after the knowledge that the feared

* For this see vv. XXXIX and XL

† See v. XLIII

1. B : anyaśvarīreṇa (v. 30).

2. P : yat karma (v. 37).

3. V . anya (v. 30).

snake is but a rope. This position (of Maṇḍana Miśra in the *Brahmasiddhi*) is, however, not very satisfactory, the impression is the effect and avidyā is the cause; so long as there is the causal relation we are still moving in the realm of nescience; the distinction between nescience and its trace will be one of degree, not of quality; with this it must be admitted that the so-called mukta is not really released. Nor will it avail to concede this, since Scripture says that at death after realisation, it is the released person that is again released (*vimuktaś ca vimucyate*), hence the earlier release during life cannot be figurative. Again, so long as a trace of nescience persists, are there any obligations positive and negative for the released one? There obviously can be none for one who has no longer the conceit that he is agent and enjoyer. And the present work, in verses LXXVI *et seq* unhesitatingly declares his freedom from all obligations. He may eat what he likes, sleep where he likes, it is a matter of no moment whether he performs a thousand horse-sacrifices or a hundred thousand heinous murders. This again can hardly be swallowed by any who have regard for morality. That objection apart, the apparent licence accorded here does not fit in with the declaration of the persistence of *prārabdha*. Perhaps a better view is that by the time knowledge dawns, the aspirant has had such rigorous moral discipline that moral life becomes a habit even after release. Is the *jīvanmukta* then a 'slave of habit'? That is hardly consistent with the absolute freedom of self-realisation. Is it possible then to say that his body is the slave of habit, not he himself? That seems far more plausible. The body keeps going for a while because of the impetus given by the karma (*prārabdha*) exhausted at the time of realisation, just as the potter's wheel keeps turning for a time because of the momentum imparted by the act now non-existent. With the exhaustion of this momentum the body drops off just as the wheel stops. During this brief interval, such acts, as are attributed to the released self and are really performed by the body, follow from the habits and discipline the body had acquired and been subjected to prior to realisation. Even with this, we are not rid of difficulties. The physical constituents of the body are present even after decease, no doubt they are inert and undergo decomposition. If the body, after realisation and prior to decease, was only this physical aggregate, how to account for disaggregation and decomposition only after death? In other words, why should death occur at all, if it be not immediately consequent on realisation? It may be thought that death and decomposition are due to desertion of the physical frame by the psychical elements—the *manas*, the senses, etc. But why should the psychical elements go away and that at one time rather than another? Further, it seems unreasonable to assume that even the psycho-physical aggregate acts at any time except as inspired by intelligence, it is against the whole trend of the *Vedānta* especially in its re-action to the *Sāṅkhya*. If there is a period of activity intervening between enlightenment and death, it must be either because the former is not perfect or because the body is actuated in some way other than by the *jīva* said to have attained wisdom. A way out seems to be provided by the view that, until all *jīvas* in the world are released (*sarvamukti*), release means the attainment of the nature of *Īśvara*, not of *Brahman*. Here, again, our text is inconclusive, speaking of release sometimes as becoming *Brahman* (v. LIX) or the Self (v. LXXX), and sometimes as the attainment of the status of *Parameśvara* (v. LXIV) or *Sarveśvara* (v. LXVII). The advantage of the latter view is that it permits of the continuance and control of matter even after release. When *Devadatta* attains release, if his body is not resolved at once, it continues to be actuated not by *Devadatta's* self, but by the Lord whose nature has been attained by that Self. No final solution has been offered of these problems in *Advaita* literature, though various phases of the problem have frequently come up for discussion. The present work, however, seems to be far from envisaging any problems, being equally convinced that for the *jīvanmukta* there is the continuance of *prārabdha* as well as unbridled licence. The interested reader may

XXXIX

prāg jñāno- 'tpatti¹-citam yat karma jñāna-śikhi-śikhā-līḍham |
bījam iva dahana-dagdham janma-samartham na tad bhavati² ||

XL 40

jñāno-'tppatter³ ūrdhvam kriyamāṇam karma yat tad api nāma⁴ |
na śliṣyati kartāram puṣkarapatram⁵ yathā vāri ||

XLI

vāg-deha-mānasair iha karma-cayaḥ kriyata iti budhāḥ prāhuḥ |
eko 'pi nā 'ham eṣām kartā tatkarmanām nā 'smi⁶ ||

XLII

karma-phala-bīja-nāśāj janma-vināśo ṇa cā 'tra sandehaḥ |
buddhvai 'vam apagata-tamāḥ savite 'vā 'bhāti bhā-rūpaḥ⁷ ||

XXXIX

That Deed which was acquired before the rise of Knowledge, being lapped up by the flame of Knowledge is, like a seed roasted in fire, not capable of causing (fresh) birth.

XL

The deed that is done subsequent to the rise of Knowledge, that too does not attach to the (apparent) agent, as water (does not cling) to the lotus-leaf

XLI-XLII

The wise say that here (for the jīvas) the accumulation of the deeds is effected through speech, body and manas ; "I am not any of these ; (hence) I am not the agent either in respect of those deeds" ; through the

pursue the discussion further in the present editor's Introductions to the *Bhāmātī Catussūtrī* (Theosophical Publishing House) and the *Siddhāntaleśasangraha* (Madras University).

XXXIX

Hence there is no fear of rebirth even for the enlightened because of the supposed need to experience the fruit of the not-yet-effective-but-accumulated Deed It may be noted that karma in the sense of act is rendered as "deed", while in the narrower sense of that whose fruit has to be experienced, it is rendered with a capital "D" The word "karma" in this clearly means "Deed" though the commentator who interprets "citam" as "practised" (ācāntam) seems to understand "act" thereby The justification for this is perhaps the use of "karma" in the next verse to mean "act"

1. *P* jñāno-'tppatth (v 38)

2 Cp. *K*

agny-abhidagdham bījam yathā prarohā-'samarthatām eti |

jñānā-'gni-dagdham evam karma na janma-pradam bhavati || (verse 62).

3 *P* jñāna-prāpteh (v 40) There is a slight change in the order of verses. Thus while v 38 in *P* corresponds to v 39 in *T*, v 39 (*P*) corresponds to v. 43 (*T*), verses 40, 41 and 42 are identically numbered in both, and v. 43 (*P*) corresponds to v 44 (*T*), (allowing for the omission of the first two verses

from, and the introduction of an extra verse into *P*)

4. *B, V*. omit "nāma" (v. 32).

5 *B, V* puṣkara-parṇam (v. 32).

6 *B, V* : omit "na" (v. 33) ;

P. na ca kartā karmanām asti (v. 41).

7. *V*. iva vibhāti bhānu-rūpaḥ (v. 34).

XLIII

yadvad iṣikā-tūlam pavano-'ddhūtam¹ hi² daśa diśo yāti |
brahmaṇi tattva-jñānāt tathai 'va karmāṇi tattva-vidah ||

XLIV

kṣīrād uddhṛtam ājyam kṣiptam yadvan na pūrvavat tasmin |
prakṛti³-gunebhyas tadvat prthak-kṛtaś cetano nā⁴ 'tmā⁵ ||

destruction (thus) of (the sense of agency which is) the cause of the fruit of the Deed, there is destruction of rebirth, and there is no doubt as to this; (the person) who knowing thus has the darkness (of nescience) dispelled, shines forth like the sun (as of the nature of light, that knows neither rising nor setting).

XLIII

As the downy tuft of iṣikā, scattered by the wind is lost in the ten directions, even so are the Deeds of him who knows the real, lost in Brahman

XLIV

As ghee taken out of milk does not become (milk) as before, on being put into that (milk), even so the intelligent one (jīva) discriminated from Prakṛti and its products (becomes) the Supreme Self (and) does not become (as before) (i.e., does not suffer such delusions as that of the body being the self).

XLIII

"Karmāṇi" in this verse obviously signifies "Deeds", not "acts", for the latter, being momentary, are always perishable even in the case of the unenlightened. The use of the plural form would suggest the denotation of all three forms of karma, inclusive of the prārabdha. This, however, has been excluded by v XXXVIII. Perhaps the author in using the plural is only unconsciously echoing the Muṇḍaka Śruti (II, 11, 8), "kṣiyante cā 'sya karmāṇi", or, as some interpreter of the latter says, the plural even as signifying the two-fold Deed (sañcita and āgamī) is justifiable, in view of the innumerable jīvas that seek and attain wisdom

XLIV

The advaitin has to struggle all the time with two stand-points—that of absolute reality and that of the work-a-day world. Difference, nescience and bondage are actual, though not ultimately real. From the empirical point of view release is a promised future whose value lies in the contrast with an undesired present, both bondage and release would appear to be in time and share the characteristic of time. Time itself can have neither beginning nor end, for, to have a beginning is to be a

1. P. pavana-balam (v. 39). 4 P (v 43), B and V (v 36) .
2. P (v. 39), B and V (v. 35), cetano 'pī
omit "hi". 5 For verses XL-XLIV, cp K verses
3. P bhavati (v. 43). 55-57
ajñānakālanicitam dharmā-'dharmātmakam tu karmā'pī |
ciraśāñcitam iva tūlam naśyati vijñāna-dīpti-vaśāt ||
jñāna-prāptau kṛtam apī na phalāya tato'sya janma katham |
gata-janma-bandha-yogo bhāti śivārkah svadīdhitibhih ||
tuṣa-kambuka-kimpśārūka-muktam bijam yathā 'nkuram kurute |
nai'va tathā mala-māyā-karma-vimukto bhavā 'nkuram hy ātmā ||

member of a temporal series, to be *in* time, in other words ; and time cannot without absurdity be said to be *in* time , if we distinguish the first time from the second, we shall be launched on an infinite regress. For the same reason time cannot have an end either. It is intelligible in this way that release, which is in time, should share time's characteristic of being endless. Such a position, however, is unsatisfactory , for, if release is in time, so is bondage , and the latter has been declared to be like time, beginningless , what more natural than for bondage to be endless as well ? In that case whence the possibility of release ? While recognising time itself to have neither beginning nor end, we yet seem compelled to admit two temporal processes, bondage and release, the former of which has an end but no beginning, while the latter has no end but a beginning. Faced with this problem, the advaitin generally scores off his logician opponents by pointing to *prāgabhāva* (antecedent non-existence) and *pradhvamsābhāva* (subsequent non-existence). An effect is said to be non-existent prior to its production , this non-existence is beginningless, but comes to an end with the appearance of the effect. Again, when something is destroyed, its non-existence comes into being , but it has no end, since what is destroyed never comes into being again as such. Analogues then are not wanting to bondage and release as conceived by the advaitin. But the illustrations are neither happy nor conclusive. *Prāgabhāva* and *pradhvamsābhāva* are concepts, not incontestable reals , and when there is dispute as to the intelligibility of one pair of concepts, it serves no useful purpose to point to another similar pair. Further the pair adduced does not even have the merit of being acceptable to the advaitin. He can hardly hope to defend his position by setting up a resemblance to what he himself considers untenable. Are we then to consider release too to have an end ?

Quite apart from Scriptural declarations of non-return for him who has been released, release would have no value in the face of an ever-present danger of relapse into bondage. All the striving would be in vain, if its only goal were a brief vision of peace. Better do without the vision altogether ! The only possible answer seems to lie in the reference to distinct stand-points. He who feels bound conceives of release as to be achieved in time , he who is released treats both bondage and the process of release as phenomenal, neither claiming absolute status. Freedom itself is the absolute reality, neither the being bound nor the becoming free. These, together with time of which they are phases, may be beginningless or endless or both. What does matter is that freedom being supra-temporal has neither beginning nor end. It is no doubt mysterious how the becoming free which is temporal can culminate in what is supra-temporal. But this is part of the general mystery of the phenomenon this is time. For, time, as we said, cannot itself be in another time , time is itself thus timeless.

The released person does not have to fear a return, for from his own point of view he was never unfree. He who has not yet realised this in experience has to accept it partly on trust based on Scripture and partly because of the compelling force of the dialectics of time.

It will be noticed that in the Advaita view, the world will not be presented as such (i.e. as inert, independent, objective, etc.) to him who has been released , for, the latter has realised his identity with the Supreme Self whereon matter is a superimposition. Hence it is not (except from the spectator's point of view) possible to put back the *jīvanmukta* into the world, as it is possible to put back butter into the milk. The illustration given in the verse should therefore be taken to be significant to the onlooker, not to the released person. The choice of this rather unsuitable analogy is perhaps due to Sāṅkhya preconceptions , for, according to this system, *puruṣa* even after release continues *vis-a-vis* *prakṛti* though no longer bound by it. Such a conception, however, is unintelligible. See further SK, verses LXI, LXV, LXVI.

XLV

guṇa-maya-māyā-gahanam nirdhūya yathā tamaḥ sahasrāṃśuḥ |
bāhyā-'bhyantara-cārī¹ saindhava-ghanavad² bhavet puruṣaḥ ||

XLVI

yadvad deho 'vayavā³ mṛd eva tasyā⁴ vikāra-jātāni⁵ |
tadvad sthāvara-jaṅgamam advaitam dvaitavad bhāti ||

XLV

The (enlightened) person, dispelling without residue the depths of māyā constituted of guṇas (the aggregate of the body and organs), as the Sun (dispels) (physical) darkness, moves (unfettered) within and without (though apparently limited by the body, etc.), and becomes like a lump of salt (in respect of homogeneity as consciousness).

XLVI

Just as the limbs are (not other than) the body [yet the body is different from them, being the whole], just (again) as its various products are (not other than) clay [yet clay is different from them as their cause], even so the (world) immovable and movable, being (not other than) the non-dual (Brahman), appears as if different (therefrom), [yet that Brahman is certainly different from the world, being the primal cause of the world]

XLV

The allusion is to the example of the lump of salt in the *Bṛh*, IV, v, 13. "As a mass of salt has neither inside nor outside, but is altogether a mass of taste, thus indeed has that self neither inside nor outside, but is altogether a mass of knowledge" (Max Muller's translation)

XLVI

In the above translation, the words in square brackets represent what is read into the verse by the commentator. Though the position is neither unintelligible nor indefensible, this hardly seems the place for it. We are told that this verse comes in to settle the doubt of duality which arises from the assertion that the self is *other than māyā*, the answer lies in indicating the phenomenal character of duality. The further emphasis on the transcendence seems out of place and explicable as due to the commentator's fear of a pantheistic interpretation being put on the verse. A more profitable reflection will lead to the indeterminability of relations, whether of whole and part or of cause and effect, making as it does the irreconcilable demands of both identity and difference between the relata, the natural consequence of this is the phenomenality of difference.

1. *B* bāhyāntaracārī (v. 37).
2. *V*. dhanavat (v. 37)
3. *B*: dehāvayavo (v. 38)
4. *P*: pārthā (v. 45).

5. *P* vikāra-jātayaśca (v. 45), the *P* reading in both cases is followed in the *LM* citation, p 314.

XLVII

ekasmāt kṣetrajñād bahavaḥ¹ kṣetrajña-jātayo jātāḥ |
loha-gatād² iva dahanāt samantato visphuliṅga-gaṇāḥ³ ||

XLVIII

te guṇa-saṅgama-doṣād⁴ baddhā iva dhānya-jātayaḥ svatuṣaiḥ |
janma labhante⁵ tāvad yāvan na jñāna-vahninā dagdhāḥ⁶ ||

XLIX

triguṇā caitanyā-'tmani sarva-gate 'vasthite⁷ 'khilā-'dhāre |
kurute sṛṣṭim avidyā sarvatra⁸ sprṣyate tayā nā 'tmā ||

XLVII

Like the multitude of sparks issuing on every side from the (one) fire present in a piece of metal, so rise a multitude of classes of cognisers (conscients) from the single (Supreme) cogniser (conscient).

XLVIII

They (the conscients), because of the defect of association with gunas (bodies), are bound, as it were, like varieties of grain (concealed) in their own husks. They obtain birth (in this migratory cycle) so long as they have not been consumed (had their attachment to bodies destroyed) by the fire of knowledge (in the same way as grain seeds regenerate so long as they have not been rendered unproductive by fire)

XLIX

Nescience, which has the three constituents (sattva, rajas and tamas)

XLVII

The commentator cites three verses to show that there are reckoned eighty-four lakhs of varieties of finite cognisers. The fire and spark analogy is from *Bṛh* II, 1, 20. "as small sparks come forth from fire, thus do all senses, all worlds, all Devas, all beings come forth from that self" (Max Muller's translation). The implications of such a view have already been mentioned in the notes on v. XXXVI

XLVIII

The verse contains only one 'iva' which would go with "varieties of grain" as a sign of comparison, the commentator holds that a repetition of the word should be understood, so that "baddhāḥ" is really "baddhā iva (bound as it were)", for if bondage were real it could not be removed, and there would be conflict with Śrutī (*Kaṭha*, II, v 1) which speaks of the freeing of the already free. The body as the cause of bondage is similar to the husk in respect of (i) being generated by oneself, (ii) not being attached to oneself in reality,⁵ so as not to allow of removal, (iii) being removable by adequate means, viz, seeking for the real, whether self or grain, and (iv) multiplicity.

XLIX

Since bondage is caused by nescience, its destruction by knowledge is intelligible

- | | |
|--|--|
| 1 Ś · bahvyaḥ | 5 B lambhate (v 40). |
| 2 B, V lauha-gatād (v 39), LM citation . loha-sthād (p 308). | 6 P · yāvaj jñānā-'gninā 'dagdhāḥ (v 47) |
| 3 P. kaṇāḥ (v. 46), also B (v. 39) and LM citation | 7. B, V . avasthitā (v. 41). |
| 4. P · traiguṇya-saṅga-doṣād (v 47). | 8 P · sarvātmā (v. 48), this is the version quoted in LM p. 269. |

L

rajivām bhujāṅga-hetuḥ¹ prabhava- vināśau yathā na staḥ |
jagad-utpatti-vināśau² na ca kāraṇam asti tadvad iha ||

LI

janma-vināśana³-gamaṇā-'gama⁴-mala-sambandha-varjito⁵ nityam |
ākāśa⁶ iva ghaṭādiṣu sarvātmā sarvado 'petah⁷ ||

LII

karma-śubhā-'śubha-phala⁸-sukha-dukhair yogo⁹ bhavaty upādhinām |
tatsaṃsargād bandhah¹⁰ taskara-sangād ataskaravat¹¹ ||

ever produces the created world in the self whose nature is intelligence, which is all-pervasive (not limited by bodies etc yet to be created), permanent (not momentary like a cognitional series), and is the substrate of all (as aware of all and illumining all), (but) the self is not tainted thereby

L

As in the rope there is not (as distinct from the rope) any cause of the snake, nor is there any (real) origination and destruction (of the snake), (yet there is the snake-delusion), even so here there is not any (real) origination and destruction of the world, nor is there any cause (thereof, other than the Self), (yet there is the delusion of the world superimposed on the Self)

LI

The Self of all is eternal and free from association with origination and destruction, departure and return, and impurities (like nescience), (yet) it is all-pervasive, as ether in pots, etc

LII

The activity of the adjuncts and conjunction with pleasure and pain consequent on what is meritorious or otherwise, (these result for the Self) because of association (superimposition of identity) with these (adjuncts), like bondage for one who is not a thief, because of association with thieves

Nescience though manifested by consciousness does not really affect the latter, just as Rāhu though manifested by the Sun does not really affect the Sun

LII

The "thief" analogy again is common to the Sāṅkhya See SK, v. 20 and the commentaries of Māṭhara and Paramārtha thereon

1. P bhujāṅga-hetau (v 49), also B (v 42)

2. P. vināśe (v. 49), the P reading in both cases is followed in the citation in LM, p 269

3. P. vināśa (v 50)

4. P (v. 50), B and V (v 43) āgamana.

5. V malaiḥ sarva-varjitaḥ (v 43), B. sanga-varjitaḥ (v 43), P omits "mala-sambandha" and reads "vivarjitaḥ" (v. 50).

6. P ākāśam (v 50)

7. P sarvago 'baddhah (v 50)

8. B, V janitaiḥ (v 44), P phala-caya (v 51)

9. B, V bandhah (v 44)

10. P. baddhaḥ (v. 51), also B (v 44)

11. K karma-phalam śubham aśubham mithyājñānena sangamād eva viṣamo hi sanga-doṣas taskarā-yogo'py ataskarasye 'va (v. 53).

LIII

deha-guṇa-karaṇa-gocara-saṅgāt¹ puruṣasya yāvad iha bhāvāḥ² |
tāvan māyā-pāśaiḥ saṁsāre baddha³ iva bhāti⁴ ||

LIV

mātr-pitr-putra-bāndhava⁵-dhana- bhoga-vibhāga-sammūḍhaḥ⁶ |
janma-jarā-marāṇa-maye cakra⁷ iva bhrāmyate jantuh ||

LV

loka-vyavahāra-kṛtām ya ihā 'vidyām upāsate mūdhāh |
te janana-marana-dharmāṇo 'ndham tama⁸ etya khidyante⁹ ||

LIII

As long as a person has the conceit (of selfhood) in respect of the body (i.e., the unmanifest, mahat, individuation and the elements, which have evolved into the body), qualities (of the soul, i.e., cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, effort, &c), the organs (of sense and action) and objects (of these organs), so long does he appear as if bound to the migratory cycle by the bonds of māyā

LIV

The creature (i.e. the apparently finite Self) revolves in this (migratory cycle) consisting of birth, old age, and death, as on a (potter's) wheel (revolve ants, etc present on it) ; (this he does) as 'deluded by the diverse presentations (in the form) of mother, father, son, relation, wealth and objects of enjoyment

LV

The fools who subserve nescience (i.e perform deeds) consequent on empirical usage (conceit of self-hood) in respect of the world (i.e., the body and organs), they reach (again) intense darkness (in another body), and, becoming possessed of the properties of birth and death, suffer

LIII

The body etc constitute the field of cognition (kṣetra) , for the interpretation he gives of the various terms, the commentator relies on the *Bhagavad Gitā*, XIII, 5 and 6.

LV

The commentator explains *lokaḥ* as the aggregate of body and organs, *vyavahāra* as the conceit of self-hood, *avidyā* as works, and *upāsate* as performs. The Scriptural reference is to *Bṛh.*, IV, iv, 10, "All who worship non-knowledge (avidyā) enter into blind darkness" (Max Muller).

- | | |
|---|-------------------------------------|
| 1. P : saṅgaḥ (v. 52). | P sukha-duhkha-sammūḍhaḥ (v. 53) |
| 2. B, V : bhāvāḥ (v. 45) ; P : bhavati (v. 52). | 7. P : cakram (v. 53). |
| 3. B, V ruddha (v. 45) | 8. B, V dhvāntam atra (v. 47). |
| 4. P : buddhavad bhavati (v. 52). | 9. K . te yānti janma-mṛtyū dharmā- |
| 5. P : dāra (v. 53). | 'dharmārgalābaddhaḥ (v. 54). P : te |
| 6. B, V : sambhoga-mūḍhaḥ (v. 46) ; | janana-marāṇa-dharmiṇo 'ndhe tamāsi |
| | prapadyante (v. 54) |

LVI

hima-phena-budbudā iva jalasya dhūmo¹ yathā vahneḥ |
tadvat svabhāvabhūtā māyai 'śā kīrtitā viṣṇoḥ ||

LVII

evam² dvaita-vikalpām³ bhrama-svarūpām³ vimohinīm māyām |
utsrjya sakala-niṣkalam advaitam⁴ bhāvayed brahma ||

LVIII

yadvat salile salilam ksīre ksīram samīraṇe vāyuḥ |
tadvad brahmaṇi vimale bhāvanayā tanmayatvam upayāti⁵ ||

LVI

This māyā of the (pervasive) Viṣṇu is said (by the wise) to be established (eternally and connately) as of His own nature, like snow, foam and bubbles in the case of water, and smoke in the case of fire

LVII

Abandoning māyā, which thus presents duality, which is of the nature of delusion, and which causes delusion, contemplate (as the self) the non-dual Brahman, which is partless and yet (appears as if it) has parts (since through its own māyā it appears as the world of name and form)

LVIII

As (by mixing) water (attains oneness) with water, milk with milk and air with air, even so by contemplation of the pure Brahman, (one) attains the same nature as that (Brahman)

LVI

The verse may be taken to explain the apparent irreconcilability of the world with Brahman, by resorting to the analogy of water and fire. Water, though a colourless liquid, by its very nature takes on various forms, like snow which is solid and white, and so on, so too fire, which is bright, by its very nature produces smoke which is non-luminous. The luminosity of the luminous could not indeed be demonstrated in the absence of the non-luminous, which obscures. An alternative interpretation, which is perhaps sounder, would take the verse to indicate the unmotivated and natural character of creation, on the analogy of fire producing smoke and water being transformed in various ways, in this understanding of it, the two analogies are more on a par. In support of the idea thus expressed, the commentator cites Gauḍapāda's *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā*, I, 9, referring to it as "Śruti".

1. P. dhūmo-'dgamo (v 55), LM in its citation of this verse and the first half of the next (p 297) follows the P version

2. P. enām (v 56)

3. P. vikalpa-bhrama-svarūpām (v. 56) :
ittham dvaita-vikalpe galite pravilanghya mohinīm māyām |
salile salilam ksīre ksīram iva brahmaṇi layī syāt ||

56).

4. B and V read "niṣkamaladvaitam", V explains it as "niṣkalmaṣamaina advaitam, the non-dual, free from blemish (kalmaṣa)" (v 49).

5. For v LVII, LVIII, cp K (v 51) :

LIX

ittham dvaita-samūhe bhāvanayā brahma-bhūyam upayāte¹ |
ko mohah kah śokah² sarvam brahmāvalokayatah³ ||

LX

vigato⁴-pādhih sphatikah svaprabhayā bhāti nirmalo yadvat |
cid-dīpah svaprabhayā⁵ tathā vibhātī 'ha nirupādhih⁶ ||

LXI

guṇa-karaṇa-gaṇa-śarīra- prāṇais tanmātra-⁷ jāti-sukha-duḥkhaih |
aparāmṛṣṭo vyāpī cid- rūpo 'yam⁸ sadā vimalah ||

LIX

When by such contemplation the aggregate of duality attains the same nature as Brahman, what is the delusion, what the grief for him who sees everything as Brahman?

LX

As the pure crystal, on the removal of adjuncts, shines in its own light, so too does the light of intelligence shine in its own light, when free from adjuncts

LXI

This (Self) is ever pure, pervasive, of the nature of intelligence and untouched by the gunas (sattva, etc), the host of organs, the body, the vital air, subtle elements, classes (of being e g, humanity) or by pleasure and pain (so that at no time is there a real possibility of the self being manifested by or in these)

LIX

The Scriptural reference is to *Īśa* 7 "What sorrow, what trouble can there be to him who once beheld that unity?" (Max Muller) This verse starts with the phenomenal world having become of the nature of Brahman, whereas the previous verse refers not to this, but to the person (*pumān*, as the commentator puts it) becoming of the nature of Brahman, evidently the former is considered to be the consequence of the latter.

LX

Though in ordinary experience, the shining forth of intelligence seems to require instruments like the intellect, in truth it is self-luminous, its real splendour is manifest, as in the case of the crystal, when the adjuncts are absent. It is not even true, as will be explained in the next verse, that at any time the self is illumined by association with adjuncts

*1. K : śivamayatvam abhiyāte (v. 52); B, V : upayāti (v. 51) its first line is prārabdhā'nte sāksāt brahmībhūtaḥ svasarṇvedyaḥ (v. 58).
2. K : kah śokah ko mohah (v. 52), 4. P : tyakta (v. 60).
V : śoko mohah kah śokah (v. 51), 5. P : cidvyāptam caitanyam (v. 60).
the explanation seems to imply the reading "krodhah" instead of the second (v. 52).
"śokah". 6. P : nirupādhi (v. 60), also B
3. P reads the second line as first, 7. P : prāṇa-tanmātra (v. 61).
8. P : aham (v. 61).

LXII

draṣṭā śrotā ghrātā śparsayitā rasayitā¹ grahītā ca |
dehī dehe-'ndriya-dhīvivarjitaḥ² syān na kartā 'sau³ ||

LXIII

eko nai 'katrā 'vasthito 'ham- aiśvarya-yogato⁴ vyāptaḥ |
ākāśavad akhīlam idam⁵ na kaścīd apy atra sandehah ||

LXIV

ātmai 've⁶ 'dam sarvam nīskala- sakalam yadaī 'va bhāvayati⁷ |
moha-gahanād vimuktas tadaī 'va parameśvarī-bhūtaḥ ||

LXII

This (Self) when embodied becomes the hearer, seer, smeller, toucher, taster and grasper ; (but) when free of the cognition (of Self) as body and organs, it cannot be the agent (in respect of these activities).

LXIII-LXIV

“ All this is but the Self, because of the possession of this lordliness (universal self-hood) , I am one (non-dual or independent), not limited to any one (time or space), but pervasive like ether of this entire (multiplicity) ; in respect of this there is no doubt whatever ” When thus is contemplated that (Brahman) which is partless and (yet apparently) has parts, at that very time does he attain oneness with Parameśvara and get released from the abyss of delusion.

LXII

Embodiment consists in the erroneous identification with body, organs &c , when free of this error, the self is manifest in its real nature as not an agent , and Śruti says “ Grasping without hands, hasting without feet, he sees without eyes, he hears without ears.” (*Śvet*, III, 19 Max Muller) “ Grasper (grahītā) ” in the text is explained by the commentator as, “ apprehender (knower), ” the functioning of manas being what is intended, not that of the hands.

LXIII-LXIV

The Scriptural reference is to *Ch* VII, xxv, 2 “ All this is but the Self ” and to *Mund*, III, 11, 9. “ He who knows Brahman becomes Brahman itself ” That the one Self has transformed itself into the world has been shown in v XXVI. It has also the authority of Śruti (“ That whence these beings originate etc ”, *Taitt*, III, 1), Smṛti (“ I am the creator of all, from me everything proceeds ” *Bh. Gītā* X, 8) and the *Vedānta Sūtra* I, 1, 2 Since this is unintelligible in the absence of indeterminable māyā, māyā is postulated in the same way as *apūrva* has been

1. *B* (v. 54) and *P* (v. 62) omit “rasayitā”. 3. *P*. kartā bhoktā hy akartā 'sau (v. 62)

2. *P* : dehendriya-vivarjitaśca (v. 62).

K : draṣṭā śrotā ghrātā dehe-'ndriyavarjito'py akartāpi |
siddhāntā-'gama-tarkāms citrān aham eva racayāmi || (v. 50).

4. *B*, *V* : mahaiśvaryam yogato there is a change of order, verses 60, 61, 62 and 63 are numbered the same in (v. 55).

5. *P* eko 'neka iva sthito 'ham both texts, v. 64 in *P* is v. 65 in *T*.

aiśvarya-yogaḥ sa evā 'tmā vyāpyā 7 *P* : nīskalam advaitam yadaī 'va bhāti 'ha (v. 59).

ākāśavad akhīlam (v 63).

6. *P* : brahmai 'va (v. 59) , here again

LXV

yadyat¹ siddhāntā-'gama-tarkeṣu prabruvanti² rāgā-'ndhāḥ |
anumodāmas tattat teṣām sarvātma-vāda-dhiyā³ ||

LXVI

sarvākāro bhagavān upāsyate yena yena⁴ bhāvena |
tam tam bhāvam bhūtvā cintāmanivat samabhyeti⁵ ||

LXV

Whatever is asserted by those blinded by attachment to their respective conclusions (other than Advaita), revelations (other than the Vedānta), and arguments (both inferential and presumptive), all that we allow, in the view that (only) the Self of all is maintained (apprehended) by all those (under such names as karma, Īśvara, puruṣa, pradhāna, etc., or Brahmā, Viṣṇu, Rudra, Maheśvara, etc.)

LXVI

The Lord has all forms (since He is the Self of all), (hence) in whatever form He is worshipped, He takes on those respective forms like the cintāmani gem and reaches (the worshipper).

postulated to explain the fruitfulness of sacrifices in a hereafter. Those who hold mere matter to be the cause are in error, since non-intelligent matter can neither know nor act, much less produce a world. That consciousness must be not merely the instrumental but also the material cause can be established, says the commentator, by the following syllogism. What is in dispute has consciousness for its material cause, since it is a product, like the dreamworld. Since pot, cloth, etc., are part of the subject, inconstancy of the *probans* cannot be alleged in respect of these. The non-production of the world is the *reductio ad absurdum* on the contrary view, as mere matter is non-intelligent and non-active. This contention of the commentator does not appear to be sound. The contrary view would be not that mere matter is the cause, but that consciousness or non-matter is not the *material* cause, from this does not follow the alleged *reductio ad absurdum*, as the world might conceivably be produced from matter as the material cause, controlled by consciousness. This position too is in the end unintelligible, in the view of the advaitin, but the commentator's syllogistic short-cut is not very convincing.

LXV

The commentator quotes a verse from *Harimīde-stotra* (cited as Sankara's) and a couplet from *Gauḍapāda-kārikā* IV, 5 (cited as Gauḍapāda's). "We approve of the ajāti (non-creation) taught by them, we do not dispute with them; (but) listen to this which is undisputable." Reference may also be made to Sankara's commentary on *Gauḍapāda-kārikā*, III, 17. "But our view, viz, the unity of Ātman, based upon the identity of all, does not conflict with others who find contradictions among themselves, as one's limbs such as hands, feet, &c., do not conflict with one another."

LXVI

This Smṛti parallel is *Bh. Gītā*, IV, 11. "In whatever way men worship Me, in the same way do I fulfil their desires, it is My path, O Pārtha, that men tread,

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|--|---|
| 1. B, V. yadvat (v. 57). | āgamatarkādiṣu (p. 318) |
| 2. P. siddhānteṣv āgama-tarkādiṣu
bhramanti (v. 64), B, V. prabhramanti
(v. 57), LM citation: yadvat siddhānt- | 3. B. sarvātma-vāda-dhiyām (v. 57).
4. P. omits (v. 65).
5. P. tam abhyeti (v. 65). |

LXVII

nārāyaṇam ātmānam jñātvā sarga-sthiti-pralaya-hetum |
sarvajñaḥ sarvagataḥ sarvaḥ sarveśvaro bhavati ||

LXVIII

ātmajñas¹ tarati śucam yasmād vidvān bibheti na² kutaścit |
mṛtyor api marana-bhayam na bhavaty anyat³ kutas tasya⁴ ||

LXIX

kṣaya-vṛddhi-vadhya-ghātaka bandhana-moksair vivarjitam nityam |
paramārtha-tattvam etad yad ato 'nyat tad anrtam⁵ sarvam⁶ ||

LXVII

Having known (i.e., contemplated fervently, unintermittently and for long) the self as Nārāyaṇa, the cause of the origination, sustentation and destruction (of the world), any one (without distinction of caste or order of life), (but who is devoted to the deity and the preceptor), becomes the omniscient, omnipresent Lord of all (i.e., achieves the intuition of identity between Nārāyaṇa and the Self).

LXVIII

The knower of the Self crosses over sorrow, because the knower (of the Self as Brahman) has no fear from anything. For him who is (himself) Death there is no fear of death itself, whence (then) any other (fear)?

LXIX

This absolute reality (the Self) is ever devoid of diminution or increase, being killed or killing, bondage or release, whatever is other than this (i.e. is subject to diminution or increase and so on, that is to say, Prakṛti) is non-real.

in all ways" "Cintāmani" is the name of a fabulous gem reputed to fulfil all the desires of its possessor.

LXVII

Does the released person become Brahman or Ívara? The present verse supports the latter view. The uncertainty of the author on this point has already been indicated in the notes

LXVIII

The Scriptural reference is to *Ch* VII, 1, 3 "He who knows the Self crosses over sorrow" and to *Taitt*, II, 9 "He who knows (the bliss that is Brahman) has no fear from anything", since this knower is identical with the Lord who is above time (and death), there is not for him the fear of death, much less is there any other fear.

1. *V* : ātmajñam (v 60)
2. *B, V* . na bibheti (v 60).
3. *P* : anyataḥ (v. 67); *B, V* . anyat bhayam (v. 60).
4. *K* ātmajño na kutaścana bibheti sarvam hi tasya nija-rūpam |
nai 'va ca śocati yasmāt paramārthe nāśitā nāsti || (v 58)
5. *B* . anatam (v 61) coming after v. LXX (7), which is v.
6. This has the same number in *P*, 68 (*P*).

LXX

evam¹ prakṛtim puruṣam² vijñāya nirasta-kalpanā-jālah |
ātmā-rāmaḥ praśamam³ samāsthitaḥ⁴ kevali⁵ bhavati ||

LXXI

nala-kadali-veṇu-bāṇā naśyanti yathā svapuṣpam⁶ āsādyā |
tadvat svabhāva-bhūtāḥ svabhāvatām prāpya naśyanti ||

LXXII

bhinne 'jñāna-granthau chinne saṁśaya-gaṇe śubhā-'śubhe kṣiṇe |
dagdhe ca janma-bīje paramātmānam⁷ harim yāti⁸ ||

LXX

Having thus discriminatively known Prakṛti and Puruṣa, free from the host of the posited (duality), delighting in the Self (alone), attaining quiescence (of the mind, in that same Self), one attains release (kaivalya)

LXXI

Just as the nala (a kind of reed), the plantain tree, the bamboo and the bāṇa (another kind of reed) perish (only) after producing their respective results, similarly the products of Nature (viz., the body, etc) perish (only) after producing their respective results

LXXII

When the knot of nescience is cut, when the host of doubts is resolved,

LXX

The name used for release, kaivalya, is yet another piece of Sāṅkhya heritage.

LXXI

The commentator says " They do not perish immediately, but they persist for a time because of prārabdha-karma and perish only after producing in that period their effects consisting of pleasure, pain and delusion " In consonance with this the word " only " has been introduced twice in the translation of the verse It must be noted here that the plantain and bamboo are usually cited as examples not of a delay in their perishing, but of perishing as soon as their fruit is produced Two of the Śruti texts cited—*Bṛh* IV, iv, 6 " But as to the man who is satisfied in his desires, or desires the Self only, his vital spirits do not depart elsewhere " (Max Muller), and *Bṛh*. IV, iv, 7 " And as the slough of a snake lies on an ant-hill, dead and cast away, thus lies his body " (Max Muller)—support only this interpretation, the third text—*Ch* VI, xiv, 2 " For him there is only delay so long as he is not delivered (from the body) : then he will be perfect " (Max Muller)—seems to teach delay, but as is made clear in the *Brahmasūddhi*, it is highly questionable whether there is a teaching of delay in this passage, any more than in a statement like " I shall delay only to bathe and feed." In any case the commentator's treatment of this particular verse does seem forced.

LXXII

The Scriptural reference is to *Mund*, II, ii, 8 " The knot of the heart is cut,

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|---|--|---|-----------------------------------|
| 1 | <i>P</i> tathā (v. 68). | 5 | <i>V</i> kevalo (v. 62) |
| 2 | <i>B, V</i> prakṛti-puruṣam (v. 62). | 6 | <i>P</i> puṣpam (v. 70). |
| 3 | <i>P</i> puruṣaḥ (v. 68) | 7 | <i>B, V</i> paramānandam (v. 64). |
| 4 | <i>P</i> paramātmā (v. 68). | | |
| 8 | <i>K</i> bhinnā-'jñāna-granthir gatasandehaḥ parākṛta-bhrāntiḥ
prakṣiṇapūṇya-pāpo vighraha-yoge 'py asau muktaḥ (v. 61). | | |

LXXIII

mokṣasya nai 'va kiñcid dhāmā 'sti na cā 'pi¹ gamanam anyatra |
ajñāna-maya²-granther bhedo yas tam³ vidur mokṣam⁴ ||

when the (Karma) meritorious and non-meritorious is exhausted, and the seed of rebirth is burnt up, one reaches Hari, the Supreme Self.

LXXIII

There is not any abode (body, other than this) for release ; nor is there any going elsewhere (for that purpose) , the cutting of the knot that is nescience, that is known to be release (not existence in another body or in another locality).

all doubts are resolved, all his Deeds perish, when He has been beheld, who is both high and low." "Ajñāna-granthih" means, according to the commentator, the knot produced by nescience, e g, the conceit that the Self is the body &c , the rendering in the present translation conforms to the expression "ajñāna-maya-granthih" in the next verse

LXXIII

The empirical world is sublatale by knowledge of the Self, since it is a product of ignorance relating to that Self, like the dream-world this is the syllogism The commentator discusses (a) various other notions of release, and (b) the nature of the removal of nescience, whether it is real, non-real, etc (a) (i). The materialists hold death to be release , but this is not a puruṣārtha (ii) The Jainas hold it to be a continual movement upwards , this too is not a puruṣārtha since it involves effort and trouble, like continual going down (iii) The Vijñānavādins look forward to the rise of a series of pure cognition , this too is unsuitable since the previous series associated with objects, which constituted the personality of the seeker, is lost, thus leading to the loss of the acquired and the influx of the non-acquired Deed (karma) , further the pure cognition being contentless and undifferentiated, there cannot be a series thereof (iv) The Mādhyamikas hold release to be the attainment of the void , if this void be self-luminous, it must be real , if not self-luminous it can be established in no other way either. (v) The Tārikikas teach release to be the abiding of the soul on the abandonment of its nine qualities such as cognition , this is untenable because of the attainment of inertness as of a stone, and because of the contingency of possessing in release feeling, knowing and willing in the same manner as Parameśvara (vi) The Nirīśvara-sāṅkhyas consider release to be the discrimination of Puruṣa from Prakṛti , since in release Prakṛti cannot be seen, the discrimination therefrom is not possible then , should Prakṛti be seen then too, there is the contingency of bondage. (vii) The Śeśvara-sāṅkhyas hold release to be union of the finite cogniser with the Supreme Self , if one who was formerly non-lordly now becomes a lord, the lordliness becomes finite and impermanent , and there are also the defects of the loss of the acquired and the influx of

1. P · naiva kañcid dāso na vā (v. 73). bered identically in P and T ; but v LXXV (T) corresponds to v. 72 (P).
2. P hṛdaya (v 73). The present verse in T corresponds in v.
3. V · yam (v. 65). 60 (K) with the following difference in
4. This and the next verse are num- the second half :
ajñāna-granthi-bhūḍā svaśaktibhur vyaktatā mokṣaḥ |

LXXIV

buddhvai 'vam asatyam idam viṣṇor māyā-'tmakam jagad-rūpam |
vigata-dvandvo-'pādhika- bhogā-'saṅgo¹ bhavec chāntaḥ ||

LXXIV

Having thus (definitively) known this world, of the nature of māyā, to be the non-real (superimposed) form of Viṣṇu, he, who is free from attachment to all enjoyment conditioned by the pairs of opposites, becomes peaceful.

the non-acquired. (viii) The Karma-mīmāṃsakas say that release is the abiding of the self in its own state, if the self is to remain in the same state as belonged to it before, there is nothing now to be effected by rites, etc., should it not remain so, the state of release could not be its own state. (ix) The Pāsupatas hold release to be the attainment of similarity to Parameśvara, what is this similarity? If it consist in omniscience and omnipotence these are impossible for one who is not the self of all, and one who is the self of all is identical with, not similar to, Paramaśiva; should similarity consist merely in freedom from the malas—ānava, karma, and māyā,—that too would be impossible, since there can be no freedom from these malas except for one who is knowledge (jñātr?) by nature, and is free from difference and bonds, if these characteristics are present there is identity with Parameśvara. Else Parameśvara would come to have a different nature than that of the Supreme Lord. (x) The Sāttvatas consider release to be the attainment of the same world as that of Hari, of proximity to Him, of the same form as His, and of union with Him. If these attainments of the same world, etc. were formerly unreal, they could not now be real, if formerly real, effort to attain them now should not be needed, since cognition of difference and duality persists, fear persists. Hence release is but the destruction of nescience through knowledge of the identity of Brahman and the self. The main defect of all such views is their failure to conceive release as the essential nature of the Self itself, though it is obscured by nescience and hence requires to be attained, as it were, in truth it is like the frantically sought for gold ornaments whose presence round one's own neck has been forgotten.

(b) The destruction of nescience cannot be real, because of the fear of duality; it cannot be unreal, for fear of nescience becoming real, and knowledge becoming fruitless, it cannot be both, for fear of contradiction, nor can it be indeterminable since it would then be of the same nature as nescience which is to be destroyed, nor can it be outside these four forms as it can then be only a void. This objection is not valid, as the destruction of nescience belongs to a fifth form and this is not the void, since the negation only of reality, not of the indeterminable, constitutes a void. Further, the removal of what is illusory consists in nothing more than the truly cognised substrate, since this alone remains on the negation of the illusory; hence Brahman, as reflected in knowledge destroys nescience which is its own product superimposed on itself, and the destruction of nescience is but the very nature of Brahman. While the second of these positions adumbrated by the commentator is intelligible, its reconcilability with the first is not clear. The essential knowledge (svarūpa-jñāna), that is Brahman, is itself the destruction of nescience, the destruction on this view is identical with the real that stands revealed, and there is no need to postulate a fifth mode of being for it. This mode too is unintelligible. The indeterminable is the neither-real-nor-unreal. The opposite of this is the wholly real or the wholly unreal. The latter is the void, which we avoid. The former is the real, why give it a fifth mode of being?

1. P : sarva-dvandva-saṅgur yogāsakto (v. 74).

LXXV

buddhvā vibhaktām prakṛtim puruṣaḥ saṃsāra-madhyago bhavati |
nirmuktaḥ¹ sarva-karmabhir ambuja-patram yathā salilaiḥ ||

LXXV-A

tyaktvā sarva-vikalpān ātmastham niścalam manaḥ kṛtvā |
dagdhe-'ndhana iva vahniḥ sarvasyā 'tmā bhavec chāntaḥ² ||

LXXVI

aśnaḥ³ yad vā tad vā saṃvīto yenakenacic chāntaḥ |
yatra kvacana ca śāyī⁴ vimucyate sarva-bhūtā-'tmā ||

LXXVII

haya-medha-sahasrāny apy atha⁵ kurute brahma-ghāta-lakṣaṇī⁶ |
paramārthavin na puṇyair na ca pāpaiḥ sprīsyate vimalaḥ ||

LXXV

Having known Prakṛti to be distinct, the puruṣa (who has attained realisation) (though) present in the migratory cycle (as an embodied being) becomes released from all Deeds (karmas), as the lotus leaf (is unaffected) by water.

LXXV-A

He who is (i e., has realised himself as) the Self of all, having abandoned whatever is posited and fixed the mind in the self, becomes tranquil, like fire whose fuel has been consumed

LXXVI

(He who has realised himself as) the Self of all beings, is tranquil, eats whatever (is available), is clad in anything, reposes anywhere and is released (i e., enjoys the bliss of release)

LXXVII

He who knows the absolute, being pure (free from the taint of nescience, etc.), whether he performs a thousand aśvamedhas or a hundred thousand brahmanicides, is untouched either by the merit (of the former) or the demerit (of the latter)

LXXV

The commentator refers to *Vedānta Sūtra*, IV, 1, 13 "On the realisation of that, there is non-attachment of the subsequent and the destruction of the earlier sins, since it is so taught" From this verse commences a description of the jīvanmukta

LXXVII

This verse is quoted in the *Jīvanmuktivveka* p 70 (TPH) for what seems to be an unsuitable application It is there contended that, even for knowers of

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|--|---|
| 1. P. mucyate (v 72). | <i>muktivveka</i> , p 70 (TPH), K haya- |
| 2 This is found in P there is no corresponding verse in T, B or V. | medha-śata-sahasrāny api (v. 70), B, V : haya-medha-śata-sahasrāny atha (v 69). |
| 3. B, V acchan (v 68) | This verse is numbered 78 in P, v. 77 |
| 4 K yatra kvacana nivāsi (v. 69), P omits "ca" (v 76). | (A) corresponding with some changes, |
| 5 P omits "api" (v 78), this ¹²⁴ also the reading quoted in the <i>Jīvan-</i> | 5 v. LXXX (T) |
| | 6. B lakṣaṇī (v 69). |

LXXVIII

mada-kopa-harṣa-matsara-viṣāda- bhaya-paruṣa-varjyavāg-buddhiḥ¹ |
nisstotra-vaṣaṭkāro jaḍavad vicared agādha-matiḥ² ||

LXXIX

utpatti-nāśa-varjitam evam³ paramārtham upalabhya⁴ |
kṛta-kṛtya-saphala-janmā⁵ sarvagatas tiṣṭhati yathe 'ṣṭam⁶ ||

LXXX

vyāpinam abhinnam⁷ ittham sarvātmānam⁸ vidhūta⁹-nānātvam |
nirupama-paramānandam yo veda¹⁰ sa tanmayo bhavati ||

LXXVIII

He who has the knowledge of (himself as identical with) the Profound (Brahman) is to behave as if inert (or insane, etc.) as devoid of conceit, anger, hilarity, envy, despair, fear, or cruelty, as without speech and mind (except as centred in the pranava or its meaning, i.e., the Brahman-self) and as not offering either hymns of praise or sacrifices

LXXIX

Having thus (intimately) realised (as himself) the Supreme Reality free from origination and destruction, he who has achieved what was to be achieved, whose life has (thus) been fruitful, who is omnipresent, lives (happily) as he pleases

LXXX

He who has realised as such what is pervasive, is non-different (from himself), has transcended diversity, is unparalleled Supreme bliss, and is the Self of all, he becomes that itself (whether the body persists or is destroyed).

Brahman, there is conceit born of knowledge (vidyā-mada), as illustrated by Yājñavalkya's greed for cattle and his cursing Śākalya to be burnt to ashes (see *Bṛh*, III, ix, 20) It is clear that Yājñavalkya was not a jīvanmukta; but his anger is no obstacle to his release, since no sin is an impediment to the Brahman-knower, it is to support this position, that the present verse of Śeṣa is cited. The privilege of sinning, probably innocuous in the case of the jīvanmukta, is sought to be extended to the knower who is admittedly on a lower level. One wonders if this is significant of the decadence of advaita by Vidyāraṇya's time

LXXVIII

The commentary cites *Bṛhad Vārtika* "buddha-tattvasya loko 'yam jaḍo-
mattapīśācavat" etc.

LXXX

The commentator raises a difficulty as to how the Self of all can be propounded by Scripture. A partial answer is given through distinguishing the express signi-

1. *P* varjita-vāg-buddhiḥ (v. 79)
2. *K*: mada-harṣa- kopa-manmatha
viṣāda- bhaya-lobha-moha- parivarjī nis-
stotra-vaṣaṭkāro jaḍa iva vicared avāda-
matiḥ. The corresponding verse in *P*'s
numbered 79

3. *P*: ekam (v. 80) : *B*: eva (v. 71).

4. *V*: upalabhyate (v. 71).

5. *B*: saphala-januḥ (v. 71).

6. *K*: iti janma-nāśa-hinam para-
mārtha- maheśvarā- 'khyam upalabhya
upalabdhr̥tā-prakāśāt kṛta-kṛtyas tiṣṭhati
yathe 'ṣṭam (v. 81).

7. *K*: abhihitam (v. 82).

8. *P*: iti śiṣya brahma yathā 'bhi-
hitam paramam (v. 77)

9. *P*: vidhūya (v. 77).

10. *K*: vetti (v. 82).

LXXXI

tīrthe śvapaca-gr̥he¹ vā naṣṭa- smṛtir api² parityajan deham |
jñāna-samakāla-muktaḥ³ kaivalyam yāti hata-śokaḥ ||

LXXXI

He whose sorrows have been destroyed, who has been released (even) contemporaneously with (the dawn of) knowledge, (again) attains release on abandoning the body, whether on (the banks of) holy waters, or in the house of an outcaste, whether he had lost consciousness (or was fully conscious).

fication of words from the figurative (gaunī) and secondary (lakṣanā) and showing that Brahman may be the secondary signification of Scriptural words like satyam, jñānam, ānandam; e.g., the word "jñānam" ordinarily means what has the capacity to illumine or reveal; this is found in experience in the cognitive psychosis having the form of pot, etc., in truth however it applies only to the inner Self. Hence the express sense of the word is the inner Self qualified by a specific cognitive psychosis, lakṣanā divests the Self of the psychosis-aspect and signifies the inner Self alone, similarly of the other words. This manner of signifying the impartite (akhandārtha) is found even in experience, in statements like "The big-bellied one is pot" where question and answer relate not to bigness nor to possession of a belly but to a certain pot-particular, which is the one particular that has a big-bellied form. Lakṣanā (which is of the *jahada-jahat*, exclusive-non-exclusive, type) is explained in the case of Scriptural sentences on the analogy of statements like "This is that Devadatta". Now, a further objection is raised that in experience what is secondarily implied (e.g., where 'Ganges' means 'bank of the Ganges') is what is capable of being known through another pramāna and is itself the express sense of some other word. To this the reply is that the secondarily implied need only be established somehow, not necessarily by a pramāna, for there is no concomitance of bare absence between the two, it can nowhere be shown that what is somehow established cannot be the secondary sense, merely because of its not being established by a pramāna. And Brahman being self-luminous and self-established may be secondarily implied. Nor is it true that the secondary sense of one word should be the express sense of some other word. Though we say that sugar is sweet and milk is sweet, the words sugar and milk imply specific kinds of sweetness, and yet this specificity is incapable of being the express sense of any word.

As Kumārila (or is it Daṇḍin?) says.

"Ikṣuksīraguḍādīnām mādhyasyā 'ntaram mahat
tathā'pi na tad ākhyātum sarasvatyāpi śakyate"

"In the sweetness of sugar-cane, milk and jaggery, there is great difference (of kind), yet that cannot be expressly stated even by Sarasvatī".

What is secondarily implied by 'satyam' etc in Scripture is but that form of you and me and all embodied beings, which is undefined by a body, and this has to be realised only in one's own experience like the specific sweetness of sugar-cane, milk, etc.

LXXXI

This verse is quoted in the *Jwanmuktiviveka*, p 46 (TPH), for an anuṣṭubh version of this kārikā, see *Yogavāsīṣṭha*, VI^a I², 2, 11 and *Dattātreyagītā*, I, 69

1 P śvapaca-gr̥he tīrthe (v. 81). 2 P. omits "api" (v. 81).
The reading in T corresponds word for word with K (v. 83), 3 B, V. jñāna-samakālam muktaḥ (v. 73).

LXXXII

puṇyāya tīrtha-sevā nirayāya śvapaca-sadana¹-nidhana-gatiḥ |
puṇyā-'puṇya-kalaṅka-sparśā- 'bhāve tu kim tena² ||

LXXXIII

vṛkṣāgrāc cyuta-pādo yadvad anicchan naraḥ kṣitau patati |
tadvad guṇa-puruṣajño 'nicchann api kevalī bhavati³ ||

LXXXIV

paramārtha-mārga-sādhanam⁴ ārabhyā⁵ 'prāpya yogam api nāma |
sura-loka-bhoga-bhogī mudita-manā modate suciram⁶ ||

LXXXV

viṣayeṣu sārvaḥaumah sarvajanaḥ pūjyate yathā rājā |
bhuvanesu sarvadevair yoga-bhrastas tathā pūjyaḥ⁷ ||

LXXXII

The resort to holy waters is conducive to merit ; dying in an outcaste's house is conducive to (demerit leading to) Hell , where, however, there is no taint by the defilement of merit or demerit, what (is the value) of these ?

LXXXIII

As the man whose foot has slipped from the top of the tree falls to the ground, albeit unwillingly, similarly, he who knows the gunas (Prakṛti) and Puruṣa (as distinct) attains release, though not willing it

LXXXIV

He who has started on the practice of that (meditation) which leads to the Absolute, but has not achieved realisation, even he, it is well known, enjoys the enjoyments of the world of gods and rejoices long with a happy mind

LXXXV

As the king with universal empery is revered by all people in (all) countries, so is he who has fallen short of realisation revered by all the gods in (all) the worlds

LXXXIII

Hence he who has lost consciousness at death is none the less released, if he had already achieved discriminative knowledge and the realization of himself as Brahman. Texts requiring the repetition of words like "Om" and the fixing of the mind on the Lord apply to the mumukṣu (one who desires release), not to the mumūrṣu (one on the point of death) who has realised.

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| 1. P . śvapacādanam (v. 82). | 4. K . paramārthamārgam enam hi |
| 2. This verse corresponds word for word with v. 84 (K) , B, V read "kena" instead of "tena" (v. 74). | (v. 100) |
| 3. There is no corresponding verse in P or K. | 5. P . abhyasya (v 83). |
| | 6. B, V : subhṛsam (v. 76). |
| | 7. This corresponds word for word to v. 84 (K) and v. 84 (P). |

LXXXVI

mahatā kālena mahān¹ mānuṣyam prāpya yogam abhyasya |
prāpnoti divyam amṛtam yat tat paramam² padam viṣṇoḥ³ ||

LXXXVII

vedānta-śāstram akhīlam vilokya⁴ śeṣas tu jagad-ādhārah⁵ |
āryā-pañcāśītyā⁶ babandha paramārthasāram idam⁷ ||

LXXXVI

*After considerable time he gains birth as a distinguished human being, practises yoga and attains that which is resplendent and immortal, the Supreme state of Viṣṇu (the Self of all, the Lord of all).

LXXXVII

Śeṣa (himself), the supporter of the world (and not some obscure scholar) has, after looking through the entire sacred teachings that are the Vedānta, (and ascertaining that they teach with one accord the unity of Brahman and the Self) composed this *Paramārthasāra* in eighty-five āryā verses

LXXXVI

The commentary cites the parallel verses from the *Bhagavad Gītā*, VI, vv. 37-45.

LXXXVII

Even on the reckoning of the *Pandit* edition, this is the eighty-sixth verse, thus taking it outside the eighty-five said to constitute the body of Śeṣa's work. There is reason to think therefore that this verse is an addition by a devout follower, who tried to invest the original author with mythological splendour suggested by the name Śeṣa and that it is not, as it appears, a piece of self-advertisement. The only other evidence of composition by Ādiśeṣa is verse VIII, which speaks of the teacher as "ity ādhāro bhagavān", and the variant reading "kṣītyādhārah" seems a clearer allusion. It is not improbable, however, that here again we have only the respect due to the guru as non-different from the Lord, the supporter of the world.

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|---|-------------|--|---------|--|
| 1 | <i>K</i> | mahatā kālena punah (v. 102). | ādhārah | Including this verse, which is probably by a later writer, there are eighty-six verses in P. |
| 2 | <i>P</i> | param (v. 85). | | |
| 3 | <i>K</i> | yasmād āvartate na punah (v. 102). | | 6 <i>V</i> ārya-'ko-'nā'sītyā (v. 79). |
| 4 | <i>P</i> | vilokya (v. 86). | | 7 The colophon in <i>B</i> reads thus |
| 5 | <i>B, V</i> | śeṣo 'khilā-'dhārah (v. 79), <i>T</i> suggests the emendation : jagata | | "iti śeṣanāga-viracītaḥ paramārthasārah samāptaḥ" |