

## A Commentary on Heidegger’s Inquiry into Technology<sup>1</sup>

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*Was leistet die Erörterung der Seinsfrage und der Epochen des Seinsgeschickes für die Auslegung des gegenwärtigen Zeitalters der Technik?*

—Martin Heidegger (1966)

In what follows, we shall *inquire* into technology.<sup>2</sup> Inquiry forges a path. Hence, it is advisable to attend to the path, and not get stuck on particular sentences or headings. The path here is a path of thought. All paths of thought lead, more or less perceptibly, in a peculiar manner through speech. We are inquiring into *technology* and hope thereby to foster a free relationship<sup>3</sup> to it. The relationship is free if it opens<sup>4</sup> our existence to the “essence”<sup>5</sup> of technology.<sup>6</sup> If we correspond<sup>7</sup> to this essence, we shall be able to experience the technological in its limitation.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> *Die Frage nach der Technik* is literally the inquiry into technology. But the title can also be heard as “the question of technology” (*die Frage der Technik*) in the sense of a weighty issue that confronts us today. Lovitt translates “concerning technology,” which would be *über Technik*.

<sup>2</sup> Lovitt retains “question” consistently for *Frage/fragen*. I find “inquiry” more idiomatic. Alternatively, *wir fragen nach der Technik* could have been rendered as, we shall pursue the question of technology, that is, the inquiry into what technology is.

<sup>3</sup> *Freie Beziehung*. The idea of freedom dominates the essay’s latter half. Heidegger here discloses his purpose in writing the essay.

<sup>4</sup> *Öffnet*. This word is often translated hastily. Etymologically, it is cognate with English “open”: “**offen** Adj. ‘nicht verschlossen, nicht bedeckt’, übertragen ‘frei, unbegrenzt, unbesetzt, aufrichtig, unverhohlen’, ahd. *offan* ‘geöffnet, offenbar, klar, einleuchtend, öffentlich’ (8. Jh.), mhd. *offen* ‘geöffnet, ausgebreitet, voll, öffentlich, unverhohlen’, asächs. *opan*, mnd. mnl. *ōpen*, nl. aengl. engl. *open*, anord. *opinn* (aus germ. \**upana-*).” However, the sense intended is not physical, but something like “make more responsive or sympathetic; make mentally or emotionally receptive.”

<sup>5</sup> *Das Wesen*. The quotation marks are my addition. They signal that Heidegger is not using the word in its ordinary signification, that is, as “the foundational [element], the specific character” (*das Grundlegende, die Eigenart*) of something. The particular sense in which Heidegger means this term is clarified later.

<sup>6</sup> This sentence defines the nature of a free relationship. The definition is comprehensive: Heidegger excludes responses to technology—whether we “affirm it or deny it”—from the essay’s ambit. Indeed, he characterizes both responses as “unfree”; that is to say, they are irrelevant to the issue at stake.

<sup>7</sup> *Entsprechen*. This word is terminologically significant in the essay. At this stage, however, the sense in which Heidegger means it is not clear. I therefore choose a neutral translation here.

<sup>8</sup> *Das Technische in seiner Begrenzung* and not, *die Grenzen* or *die Begrenztheit der Technik*, “the limits” or “the limitation of technology.” This is a further indication that the essay is not directly concerned with technology.

Technology is not the same as the essence of technology. When we seek the essence of a tree, we should know that what determines<sup>9</sup> every tree qua tree is not itself a tree that we might encounter amidst other trees.

Likewise, the essence of technology is itself emphatically nothing technological.<sup>10</sup> We shall hence never experience our relationship to the essence of technology as long as we merely induct<sup>11</sup> and operate<sup>12</sup> the technological, whether we accede<sup>13</sup> to it or we avoid it. Everywhere, whether we fervently affirm it or deny it, we remain unfree, chained to technology. But we are most hopelessly surrendered<sup>14</sup> to technology when we consider it to be something neutral, for this idea, which we today particularly revere, renders us completely blind to the essence of technology.

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<sup>9</sup> *Durchwalten* is “rule something.” The idea is that which determines a tree so thoroughly that it is only a tree insofar as it corresponds to this essence. Lovitt is misled by the prefix, which conveys emphasis, into translating, “that which pervades every tree, as tree...” Although we might have expected *bestimmen* oder *determinieren* here, Heidegger is already signalling a transition from the language of entities determined through eidos and essence to the language of entities in whom Being reigns, presences, et cetera. I render all other occurrences of *durchwalten* with “govern.”

<sup>10</sup> *Nichts Technisches*. Lovitt translates: “the essence of technology is by no means anything technological.” Although the argument appears to parallel the preceding sentence, the insight that what determines technology cannot itself be some form of technology is a banal observation. Heidegger quickly sets it aside and thereafter, also rejects the “ancient doctrine” of “essence.” The sentence thus says something other than what it appears when we understand “essence” to mean the “idea,” “form,” or “whatness” of a thing.

<sup>11</sup> *Vorstellen* has several meanings including “introduce, acquaint someone (or oneself to someone),” “showcase, present something for the first time,” “imagine, conceptualize something,” and “present something.” More literally, it can mean “place something in front, to advance something” or “place something in front of something (else).” Lovitt’s “conceive” relies on the third of these meanings. But the idea is not just that we *imagine* technology, but that we conceptualize, introduce, showcase, advance, and literally, push forward technology. “Induct” covers all these senses of *vorstellen* at once.

<sup>12</sup> *Betreiben* can mean *etw. vorantreiben*, but this not in the sense of “push forward,” but “work energetically towards the completion of something” (*auf die Ausführung einer Sache verstärkt hinarbeiten*). But here probably the basic sense of operating technology, machinery, et cetera is intended.

<sup>13</sup> *Abfinden* here means, “make do with something” or “come to terms with something” (*sich mit etw. zufrieden geben*). It can also mean, “go along with something, accept something” (*sich in etw. schicken*). “Accede” was chosen for reasons of euphony, but it also correctly conveys the sense of yielding to something.

<sup>14</sup> *Ausliefern* is both “hand something over into someone’s power” (*jmdn., etw. in jmds. Gewalt übergeben*) and the more everyday meaning of delivering or distributing products, particularly in the context of wholesale (*Waren von der Produktion über den Großhandel an den Einzelhandel liefern, verteilen*). The stronger meaning is meant.

According to ancient doctrine, the essence of a thing is *what* something is. We inquire into technology when we ask what it is. Everyone knows the two responses that answer our question. The first says, technology is a means to an end. The second says, technology is a human activity. These two definitions of technology belong together. To establish ends and to create and apply the means for them is a human activity. Technology encompasses the manufacture and use of stuff, equipment,<sup>15</sup> and machines; it also encompasses what is thus manufactured and used and the needs<sup>a</sup> and purposes they serve. The totality of these expedients<sup>16</sup> constitutes technology. Technology is itself an expedient; in Latin, an *instrumentum*.

The commonplace conception of technology, according to which it is a means and a human activity, can hence be called the instrumental and anthropological definition of technology.

Who would deny that this definition is correct? It is clearly in accordance with what we picture<sup>17</sup> when we speak of technology. Indeed, the instrumental definition of technology is so impressively<sup>18</sup> correct that it also holds for modern technology, of which we otherwise maintain with some justification that, versus the older technology of the craftsman,<sup>19</sup> it is completely different and hence new. A power-station with its turbines and generators is also a man-made means for an end established by man. A rocket-powered plane<sup>20</sup> and a high-frequency generator<sup>21</sup> are also means to ends. A radar station is, of course, less simple than a weathervane. The fabrication of a high-frequency transmitter, of course, requires the interlocking of different

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<sup>15</sup> Taking *Zeug* literally as indeterminate material (*etw. nicht näher Bezeichnetes*) and *Gerät* (sg.) as equipment.

<sup>a</sup> 1954: (Economy, supply management, consumer) industry: the accelerated potential for consumption.

<sup>16</sup> *Einrichtung* is whatever is needed to furnish an apartment or the totality of arrangements made to serve the public good. It is more correctly rendered by “expedients” than Lovitt’s “contrivances.”

<sup>17</sup> *Was man vor Augen hat*. Literally, “what one has before one’s eyes.”

<sup>18</sup> *Unheimlich* is something that stimulates feelings of anxiety or fear, but Lovitt’s “uncanny” is an overtranslation. In everyday or hyperbolic speech, *unheimlich* merely adds emphasis.

<sup>19</sup> *Handwerkliche Technik* is literally “handwork technology” as translated by Lovitt, but what is meant is the technology employed by the craftsman, which differs in both degree and kind from industrial production.

<sup>20</sup> *Raketenflugzeug*, not *Strahlflugzeug*.

<sup>21</sup> A *Hochfrequenzmaschine* is a now obsolete piece of equipment, its function assumed by the generator.

processes of technical-industrial production. A sawmill in a remote<sup>22</sup> Black Forest valley is, of course, a primitive means compared with a hydroelectric station on the Rhine River.

It nonetheless remains correct that modern technology too is a means to an end.<sup>23</sup> This is why the instrumental conception of technology conditions<sup>24</sup> every effort to bring man into the right relation to technology. Everything depends on the appropriate application<sup>25</sup> of technology as a means. We wish, as the saying goes, to get technology “psychologically in hand.”<sup>26</sup> We wish to master it. The desire to master it becomes all the more urgent the more technology threatens to slip from man’s control.

But suppose now that technology were no mere means: how would matters stand with regard to the will to master it? Yet, we did say that the instrumental definition of technology was correct. Certainly. A correct statement always makes some kind of accurate determination<sup>27</sup> about the matter at hand. But, in order to be correct, this determination by no means needs to unveil the matter at hand in its essence. The true, however, eventuates<sup>28</sup> only where such

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<sup>22</sup> Taking Heidegger’s *verlorenes Schwarzwaldtal* metaphorically to mean a forgotten or remote valley. Lovitt translates “secluded.”

<sup>23</sup> We remain within the “instrumental and anthropological” definition of technology as long as we think that modern technology differs merely by its capacity and its scale, whereas, Heidegger claims, what really makes it significant is: it is the end point of Western thought insofar as it began with Greek rationality. As such it indicates the eschatological horizon of Being, this word being understood with all its Pauline resonances.

<sup>24</sup> *Bestimmt*. Lovitt also translates “conditions.” *Bestimmen* can mean “determine something” (*etw. festsetzen*) but this meaning is too strong. The weaker meaning of “have an essential share in the formation of a phenomenon” (*an der Formung einer Erscheinung wesentlich Anteil haben*) seems implied.

<sup>25</sup> *Handhaben* is “use or apply something with one’s hand as per its purpose” (*etw. mit der Hand seiner Bestimmung gemäß gebrauchen, verwenden*). Lovitt’s “manipulate” carries a negative connotation not present in the original. An alternative translation would have been, to handle technology in the proper way as a means.

<sup>26</sup> *Geistig in die Hand*, that is, mentally or psychologically under one’s control.

<sup>27</sup> *Feststellen* is simply “identify something or someone; notice, perceive something” (*etw., jmdn. ermitteln; etw. bemerken, wahrnehmen*). It can also mean “emphatically state, establish something” (*etw. nachdrücklich sagen, konstatieren*). Lovitt’s “fixes upon” is excessively literal. The phrase *stellt etwas zutreffendes... fest* is best translated idiomatically here rather than with a finite verb form; this also lets the connection to the noun *Feststellung* in the next line appear more clearly.

<sup>28</sup> Lovitt translates *sich ereignen* correctly as “come to pass” (*sich ereignen = sich begeben, sich zutragen, vor sich gehen*), but his gloss is misleading. “Later in this essay (p. 45), Heidegger points to the fact that *Ereignis*, and with it necessarily *sich ereignen*, embodies the meanings of the two verbs *eignen* (to be one’s own, to suit, to belong to), and the archaic *eräugnen* (to bring before the eyes, to bring to sight). .... [This] meaning clearly informs the argument of the essay throughout and should therefore be borne in

unveiling occurs. Hence, something that is merely correct is not yet the true. Only the latter brings us in a free relationship to that which concerns us from out of its essence. Accordingly, the correct instrumental definition of technology does not yet show us the essence of technology. In order that we may arrive at the latter or, at least, come close to it, we must seek the true lying beyond<sup>29</sup> the correct. We must ask: what is instrumentality itself? In what do things such as means and ends belong? A means is that whereby something is effected and hence realized. We call something that has an effect as its consequence a cause. But not only that by means of which something else is effected is a cause. The end in keeping with which the means are determined is also considered a cause. Wherever ends are pursued and means are employed, wherever instrumentality reigns, there reigns<sup>30</sup> causality.

For centuries, philosophy has taught that there are four causes: 1. *causa materialis*, the material or the matter<sup>31</sup> out of which a silver chalice, for example, is fashioned; 2. *causa formalis*, the form or the shape<sup>32</sup> into which the material enters; 3. *causa finalis*, the end, for example, the sacrificial rite, which determines the form and material of the chalice needed in the rite; and 4. *causa efficiens*, that which brings about the effect—the finished, actual chalice; [here,] the silversmith. What technology is, when represented as a means, reveals itself when we trace instrumentality back to fourfold causality.

But what if causality, for its part, veils itself in obscurity with regard to what it is?<sup>33</sup> For centuries, we have carried on as though the doctrine of four causes had fallen from heaven, a truth clear as day. But perhaps it is finally time to ask: why are there precisely<sup>34</sup> four causes?

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mind.” Despite Heidegger’s claim, *sich eignen* is unrelated with *eignen*: “Ahd. *irougen* (8. Jh.; zu ahd. *ouga*, s. Auge), mhd. *erougen*, *-öugen*, frühhd. *eräugen* ‘vor Augen stellen, zeigen’ entwickelt die Nebenform frühhd. *eräugnen*, die bei landschaftlicher Entrundung *ereignen* ergibt und sich im 18. Jh. (irrtümlich an *eignen*, s. d., angelehnt) durchsetzt. Nach anfangs (ahd. mhd.) transitivem und später reflexivem Gebrauch entwickelt sich die Bedeutung von ‘(sich) zeigen’ zu ‘sich begeben, vor sich gehen’.” The neutral “eventuate” avoids all connection with “appropriation,” the “propriating event,” et cetera.

<sup>29</sup> *Hindurch*, not *durch*. The idea is that we must pass through the correct to the true, or: the true lies on the other side of the correct.

<sup>30</sup> *Walten*. Lovitt correctly translates “reigns” here, but problematically shifts to the language of “holding sway” when discussing the four causes. See n. 67.

<sup>31</sup> *Das Material, der Stoff*. The two terms are equivalent in Heidegger’s usage.

<sup>32</sup> *Die Form, die Gestalt*. Note the contrast with *Aussehen* (Heidegger’s preferred rendition of εἶδος) in nn. 49 and 50.

<sup>33</sup> *Sich ... ins Dunkel hüllt*. Lovitt’s “is veiled in darkness” loses the active sense.

<sup>34</sup> *Gerade* not *nur* as Lovitt’s “only” requires.

What does “cause” really mean in relation to the aforementioned four causes? Out of what is their causal character so uniformly determined that they belong together?

Unless we engage with these questions, causality and, along with it, instrumentality and, with this, the standard definition of technology will remain obscure and without foundation.

For a long time, we have been used to representing cause as that which effects something.<sup>35</sup> In this context, “to work”<sup>36</sup> means to obtain results, effects.<sup>37</sup> The *causa efficiens*, which is just one of the four causes, sets the standard for all causality. This has been carried so far that we no longer include the *causa finalis*, purposiveness,<sup>38</sup> within causality. *Causa, casus* belongs to the verb *cadere*, “to fall,” and means that which effects that, as a result [of its activity], something turns out<sup>39</sup> in one way or another.<sup>40</sup> The doctrine of the four causes goes back to Aristotle. However, everything that later ages seek [to identify] among the Greeks under the idea and the term “causality” is, in the domain of Greek thought and for Greek thought, absolutely unrelated to effecting and bringing about.<sup>41</sup> What we call *cause* and the Romans called *causa* is termed *αἴτιον*<sup>42</sup> among the Greeks, that is, that which is responsible for something

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<sup>35</sup> *Das Bewirkende*. The addition of the *be-* affix to intransitive verbs makes them transitive. Thus, *wirken*, “be active, work (at or in something),” becomes *bewirken*, “effect,” that is, “bring about, cause something” (*etw. herbeiführen, verursachen*). Lovitt retains “bring about” for both *das Bewirkende* and *wirken* (in the next sentence), but this loses Heidegger’s meaning: the idea is that a cause is that which, in or through its activity, brings about something else, that is, it effects it.

<sup>36</sup> Here it is *wirken*.

<sup>37</sup> *Erzielen von Erfolgen, Effekten*. Lovitt’s translation is unexceptionable and I have adopted it too.

<sup>38</sup> *Finalität*. Lovitt: “telic finality.”

<sup>39</sup> *Ausfallen*. Lovitt translates “falls out.” Although this is the literal meaning of the verb (*herausfallen*), Heidegger is using the verb in its colloquial sense of something having a good or bad outcome (*etw. zeigt ein gutes, schlechtes Resultat*). English “turns out” best captures this sense.

<sup>40</sup> Lovitt’s “in such and such a way” loses the force of *so oder so*. The meaning is, something turns out either thus or thus.

<sup>41</sup> *Wirken und bewirken*. Here the order is reversed.

<sup>42</sup> Αἴτιον, τό, is “cause, Hp.VM6 (pl.), 21, Hdt.7.125, E.IA939, Th.4.26, etc.; τί ποτ’ οὖν ἐστὶ τὸ αἴτιον τὸ . . . μηδὲνα εἰπεῖν; D.8.56; freq. in Philos., ‘τὸ δ’ αἰ. τούτου εἶναι ὅτι . . .’ Pl.Ph.d.110e, etc.” Heidegger is drawing rather on αἰτι-α, ἤ: “A. responsibility, mostly in bad sense, *guilt, blame*, or the imputation thereof, i.e. *accusation*, first in Pi.O.1.35 and *Hdt.*, v. infr. (Hom. uses αἴτιος); II. *cause*, ‘δι’ ἣν αἰτίην ἐπολέμησαν’ *Hdt.Prooem.*, cf. *Democr.*83, Pl.Ti.68e, Phd.97a sq., etc.; on the four causes of *Arist.* v. *Ph.194b16*, *Metaph.*983a26:—αἰ. τοῦ γενέσθαι or ‘γεγονέναι’ Pl.Ph.d.97a; ‘τοῦ μεγίστου ἀγαθοῦ τῇ πόλει αἰτία ἢ κοινωνία’ Id.R.464b:—dat. αἰτία for the sake of, ‘κοινοῦ τινος ἀγαθοῦ’ Th.4.87, cf. D.H.8.29:—αἴτιον (cf. ‘αἴτιος’ 11.2) is used like αἰτία in the sense of *cause*, not in that of *accusation*.” More specifically, he emphasizes the first sense. Αἴτιον is not “cause” in our sense, and hence unrelated to “effecting and bringing about”; it is a being responsible that ultimately implies a transformed attitude to things.

else.<sup>43</sup> The four causes are the four reciprocally related<sup>44</sup> ways of being responsible.<sup>45</sup> An example will make this clear.

Silver is that from which a silver chalice is fashioned.<sup>46</sup> It is thus co-responsible for the chalice as this matter (ὕλη) [that is, the matter in the chalice]. The chalice itself owes, in the sense of thanking, the silver that out of which it consists.<sup>47</sup> But the sacrificial vessel does not owe a debt to the silver alone. As a chalice, that which owes a debt to the silver appears<sup>48</sup> in the outward look<sup>49</sup> of a chalice and not in that of a clip or a ring. The sacrificial vessel thus simultaneously owes a debt to the outward look<sup>50</sup> (εἶδος) of chaliceness.<sup>51</sup> Both the silver into which its outward look as a chalice has entered and the outward look in which the silver appears are, in their respective ways, co-responsible for the [being of the] sacrificial vessel.

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<sup>43</sup> *Verschuldet. Verschulden* means, “be responsible for something (negative), cause something (negative) through one’s own fault” (*die Schuld an etw. (Üblem) haben, etw. (Übles) durch eigene Schuld verursachen*). Lovitt translates, “indebted,” but this is the second meaning of *verschulden*, namely, “someone lands in financial difficulties, debts” (*jmd. gerät in finanzielle Schwierigkeiten, Schulden*). It is grammatically impossible here: “that to which something else is indebted” requires an *ist* and a *dem* instead of *was*.

<sup>44</sup> *Unter sich zusammengehörig*. Lovitt translates all too literally, “all belonging at once to each other.” *Zusammengehörig* means, “forming a unity, a whole, belonging to each other” (*eine Einheit, ein Ganzes bildend, zueinander gehörend*). *Unter sich*, “among themselves,” underscores the reciprocity.

<sup>45</sup> *Des Verschuldens*. Lovitt’s “for something else” is his addition.

<sup>46</sup> *Verfertigt*. Note the connection to *Verfertigung* (nn. 107 and 120). Lovitt’s “is made” is too generic.

<sup>47</sup> *Verdanken*. The chalice does not “owe thanks to the silver for that out of which it consists.” This would be at best metaphorical. What Heidegger literally means is, the chalice thanks the silver that part of the silver which has entered into it or it thanks the silver that part of itself, which was provided by the silver.

<sup>48</sup> *Erscheint*. This is one reason for not translating *Aussehen* idiomatically with “appearance.” The latter is *Erscheinung*, whereas with *Aussehen* Heidegger literally means the “look” of something.

<sup>49</sup> *Im Aussehen*. Both the choice of the word and the construction are unusual. We would expect: *hat das Aussehen von* or, more colloquially, *sieht wie ... aus*. Alternatively, we might expect a word such as *Form* or *Gestalt*. But Heidegger is already setting up his translation of εἶδος with *Aussehen* (literally, “have the appearance or have the outward aspect of”; *das Aussehen haben*) in the next sentence.

<sup>50</sup> *Aussehen*. Lovitt translates (both here and in the previous sentence) with “aspect.” This is not wrong, but the idea of εἶδος as how something looks like, the way it presents itself *to us*, is so important to Heidegger that I felt it best to translate literally. “Outward” underscores the prefix.

<sup>51</sup> *Von Schalenhaftem*. Literally, “the chalice-like” or “that which is of the nature of a chalice.”

However, a third thing is responsible, above all, for the sacrificial vessel, namely, that which encloses<sup>52</sup> it, in advance, into the domain of consecration and libation.<sup>53</sup> Thereby, the chalice qua sacrificial vessel<sup>54</sup> becomes circumscribed. Whatever circumscribes something terminates it.<sup>55</sup> The latter does not cease to be upon termination; rather, it first begins to be what it will be upon production from out of this termination. In Greek, that which terminates, that is, completes in this sense,<sup>56</sup> is called τέλος. This word is all too often translated as “aim” or “purpose” and hence misinterpreted. The τέλος is responsible for that which as the material and that which as the outward look are co-responsible for the sacrificial vessel.<sup>57</sup>

Finally, there is a fourth thing that is co-responsible for the finished sacrificial vessel lying before us ready to use: [this is] the silversmith. But this does not occur in the sense that,

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<sup>52</sup> *Eingrenzen*. Lovitt translates “confines,” making it difficult for him to convey the sense of the accusative. Heidegger means an active enclosing or placing *in* the domain rather than a static being placed in, as would be the case with the dative.

<sup>53</sup> *Weihe und des Spendens*. Lovitt’s “consecration and bestowal” shows that he has not understood the meaning. The sacramental wine in the chalice is shared with congregants (*spenden* = “give something as a donation, gift”; *etw. als Spende geben, schenken*).

<sup>54</sup> *Sie als Opfergerät*. Lovitt’s “is circumscribed as sacrificial vessel” suggests that the chalice’s intended use shapes it as a sacrificial vessel, but this would be efficient causality. The meaning is rather that insofar as it is a sacrificial vessel, the chalice attains completeness in the domain in which sacrificial vessels are employed.

<sup>55</sup> *Beenden* is straightforwardly “terminate.” Lovitt’s “gives bounds” loses the sense that a thing’s “end” (τέλος) both cuts it off from the indefinite possibilities of what it could have been and sets an end to an indefinite process of production. The next sentence also will not make sense, for a thing *does* stop with its bounds.

<sup>56</sup> *Das Beendende, Vollendende*: the play is lost in Lovitt’s translation. Termination *is* completion; something that is not terminated never attains completion.

<sup>57</sup> *Das τέλος verschuldet, was als Stoff und was als Aussehen das Opfergerät mitverschuldet*. Lovitt’s insertion of “together” is unwarranted; it also confuses the sense. The idea is simple: the τέλος determines (or, in Heidegger’s language, is responsible for) the form and material of the chalice. But here again, Heidegger wishes us not to think of the standard dictionary definition of τέλος, εος, τό, “the end or purpose of action, ‘τ. εἶναι ἀπασῶν τῶν πράξεων τὸ ἀγαθόν’ Id.Grg.499e; freq. in Arist., EN1094a18, al.: hence, the *final cause*, = τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα, Id.Metaph.994b9, 996a26, al.; hence simply = τὸ ἀγαθόν, the *chief good*, Id.EN1097a21, Zeno Stoic.1.45, etc.,” but rather the sense related to use, implementation, et cetera: “coming to pass, performance, consummation,” “εἰ γὰρ ἐπ’ ἀρήσιν τ. ἡμετέρησι γένοιτο” Od.17.496; “ἐν [θεοῖς] τ. ἐστὶν ὁμῶς ἀγαθῶν τε κακῶν τε” Hes.Op.669; δίκη δ’ ὑπὲρ ὕβριος ἴσχει ἐς τ. ἐξελθοῦσα issuing in *fulfilment, execution*, ib.218; “καθ’ ἅπερ ἐκ δικῆς κατὰ νόμον τ. ἐχούσης” PEleph.1.12 (iv B.C.), cf. IG12(7).67.48 (Arcesine, iv/iii B.C.)” Finally, note that with this interpretation Heidegger is subordinating ὕλη and εἶδος to τέλος; it determines them or rather, silver and chaliceness as the ὕλη and εἶδος appropriate to a chalice; and they in turn determine the finished being of the chalice.

[by] working, he brings about the finished sacrificial chalice as the effect of [his activity of] making.<sup>58</sup> The silversmith is not *causa efficiens*.

Aristotle’s doctrine neither knows of the cause we designate thus nor does it use a corresponding Greek term.<sup>59</sup>

The silversmith deliberates on<sup>60</sup> and unifies<sup>61</sup> the three aforementioned ways of being responsible. In Greek, *to deliberate* is λέγειν, λόγος. It is rooted in ἀποφαίνεσθαι, letting something become visible.<sup>62</sup> The silversmith is co-responsible as the one from whom the bringing forward and self-sufficient existence<sup>63</sup> of the sacrificial chalice take and retain their first departure.<sup>64</sup> The three aforementioned ways of being responsible owe thanks to the silversmith’s deliberation<sup>65</sup> for the fact that, and the way in which, they come into appearance and into play<sup>66</sup> in the bringing-forth of the sacrificial chalice.

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<sup>58</sup> *Eines Machens ... bewirkt*. Heidegger’s point is that the silversmith’s contribution does not lie in productive activity as such, but in an antecedent consideration of ὕλη, εἶδος, and τέλος with the aim of letting the chalice come into being. He thus participates in the “disclosure” of the chalice, the “event of truth,” et cetera but in no way as *homo faber*.

<sup>59</sup> Aristotle speaks of “the primary source of the change or coming to rest” (ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς μεταβολῆς ἢ πρώτη ἢ τῆς ἡρεμῆσεως) and more generally, “what makes of what is made and what causes change of what is changed” (τὸ ποιοῦν τοῦ ποιουμένου καὶ τὸ μεταβάλλον τοῦ μεταβαλλομένου; *Phys.* 194b29). Heidegger wishes this to be heard not in the sense of effecting (*wirken*), but rather in the sense of reflection, guidance, and ultimately, letting something come into being.

<sup>60</sup> *Überlegt sich*. “deliberate on, think through, before one resolves on something <consider something>” (*etw. bedenken, durchdenken, bevor man sich zu etw. entschließt <sich etw. überlegen>*).

<sup>61</sup> A generation of Heideggerians has grown up on the language of “gather.” But *versammeln* is “assemble” (usually people); more precisely, it is “bring, call together for a particular purpose”; “unite them to this purpose” (*eine (größere) Anzahl von Personen zu einem bestimmten Zweck an einem Ort zusammenbringen, zusammenrufen, vereinigen*). The meaning is not simply that the silversmith collects the elements for his task: this would make him a mere apprentice. He actually makes the matter, the form, and the end *into one*.

<sup>62</sup> *Zum Vorschein bringen*. Lovitt’s “bring forward into appearance” loses the connection Heidegger is making to ἀποφαίνεσθαι (from ἀποφαίνω, “show forth, display”).

<sup>63</sup> *Vorbringen*, not *hervorbringen*. Lovitt’s “resting-in-self” would be *in sich beruhen*. *Auf sich beruhen* means, the chalice supports itself on itself, that it requires nothing further for its existence at the end of the production process. We might also have translated, “independent existence.”

<sup>64</sup> *Ausgang* could be conclusion or result, but the *erst* speaks against it. Lovitt’s “departure” is unimpeachable.

<sup>65</sup> Lovitt: “pondering.”

<sup>66</sup> *Ins Spiel kommen* is idiomatically “enter consideration.” But here Heidegger probably means not only that they enter into consideration as the material and form for the chalice, but also that they interact in bringing forth the chalice.

Thus, four ways of being responsible reign<sup>67</sup> in the sacrificial vessel lying before us ready to use.<sup>68</sup> They differ from each other but, nonetheless, they belong together. What antecedently<sup>69</sup> unites them? In what does the reciprocal play<sup>70</sup> of the four ways of being responsible play? From what does the unity of the four causes derive?<sup>71</sup> Thought of in Greek terms, what does this being responsible<sup>72</sup> mean?

Today, we are far too easily inclined either to understand being responsible<sup>73</sup> moralistically as a lapse or to construe it as a kind of effecting. In either case, we bar the way to the original meaning of what is later called *causality*. Unless this way opens up to us,<sup>74</sup> we shall also fail to see what the instrumentality that is rooted in the causal<sup>75</sup> actually is.

In order to guard against these misinterpretations of being responsible,<sup>76</sup> we shall clarify its four modes in relation to that for which they are responsible. In the example, they are responsible for the silver chalice lying before us ready for use<sup>77</sup> as a sacrificial vessel. Lying before

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<sup>67</sup> *Walten* is “exercise rule” or “have power” (*Herrschaft ausüben, Macht haben*). Insofar as something exercises this role, it can be “clearly perceivable in a thing, the dominant characteristic in it” (*etw. waltet = etw. ist deutlich wahrnehmbar, ist das bestimmende Charakteristikum*). To let something exercise this role is “to act in a way that it becomes clearly perceptible, that it can unfold its effects” (*etw. walten lassen = so handeln, dass etw. deutlich wahrnehmbar wird, sich auswirken kann*). The English “reign” best conveys all these senses. Lovitt’s “sway” is lexically untenable.

<sup>68</sup> *Vor- und bereitliegen*. Lovitt’s “lying ready before us” attempts to cover both. But *Bereitliegen* is specifically “lie there for use” (*zum Gebrauch daliegen*). As every Heideggerian knows, this is the precise point for Heidegger.

<sup>69</sup> *Im voraus* and not *von Anfang an* as Lovitt’s “from the beginning” requires.

<sup>70</sup> *Zusammenspiel* is the mutual or reciprocal play. It can also be the harmonious interplay. Lovitt translates *zusammen* with “in unison,” but this would be *im Einklang*. The four causes are not identical.

<sup>71</sup> *Woher stammt*. There is no word for Lovitt’s “source” here.

<sup>72</sup> *Dieses Verschulden*. Lovitt’s “owing and being responsible” is an overtranslation.

<sup>73</sup> *Das Verschulden*. Lovitt’s “being responsible and being indebted” is unwarranted. As noted previously, *verschulden* simply means to be responsible (*Schuld*) for something. It is not formed from *schulden*, “owe someone something,” through the addition of the affix *ver-*. Although *Schuld* carries a sense of moral or financial responsibility impossible to convey in English, neither the person responsible for the outcome is “indebted” to the latter nor is the outcome “indebted” to the former.

<sup>74</sup> Lovitt translates using the passive voice.

<sup>75</sup> *Im Kausalen beruht*. Lovitt’s “based on” requires an *auf*. *Wurzelt* would have been more standard.

Contrary to my usual practice (see n. 172), I retain the substantivized adjective here: I think Heidegger wishes to make a distinction between “the causal” and what is called *causality* in the previous sentence.

<sup>76</sup> Lovitt again doubles the verb (“being responsible and being indebted”).

<sup>77</sup> *Bereitliegen* is not simply “lying ready,” but specifically, lying ready *for use*. The chalice’s finishedness consists not in being present, but being available.

and ready for use (ὕποκεισθαι) characterize the presence<sup>78</sup> of the presencing.<sup>79</sup> The four ways of being responsible bring something to appearance. They let it come forward into presence.<sup>80</sup> They release it into the latter<sup>81</sup> and initiate it thus—namely, into its completed<sup>82</sup> arrival.<sup>83</sup> Being responsible has the fundamental characteristic of initiating something into arrival. Understood as such initiating, being responsible is an inducing.<sup>84</sup> Keeping in view what the Greeks experienced in being responsible, αἴτια, we now give the word “inducing” an extended meaning, so that it now designates the essence of causality as the Greeks thought of it. By contrast, the

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<sup>78</sup> Lovitt translates “the presencing of something that presences.” But the first is a noun and the second is a substantivized participle. The English gerund most closely replicates the German present participle. David Farrell Krell’s “the presencing of something that is present” is decidedly worse: it loses the point of the present participle, which indicates an action or a process. See also n. 79.

<sup>79</sup> *Das Anwesen eines Anwesenden*. *Anwesen* is a substantivized infix from the verb *anwesen*, and hence initially (fifteenth c.) meant “the presence, stay, presence” (*Gegenwart, Aufenthalt, Anwesenheit*); in Upper German, it then came to mean (end fifteenth c.) “an estate with a residence” (*Grundstück mit Wohnhaus*). *Anwesenheit*, meaning “being in that place, being present” (*das Zugegenessein, Dabeisein*) was formed on the model of the older *Abwesenheit* in the first half of the seventeenth c., and alongside it the synonymous *Anwesen* (used in this sense until the eighteenth c.). Heidegger preferentially uses *anwesen* to indicate that being is understood as staying, dwelling, or tarrying (for a while)—in German: *aufhalten, wohnen, and verweilen*—although he typically reverses the etymology, deriving “presence” from “an estate with a residence.” The verb *anwesen*, from Old High German *anawesan*, “be in that place, be there, be present/available” (*zugegen sein, dasein, vorhanden sein*), a translation of the Latin *adesse*, which emerges in the ninth c. is now only preserved in the vernacular. The adjective *anwesend*, “[present] in place, present” (*zugegen, gegenwärtig*), is the present participle of the verb.

<sup>80</sup> *An-wesen*. Heidegger hyphenates the word to indicate the connection with *wesen* (see n. 122).

<sup>81</sup> Lovitt’s “set it free to that place” is an overtranslation. *Loslassen* is simply “release” (*etw., jmdn. nicht mehr halten, festhalten*), whereas *dahin* describes a vector. It is not *da + hin*.

<sup>82</sup> *Vollendete*. Lovitt’s “complete” loses the sense of the past participle.

<sup>83</sup> *Ankunft*. Heidegger is playing on *anwesen, anlassen, and Ankunft*. The latter means “arrive, show up” (*das Ankommen, Eintreffen*) and derives from the substantive *Kunft*, itself a derivative of *kommen*: “das Kommen, Ankommen’ (selbständiges Substantiv bis ins 19. Jh.), ahd. *kumft* (8. Jh.), *kunft* (9. Jh.), mhd. *kumft, kunft*’ *Ankunft, das Kommen, Eintreffen, Zukunft, das Zukünftige*’ neben mnd. *kumpst, kumst, komst*, mnl. *comst*, nl. *Komst* sind Abstrakta mit sti-Suffix (vgl. auch mit ti-Suffix got. *Gaquumps* ‘Zusammenkunft, Versammlung’), wobei im Hd. -s- in -f- übergeht mit nachfolgendem Wandel von m zu n; daran anschließend die Ableitung *künftig* (s. d.). Im frühen 19. Jh. wird das Substantiv in freier Verwendung aufgegeben, bleibt jedoch als Grundwort von Komposita erhalten.”

<sup>84</sup> Heidegger is playing on the words *anlassen* and *veranlassen*. Lovitt translates, “start something on its way” and “occasion” or “induce to go forward” (the latter glosses Heidegger’s hyphenated rendition of *veranlassen* as *ver-an-lassen*). But *anlassen* simply means, to start something in the sense of turning something on. *Veranlassen* is “cause, effect, elicit/evoke, or bring about something” (*etw. verursachen, bewirken, hervorrufen, herbeiführen*). It also means, to be the indirect cause of something in that one brings it about that someone else does something (*jmdn. dazu bringen, etw. zu tun*).

popular narrower meaning of the word “inducing” signifies only an impulse and a triggering<sup>85</sup> and refers to a species of accessory cause within the totality of causality.

But in what does the reciprocal play of the four ways of inducing play? They let what is not yet present arrive into presence. Accordingly, they are uniformly governed<sup>86</sup> by a bringing that brings what presences into appearance. Plato tells us what this bringing is in a sentence from the *Symposium*:

(205 b): ἡ γὰρ τοι ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος εἰς τὸ ὄν ἰόντι ὀτρωοῦν αἰτία πᾶσά ἐστι ποιησις.

Every inducing for whatever transitions and proceeds from what is not-present to presencing is ποιησις, bringing-forth.<sup>87</sup>

It is of utmost importance that we think of bringing-forth<sup>88</sup> in its full breadth and, simultaneously, as the Greeks thought it. Not only the craftsman’s fabrication but also artistic

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<sup>85</sup> *Anstoß und Auslösung*. Lovitt’s “striking against” is too literal, whereas “releasing” would be *Erlösung*. The idea is that the “true” meaning of *veranlassen* is, enabling something to attain its full being by providing the pathway (Latin *ductus, ducere*) into the latter, whereas everyday speech takes *veranlassen* to be merely an occasional or incidental causation (see previous note). “Induce” correctly conveys this sense. Heidegger’s hyphenation should be read as follows: causality is a permitting or letting [happen] (*lassen*) that initiates something (*an-lassen*) such that it at all times guides and enables (*ver-an-lassen*) this thing’s becoming; it is an inducing in this special threefold sense. Krell’s modification, “colliding and releasing,” is scarcely better.

<sup>86</sup> *Durchwalten*. See n. 9.

<sup>87</sup> Nehamas and Woodruff: “After all, everything that is responsible for creating something out of nothing is a kind of poetry”; Benardete: “For you see, every kind of making is responsible for anything whatsoever that is on the way from what is not to what is.”

<sup>88</sup> *Hervorbringen* means, “bring something to light, bring it forth” (*etw. zum Vorschein bringen, hervorholen*) and “let something or someone emerge” (*etw., jmdn. entstehen lassen*). Heidegger’s point is that the essence of ποιησις is not “making,” but “manifesting,” whether that be the bringing forth of something through craft or the spontaneous emergence characteristic of nature. Lovitt notes, Heidegger “hyphenates the word in order to emphasize its adverbial prefixes, *her* (here or hither) and *vor-* (forward or forth). Heidegger elsewhere makes specific the meaning resident in *Her-vor-bringen* for him by utilizing those prefixes independently. Thus he says (translating literally), ‘Bringing-forth hither brings hither out of concealment, forth into unconcealment’ (below, p. 11); and after identifying working (*wirken*) and *her-vor-bringen* he says that working must be understood as ‘bringing hither-into unconcealment, forth-into presencing’ (SR 161). Because of the awkwardness of the English phrase ‘to bring forth hither,’ it has not been possible to include in the translation of *her-vor-bringen* the nuance of meaning that *her-* provides.” *Hervorbringen*, however, is not formed from *her-* and *vor-*, even though *hervor* can be further analyzed into the two. *Hervor-* forms a semantic unit on its own: it indicates “the vector from the back to the front, from there to here” (*die Richtung von (dort) hinten nach (hier) vorn*) or the “becoming explicit or manifest of something out of something or amidst something” (*ein Deutlich-, Sichtbarwerden aus, zwischen etw. heraus*). Both meanings are present here: *hervorbringen* is to

and poetic bringing into appearance and bringing into images is bringing-forth, ποιήσις. Φύσις, too, the upsurge<sup>89</sup> of something from out of itself, is a bringing-forth, ποιήσις. Indeed, φύσις is ποιήσις in the highest sense for what presences φύσει [by nature] has the onset<sup>90</sup> of [that is, into] bringing-forth, for example, the onset<sup>91</sup> of a flower into bloom, in itself (ἐν ἑαυτῷ). By contrast, what is brought-forth by craft or by art, for example, the silver chalice, does not have the onset of [that is, into] bringing-forth in itself, but in another (ἐν ἄλλῳ), namely, in the craftsman or the artist.

The modes of inducing, the four causes, are hence at play within bringing-forth. Through it, everything that grows in nature and, likewise, everything that is the product of skill and all creations of the arts come, each time, to appearance.

But how does bringing-forth—be it in nature or be it in skill and art—occur? What is the bringing-forth in which the fourfold manner of inducing is at play? Inducing concerns the presencing<sup>92</sup> of that which comes, each time, to appearance in bringing-forth. Bringing-forth brings forward<sup>93</sup> from concealment<sup>94</sup> into unconcealment.<sup>95</sup> Bringing-forth eventuates only

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bring something to light or to bring it forth such that it becomes manifest thereby. Heidegger’s meaning is that the essence of ποιήσις is a movement, a vector, from non-existence to existence or, rather, from concealment to unconcealment. Lovitt’s analysis obscures rather than clarifies the meaning:

*hervorbringen* is not a *her-* and *vorbringen*, a bringing here and advancing or presenting.

<sup>89</sup> *Aufgehen*. I render *aufgehen* with “upsurgence” and *aufkommen* with “emergence.”

<sup>90</sup> *Aufbruch*, “blossoming, departure” (*das Aufbrechen, das Fortgehen*), is Heidegger’s translation of Aristotle’s ὄρμη, “rapid motion forwards, onrush, onset, assault.” I have translated “onset” as best preserving this double sense. Lovitt translates “bursting open.”

<sup>91</sup> Here it is the substantivized verb *das Aufbrechen*.

<sup>92</sup> *Das Anwesen*. This could either be the noun or the substantivized verb, but it is clear Heidegger intends the activity of something that comes to presence. The English gerund comes closest.

<sup>93</sup> *Das Her-vor-bringen bringt ... vor*. If Heidegger glosses *hervorbringen* with *vorbringen*, the former can hardly be “bringing-forth hither” as Lovitt has it. Colloquially, *vorbringen* is “bring something forward” (*etw. nach vorn bringen*). However, this yields a weak sense. The primary meaning—“present or articulate something as a wish or explanation, assert something” (*etw. als Wunsch, zur Erklärung vortragen, äußern, etw. geltend machen*)—seems implied. Interpreted thus, *hervorbringen* is not a *spatial* movement, but a presentation, an articulation, or an assertion of something. The sentence is therefore not a tautology (as it would be if we had taken *vorbringen* as merely another word for *hervorbringen*): it really does tell us something about what *hervorbringen* is (or, rather, about how Heidegger conceives it). Furthermore, because *hervorbringen* is an assertion against concealment, it can be seen as a kind of ontological *impiety*. This theme plays an important role later in the essay.

<sup>94</sup> *Verborgenheit*.

<sup>95</sup> *Unverborgenheit*.

insofar as something concealed comes into the unconcealed [that is, it becomes unconcealed].<sup>96</sup>

This coming is rooted in what we call disclosure;<sup>97</sup> it is an oscillation<sup>98</sup> within the latter. The Greeks called it *ἀλήθεια*. The Romans translated this word with “*veritas*.” We say “truth” and commonly understand it as the correctness of representation.<sup>99</sup>

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<sup>96</sup> The complete chain of thought is thus as follows: *verschulden* → *veranlassen* → *hervorbringen* → *entbergen*. Insofar as *hervorbringen* is an *entbergen* it is only possible out of and against *Verborgenheit*. Thus, provided we trace it sufficiently far, causality as the Greeks thought of it, *ontic* being responsible, points to a deeper sense of *verschulden*: an ontological (and not merely causal) *Verschuldetein*.

<sup>97</sup> *Entbergen*. Lovitt translates “revealing.” This is possible (*Entbergung* = *Entdeckung, Aufdeckung, Enthüllung, durch die etwas bisher Verborgenes, Geheimes sichtbar, erkennbar wird*), but loses the specific sense Heidegger intends. *Offenbarung* and *offenbaren* are straightforwardly “revelation” and “reveal.” *Entbergen*, however, carries the sense of manifesting something that was previously concealed: it is the “discovery, excavation, exposure through which something that was previously hidden or secret becomes visible, recognizable” (*Entdeckung, Aufdeckung, Enthüllung, durch die etwas bisher Verborgenes, Geheimes sichtbar, erkennbar wird*). The root *bergen* has a threefold meaning: (1) “bring something or someone from danger to safety” (*etw., jmdn. vor Gefahr in Sicherheit bringen*), “to rescue someone alive (from a disaster)” (*jmdn. (bei einem Unglück) lebend b. (retten)*), “bring in the harvest, the hay” (*d. Ernte, Heu b. (einbringen)*); (2) “conceal or hide something for safety” (*geh. etw., sich zum Schutz verbergen, verstecken*); and (3) “something hides something in the sense of containing it” (*etw. birgt etw. = etw. enthält etw.*), “something shelters something within itself” (*etw. birgt etw. in sich*). The etymology of the word—“**bergen** Vb. ‘in Sicherheit bringen’. Ahd. *bergan* (8. Jh.), mhd. *bergen* (ahd. und mhd. auch ‘verbergen’), asächs. *gibergan*, mnd. *bergen*, mnl. *berghen*, nl. *bergen*, aengl. *beorgan*, anord. *bjarga*, schwed. *bärga*, got. *baírgan* gehen mit lit. *birginti* ‘nicht viel ausgeben, sparen’, aslaw. *nebrěšti* ‘außer acht lassen, mißachten’, russ. *beréc’* (беречь) ‘hüten, bewahren’ auf ie. *\*bhergh-* ‘bergen, verwahren’ zurück”—reveals a connection with preservation (*verwahren*). Heidegger uses the related *Unverborgenheit* (“unconcealment” or “uncoveredness”) to translate the Greek *ἀλήθεια*, which, he claims, incorrectly, is etymologically derived from *λήθη*, “forgetting, forgetfulness”; *entbergen* would then mean something like: a distancing or a separation, a coming out or a taking out of that which was previously *geborgen* (note, however, that neither *verbergen* nor *entbergen* is formed directly from *bergen* through the addition of the respective affix). English “disclosure” is closest to Heidegger’s meaning, but cannot preserve the sense of retrieval, raising up, shelter, or safekeeping.

<sup>98</sup> *Beruhet und schwingt in dem, was wir das Entbergen nennen*. Lovitt’s “rests and moves freely” is more literal, but the idea is that coming to presence is founded in, supported upon (*etw. gründet, stützt sich auf etw.*) disclosure: it occurs as a “pendular, arc-like, and periodic back-and-forth movement” within the latter (*sich, jmdn., etw. wie ein Pendel, große Bogen beschreibend, regelmäßig hin- und herbewegen*). “Moves freely” fails to capture this sense.

<sup>99</sup> *Richtigkeit des Vorstellens*. Lovitt’s “correctness of an idea” loses the point. The idea is that truth, for us, has been degraded to the correspondence between two things that are, in Heidegger’s language, *vorhanden*. Knowledge, in turn, becomes a mere process of adequation of an interior representation to an exterior object. Things thereafter become available to us for various forms of manipulation, including technology.

Whither have we strayed? We were inquiring into technology and we have now arrived at ἀλήθεια, at disclosure.<sup>100</sup> What does the essence of technology have to do with disclosure? The answer is, everything. For all bringing-forth is grounded in disclosure. The latter, however,<sup>101</sup> unifies<sup>102</sup> the four modes of inducing, that is, causality, within itself and [ , as such,] it governs<sup>103</sup> causality. Ends and means, that is, instrumentality, belong in the domain of causality.<sup>104</sup> Instrumentality, however, is considered the fundamental characteristic of technology. When we inquire methodically<sup>105</sup> into what technology, represented as a [mere] means, actually is, we arrive at disclosure.<sup>106</sup> The possibility of all productive fabrication<sup>107</sup> is grounded in it.

Technology is thus no mere means. Technology is a mode of disclosure.<sup>b</sup> If we are attentive to this, an entirely different domain reveals itself to us for [establishing] the essence of technology. It is the domain of disclosure, that is, of truth.<sup>108</sup>

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<sup>100</sup> *Entbergen*, rather than *Entbergung*. Although it might have been more natural to translate the substantivized verb *das Entbergen* with “disclosing,” in context the noun “disclosure” seemed more appropriate. Heidegger uses both words interchangeably; however, in this translation, the occurrence of *Entbergung* will always be signalled.

<sup>101</sup> *Aber*, not *gar* or *durchaus* as Lovitt’s “indeed” would require.

<sup>102</sup> See my note on *versammeln* (n. 61). Lovitt’s “gathers up” makes no sense.

<sup>103</sup> *Durchwalten*. See n. 9.

<sup>104</sup> Lovitt’s note on this line is misleading. *Gehören in* (accusative) is as standard a construction as *zu etw., jmdm. gehören*; the former indicates the proper place or being befitting; the latter possession.

<sup>105</sup> *Schritt für Schritt* is idiomatic for any methodical process or investigation; we might also have said, “carefully.”

<sup>106</sup> *Entbergung*.

<sup>107</sup> “Manufacturing” has lost its connection with “hand” (Latin *manus*); it now suggests large-scale industrial production. Heidegger’s *Verfertigung* is broader: *herstellendes Verfertigung* is any activity oriented towards a finished product. *Verfertigung* is often used for handmade or custom production; it clearly has this connotation in Heidegger. All *Verfertigung*, including the making of the craftsman, is grounded in disclosure; as a specific modern derivative of the former, *Herstellung* is also grounded in disclosure.

<sup>b</sup> Or, now *the* dominant mode of disclosure.

<sup>108</sup> Lovitt attributes great significance to Heidegger’s hyphenation of the German word for truth, *Wahrheit*, but the root of the word is self-evident. It is more helpful to look at its etymology, which indeed will reveal the connection with *gewähren* and *wahren* that Heidegger makes: “**wahr** Adj. ‘der Wahrheit entsprechend, wirklich’, ahd. (8. Jh.), mhd. *wār* ‘wahr(haft), wirklich, gewiß, echt, recht’, asächs. mnd. *wār*, mnl. *waer*, nl. *waar*, afries. *wēr* (germ. *\*wēra-*) und (als j-Stamm gebildetes) ahd. *wāri* (8. Jh.), mhd. *wäre*, aengl. *wæ̅r* sind verwandt mit ahd. *wāra* ‘Bündnistreue, Schutz’ (8. Jh.), mhd. *wāre* ‘Vertrag’, mnl. *wāre*, *waer* ‘Sicherheit, Gewährleistung’, aengl. *wer* ‘Vertrag, Schutz’, anord. *vārar* (Plur.) ‘Gelübde’ (germ. *\*wērō* f.); s. dazu auch albern, *gewähren* und (unter Vorbehalt) *Wirt*. Mitlat. *vērus* ‘wahr’, air. *fīr* ‘wahr’, aslaw. *věra*, russ. *věra* (*βερα*) ‘Glaube, Zuversicht, Vertrauen’ läßt sich dehnstufiges

This prospect unsettles us. Indeed, it should. It should unsettle us as long as possible and so direly<sup>109</sup> that we finally take the innocuous<sup>110</sup> question of what the word “technology” means seriously. The word is derived from the Greek. Τεχνικον refers to something that belongs to τέχνη. As for its meaning, we must observe two things. First, τέχνη is not only the name for the craftsman’s activity and skill but also for the art of thinking<sup>111</sup> and the fine arts. Τέχνη belongs to bringing-forth, to ποιήσις; it is something poetic.<sup>112</sup>

The second point to observe regarding the word τέχνη is even more important. From early on until Plato’s time, the word τέχνη occurs along with the word ἐπιστήμη. Both words are terms for knowledge in the widest sense. They refer to knowing one’s way about something, being proficient in something.<sup>113</sup> Knowledge provides access.<sup>114</sup> In that it makes accessible,<sup>115</sup> it is a form of disclosure. Aristotle, in a remarkable treatment (Eth. Nic. VI, c.3 and 4), distinguishes between ἐπιστήμη and τέχνη; specifically, with regard to what they disclose and how they disclose it. τέχνη is a mode of ἀληθεύειν. It discloses objects that cannot, themselves, bring themselves forth;<sup>116</sup> objects that are not yet present; and hence can look and turn out differently each time. Someone who builds a house or ship or fashions a chalice discloses what is

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ie. \**uēr-* ‘Vertrauen’ zu einer Wurzel ie. \**uer-* (oder \**uerā-*?) ‘achten, Freundlichkeit erweisen’ (s. wahren), adjektivisch ‘vertrauenswert, wahr’ erschließen. **wahrhaft** Adj. ‘aufrichtig, wahr, wirklich’, ahd. (8. Jh.), mhd. *wārhaft*. **Wahrheit** f. ‘das Wahre, Wirklichkeit’, ahd. (9. Jh.), mhd. *wārheit*.”

<sup>109</sup> *Er soll es auch, soll es möglichst lange und so bedrängend, daß ...*

<sup>110</sup> *Schlichte* can be “simple,” but here a stronger meaning is probably called for.

<sup>111</sup> *Hobe Kunst*—literally, high art—is idiomatic for thought. I have preserved “art” in order to indicate the connection with the fine arts and because, for Heidegger, thinking is an art or craft to be mastered. Lovitt translates “arts of the mind,” which loses the point. The expression is clearly singular.

<sup>112</sup> I do not see what is gained by Lovitt’s “poetic.”

<sup>113</sup> *Sichauskennen in etwas, das Sichverstehen auf etwas*. Lovitt translates, “be entirely at home in something, understand and be expert in it.” Lexically, *sich in etw. auskennen* and *sich auf etw. verstehen* are synonyms; Heidegger is using the one to amplify the other here.

<sup>114</sup> *Aufschluß* could be either “unlock” (*das Aufschließen*) or “clarification, information” (*Aufklärung, Auskunft*). Lovitt translates “knowing provides an opening up,” but this would be *Erschließung*. Although “knowledge provides clarification/information” is possible, this is precisely the meaning Heidegger does not intend. He means a pre-theoretical knowing one’s way around. The next sentence makes it clear that what is meant is that knowledge lets us enter into a field or embark on an activity. I have chosen “access” as best capturing this sense.

<sup>115</sup> *Als aufschließendes*. Lovitt’s “as an opening up” loses the sense of the present participle.

<sup>116</sup> *Was sich nicht selber*. The sentence is not merely reflexive; the point is that τέχνη ὄντα do not *themselves (selber)* bring themselves forth. Heidegger is being true to Aristotle here.

to be brought-forth following the perspectives<sup>117</sup> of [that is, latent in] the four modes of inducing. This disclosure selects<sup>118</sup> the appearance and the material for the ship or the house in advance with regard to the finished product intuited in ideality,<sup>119</sup> thereafter determining the manner of fabrication<sup>120</sup> out of them. Thus, the decisive characteristic of τέχνη is not [that it involves] making or working with<sup>121</sup> something; nor is it the employment of means, but the aforementioned disclosure. Τέχνη is a bringing-forth in this sense [that is, as disclosure] and not in the sense of manufacturing.

Thus, the cue as to what the word τέχνη means and how the Greeks determined it leads into the same context as the one that manifested to us when we pursued the question of what instrumentality as such is in truth.

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<sup>117</sup> *Nach den Hinsichten*. Lovitt’s “according to” is lexically and grammatically unobjectionable, but hardly revealing.

<sup>118</sup> Heidegger’s use of *versammeln* is idiosyncratic here: *sammeln*, “bring together, collect, amass,” would have been more fitting. Heidegger intends to express that these things are brought together for a single purpose; the translation “select” best conveys this sense. “Gather” is better reserved for Heidegger’s *auflesen*, which he relates to Greek λέγειν.

<sup>119</sup> *Das vollendet erschaute fertige Ding*. Lovitt’s translation, “the finished thing envisioned as completed,” supplies an *als* and treats *vollendet* as an adjective. Its use in this sentence, however, is adverbial, modifying *erschaut*. The meaning is that the finished thing or product is intuited fully or perfectly, that is, in its ideal form.

<sup>120</sup> *Verfertigung*, rather than *Herstellung*. See n. 107.

<sup>121</sup> *Hantieren* is “work, be busy” (*wirtschaften, geschäftig sein*). Lovitt’s “manipulating” rests on a false etymology: despite the verbal similarity and its present day meaning, the verb is not derived from German *Hand* (hand), but from Old French and French *hanter*, “frequently visit, have dealings with” (*häufig aufsuchen, Umgang haben*).

Technology is a mode of disclosure. Technology prevails<sup>122</sup> in the domain where disclosure and unconcealment; [the domain] where *ἀλήθεια*, the truth, occurs.<sup>123</sup>

Against this determination of the domain where technology prevails,<sup>124</sup> one could object that, while it certainly holds for Greek thought and may, in the best case, [also] fit the technology of the craftsman, it does not apply to modern industrial technology.<sup>125</sup> Yet, it is precisely the latter and it alone that is disturbing; this is what motivates us to inquire into technology “*as such*.”<sup>126</sup> We say that modern technology is unlike earlier forms of technology because it is based on modern exact natural science.<sup>127</sup> However, in the meantime, we recognize ever more clearly that the reverse also holds true: as experimental physics, modern physics depends on technical apparatuses and advances in the construction of apparatuses.<sup>128</sup> This determination of the reciprocal relationship of technology and physics is correct. But it remains

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<sup>122</sup> *Wesen*. Lovitt’s “comes to presence” requires an *anwesen*. Heidegger translators typically translate *wesen* by “essence” drawing on the noun *das Wesen*. The English verb “essence,” however, means something quite different. Furthermore, the verb *wesen* expresses a different meaning than the noun; indeed, if one does not know this meaning, one cannot understand why Heidegger employs this verb, since it apparently invokes a concept to which he is totally opposed. Lexically, *wesen* is an obsolete verb (though it is still found in formal usage) meaning “to be present (as a vital force)” (*als lebende Kraft vorhanden sein*). Although it means “exist,” it is used in a more intensive sense encompassing “the concept of a specific assertion of life or efficacy” (“WESEN, vb., ‘leben und weben’, d. h. ‘existieren, da sein’ (oft mit lokaler ergänzung) in einem intensivierten und den begriff spezifischer lebensäusserung oder wirksamkeit vage einschliessenden sinne”). The word is identical with the substantivized verbs ahd. *wesan*, mhd. *wesen* ‘esse’, from the Indo-Germanic root \**ues-* ‘verweilen’; together with forms of the roots \**es-* (sein) und \**bheu-* (bin, bist) it forms the paradigm of the German verbum substantivum. However, it has almost completely lost its present-tense forms in this function (merely the participial usage survives); the new High German usages in this sense are secondary and the word sporadically appears and in more or less temporally limited contexts in mystic-religious texts or (more recently) in mystical stylization. It is this particular sense that appeals to Heidegger over what he considers the more static semantic field of other expressions for “being.”

<sup>123</sup> *Geschehen*, not *erreignen*, as we might expect given Heidegger’s usage.

<sup>124</sup> *Wesensbereich*. Lovitt’s translation, “essential domain,” is both more literal and accurate, but given Heidegger’s usage of the verb in the previous line, I think this is what is meant.

<sup>125</sup> *Moderne Kraftmaschinentchnik. Kraftmaschinen* are all forms of engines for power generation (see also n. 317). Lovitt’s “machine-powered technology” would be *kraftbetriebene Maschine*.

<sup>126</sup> *Nach “der” Technik zu fragen*.

<sup>127</sup> *Neuzeitlichen exakten Naturwissenschaft*. Lovitt: “modern physics as an exact science.”

<sup>128</sup> Possibly a reference to Heisenberg’s observation that “in the developments of the last two hundred years, technology has always been both the starting point and consequence of natural science. It is the starting point since developments and clarifications of science often arise because of refinements in the means of observation alone. (We may remind the reader of the invention of the telescope, the microscope, or even the development of X-rays.)”

a mere historicist<sup>129</sup> determination of facts and does not clarify wherein this reciprocal relationship is grounded. The decisive question, however, remains: what is the essence of modern technology that it can even think of employing exact natural science?<sup>130</sup>

What, then, is modern technology? It too is a disclosure. Only when we focus our attention on this fundamental characteristic does the specifically new element of modern technology reveal<sup>131</sup> itself to us.

The disclosure that dominates<sup>132</sup> modern technology, however, does not unfold into a bringing-forth in the sense of *ποίησις*. The disclosure that presences in modern technology is a harnessing<sup>133</sup> that subjects nature to the audacious demand<sup>134</sup> that it supply energy that can be

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<sup>129</sup> *Historisch*. Lovitt’s “historiological” is unwarranted.

<sup>130</sup> Literally, “of what nature is modern technology.” I have chosen to translate idiomatically.

<sup>131</sup> *Zeigen*.

<sup>132</sup> *Durchherrschen*. Heidegger uses this verb only twice in the entire essay, in near identical contexts. We might have expected him to say “the disclosure that dominates *in* modern technology,” but he is quite clear: there is not only a dominant mode of disclosure in modern technology; modern technology *is itself* dominated by a certain mode of disclosure. Lovitt’s “holds sway throughout modern technology” loses this nuance.

<sup>133</sup> *Herausfordern*. This is one of the key terms in the essay. Lovitt translates “challenge” or, sometimes, “challenge forth.” Although lexically correct—*herausfordern* is “challenge someone to a duel; rile or provoke someone or something” (*jmdn. zu einem Zweikampfauffordern; jmdn., etw. reizen, provozieren*) or “animate, encourage to something” (*zu etw. ermuntern, ermutigen*)—Lovitt’s translation does not work. Neither does man “challenge” nature (except perhaps in a metaphorical sense) nor is man “challenged” to do so. We make more progress when we look at the stem: **fordern** Vb. ‘verlangen, zum Zweikampf aufrufen’, *ahd. ford(a)rōn ‘begehren, verlangen, sich bemühen um, fördern’* (8. Jh.), *mhd. vordern, (omd.) vodern, mnd. vōrderen* (schwed. *fordra*, nl. *vorderen* aus dem Dt. entlehnt) ist eine Ableitung von *ahd. ford(a)ro*, s. *vorder* (ähnlich *ändern* zu *ander*), und bedeutet ursprünglich ‘verlangen, daß etw. hervorkommt’. Bereits in mhd. Zeit wird das Verb im Sinne von ‘auffordern, vor Gericht stellen, vorladen’ ein geläufiger Ausdruck der Rechtssprache und gewinnt danach an Verbreitung. **anfordern** Vb. wie verstärktes *fordern*, *mhd. anvo(r)dern*; vgl. *ahd. anaford(a)rōn ‘anklagen, auffordern’* (um 1000). **auffordern** Vb. ‘ermahnen, befehlen, einladen’, *mhd. ūfvo(r)dern*. **herausfordern** Vb. ‘zu etw. reizen’ (wohl 17. Jh.); **Herausforderung** f. (17. Jh.). **überfordern** Vb. ‘zuviel verlangen’ (18. Jh.). **Forderung** f. ‘ausdrückliches Verlangen’, *ahd. ford(a)runga ‘Vorrecht, Beförderung’* (9. Jh.), *mhd. vo(r)derunge* ‘Verlangen, (rechtliche) Forderung, Klage’. The original sense is that of demanding something of someone (often in a legal context); the idea here is that man compels nature to yield up something—what this is is clarified in the second half of the line. English “harness” best conveys this meaning: “to put harness on ... *figurative[ly]*, now chiefly to utilize (a river, waterfall, natural forces, atomic energy) for motive power.” (*OED*) A literal translation does not work, because Heidegger actually just means *fordern*: the prefix *heraus* underscores that not just any demand is meant, but specifically the demand that something *come forth* (*verlangen, daß etw. hervorkommt*). Lovitt’s “challenge forth” is simply incorrect.

<sup>134</sup> *Das Ansinnen stellen*. Lovitt’s “unreasonable demand” is excessive.

extracted<sup>135</sup> and stored up *as such* [that is, as pure energy]. But is this not also true of the old windmill? No. Its sails admittedly turn in the wind; they are entirely at the mercy of its blowing. But the windmill does not tap<sup>136</sup> the energy of air currents in order to store it up.<sup>137</sup>

By contrast, a tract of land is harnessed in mining<sup>138</sup> coal and ore. The earth now discloses itself as a coal field;<sup>139</sup> the ground as ore deposits.<sup>140</sup> The field that the farmer formerly

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<sup>135</sup> *Herausfördern*. Despite the similarity of form, this verb has a different root: **fördern** Vb. ‘unterstützen, begünstigen, voranbringen’, seit dem 16. Jh. bergmännisch ‘Bodenschätze zutage bringen’, ahd. *furd(i)ren* ‘jmdn. voranbringen, erhöhen, ernennen zu, einsetzen als’ (9. Jh.), mhd. *vürdern*, *vu(r)dern* ‘vorwärtsbringen, beschleunigen, vorwärtskommen’, mnd. *vōrderen*, mnl. nl. *vorderen*, aengl. *fyrþran* sind Ableitungen von einem Komparativ, der in ahd. *furdir*, mhd. *vürder*, *vurder* ‘(räumlich und zeitlich) vorwärts, weiterhin, fortan, fort, weg’, nhd. *fürder*, aengl. *furþor*, *furþur*, engl. *furthber* erhalten ist (s. fort). Entsprechend bedeutet das Verb ursprünglich auch ‘vorwärts schaffen, wohin bringen’. **förderlich** Adj. ‘nützlich, voranbringend’, mhd. *vürderlich*. **Förderung** f. ‘Unterstützung, Abbau von Bodenschätzen’, mhd. *vürderunge*, *vu(r)derunge*. **befördern** Vb. ‘transportieren, unterstützen’ (16. Jh.), ‘in der Dienststellung höherrücken lassen’ (18. Jh.). Lexically, *fördern* can either mean “extract something from the earth” (*etw. aus der Erde herausholen*) or “move something forwards or bring something a specific spot; archaic: transport/carry something” (*etw. fortbewegen, an eine bestimmte Stelle bringen*; veraltet: *etw. befördern*). Heidegger clearly means the first sense. The addition of *heraus* is unusual, because it normally applies to the second sense. As with *herausfordern*, Heidegger simply means that something is mined *out* of the earth.

<sup>136</sup> *Erschließen* has three primary senses:

1. “Make something previously unused or enclosed accessible to something or someone (*etw. bisher nicht Genutztes, etw. Verschlossenes für etw., jmdn. zugänglich machen*).

a) ...

b) <Something opens up to someone> “something reveals itself to someone, becomes comprehensible to someone” (<*etw. erschließt sich jmdm.*> *etw. offenbart sich jmdm., wird jmdm. verständlich*).

c) “Render something practicable for recovery” (*etw. für die Gewinnung nutzbar machen*).

2. <Infer something out of something> “derive something from something” (<*etw. aus etw. erschließen*> *etw. aus etw. herleiten*).

3. [elevated] “open something” (*[gehoben] etw. öffnen*).

Lovitt’s “unlock” relies on the last of these, though used metaphorically. I prefer the straightforward “tap” to convey c, which is clearly the sense intended.

<sup>137</sup> Wind turbines, though still dependent on the wind to generate power, have become much more efficient at extracting energy from the available wind. They can also feed their power into storage systems. The development of the two systems (generation and storage) is not directly connected. We have simply become more efficient in our use and distribution of energy to meet our needs. Moreover, the operative distinction appears not to be between “the older technology of the craftsman” and modern technology, but between kinetic and chemical energy. The latter depends on finding sufficiently large deposits (coal, gas, et cetera) for extraction. It would be a mistake to think there is something intrinsic to modern technology that demands “orderability.” Coal-mining moreover is attested in 40,000 BCE, which makes it distinctly older than the earliest known windmill (ca 500 CE).

<sup>138</sup> *Förderung*. I am unclear why Lovitt translates “putting out.”

<sup>139</sup> *Kohlenrevier*. Lovitt’s “coal mining district” is equally acceptable.

<sup>140</sup> *Erzlagerstätte*. Both “ore” (my choice) and “mineral” (Lovitt’s) are equally acceptable.

tilled<sup>141</sup> appeared differently when to till still meant to cultivate and to nurture. The farmer’s activity does not harness the farmland.<sup>142</sup> When sowing grain, he hands seeds over to the forces of growth and watches over their increase.<sup>143</sup> But in the meantime, the tilling of the field has likewise been drawn into the undertow<sup>144</sup> of another kind of ordering;<sup>145</sup> [namely, one that] *apprehends*<sup>146</sup> nature. It apprehends it in the sense of harnessing it.<sup>147</sup> Agriculture is now the mechanized food industry. The atmosphere is now apprehended<sup>148</sup> for nitrogen; the ground for ore; the ore for uranium; and the uranium for nuclear power,<sup>149</sup> which can be unleashed for either destructive or peaceful purposes.

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<sup>141</sup> Lovitt translates “cultivated and set in order,” but *bestellen* is idiomatic for “working the land” (*den Boden bearbeiten*). In a metaphorical sense, it can mean “arrange.”

<sup>142</sup> This is debatable. Measures to increase crop yields are as old as farming itself. Moreover, farmland was continuously harnessed by bringing it under the plough.

<sup>143</sup> Heidegger’s romanticizing account of farming plays a crucial role in his critique of modern technology, but the distinction he seeks to draw does not really obtain. Aspects of “modern” technology are older than he concedes; the real novelty in modernity appears to be our hunger for resources, an issue Heidegger conspicuously does not address.

<sup>144</sup> *In den Sog geraten*. Lovitt’s “grip” requires a different word.

<sup>145</sup> *Ein andersgeartete Bestellen*. Heidegger is moving from *bestellen* in the sense of tilling the land and bringing fields into order to a different kind of ordering. This will no longer have the positive sense of ordering, but mean something like “on order” or “on demand.” A critique of modern industrialized societies is plainly intended here: compare the description of the farmer who tills the soil in *The Origin of the Work of Art*.

<sup>146</sup> *Stellen* has a range of meanings, as Lovitt notes. But his “sets upon” is excessively lyrical. The relevant meaning here is seizing or capturing someone (see n. 150). I have chosen the more neutral “apprehend.” The substantivized verb *das Stellen* is rendered with “apprehending.”

<sup>147</sup> *Herausforderung*. Lovitt translates “it sets upon it in the sense of challenging it.” Neither is it clear what setting upon in the sense of challenging would consist in nor what challenging might mean here. By contrast, “it apprehends it in the sense of harnessing it” is immediately transparent.

<sup>148</sup> *Gestellt*.

<sup>149</sup> Lovitt’s “Air is now set upon to yield nitrogen, the earth to yield ore, ore to yield uranium, for example; uranium is set upon to yield atomic energy” loses the sense that every resource is apprehended for something. It also introduces an additional verb not in the original.

The apprehending<sup>150</sup> that harnesses the energy in nature is a facilitating<sup>151</sup> in a twofold sense. It facilitates in that it taps and extracts.<sup>152</sup> However, this facilitating remains oriented in advance to facilitating something else, that is, to driving it onward into the maximum utility<sup>153</sup> at minimum expense. The coal mined<sup>154</sup> in the coal field is no longer provided so that it is at all available<sup>155</sup> somewhere. Rather, it is stockpiled, that is, it is on hand so that the solar energy

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<sup>150</sup> *Das Stellen*. *Stellen* is an important word in the essay. It underlies verbs such as *vorstellen*, *bestellen*, and *herstellen*, but more important, Heidegger forms the neologism *Gestell* from its stem. Lexically, *stellen* has the following primary senses:

1. (sich irgendwohin stellen) sich an einen bestimmten Ort begeben und dort eine stehende Haltung einnehmen  
(jmdn. irgendwohin stellen) jmdn. an einem bestimmten Ort in stehende Haltung bringen
2. (etw. stellen)
  - a) (etw. irgendwohin stellen) etw. an einem bestimmten Platz so unterbringen, dass es aufrecht steht
  - b) etw. an einem bestimmten Platz unterbringen
3. (sich jmdm. stellen)
4. jmdn. zum Stehenbleiben zwingen

This is the first place *stellen* occurs in the text, and it is clear that the meanings “stand,” “position,” “put” or “place,” and “confront” will not work. This leaves the fourth sense, “apprehend” or “seize.” If we look at Heidegger’s use of inflected forms of this verb in the preceding paragraph, it is clear that this is the sense intended. Technology does not “position” or “place” nature; rather it *seizes* it. Likewise, the atmosphere is not “positioned” or “placed” for nitrogen, but *apprehended* for it. While either could work (in fact, their meanings overlap to an extent), a look at the etymology of each word shows that *apprehend* is closer to the meaning we want, a deliberate “laying hold” rather than “possession.”

<sup>151</sup> *Fördern*. This is the first meaning of the verb: *Fördern*<sup>1</sup>, “advance someone in their development, support” (*jmdn., etw. in seiner Entwicklung vorwärtsbringen, unterstützen*). English “facilitate” (“make (an action, process, etc.) easy or easier; promote, help forward; assist in bringing about (a particular end or result); *OED*) comes closest. Lovitt’s “expediting” is based on the meanings “*vorwärtsbringen, beschleunigen, vorwärtskommen*” (see n. 135). It will not work in the next sentence, which is why Lovitt changes to “furthering something else.”

<sup>152</sup> *Herausstellen*. I think Heidegger literally means “draw forth” or “extract.” Lovitt’s “exposes” would be *Ausstellen*.

<sup>153</sup> *Nutzung*, not *Ertrag*, as Lovitt’s “yield” would require.

<sup>154</sup> Heidegger is playing on the synonymy of the two meanings of *Fördern*: *Fördern*<sup>1</sup> and *Fördern*<sup>2</sup>, “extract something from the earth” (*etw. aus der Erde herausholen*).

<sup>155</sup> *Vorhanden* can mean any of the following: “something or someone exists, is there, available” (*etw., jmd. existiert, ist da, verfügbar*). Lovitt translates, quite literally, “present somewhere.” Many Heideggerians reserve “available” for *zuhanden*, but in fact *both* terms can mean “available”: “**vorhanden** Adj. Adv. ‘verfügbar, existent’ (15. Jh.), Zusammenrückung aus der Präp. *vor* und dem Dativ Plur. von Hand, also eigentlich ‘greifbar’. **zuhand** Adv. ‘alsbald, sogleich’, Zusammenrückung aus mhd. *ze hant*, eigentlich ‘zur Stelle, bereit’ (hier hinsichtlich der Zeit); in neuerer Sprache selten. Vgl. ahd. (Dativ Sing.) *zi henti*, und (Dativ Plur.) *zi hantun* ‘zur Hand, bereit, nahe’ (9. Jh.). **zuhanden** Adj. ‘verfügbar’, *jmdm. zuhanden sein*, Präp. schweiz. öst. ‘gegenüber, anlässlich, zu Händen’.” It is more helpful to think in terms of two senses of availability, potential and actual or potential and immediate. Not only is the

conserved in it can be ordered. The latter is harnessed for heat, which has been ordered to produce steam, whose pressure drives the machines that allow a factory to remain in operation.

The hydroelectric station is set into the current of the Rhine. It apprehends the river for its hydrostatic<sup>156</sup> pressure, which then sets the turbines rotating. This rotation drives the parts whose motion<sup>157</sup> produces<sup>158</sup> the electric current, for which the substation and electric grid serving the distribution of electricity are ordered.<sup>159</sup> Within the domain of these interlocking after-effects of ordering<sup>160</sup> electric power, the Rhine River too appears as something that has been ordered. The hydroelectric station is not built into the Rhine River like the old wooden-bridge, which connected its two banks for centuries. Rather, the river has been integrated into the hydroelectric station.<sup>161</sup> As a river, it now has its being, namely, as a supplier of hydrostatic pressure,<sup>162</sup> from out of the essence of the hydroelectric station. Let us for a moment reflect on the contrast that is expressed in the two titles, “the Rhine,” as integrated into the *hydroelectric*

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translation of *vorhanden* by “available” lexically required here; it is also philosophically profitable. Heidegger here discovers a *third* mode of availability besides the two introduced in *Being and Time*, *Vorhandenheit* and *Zuhandenheit*. Whereas previously the field of being was articulated by the tension between *episteme* which is oriented towards *Vorhandenheit* and *techne* which is oriented towards *Zuhandenheit*, technology bypasses the orientation towards actual use that characterizes traditional craftsmanship; it transforms *das Vorhandene* into a new mode of being Heidegger will call “*der Bestand*.” Like *Vorhandenheit* and *Zuhandenheit*, *Bestand* denotes a mode of availability, but a highly specific one: it is a kind of *notional* or *mathematical* availability, which is why I render it with “the quantified.” See n. 176.

<sup>156</sup> *Wasserdruck*. Dams operate on the hydrostatic and not the hydraulic principle.

<sup>157</sup> *Getriebe*. Lovitt translates “thrust,” but the word simply means “lively activity; bustle” (*lebhaftes Treiben; Betriebsamkeit*).

<sup>158</sup> *Herstellen*. I am uncertain why Lovitt translates “sets going.”

<sup>159</sup> *Bestellt sind*. I am uncertain why Lovitt translates “set up.”

<sup>160</sup> Literally, this is “the ordering of electric power” (*die Bestellung elektrischer Energie*).

<sup>161</sup> *In das Kraftwerk verbaut*. Lovitt translates “the river is dammed up into the power plant,” but this is *aufstauen* rather than *verbauen*. *Verbauen* can mean “block, build over something with construction” (*etw. durch einen Bau versperren, zubauen*), but we would then expect something like *durch eine Talsperre* rather than *in das Kraftwerk*. The technical meaning of *verbauen*, “secure something by constructing retaining walls” (*etw. durch den Einbau von Befestigungen absichern*) is clearly preferable; Heidegger means the canalization of the river for hydroelectric power. I have chosen the more metaphorical “integrated” as being better suited to the argument. Lovitt’s translation loses the play between *die alte Holzbrücke ist in den Rheinstrom gebaut* (“the old wooden-bridge is built into the Rhine River”) and *der Strom ist in das Kraftwerk verbaut* (“the river has been integrated into the hydroelectric station”).

<sup>162</sup> *Er ist, was er jetzt als Strom ist ... aus dem Wesen des Kraftwerks*. Lovitt translates “what the river is now ... derives from the essence of the power station.” I take Heidegger to be making a stronger claim: there is a change in the ontological status of the river.

*reservoir*, and “The Rhine,” as spoken out of the *art work* in Hölderlin’s hymn of the same name in order to gauge even remotely the monstrous nature of what reigns here.<sup>163</sup> But, someone will counter, surely the Rhine remains a river in the landscape. Perhaps. But how? In no other sense than as an object<sup>164</sup> of sightseeing<sup>165</sup> that can be ordered through a travel agency,<sup>166</sup> which has itself been ordered<sup>167</sup> there by the holiday industry.<sup>168</sup>

The disclosure that dominates<sup>169</sup> modern technology has the character of apprehending in the sense of harnessing. This occurs as follows: the energy that is hidden in nature is tapped,<sup>170</sup> what is tapped is transformed, what is transformed is stored up, what is stored up is distributed in turn, and what is distributed is again converted.<sup>171</sup> Tapping, transforming, storing

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<sup>163</sup> *Das Ungeheure, das hier waltet*. Lovitt translates “the monstrousness that reigns here,” but that would be *die Ungeheuerlichkeit, die hier waltet*. The indefinite nature of *das Ungeheure* suggests that a *dessen* is implicit: *das Ungeheure dessen, das hier waltet* or, more colloquially, *das Ungeheure dessen, was hier waltet*. In that case, “the monstrous nature of what reigns here” works perfectly. It is also more appropriate to the context: let us contemplate the monstrous nature of technology or of the understanding of being that reigns here.

<sup>164</sup> *Objekt der Besichtigung*. This is one of only two instances in the essay when Heidegger uses *Objekt* instead of *Gegenstand*. Whereas *Gegenstand*, “thing, topic, affair” (‘Ding, Thema, Angelegenheit’) originally meant “resistance, contrast and also what is opposed” (zuerst ‘Widerstand’ (16. Jh.), ‘Gegensatz’, auch ‘das Entgegenstehende’ (17. Jh.)), it comes to be used around the end of the seventeenth century as a translation of *Objekt* or, rather, Latin *obiectum* in philosophical discourse (dann (Ende 17. Jh.) Übersetzung von *Objekt* bzw. lat. *obiectum* in philosophischer Sprache). By contrast, *Objekt* means “an object or goal of thought or action, a matter of particular interest, the subject of a contract” (‘Gegenstand oder Ziel des Denkens und Handelns, Sache von besonderem Interesse, Vertragsgegenstand’). Heidegger appears to be following this distinction.

<sup>165</sup> *Besichtigung* is idiomatic for viewing or sightseeing. Lovitt’s “inspection” is disputable: tour groups do not typically inspect the Rhine.

<sup>166</sup> *Bestellbares Objekt der Besichtigung durch eine Reisegesellschaft*. Both Lovitt’s “on call” and his “by a travel group” are misleading. The Rhine is not “on call” as though one could summon it, but tourists can “book” it as one of the sights they wish to see through a travel agency. The travel agency in turn “dispatches” tourists there (see n. 167).

<sup>167</sup> In certain contexts, “dispatch” (*bestellen = jmdn. an einen bestimmten Ort kommen lassen, jmdm. etw. ausrichten, jmdm. etw. zustellen*) and “book” (*bestellen = sich etw. reservieren lassen*) work better as translations of *bestellen* but, since Heidegger so clearly means to assimilate the several senses of the word to one, I retain “order” throughout.

<sup>168</sup> *Bestellbares Objekt ... dorthin bestellt hat*. Lovitt renders this with “object on call ... ordered there.”

<sup>169</sup> *Durchherrschen*. See n. 132.

<sup>170</sup> *Aufgeschlossen*. Lovitt’s “unlocked” draws on the everyday meaning, “open some locked thing with a key” (*etw. Verschlussenes mit dem Schlüssel öffnen*). But here the miner’s sense is meant: “tap mineral resources for recovery” (*Bodenschätze für die Gewinnung erschließen*).

<sup>171</sup> Lovitt’s “switched about ever anew” makes the best of *erneut umgeschaltet wird*. But context suggests that the last step in electric power transmission is meant—the conversion of high-voltage electricity to a

up, distributing, converting are all forms of disclosure. However, such disclosure does not merely peter out. Neither does it simply continue into indeterminacy.<sup>172</sup> Rather, by directing these forms of disclosure, disclosure discloses the manifold enmeshed circuits proper to it to itself.<sup>173</sup> This direction is itself likewise secured everywhere. Indeed, directing<sup>174</sup> and securing become the main traits of the disclosure that harnesses.

What is the nature of the unconcealment proper to that which comes about through the apprehending that harnesses? Everywhere, it has been ordered, in place so as to be available; specifically, in a manner that it can itself be ordered in a further [act of] ordering. What has been ordered in this way has its specific standing.<sup>175</sup> We shall call it “the quantified.”<sup>176</sup> This

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lower voltage in a local substation or *Umspannwerk*. Heidegger’s *umgeschaltet* is likely a dialectical variation for *umgespannt*.

<sup>172</sup> Lovitt retains the substantivized adjective. I feel it is less idiomatic in English than in German.

<sup>173</sup> Lovitt adds “their course,” taking *sie* to refer to *Bahnen*. But the reference of *sie* is more likely the *Weisen des Entbergens* referred to in the previous sentence: by driving or directing these forms of disclosure, disclosure discloses the manifold enmeshed circuits proper to it. The *ihm selber* requires a “to itself.”

<sup>174</sup> *Steuerung*. Lovitt’s “regulating” is equally possible, but “directing” conveys a sense of onward motion.

<sup>175</sup> *Stand*. Status or standing are equally possible. Too much is made of this word.

<sup>176</sup> This is one of the key terms in the essay. Lovitt correctly notes its connection with *Bestehen* and the contrast in Heidegger’s thought with *Gegenstand*, but his translation does not explain why objects should “lose their character as objects when they are caught up in the ‘standing-reserve.’” Heidegger explicitly notes that *Bestand* does not mean *Vorrat*, which Lovitt translates as “stock.” Reserve and stock, however, are synonyms. Further, *Gegenstand* can also be explained in terms of “standing.” One must focus rather on the particular mode of being Heidegger has in mind; only out of this understanding can we attempt a translation. Lexically, *Bestand* has the following meanings:

**Bestand, der; -(e)s, Bestände**

1. /ohne Pl./ das (Weiter)bestehen: um den B. eines Betriebes kämpfen; für den B. sorgen; auf den B. des Staates bedacht sein; den (sicheren) B. des Staates gefährden, bedrohen; von B. sein von Dauer sein: seine Besserung ist nicht von B.; B. haben andauern: sein Eifer hat keinen B.; sein Glück sollte nicht lange B. haben;

2. das Vorhandene: der B. an Waren, Büchern, Vieh; den B. aufnehmen, melden

a) Vorrat an Waren: die Bestände müssen aufgefüllt, erneuert werden; gehortete Bestände; der eiserne B. (*Vorrat, der nur im Notfall angegriffen werden darf und immer wieder aufgefüllt werden muß*) /bildl./ das Stück gehört zum eisernen B. des Spielplanes (*wird immer wieder gespielt*) das Werk gehört zum klassischen B. der Literatur

b) augenblicklicher Wertbetrag: der B. des Vermögens; die Kasse weist einen B. von 100 Mark auf;

3. beieinanderstehende gleichartige Pflanzen, bes. des Waldes: an den Abhängen war der B.

ungleichmäßig; aufgelockerter B.; abgeholzte Bestände; die Bestände stehen zu dicht;

4. *südwestdt. österr.* Pacht: jmdm. eine Wirtschaft in B. geben; Vieh in B. haben, nehmen.

The first, the third, and the fourth meanings can be excluded. The second has two senses, a primary and a secondary one. Heidegger explicitly excludes the primary meaning in the following sentence. This

word signifies something more and something more essential than “reserve.” The word “quantified” has the status of a [technical] term. It describes nothing less than the manner in which everything that has been affected by the disclosure that harnesses presences. What exists in the sense of the quantified no longer confronts us as an object.<sup>177</sup>

But surely a passenger plane that stands on the runway is an object. Certainly. We can represent the jet to ourselves thus. But it then conceals what it is and the manner in which it exists. Disclosed [for what it is], the jet stands on the tarmac<sup>178</sup> only as the quantified; [that is,] insofar as it has been ordered to secure the possibility of transport. In order to do so, it must itself be capable of being ordered,<sup>179</sup> that is, ready for takeoff in its entire construction and each of its components. (Here one could discuss Hegel’s definition of a machine as a self-

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leaves only the secondary meaning. *Bestand* must denote a notional quantity, something that is not physically present but has been reduced to its theoretical availability (no one actually has 100 billion dollars in his account, even if his account balance [= *Wertbetrag*] says so). Neither Lovitt’s “standing-reserve” nor Mitchell’s “inventory” nor Rojcewicz’s “disposables” conveys this sense. *Bestand* refers to the commodification, or better, the *quantification* of entities: it marks a further departure from *Vorhandenheit*—according to Heidegger, the mode of being of present entities and hence already a derivative mode of being in comparison with *Zuhandenheit* (see n. 155). Lexically, 2b exactly fulfills this sense: it is a further specification of *das Vorhandene*. The translation “the quantified” not only permits us to appreciate the distinction between *Bestand* and *Vorrat*, which is lost in other translations; it also enables us to comprehend Heidegger’s thought and locate it in a continuity with his earlier work. Why translate *Bestand* with “the quantified” and not “quantity” or “commodity”? The first is too neutral: *Bestand* does not refer to a simple quantity, but to something that possessed physical existence before it was reduced to a notional quantity (the Rhine River *becomes* an installed capacity of 148 MW in the Iffezheim power station). The second retains too much of its material existence. Understood as “a thing produced for use or sale” or “a piece of merchandise,” a commodity is an object; only as “an article of commerce; ... spec. a raw material, primary product, or other basic good which is traded in bulk and the units of which are interchangeable for the purposes of trading” does it have the meaning Heidegger intends.

<sup>177</sup> *Gegenstand*. The contrast is self-evident if *Bestand* is translated with “the quantified.” Otherwise, this statement is incoherent. Lovitt’s clarifies that “he [Heidegger] wishes to stress here not the permanency, but the orderability and substitutability of objects,” but this explanation does not work. Lovitt is forced to supply “of objects”; furthermore, permanency is a characteristic precisely of *Bestand* (historically, *Bestand* = *Dauer*, *Existenz*, *Vorrat*). Unlike objects, which emerge, confront us, and cease to be, *Bestand* is ceaseless, objectless presence. Indeed, “orderability and substitutability” flow from the status of things as *Bestand*, and not vice versa. I cannot order 100 million bushels of wheat except notionally, that is to say, except as *Bestand*. We miss these connections if we think of *Bestand* as a particular *type* of object.

<sup>178</sup> *Rollbahn* is literally “taxiway.” I take it as *Vorfeld*, the tarmac or the apron. Jets do not usually stand on the taxiway.

<sup>179</sup> *Bestellfähig*.

contained<sup>180</sup> tool. If the craftsman’s tool is our paradigm, his description is correct. But in that case, the jet is precisely not considered out of the essence of technology, in which it belongs. Regarded in terms of the quantified, the jet is in no way self-contained, for it has its standing solely from the ordering of what can be ordered.<sup>181</sup>) The circumstance that, when we try to exhibit modern technology as the harnessing disclosure, words such as “place,” “order,” and “the quantified” obtrude and multiply in a dry, monotonous, and hence onerous manner has its reasons in the matter that is vocalized thereby.<sup>182</sup>

Who accomplishes the apprehending that harnesses, through which what we call the real is disclosed as the quantified? Manifestly, man. In what way is he capable of such disclosure? Man can represent, form, and operate<sup>183</sup> this or that thing<sup>c</sup> in one way or another, but he has no control over the unconcealment within which the real, at any given time, either reveals itself or withdraws. The circumstance that, since Plato, the real has been showing itself in the light of ideas is not Plato’s doing. The philosopher only acquiesced<sup>184</sup> in what was assigned<sup>185</sup> him.

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<sup>180</sup> Here and in the next occurrence, the word is *selbstständig*. Lovitt translates “autonomous.” But this would be *selbstbestimmt*. “Self-contained” maintains the connection to standing in or by itself better.

<sup>181</sup> *Bestellbarem*.

<sup>182</sup> Heidegger means to say that he is neither making this up nor indulging in arbitrary word choices and etymologies. He really believes he has uncovered a hidden logic behind things.

<sup>183</sup> *Betreiben*. Lovitt’s “carry through” requires *ausführen* or *durchführen*.

<sup>c</sup> 1954: this or that unconcealed [thing]! But unconcealment as such? The disclosure?

<sup>184</sup> *Entsprochen*.

<sup>185</sup> *Zusprach*. Lovitt translates “The thinker only responded to what addressed itself to him.” But this loses a lot. The same construction occurs later (see n. 206). If Heidegger had wanted to say “address” he would have used *ansprechen*. Both *ansprechen* and *Anspruch* are missing here. Plato was neither “addressed” nor “claimed.” He was merely assigned a role in the history of being. He acquiesced in this role by bringing forth the thought called for. This thought was, from Heidegger’s perspective, mistaken, but it was necessary for the history of being. In particular, it was necessary for the history of Western thought, which has now reached its final stage in modern technology. As such, the latter takes on eschatological significance; it marks the end but also the completion of the former, that is to say, it is the *τέλος* of the former in both senses. Note also that by not being subject to a claim, Plato was also not free: he could only acquiesce in what was assigned him. This is why the notion of being claimed becomes so important for Heidegger later in the essay: it is intimately related to the possibility of freedom. Finally, while we may be tempted to translate *zusprechen* with “bestow” in keeping with our translation of *Zuspruch*, Heidegger appears to make a distinction between the two. *Zusprechen* occurs only once in the essay, and is used only of Plato. Its meaning is clearly deprecatory, corresponding to Plato’s position in the history of being. *Zuspruch*, by contrast, is reserved for those on whom a prior claim (*Anspruch*) has been exacted (see nn. 205, 430, and 435).

Only insofar as man is likewise already instigated<sup>186</sup> to harness<sup>187</sup> the energy in nature can the disclosure that orders unfold. But if man is instigated, [that is,] ordered to do this, does he not belong within the quantified even more originally than nature?<sup>188</sup> The current talk of human resources, patient material, [etc.] supports this interpretation. Whether he knows it or not, the woodcutter who surveys<sup>189</sup> the timber logged in the forest and, to all appearances, walks the same forest paths as his grandfather did before him is there at the order of the wood-processing industry.<sup>190</sup> He has been ordered to ensure the orderability<sup>191</sup> of cellulose, which, in turn, has been harnessed to the demand for the paper that is supplied to newspapers and illustrated magazines. The latter, however, prime<sup>192</sup> public opinion to consume<sup>193</sup> what is published, in order to become orderable<sup>194</sup> for a [previously] ordered formation of opinion.<sup>195</sup> But precisely because man is instigated more originally<sup>d</sup> than the energy in nature, namely, to

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<sup>186</sup> *Herausgefordert*. Here the second meaning of *herausfordern* is called for (see n. 133). Whereas nature is harnessed, man is instigated to harness nature.

<sup>187</sup> This is the same verb. Lovitt translates “exploit,” the only time he uses this word in the entire essay. Although this frees up “challenge” for man, it lacks justification. I render *herausfordern* consistently with “harness” in reference to nature and “instigate” in reference to man.

<sup>188</sup> That is, has man not himself been turned into *Bestand*? The next sentence answers in the affirmative. A bit later, however, Heidegger suggests that this is not really possible, because man always retains the ability to recognize that he is more than a quantum amidst the quantified; he has a unique role in regards to being.

<sup>189</sup> *Vermisst*. Lovitt’s “measures” is also possible.

<sup>190</sup> *Holzverwertungsindustrie* is more than just “lumber industry.” The latter would be *Holzindustrie*.

<sup>191</sup> *Bestellbarkeit*.

<sup>192</sup> *Stellen*. Lovitt translates “set”; in general, he makes too much of this verb, which is best translated idiomatically and according to context.

<sup>193</sup> *Verschlingen*. Lovitt’s “swallowing what is printed” suggests that the news is untrue. But it suffices that people consume publications.

<sup>194</sup> *Bestellbar*.

<sup>195</sup> *Bestellte Meinungsherrichtung*, not *Meinungsrichtung*, which would be Lovitt’s “configuration of opinion.” The former comes from *herrichten*, “complete, prepare oneself or something” (*etw., sich fertigmachen, bereitmachen*) and “bring something again in order” (*etw. wieder in Ordnung bringen*) and implies that a particular opinion must be manufactured. Lovitt’s “set” is particularly unsatisfactory.

<sup>d</sup> 1954: meaning? Appropriated more genuinely into the event [*eigentlicher in das Ereignis vereignet*]! [Comm.: Here, as elsewhere, when Heidegger uses words that do not exist, it is very hard to comprehend what he means. The rendition above is a guess at best.]

undertake the ordering,<sup>c</sup> he will never become a mere quantum.<sup>196</sup> By carrying on<sup>197</sup> with technology man participates in ordering as a mode of disclosure. Yet, the unconcealment within which this ordering unfolds is never something made by man; it is this as little as the domain that he irreducibly<sup>198</sup> traverses<sup>199</sup> every time he relates as a subject to an object.<sup>200</sup>

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<sup>c</sup> 1954: meaning? Speaking metaphysically: in an exceptional naming [Geheiß] of being and the corresponding relation [to it], cf. “On the Question of Being” [in GA 9].  
[Comm.: *Geheiß* is a verbal abstract noun developed from “ahd. *giheizan* ‘versprechen, verheißen, versichern’ (8. Jh.), mhd. *geheizen*.” Its lexical meaning is “Anweisung, Anordnung, Befehl’, ahd. *giheiz* m. ‘Verheißung, Versprechen, Gelöbniß, Vorhersage’ (8. Jh.), mhd. *geheiz* m., *geheize* n. ‘Befehl, Gebot, Versprechen, Gelübde, Verheißung’.” However, Heidegger likely does not mean its standard meaning, but wants it to be heard as a *Ge*-Kollektiv word built from a verbal base. While *heißen* has several meanings, Heidegger most likely intends the primary one, “naming,” though with shades of both “signifying” and “saying”:

1. genannt werden, den Namen haben
2. jmdn., etw. nennen
  - a) [gehoben, veraltend] (>jmdn. heißen< + EN) jmdm. einen Namen geben
  - b) (>jmdn. heißen< + Nomen) jmdn. als etw. bezeichnen
3. [gehoben] (jmdn. etw. tun heißen) jmdm. gebieten, etw. zu tun
4. einen bestimmten Sinn haben, etw. bedeuten  
(das heißt)
5. (es heißt) es wird gesagt
  - a) es lautet
  - b) es geht die Rede
6. (es heißt) es gilt

In that case, *Geheiß* would mean something like the totality of the naming of being (the genitive potentially being intended in both subjective and objective senses), or the neologism “nameage.” I have, however, split the difference: I do not think Heidegger intends the word in its traditional sense of “instruction, directive, command,” but it is also unlikely he put this much reflection into a marginal remark. I therefore translate “naming.”]

<sup>196</sup> *Bestand*. Here, the singular is called for. Previously, Heidegger had suggested that if man is instigated to harness nature, then he must himself belong within the quantified (*gehört in den Bestand*). Now, however, he clarifies that, even so, man will never become a mere quantum (*wird niemals zu einem bloßen Bestand*) amidst the quantified. Lovitt translates “mere standing-reserve,” thereby avoiding having to deal with the *einem*. I take it to be deliberate: Heidegger could also have said, “*der Mensch wird niemals zu bloßem Bestand*.”

<sup>197</sup> *Betreibt*. Lovitt’s “drives forward” requires a *vorantreibt*. But we do not need to *advance* technology; it suffices that we continue using it as we have.

<sup>198</sup> *Jederzeit schon*. Literally, “at all times already” or “always already.”

<sup>199</sup> *Durchgeht*. Lovitt’s “passing ... through” feels more casual.

<sup>200</sup> *Objekt*. See n. 164.

Where and how does disclosure occur, if it is no mere man-made creation?<sup>201</sup> We need not look far. We only need discern, without prepossession, that which has always already claimed<sup>202</sup> man; and this so decisively that he can only ever be man as the one who has been thus addressed.<sup>203</sup> Everywhere man opens his eyes and ears, opens up his heart, gives himself over to planning and realizing, shaping and working, requesting and thanking, he finds himself already brought amidst the unconcealed. The unconcealment of the unconcealed has already eventuated every time it summons<sup>204</sup> man into the modes of disclosure it has meted (out)<sup>205</sup> for him. When man, [standing] within the unconcealment, in his own way discloses what presences, he only acquiesces in the bestowal<sup>206</sup> of unconcealment; and this is the case even

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<sup>201</sup> Man’s dependence on an antecedent “disclosure” is one of the essay’s key themes, inspiring Heidegger’s rejection of both Heisenberg’s claim that “*man on this earth now confronts himself alone*” and of the view that technology is “simply human activity.” The essay aims to indicate the true dimension in which technology and man are found—the mysterious domain Heidegger indicates by means of circumlocutions such as “dispensation,” “disclosure,” “the mystery,” and “that which saves.” It is also the domain of experiences such as being claimed or called, the domain of hope and bestowal.

<sup>202</sup> *In Anspruch genommen*. See the next note.

<sup>203</sup> *Als der so Angesprochene*. This sentence introduces a series of words that are derived from *sprechen*. Lovitt translates, “We need only apprehend in an unbiased way That which has already claimed man and has done so, so decisively that he can only be man at any given time as the one so claimed.” However, Heidegger shifts from *Anspruch*, a word with a legal connotation (*Anspruch* m. ‘Anrecht, Forderung’, mhd. *anspruch* ‘Anklage, Einspruch’), to *der Angesprochene*, the substantivized past participle of *ansprechen*, a word that can have a legal connotation (**ansprechen** Vb. ‘anreden’, ahd. *Anasprehhan* (11. Jh.), mhd. *Anesprechen* ‘anfangen zu sprechen, in Anspruch nehmen, einen mit Worten (herausfordernd, beschuldigend, anklagend) angehen’, übertragen ‘gefallen, anrühren’ (Anfang 19. Jh.)), but here probably simply means “address.”

<sup>204</sup> *Hervorrufft*. Lovitt’s “calls man forth” is not wrong, but insufficiently idiomatic. *Hervorrufen* means “cause someone to appear by calling” (*jmdn. durch Rufen zum Hervorkommen veranlassen*), a sense English “summon” preserves. “Summon” also suits the legal and religious context of the passage.

<sup>205</sup> *Die ihm zugemessenen Weisen*. Lovitt translates “allotted to him.” However, here it is not *zugeteilt*, a word that actually occurs later (see n. 442), but *zugemessen*. English “mete (out)” and “admeasure” both preserve the connection to measure, the former through deriving from Old High German *mezzan* (Middle High German *mezzan*, German *messen*) and the latter through Latin *mensūrāre*.

<sup>206</sup> *Entspricht er nur dem Zuspruch*. Lovitt translates: “When man, in his way, from within unconcealment reveals that which presences, he merely responds to the call of unconcealment even when he contradicts it.” *Entsprechen*, however, is not “respond.” Whereas it commonly means “correspond,” context demands the more formal sense, “satisfy, acquiesce in something or someone’s wish, fulfill something” (*[gehoben] einer Sache, jmds. Wunsch, jmdm. genügen, nachkommen, etw. erfüllen*). Likewise, *Zuspruch* is not “claim”: Lovitt is confusing prefixes. Lexically, *Zuspruch* has the following meanings: “encouraging, consoling words; words of empathy” (*ermunternde, tröstende Worte, Worte der Anteilnahme*), “resonance” (*Zulauf*), and “appeal to someone” (*<etw. findet bei jmdm. Zuspruch> etw. findet bei jmdm. Anklang, gefällt jmdm.*). None of these work here. We thus have to look

when he rejects<sup>207</sup> it. Thus, if man, [in the attitude of] researching or observing, pursues<sup>208</sup> nature as a domain of his representation, he has already been claimed<sup>209</sup> by a mode of disclosure, which instigates him to approach nature as an object of research until, finally, even the object disappears in the objectlessness of the quantified.

Thus, modern technology, as a disclosure that orders, is no mere human activity. Hence, we must also consider that instigation, which apprehends man to order the real into the quantified, the way it manifests. That instigation unifies man into ordering. This unifying<sup>210</sup> centers man into ordering the real into the quantified.

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at the underlying verb *zusprechen*: “speak to someone, coax someone” (<*jmdm. zusprechen*> *zu jmdm. sprechen, aufjmdn. einreden*); “console, encourage someone with words” (<*jmdm. Trost, Mut zusprechen*> *jmdn. mit Worten trösten, ermutigen*), and “recognize, through a legal judgment, someone’s claim on someone or something; grant someone something or someone” (<*jmdm. jmdn., etw. zusprechen*> *durch gerichtlichen Beschluss jmds. Anspruch aufjmdn., etw. anerkennen, jmdm. jmdn., etw. zuerkennen*). The legal sense is clearly intended. To the claim (*Anspruch*) made on man corresponds an equivalent granting or giving (*Zuspruch*). Either “award” or “bestowal” work, but the latter has a more ceremonial sense. Near the end of the essay Heidegger clarifies that man “ek-sists in the realm of a bestowal”: “award” works less well there.

<sup>207</sup> *Widerspricht*. Lovitt’s “contradicts” loses the sense of the concessive statement: to contradict someone can be a form of response. The meaning is rather that, *even when* man rejects the bestowal of unconcealment, he ends up acquiescing in it. The paradox is intentional. In traditional terms, Heidegger is expressing the relation of sin and conversion as mediated through the terms ἀρνέομαι (“1. deny [say ... not, contradict]; 2. deny, with an acc. of the pers. in various senses; 3. deny, abnegate, abjure; 4. not to accept, reject, refuse, something offered”) and ὑπακούω (“1. listen, hearken; 2. hearken to a command, i.e. obey, be obedient unto, submit to”). Ἀρνέομαι occurs at Matt. 10:33, 26:70, 26:72; Mark 14:68, 14:70; Luke 8:45, 9:23, 12:9, 22:57; John 1:20, 13:38, 18:25, 18:27; Acts 3:13, 3:14, 4:16, 7:35; 1 Tim. 5:8; 2 Tim. 2:12, 2:13, 3:5; and Titus 1:16, 2:12; ὑπακούω at Matt. 8:27; Mark 1:27, 4:41; Luke 8:25, 17:6; Acts 6:7, 12:13; Romans 6:12, 6:16, 6:17, 10:16; Eph. 6:1, 6:5; Phil. 2:12; Col. 3:20, 3:22; 2 Thess. 1:8, 3:14; Heb. 5:9, 11:8; and 1 Pet. 3:6.

<sup>208</sup> *Nachstellt*. The occurrence of this word here clarifies Heidegger’s thought. He programmatically contrasts words related to *stellen*, including *stellen* itself and *nachstellen*, *bestellen*, and *vorstellen*, to words related to *sprechen*. The former designate activities in which we move things, pursue them, order them, or represent them; the latter the experience of being addressed, claimed, and acquiescing in what is bestowed on us. The exception to this rule is *widersprechen*, which does not denote a form of address, but is quite literally a *wider-sprechen*, that is, a resistance to being addressed.

<sup>209</sup> *Beansprucht*. The thought comes full circle here (*beanspruchen* = *etw. (mit Recht) fordern, auf etw. einen (berechtigten) Anspruch erheben*).

<sup>210</sup> *Dieses Versammelnde*.

What originally unfolds mountains to mountain chains and courses through them in their enfolded collective presence<sup>211</sup> is the unifying [element]<sup>212</sup> that we call “the mountain range.”<sup>213</sup>

We call that original unifying [element],<sup>214</sup> from which unfold the ways according to which we are disposed in this or that way, “disposition.”<sup>215</sup>

We shall now call that instigating claim,<sup>216</sup> which unifies man such that<sup>217</sup> he orders what discloses itself into the quantified, the *ap-prehendage*.<sup>f218</sup>

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<sup>211</sup> *In ihrem Beisammen*. *Beisammen* is an adverb and hence requires a verb. Heidegger uses it as a noun. Lovitt follows him in translating it as “togetherness” (which would be something like *Beisammenheit*).

<sup>212</sup> *Das Versammelnde*. Lovitt again translates “gathering.” This is incorrect (see n. 61), not least because it negates the point of the sentence. “Gather” is “to bring (persons, or occasionally animals) together; cause to assemble in one place or company; collect (an army, a flock, etc.),” “bring (things) together; collect from different quarters into one mass or place; acquire by such means, amass,” whereas Heidegger’s point is precisely that mountains are *not* subsequently gathered, but exist only in and as part of a mountain range.

<sup>213</sup> *Gebirg*.

<sup>214</sup> *Jenes ursprüngliche Versammelnde*.

<sup>215</sup> *Gemüt*. With *Gebirg* and *Gemüt*, Heidegger introduces the class of words known as *Ge-Kollektiva*. Erben’s note is worth citing in full. “*ge-* bildet im neueren Deutschen vorwiegend kollektive Vorgangsbezeichnungen, Sammelnamen also, die ‘verschiedene Aktionen zu einem Gesamtvorgang zusammenfassen’: *Ge-brumm*, *-kicher*, *-klimper*, *-quassel*, *-wühl*, *-zwitscher*, wobei oft die Endung *-e* hinzutritt und den Überdruß an nervenbedrängen, durch Wiederholung lästigen Vorgängen ausdrückt: *Ge-neck-e*, *Ge-quak-e*, *Ge-tu-e*. Bildungen anderen Inhalts—dem ursprünglich denominativen Typus folgend—erscheinen nur noch vereinzelt: *Ge-päck*, *-rippe*, *-strüpp* (zu mhd. *strupp*, ‘struppiges Gewächs’), *-stüt* (Verdeutlichung des alten Kollektivums *stuot*, das zur Individualbezeichnung geworden war: *Stute*). Allerdings können solche Vorgangskollektiva nicht zu jedem Verbum gebildet werden, dessen Inhalt dies erlauben würde, gemeinhin nicht zu transitiven, stets mit Objekt verbundenen Verben und nie zu Verben mit Präfix oder dem betonten Suffix *-ieren*.” Johannes Erben, “Zur Geschichte der deutschen Kollektiva,” in *Sprache—Schlüssel zur Welt. Festschrift für Leo Weisgerber*, ed. Helmut Gipper (Düsseldorf: Schwann, 1959), 222.

<sup>216</sup> *Herausfordernden Anspruch*.

<sup>217</sup> This is actually *dahin*, which means “thither” or “there” in the sense of “to that place.”

<sup>f</sup> The *ap-prehendage* [*das Ge-Stell*]

1. As the essence of the will to will—»essence« in the sense of the constantly enduring—the basic trait—what runs through the ground—thoroughgoing grounding

2. As a restrained undertone

Forgetfulness—the thesis [Ge-»setz«] of ~~being~~

3. As veil of the event, the first flashing/glimpse [Erblitzen] of the most extreme shrouding custom/use [Brauch] in ordering [Be-stellen]

<sup>218</sup> No other word has given Heidegger translators as much trouble. The commentaries on it range from mildly misleading to manifestly erroneous. This is not the place to discuss them, but it is worth noting, contra Rojcewicz, that *Gestell* is exactly “a *Ge*-word in the special sense just delineated,” that is, it belongs

to the class of words known as *Ge*-Kollektiva. Heidegger is not imposing this function on it. Second, “what is idiosyncratic here” is not “Heidegger’s making a *Ge*-word out of *Gestell*,” but his replacing its actual base *Stall*, with the stem of the verb *stellen*. It is thus helpful to consider: (1) the class of words to which *Gestell* belongs; (2) its etymology; (3) the reason for its erroneous derivation from *stellen*; (4) the change of meaning implied in changing the base word; (5) the sense in which Heidegger uses *stellen*; and (6) the sense in which Heidegger uses *Ge-stell*. Only then can we translate it correctly. I first introduce the *Ge*-Kollektiva. Fleischer and Barz remark, “The prefix *ge-* must be distinguished from the circumfix *ge-...-e-...* The prefix models have a substantive basis and are unproductive. Nearly all forms are collectives, predominantly descriptions of things: *Geäst, Gebälk, Gebüsch, Gedärm, Gehörn, Gemäuer, Gestein, Gesträuch, Getäfel, Gewölk; Getier...* Historically, the prefixation was coupled with a *-j-* suffix (thus historical circumfixation), which is why an umlaut also always enters, cf. ahd. *gibirgi, gifildi* ‚Gefilde‘ (cf. Wilmanns 1899, 242ff.).... The collective character has been lost in a number of prefix derivatives; there exist only minor or no semantic differences [at all] between the simplex and the derivative: *Stern – Gestirn, Wasser – Gewässer, Sims – Gesims, Trank – Getränk*. Forms such as *Gefäß, Geländer, Genick, Geweih, Gewitter* are completely demotivated and hence are to be regarded as *simplicia*, since they can be considered word forms only in structural terms.” Wolfgang Fleischer and Irmhild Barz, *Wortbildung der deutschen Gegenwartssprache* 4th edn. (Berlin and Boston: de Gruyter, 2012), 256–57. The etymology of *Gestell*—“ahd. *gistelli* ‘Stellung, Lage, Sternbild, Gerüst’ (9. Jh.), mhd. *gestelle* ‘Gestell, Gestalt’, mnl. *g(h)estelle*, nl. *gestel* stehen mit Kollektivpräfix neben ahd. *stal* ‘Standort, Stelle, Gebäude zum Einstellen von Vieh’, mhd. *stal* ‘Steh-, Sitz-, Wohnort, Stand, Gebäude zum Einstellen von Vieh’ (s. Stall<sup>1</sup>)”—shows that it originally meant something like “the totality of/many stalls” (*die gesamten/vielen Ställe*). Like *Gefäß* and *Geländer*, however, it lost this collective character: as a noun, it now simply means ‘Regal, Stütz- oder Tragerahmen’. Regarding its derivation, it is helpful to know that “the association with *stellen* is secondary, since the verb is likewise derived from the substantive treated under Stall<sup>1</sup>.” Indeed, Heidegger is not alone in attempting to derive it from *stellen*. Rather, as Henzen notes, “Oft ist bei den äußerst zahlreichen Bildungen, die zunächst nur aus Substantiven erfolgten, Beziehung auf ein Verbum möglich, z. B. bei ahd. *gistrewi* Streue (neben *strō* und *strewen*), *giredi* Gespräch (neben *reda* und *red[i]ōn*), *gisalbi* Salbe (neben *salba*, *salb* N., und *salbōn*), *gikōsi* Geplauder (neben *kōsi* oder *kōsa* und *kōsōn*). Sie liegt besonders nahe, wo nominales Grundwort untergegangen ist (in *Geleite, Gestell, Gesäß, Geschenk, Gedicht* u.ä.). Das gab denn die Veranlassung, daß entsprechende Bildungen unmittelbar aus Verben abgeleitet wurden, besonders Nomina actionis, und unter diesen namentlich solche, die mit dem Tätigkeitsbegriff die Vorstellung einer wiederholten Handlung verbinden, aber auch einige Gegenstandsbezeichnungen: mhd. *gebrüse, geriusche, geloufe, gebinde, getiusche, gehenke, gezenke, gewimmel*, nhd. *Geschwätz, Gebrüll, Gebeul, Gebräu, Gewühl, Geschiebe, Geflüster, Gekicher, Gemetzel, Gerassel, Geschnatter, Gedonner, Geklimper, Gefunkel, Gefasel, Geplauder, Geriesel, Gemurmél, Getrommel, Gebimmel* usw.” Walter Henzen, *Deutsche Wortbildung*, 2nd rev. edn. (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1957), 137–39. It is thus not sufficient to find a rough equivalent for *Gestell* (or for *Ge-stell*). Indeed, as Wellmann notes, “Geht die Beziehung zwischen den Bauelementen für das Sprachbewußtsein verloren, wird zuweilen versucht, eine neue durch **Umdeutung** herzustellen. Die bekannteste Erscheinung dieser Art ist die Volksetymologie. So wird in *Gezeug* (für *Gezäu*), *Geschlinge* (zu *Schlung*; vgl. mhd. *Geslünge*), *Geflügel* (spätmhd. Neben *gewügel: vogel*; in Anlehnung an *Flügel*...) ein etymologisch unverständlich gewordenes Wort einem lautlich und inhaltlich vergleichbaren Sprachelement angeglichen.... Die Umdeutung führt zu Veränderungen des Grundinhalts; sie bewirkt den Wechsel von einem Strukturtypus in den anderen.” Hans Wellmann, “Kollektiva und Sammelwörter im Deutschen” (PhD diss., University of Bonn, 1969), 134–35. We thus have to be able to explain the sense in which the *new* word is a collective noun and, moreover, to relate it

We dare to use this word in a hitherto completely unaccustomed sense.<sup>§219</sup>

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to the sense in which *stellen* has been used throughout the essay. If Heidegger is forming *Ge-stell* from *stellen*, it falls more accurately under the class of “Frequentativa,” nouns where “what is meant ... is not evaluated in virtue of the number and extent of a plurality, but rather, with regard to the aspects of the duration, repetition, and frequency of an action or of a state” (63). In particular, it no longer signifies the totality of stalls (*Gestell = Ställe insgesamt*), but a continual *stellen* (*Ge-stell = das Stellen, die Stellung*). Compare Wellmann: “from a grammatical perspective, forms such as *Gelaufe, Spielerei* [belong] in a completely different word class. They are substantives used for predicate content ... [and] hence occur in the same functional milieu as forms in *-ung* and substantivized infinitives” (63). I have already discussed the sense in which Heidegger uses *stellen* (see nn. 146 and 150). Whatever its generic uses, in the context of Heidegger’s essay *stellen* does not mean “stand,” “position,” “put,” “place,” or “confront.” The only available meaning is “apprehend.” Moreover, when we turn to Heidegger’s gloss “*Ge-stell heißt das Versammelnde jenes Stellens, das den Menschen stellt*,” “apprehend” is the only sense that works. Scholars have proposed using prefixes such as “co-” or “com-” (Rojcewicz), “syn-” (Kiesel), and “im-” (Dahlstrom) to replicate the German prefix, but this is misguided. Not only are these not equivalent to *ge-*, either semantically or morphologically (Wellmann considers it a “morphological peculiarity” of German that “in addition to the suffixes, even a prefix can determine the word class and grammatical gender” of a noun; 155); but English also does not form collective nouns this way. Adding a prefix for a prefix’s sake clarifies nothing: one has to first understand the underlying category and how each language forms words of this class. Consider how English forms collective nouns (I give only the forms that enter consideration here): “The suffixes *-ery* and *-age* both form nouns that denote collectives, locations, and nouns denoting aspects of behaviour... [They] attach predominantly to nouns and verbs, although for many forms derived with these suffixes, it is difficult to tell whether their bases are nominal or verbal, as they frequently attach to bases that have both nominal and verbal forms related by conversion.” Laurie Bauer, Rochelle Lieber, Ingo Plag, *The Oxford Reference Guide to English Morphology* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 250. Since we know that Heidegger is building *Ge-stell* on a verbal base, we only need consider the latter. Here are some examples of “*-age on verbal bases*: assemblage, cleavage, creepage, dilatage, eatage, fosterage, hurlage, pilferage, readage, shrinkage, spoilage, stowage, tillage, windage” (251). Although “both *-age* and *-ery* display a reasonable degree of productivity in contemporary English” (252), only the former has the meanings we are looking for: “action, power of...” and “result of...” Hans Marchand, *The Categories and Types of Present-Day English Word-Formation: A Synchronic-Diachronic Approach* (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1969), 235–36. Analogous to obsolete “stallage” (“a stand, stage”) we can now form a collective noun ending in *-age* by substituting Heidegger’s *stell* with “apprehend.” The ending *-age* has three senses, of which the third, “forming nouns derived from verbs, denoting an action or the result of an action,” is an exact match for the sense found in *Ge-stell*. “Apprehendage” thus provides the closest, most perfectly analyzable equivalent to Heidegger’s neologism in standard English. It has the added advantage that it can be hyphenated to indicate the underlying verb *prehend* (“French *appréhende-r* (15th cent. in Godefroy), < Latin *apprehendere, adprehendere* to lay hold of, seize, < *ad* to + *prehendere* to seize. In the contracted form *apprehendere*, the word survived in the Romance languages in the figurative sense ‘lay hold with the mind, comprehend, learn,’ whence also later ‘teach, inform’: compare French *apprendre*, and English APPRISE *v.*<sup>1</sup> Subsequently, the full *apprehendere* was taken into French and English in its original form and sense”). However, the prefix *ap-* should not be confused with *ge-*. *It merely allows us to signal when Heidegger hyphenates his neologism Gestell.*

<sup>§</sup> 1954: cf. Identity and Difference [planned for GA vol. 11]

<sup>219</sup> “Completely unaccustomed,” because *Gestell* typically implies the totality of stalls or enclosures, but here it means the totality of apprehension.

According to the customary meaning, the word “enclosure”<sup>220</sup> refers to a contraption,<sup>221</sup> for example, a bookshelf.<sup>222</sup> A skeleton<sup>223</sup> is also called an “enclosure.”<sup>224</sup> The use of the word “*Gestell*”<sup>225</sup> now being imposed on us appears equally hair-raising,<sup>226</sup> to say nothing of the caprice<sup>227</sup> with which words of a developed language are being mangled here. Is it possible to carry this eccentricity<sup>228</sup> any further? Certainly not.<sup>229</sup> Yet, this eccentricity is an old habit of thought. Philosophers submit<sup>230</sup> to it precisely when what is at stake is contemplating the highest truth. We latecomers<sup>231</sup> are no longer capable of appreciating the significance of Plato’s

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<sup>220</sup> As noted previously, *Gestell* is not derived from *stellen*, but from *Stall*. The latter’s etymology, “**Stall**! m. ‘Gebäude zur Viehhaltung’, ahd. *stal* (Genitiv *stalles*) ‘Standort, Stelle, Gebäude zum Einstellen von Vieh’ (8. Jh.), mhd. *stal* ‘Steh-, Sitz-, Wohnort, Stand, Gebäude zum Einstellen von Vieh’, mnd. mnl. afries. nl. *stal*, aengl. *Steall* ‘Stand, Stelle, Stellung, Stall’, engl. *stall* ‘Platz, Stand, Box, Rinder-, Pferdestall’, anord. *stallr* ‘Gerüst, Altar, Stall, Krippe’, schwed. *stall* ‘Stall,’” suggests a basic meaning of “enclosure,” “that wherewith something is enclosed.” While it is tempting to build a collective noun from English “stall,” “a standing-place for horses or cattle; a stable or cattle-shed; also each division for the accommodation of one animal in a stable, cattle-shed or cow-house; also, a manger,” using the suffix *-age* (see n. 218), “stallage” means something else in English. The derivation of *Gestell* from “frame” or “framing” in Lovitt, Mitchell, Greaves, and Merwin is false.

<sup>221</sup> *Gerät*. This word also belongs among the *Ge*-Kollektiva. Its derivation is unimportant here.

<sup>222</sup> *Büchergestell*. *Bücherregal* is a more common term.

<sup>223</sup> *Knochenrippe*. *Skelett* is the more common term, but Heidegger is intentionally using *ge*-terms.

<sup>224</sup> *Gestell*. Here Heidegger is reverting to the ordinary meaning of the term. Although in casual speech *Gestell* can mean “figure, physique” (*Figur, Körperbau*), Heidegger probably means the more basic sense of “subframe” (*Unterbau*) or, as we might, say a “scaffold” (compare *Körpergerüst*, an alternative term for “skeleton”). I have chosen to translate “enclosure” both to preserve the root meaning (see n. 218) and also to maintain consistency with the term for “bookshelf.”

<sup>225</sup> Lovitt hyphenates the word, but I can find no evidence in the German text of this.

<sup>226</sup> That is, as hair-raising as a skeleton.

<sup>227</sup> *Willkür*.

<sup>228</sup> *Das Absonderliche*.

<sup>229</sup> Rojcewicz translates: “We are daring to use this word in a totally novel way. . . . In its usual sense, *Gestell* means some sort of gadget, e.g., a bookrack [*Büchergestell*]. A skeleton, too, is called a *Gestell*. And just as a skeleton is something horrid, so the use we are now proposing to make of the word *Gestell* will appear horrible and, it goes without saying, completely arbitrary. . . . Can idiosyncrasy be pushed any further? Certainly not.” Richard Rojcewicz, *The Gods and Technology: A Reading of Heidegger* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2006), 104.

<sup>230</sup> *Fügen sich ihm*. Either “submit” or “surrender” work. *Sich fügen* is a synonym for *sich schicken*, which becomes an important term later on. Heidegger means that, contrary to appearance, the thinker does not capriciously make up words or word meanings; he responds to the matter or to that which addresses him. The claim is thus stronger than Lovitt’s “accord,” which would be something like *übereinstimmen* or *zustimmen*.

<sup>231</sup> *Wir Spätgeborenen*. Lovitt translates “late born” which to me means something else. “Late born” would be *nachgeboren*.

daring to use the word εἶδος for that which prevails<sup>232</sup> in each and every thing. In everyday speech, εἶδος meant the view<sup>233</sup> that a visible thing presents to the physical eye. Plato, however, exacts something utterly unprecedented of this word: that it designate what is not and will never be perceptible to the physical eye.<sup>234</sup> As if this were not enough, ἰδέα does not just mean the imperceptible<sup>235</sup> outward look<sup>236</sup> of what is physically perceptible. Outward look, ἰδέα, designates and is also that which constitutes the essence<sup>h</sup> in everything that is audible, tactile,<sup>237</sup> or sensory, that is, in everything that is somehow accessible [to the senses].<sup>238</sup> Compared with the demands Plato makes of language and thought in this case and others,<sup>239</sup> the use of the word “*Gestell*”<sup>240</sup> that we have hazarded, as the name for the essence of modern technology, is almost innocuous. Nonetheless, the turn of speech being demanded now remains an imposition and hence is liable to misunderstanding.

Ap-prehendage<sup>241</sup> signifies the unifying [element]<sup>242</sup> of that apprehending, which apprehends man,<sup>243i</sup> that is, instigates him to disclose the real in the mode of ordering [it] into<sup>244</sup>

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<sup>232</sup> *West*.

<sup>233</sup> *Ansicht*. Lovitt translates “outward aspect.” This is too close to his translation of *Aussehen*. Moreover, the prefix is not *aus*, but *an*.

<sup>234</sup> *Vernehmbar wird*. Lovitt’s “perceivable with the physical eye” is equally possible.

<sup>235</sup> For *nichtsinnliche*. English “nonsensuous” works less well here, because the idea is not that the εἶδος is not sensuous but that it cannot be sensorily perceived.

<sup>236</sup> Continuing with my translation of *Aussehen*, though Lovitt’s “aspect” is far preferable here.

<sup>h</sup> 1954: more precisely! An ontically used, commonplace word raised to an exceptional ontological status.

<sup>237</sup> Lovitt’s “tasteable” is a common error for *tastbar*.

<sup>238</sup> “To us” or “to the senses” is implied.

<sup>239</sup> The term of comparison appears to be daring and not correctness.

<sup>240</sup> Translating the term does not work here, because a translation has to opt for one of the two meanings: the standard meaning or Heidegger’s meaning. This loses the point of the homonym.

<sup>241</sup> *Ge-stell*. Wherever Heidegger hyphenates the term to emphasize his substitution of the base word, I likewise do so. Note, however, that *ap-prehendage* is merely intended to indicate the underlying verb *prehend* (“classical Latin *prehendere* to grasp, seize, catch, variant of *praehendere*”): the prefix *ap-* does not correspond to *ge-* in either its meaning or its function. See n. 218.

<sup>242</sup> *Das Versammelnde*.

<sup>243</sup> *Ge-stell heißt das Versammelnde jenes Stellens, das den Menschen stellt*. Here one sees the advantage of translating *Gestell* with “apprehendage.” Compare Lovitt’s “Enframing means the gathering together of that setting-upon which sets upon man.” This fanciful translation completely loses the point of the sentence.

<sup>i</sup> 1954: not only man! Event und *das Ge-viert*

<sup>244</sup> Literally, the text at this point says “in the mode of ordering as the quantified” (*Bestellens als Bestand*).

the quantified.<sup>245</sup> Ap-prehendage<sup>246</sup> signifies the mode of disclosure that reigns in modern technology<sup>247</sup> and [it] is itself nothing technological.<sup>248</sup> By contrast, everything that we know of as an assemblage of rods and moving parts and scaffolding<sup>249</sup> and is thus a component<sup>250</sup> of what we call “assembly”<sup>251</sup> belongs to the technical. However, this, together with the components just named, falls in the domain of technical activity, which constantly corresponds<sup>252</sup> to the instigation of the apprehendage, but neither constitutes nor effects it.<sup>253</sup>

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<sup>245</sup> Rojcewicz: “*Ge-stell* is the name for the collection [or encompassing] of the imposition that imposes upon man, that is, challenges him, to impose upon reality in turn by looking disclosively upon realities as disposables.” *The Gods and Technology*, 104.

<sup>246</sup> *Ge-stell*.

<sup>247</sup> The two definitions are complementary. Apprehendage signifies both the unifying element of the apprehending that apprehends man to disclose the real in the mode of the quantified and it is the mode of disclosure that reigns in modern technology. This corresponds to what we found earlier: instigating (man) and harnessing (nature) are two sides of the same coin. We might call them the subjective and the objective side of apprehending, respectively.

<sup>248</sup> *Selber nichts technisches ist*. This formulation returns from the introduction. There Heidegger had promised that the “essence of technology” is “nothing technological.” Having established that apprehendage constitutes the essence of technology, Heidegger can now repeat the claim. He will return to it a third time below (see n. 342).

<sup>249</sup> There are three *Ge-Kollektiva* here: *Gestänge*, *Geschiebe*, and *Gerüste*. I use “assemblage” to convey the collective sense and spell out the root of each collective noun. Lovitt’s “all those things that are so familiar to us and are standard parts of an assembly, such as rods, pistons, and chassis” loses the collective sense.

<sup>250</sup> *Bestandsstück*.

<sup>251</sup> *Montage*. The quotation marks are my addition.

<sup>252</sup> *Entspricht*.

<sup>253</sup> That is, the apprehendage.

The word “apprehend” in the term ap-prehendage<sup>254</sup> does not just signify harnessing. Rather, it should simultaneously preserve the undertone<sup>255</sup> of another “apprehending”<sup>256</sup> from which it derives,<sup>257</sup> namely, the production and presentation<sup>258</sup> that lets what presences<sup>259</sup> come

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<sup>254</sup> *Ge-stell*. This is the clearest indication that Heidegger is replacing the root of *Gestell* (see n. ) with the stem of the verb *Stellen*.

<sup>255</sup> *Anklang* is “a singular trait, which shows a similarity to something else” (*einzelner Zug, der Ähnlichkeit mit etw. zeigt*). There is no support in standard lexica for translating this word with “echo.” Grimms actually notes that English lacks an equivalent (m. *concentus, accentus, ein schönes wort, desgleichen Engländer und Romanen nichts haben*). The underlying verb *anklingen* has the following meanings:

1. “to be audible, to sound” (*zu hören sein, erklingen*)  
“to be visible, palpable” (*sichtbar, spürbar sein*)
2. “to recall something, to partially coincide with something” (*an etw. erinnern, teilweise mit etw. übereinstimmen*).

The meaning “to toast while drinking” (*beim Trinken anstoßen*) is now obsolete. The lexical meaning of *Echo* (1. *Widerhall [bildlich] ...; 2. [übertragen] Reaktion (ein Echo finden, haben) Zustimmung finden, haben*) does not overlap with *Anklang*. We could justify such a translation via the latter’s English entry—“A repetition or close imitation, chiefly of things that can be compared to speech, voice, or sound (e.g. a writer’s thoughts or style), but occasionally with wider meaning: an enfeebled reproduction; an effect that continues after its cause has ceased; and the like”—but English “echo” implies “a repetition of sounds,” whereas *Anklang* means an inceptive sound that either recalls or accords with something (compare “**anklingen** Vb. ‘anfangen zu klingen, an etw. erinnern, mit etw. übereinstimmen’”). The idea is something between “intone” and “undertone.” The latter accords best in both its basic (“A low or subdued tone”) and its figurative meanings (“An underlying tone (of feeling, etc.); a subordinate or unobtrusive element; an undercurrent”). Finally, note that Heidegger is not saying that *apprehending* preserves “the undertone of another ‘apprehending,’” but rather, that the word “apprehending” preserves such an undertone—he is justifying his word choice. *Ge-stell* invokes *stellen* because it recalls *her-* and *darstellen*. Although we might have expected him to say *vorstellen*, the activity corresponding to the theoretical attitude, *dar-* corresponds better to *her-*. The idea is that things are torn from concealment and brought or placed before us: production and presentation are an attack on things.

<sup>256</sup> *Ein anderes Stellen*.

<sup>257</sup> *Abstammen*, “have one’s origin from someone or something” (*seinen Ursprung von jmdm., etw. haben*) is stronger than “emerge” or “arise” or even “result.” Pfeiffer notes that “the metaphorical meaning ‘part of a people, tribe, lineage, family ... follows the image of a tree spreading out on all sides, whose branches grow from a common trunk.’” This physical/genealogical connection is obviously important to Heidegger. While English “stem” partially preserves the same root, “derive” feels more idiomatic.

<sup>258</sup> *Her- und darstellen*. Here the argument has shifted. Previously, it was justifying a word choice. Now it is about the activities themselves. The two are isomorphic: Heidegger’s word choice hews to the relationship of “apprehending” to “production and presentation.” Compare the thought in n. 182.

<sup>259</sup> *Das Anwesende*.

forth into un-concealment in the sense of *ποίησις*.<sup>260j</sup> This production, which brings forth<sup>261</sup>— for example, the erecting<sup>262</sup> of a statue in the temple precinct<sup>263</sup>—and the ordering that harnesses<sup>264</sup> that is under discussion differ fundamentally<sup>265</sup> and yet remain related in their essence.<sup>266</sup> Both are modes of disclosure, *ἀλήθεια*.<sup>267</sup> What eventuates in the ap-prehending is the unconcealment, in consonance with which the activity of modern technology discloses the real as the quantified.<sup>k268</sup> It [modern technology]<sup>269</sup> is therefore neither simply human activity<sup>270</sup> nor a mere means within such activity.<sup>271</sup> The merely instrumental, merely anthropological

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<sup>260</sup> Here the thought is completed (see n. 258). Why not just say, “production and presentation ... in the sense of *ποίησις*”? Because the insertion “what presences come forth into un-concealment” reminds us that the coming forth into un-concealment of what presences is not autonomous. It is not referred to “the causality of human desire.” It is dependent, above all, on disclosure itself, particularly its “granting.” Heidegger is rebuffing “pagan” hubris.

<sup>j</sup> 1954: cf. now the afterword on *θέσις* to “The Origin of the Work of Art” in GA vol. 5

<sup>261</sup> *Dieses hervorbringende Herstellen*. Heidegger could just have said *dieses Herstellen*. What is gained by the addition of *hervorbringend*? It reminds us that even production is ultimately a bringing-forth; that even in production the release of things from concealment is implied. Disclosure plays along with us, even when we reject its truth.

<sup>262</sup> *Aufstellen*.

<sup>263</sup> Heidegger’s Winckelmannian inheritance manifests here. Even though the essay is anti-Greek overall, the examples chosen are all “classical.”

<sup>264</sup> The contrast between *Aufstellen* and *Bestellen* is stronger in German as Heidegger uses the participial adjective. “Harnessing ordering,” however, is awkward.

<sup>265</sup> *Grundverschieden*. This must be read literally: they come out of different grounds. The one is Greek; the other, despite the reversion to a Greek example (see n. 263), is Christian.

<sup>266</sup> *Im Wesen verwandt*. Why not just *wesensverwandt*? Because that would have been the noun *Wesen*. Here, Heidegger means the substantivized verb. *Herstellen* and *aufstellen* do not have a “form” or a “genus” in common; nor do they each have a “nature” which is akin. They are related in the verb (see n. 122) itself; both are modes of “prevailing.” The prevailing of what? “Of disclosure, *ἀλήθεια*.”

<sup>267</sup> Scholars have noted that Heidegger’s derivation and translation of *ἀλήθεια* are nonstandard. The concept appears to owe more to Luther’s notion of *Deus absconditus* (cf. also Isa. 45:15). At any rate, the idea of what is unknowable behind the things we know, manipulate, and make use of in technology dominates the essay.

<sup>k</sup> 1954: focused too onesidedly on only the *δηλοῦν*

[Comm.: *δηλόω*, “make visible or manifest, show, exhibit; make known, disclose, reveal; to be clear or plain”]

<sup>268</sup> *Das Wirkliche als Bestand*.

<sup>269</sup> The antecedent of *sie* could be either *moderne Technik* itself or *die Arbeit der modernen Technik*. Context, however, suggests the former.

<sup>270</sup> *Ein menschliches Tun* is literally “a human doing.”

<sup>271</sup> See n. 201.

definition of technology<sup>272</sup> becomes<sup>273</sup> redundant in principle. Neither can we, supposing we do recognize it as insufficient, supplement it by appending an underlying metaphysical or religious explanation.<sup>274</sup>

Nonetheless, it remains true that, in the technological age, man<sup>275</sup> remains instigated into disclosure in a particularly conspicuous manner.<sup>276</sup> Initially, this only affects nature as the principal reservoir<sup>277</sup> of the energy that is available.<sup>278</sup> Correspondingly, man’s ordering comportment<sup>279</sup> first manifests in the emergence<sup>280</sup> of modern exact natural science.<sup>281</sup> Its specific manner<sup>282</sup> of representation<sup>283</sup> pursues<sup>284</sup> nature as a calculable system of forces.<sup>285</sup>

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<sup>272</sup> This phrase returns from the introduction, but with the additional insertion of “merely” (*nur*). The term does not repeat for mere emphasis. Rather, in both cases, a point of comparison has been set up: “merely instrumental [as compared with being called to disclosure], merely anthropological [as compared with that which calls us to disclosure].” Each is being negated individually.

<sup>273</sup> *Wird im Prinzip hinfällig*. Heidegger significantly does not say the definition *is* redundant. It is incorrect *ab initio*, but it only *becomes* redundant once we are underway in “essential” questioning, that is, the kind of questioning Heidegger unfolds.

<sup>274</sup> This is the same criticism as in Heidegger’s “Letter on Humanism.” The “instrumental and anthropological” definition of technology is so insufficient that it cannot be salvaged by subsequently appending a “metaphysical or religious explanation.” This does not *a priori* exclude a “metaphysical or religious explanation.” On the contrary, as Heidegger notes in the “Letter on Humanism,” the former must be opposed precisely because it “does not set the *humanitas* of man high enough.”

<sup>275</sup> *Der Mensch des technischen Zeitalters*. Literally, “the human of the technological age.”

<sup>276</sup> *Besonders hervorstechende Weise*. Lovitt: “in a particularly striking way.”

<sup>277</sup> *Hauptspeicher*. Lovitt: “chief storehouse.”

<sup>278</sup> *Des Energiebestandes*. Here meaning 2b of *Bestand* is called for: *das Vorhandene*. The idea is: the energy that exists or is there or is available (*vorhanden = etw., jmd. existiert, ist da, verfügbar*) in nature. I have chosen the third of these. Lovitt’s “of the standing energy reserve” is nonsensical: the energy only enters *Bestand* in the technical sense once it is extracted from nature.

<sup>279</sup> *Bestellendes Verhalten*. I have no idea why Lovitt translates “ordering attitude and behavior.”

<sup>280</sup> I render *aufkommen* with “emergence”

<sup>281</sup> *Der neuzeitlichen exakten Naturwissenschaft*. The contemporary meaning of *Naturwissenschaft* (= *Wissenschaft von der anorganischen und organischen Natur einschließlich der Bezogenheit des Menschen zur Natur*) is broader than Lovitt’s “physics.” Lovitt pulls the word forward from two sentences down. While this is justified—Heidegger clearly intends the term in its older sense of “the scientific knowledge of nature and natural laws, natural history, natural science” (*die wissenschaftliche kenntnis der natur und naturgesetze, die naturkunde, naturforschung*)—it loses the connection that Heidegger is building to *Physik* in the next but one sentence.

<sup>282</sup> *Ihre Art*. Lovitt’s “modern science’s way” is unwarranted.

<sup>283</sup> *Vorstellens*. The idea is that the *vorstellen* endemic to natural science is a *nachstellen*.

<sup>284</sup> *Stellt der Natur ... nach*. *Nachstellen* is to “pursue animal or someone (with guile)” (*ein Tier, jmdn. (mit List) verfolgen*). Lovitt’s “pursues and entraps” may be an attempt to emphasize the root *stellen*.

<sup>285</sup> *Kräftezusammenhang*. Lovitt’s “coherence of forces” is less plausible.

Modern physics is not experimental physics because it deploys<sup>286</sup> apparatuses in order to investigate nature.<sup>287</sup> Rather, the contrary holds: because physics, indeed, already as pure theory, constrains<sup>288</sup> nature to present itself<sup>289</sup> as a system of forces that is calculable in advance, it has to order the experiment<sup>290</sup>—namely, in order to investigate whether the nature that has been constrained thus<sup>291</sup> reports and the way in which it reports [back to man].<sup>292</sup>

But the mathematical natural sciences surely emerged nearly two centuries before modern technology. How should they then have been placed by modern technology in its service?<sup>293</sup> The facts favor the contrary interpretation. Modern technology first started to

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<sup>286</sup> Interpreting *ansetzen* in the sense of “deploy someone (in order to pursue someone)” (*jmdn. einsetzen* (*zu jmds. Verfolgung*)). This is the only sense possible here. Otherwise, it should have been straightforwardly *einsetzen*.

<sup>287</sup> *Befragung der Natur*. Lovitt translates: “questioning of nature.”

<sup>288</sup> *Stellen*. A more nuanced translation seems required here, though “apprehend” also works.

<sup>289</sup> *Sich darzustellen*.

<sup>290</sup> *Wird das Experiment bestellt*. Literally, “the experiment is ordered.”

<sup>291</sup> *Die so gestellte Natur*. Lovitt’s “nature ... set up in this way” attempts to forge a link to “set upon” (for *stellen*), but it is quite meaningless. *Natur* is not “set up.”

<sup>292</sup> The idea is that the experimental nature of modern physics is itself a consequence of the way it views nature. More specifically, at a theoretical level, it already pursues (*nachstellen*) and constrains (*stellen*) nature: the apprehending of nature in modern technology is only a late, and final, consequence thereof. Heidegger is taking aim not just at Heisenberg (see n. 128), but at the idea of *ἐπιστήμη* itself, particularly as it originated from the Greek notion of *τέχνη*. In the following paragraphs, Heidegger argues that *ἐπιστήμη* itself arises from a particular way of regarding beings, an attitude whose origin he traces to Greeks. The same idea occurs in *Being and Time* and in *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*: the theoretical attitude emerges from a breakdown of practical circumspection.

<sup>293</sup> *In deren Dienst gestellt* is quite idiomatic (to place something or someone in its service). I do not know why Lovitt translates “How, then, could it have already been set upon by modern technology and placed in its service?”

develop once it was possible for it to base itself on the exact natural sciences. Considered historically,<sup>294</sup> this is correct. However, thought essentially,<sup>295</sup> it does not strike the truth.

The theory of nature of modern physics<sup>296</sup> paves the way<sup>297</sup> not just for technology, but for the essence of modern technology. For the instigating unification [of man] into the disclosure that orders already reigns in physics.<sup>298</sup> But it does not as yet manifest explicitly in it. In its origin, modern physics is the still unrecognized herald of the ap-prehendage.<sup>299</sup> The essence of modern technology conceals itself for a long time even after engine power has already been invented, the railway has been electrified,<sup>300</sup> and nuclear technology has been developed.

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<sup>294</sup> In this paragraph, Heidegger introduces two different words, *historisch* and *geschichtlich*, both of which are translated with “historical.” Because Heidegger discusses their underlying nouns *Historie* and *Geschichte* later in the essay, I defer a discussion of the terms to that section. For now, it suffices to know that when Heidegger uses *historisch* he means an extrinsic, disinterested, but for this very reason *superficial* determination of the facts (*Tatsachen*). Lovitt attempts to resolve the issue by translating *historisch* with “chronological” and *geschichtlich* with “historical,” but this engenders a hopeless confusion. The translation “Reckoned chronologically, this is correct. Thought historically, it does not hit upon the truth” makes it appear as if Heidegger is disputing the historical facts, whereas his point is that we need to focus on an essential history behind the facts.

<sup>295</sup> *Geschichtlich*. Lovitt’s translation is lexically correct, but here a nonstandard translation is called for to convey the meaning. Heidegger cannot simply say *wesentlich gedacht* because: (1) that word is overdetermined in this essay, and (2) in a way *geschichtlich* and *wesentlich* are synonyms for him. *Geschichte is Historie* thought essentially, that is, history thought out of the “dispensation” (*Geschick*).

How is it that I render *geschichtlich* with “essentially” here but with “destinally” later (n. 320)? The answer is: the two are related for Heidegger. Moreover, “essentially” would only confuse the reader there.

<sup>296</sup> *Die neuzeitliche physikalische Theorie der Natur*. Lovitt’s “modern physical theory of nature” is equally possible.

<sup>297</sup> *Wegbereiter* is literally “someone who creates the preconditions for something through his action, thought” (*jmd., der durch sein Handeln, Denken die Voraussetzungen für etw. schafft*). We could also have translated: “The theory of nature of modern physics creates the preconditions,” et cetera.

<sup>298</sup> Indeed, it reigns in everything, not just physics or technology. We must be careful to distinguish “instigating unification into disclosure” from “instigating unification into harnessing.” Only, the latter is unique to technology or, more precisely, to a-prehendage as the essence of modern technology.

<sup>299</sup> *Der in seiner Herkunft noch unbekannte Vorbote des Ge-stells*. It is not quite clear what Heidegger means by the “origin” of modern physics. At times he suggests that modern physics arises from the theoretical attitude to things, which itself emerged from the Greek focus on production. But at others, its origin seems to be disclosure itself, or, more particularly, the specific dispensation that instigated man “into disclosure,” though erroneously. At any rate, it is significant that the “herald” remains unrecognized until the end—it is only in the last stage of this history that we begin to understand not only the herald but also the signs, the entire history *and* its significance.

<sup>300</sup> *Kraftmaschinen erfunden, die Elektrotechnik auf die Bahn und die Atomtechnik in Gang gesetzt sind*. If Heidegger is treating all three elements as coordinate, the plural verb makes sense, but the past participle *gesetzt* only applies to the latter two elements; it would hence be simpler to say *Elektrotechnik und*

Whatever is the prevailing<sup>301</sup> element, not only in modern technology, remains concealed everywhere for the longest time. With regards to its reign,<sup>302</sup> however, it nonetheless precedes everything: [it is] the earliest.<sup>303</sup> Greek philosophers already knew of this when they said: that which is earlier with regard to its reigning upsurge<sup>304</sup> becomes manifest to us men only later.<sup>305</sup> The inceptive earliness<sup>306</sup> reveals itself to humans only last.<sup>307</sup> Hence, in the domain of thought,<sup>308</sup> the effort to think what has been thought inceptively<sup>309</sup> still more inceptively<sup>310</sup> is not the absurd<sup>311</sup> determination<sup>312</sup> to renew that which is past but the clear-headed<sup>313</sup> willingness<sup>314</sup> to marvel at that which is coming out of earliness.<sup>315</sup>

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*Atomtechnik in Gang gesetzt sind.* I therefore think that what Heidegger means is not that electrification is underway, but that the railway (*die Bahn*) has been electrified. In that case, all three elements coordinate nicely as I have them in English.

<sup>301</sup> *Alles Wesende.* Lovitt’s “all coming to presence” loses the sense of the substantivized participle.

<sup>302</sup> *Walten.* Lovitt again translates “holding sway.”

<sup>303</sup> In other words, its reign is latent until the very end.

<sup>304</sup> *Waltenden Aufgehens.* Lovitt’s “arising that holds sway” makes little sense.

<sup>305</sup> Greek philosophers did not say this. Heidegger is mangling Aristotle. He means the distinction between what is earlier by nature (*πρώτον φύσει*) and what manifests first for us (*πρώτον πρὸς ἡμᾶς*).

<sup>306</sup> *Anfängliche Frühe.* Either “inceptive” or “incipient” are possible. Lovitt’s “primally” requires an *ursprünglich*.

<sup>307</sup> Eschatological and apocalyptic motifs were latent in the preceding paragraph. Here they finally break through explicitly. The significance of modern technology now becomes apparent: what distinguishes it is not a difference in degree or kind from “the older technology of the craftsman,” but that it is *the last*. We are now standing in the end of days, and what announced itself at the beginning, but was reserved and hidden throughout the long history of being, manifests in all its apocalyptic significance.

<sup>308</sup> That is, not philosophy, which is anyway now at an end (as indicated by technology),

<sup>309</sup> *Das anfänglich Gedachte.* Both “thought inceptively” (that is, thought at the inception) and “inceptively thought” (that is, thought as inception) are possible. The ambiguity is clearly intentional.

<sup>310</sup> Again, both senses of “inceptive” are intended. We think the origin more “inceptively” than the Greeks, and we think “inceptively” from out of the origin, which remained obscure to the Greeks. The idea owes a lot to the *ἄγνωστος Θεός* of Acts 17:23.

<sup>311</sup> *Widersinnig*, but perhaps also with a hint of *eigensinnig* (persistent, stubborn).

<sup>312</sup> *Wille* not *Wunsch* as Lovitt’s “wish” would require.

<sup>313</sup> *Nüchtern.* Lovitt translates quite literally “sober.” The metaphorical sense “only taking what is essential into consideration, factual” (*nur das Wesentliche berücksichtigend, sachlich*) is preferable.

<sup>314</sup> *Bereitschaft.* Lovitt’s “readiness” is acceptable, but loses the sense of being not just ready, but willing to do something (*Bereitschaft = die Bereitwilligkeit, das Bereitsein; der Wille, etw. zu tun*). This seems to be the point here.

<sup>315</sup> *Vor dem Kommenden der Frühe.* Lovitt’s “before the coming of what is early” suggests that whatever is coming arrives “early.” This is not the intended meaning. Rather, it is the coming, *at last*, of that which announced itself at the beginning, at the dawn of time (*die Frühe = erste Periode eines Zeitabschnitts, besonders eines Tages*). Moreover, it is not *vor dem Kommen*, but *dem Kommenden der Frühe*. This could

In terms of the historical<sup>316</sup> reckoning of time, the point of origin of the modern natural sciences lies in the seventeenth century. By contrast, engine power technology<sup>317</sup> developed only in the second half of the eighteenth century. However, what is later according to the historical<sup>318</sup> determination, [namely,] modern technology, is, with regard to the essence that reigns<sup>319</sup> in it, destinally<sup>320</sup> earlier.

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be either *der Kommende* or *das Kommende*. The ambiguity may be deliberate. *Das Kommende* also looks forward to *das Rettende*, a term that plays a major role in the essay’s hopeful end portion.

<sup>316</sup> Lovitt’s translation “Chronologically speaking, modern physical science begins in the seventeenth century. In contrast, machine-power technology develops only in the second half of the eighteenth century. But modern technology, which for chronological reckoning is the later, is, from the point of view of the essence holding sway within it, the historically earlier” runs into the problem as before (see n. 294). It seems as if Heidegger is denying the chronological priority of the natural sciences; as if, contrary to what the “chronological reckoning” suggests, modern technology is actually “historically earlier.” This is not his meaning at all. Modern technology is, indeed, later; in fact, it is central to his argument that it is the *last thing*, the final manifestation of Western, Greek rationality. Rather than contesting the historical priority of the modern natural sciences, Heidegger is arguing that the essence of modern technology precedes both the modern natural sciences and modern technology. In other words, the same essence runs through both of them and, in particular, it enables the former as a necessary preparation for the latter.

<sup>317</sup> A *Kraftmaschine* is a “machine that converts one of the forms of energy found in nature into a form that is usable for humans” (*Maschine, die eine in der Natur vorkommende Energieform in eine für den Menschen brauchbare umwandelt*). *Kraftmaschinentechnik* is accordingly the technology of steam engines, the internal combustion engine, power generation, et cetera. “Engine power” seems the most generic.

<sup>318</sup> *Historisch*. Note that Heidegger is not denying that modern technology is later in historical terms.

<sup>319</sup> *Des in ihm waltenden Wesens*.

<sup>320</sup> I render *geschichtlich* as a rule with “historical,” because that is its meaning. Here, however, that translation will not work. Irrespective of how we hedge it around, to claim that modern technology is “historically earlier” than the natural sciences can only confuse the reader. The idea is not that it temporally precedes the natural sciences, but that it takes “logical” priority over them. The word “logical” again has to be hedged by quotation marks, because Heidegger does not mean logic in the usual sense. Rather, he means that according to the logic of “essential” history (*Geschichte*), the logic of the dispensation (*Geschick*), modern technology has priority over the natural science? How so? Because it is the intended last manifestation of Western thought and as such it must have been there at its inception. Read as Heidegger intends, the sentence makes perfect sense: whatever manifests later in historical terms must, in destinal terms, have been conceived earlier (else it could not manifest). *A fortiori*, what manifests last, must be the earliest. The argument is indebted to the structure of prophetic discourse and potentially also to Matt. 20:16.

If modern physics increasingly has to accept that its domain of representation<sup>321</sup> remains inaccessible to it,<sup>322</sup> this surrender has not been dictated by a commission of researchers. Rather, it has been demanded<sup>323</sup> by the reign of the ap-prehending that requires the orderability of nature into the quantified.<sup>324</sup> Hence, despite its retreat from a representation oriented exclusively towards objects<sup>325</sup>—a representation that, until recently, remained solely normative, physics can never relinquish one thing; namely, that nature declare itself in a form that is, in some way, mathematically determinable and that it remain orderable<sup>326</sup> as a system of information.<sup>327</sup> This system then determines itself in terms of a [concept of] causality that has undergone a further transformation. It now has neither the character of an inducing that brings forth nor is it of the nature of the *causa efficiens* or the *causa formalis*.<sup>328</sup> Presumably, causality

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<sup>321</sup> That is, nature.

<sup>322</sup> Heidegger is referring to Heisenberg’s statement that “the new mathematical formulae [of quantum theory] no longer describe nature itself but *our knowledge* of nature. We have had to forego the description of nature which for centuries was considered the obvious aim of all exact sciences.”

<sup>323</sup> *Herausgefordert* seems to be an error for *fordert*.

<sup>324</sup> *Bestellbarkeit der Natur als Bestand*. Literally, “the orderability of nature as the quantified.”

<sup>325</sup> The reference is to Heisenberg’s observation that “in modern science ... we can no longer consider ‘in themselves’ those building-stones of matter which we originally held to be the last objective reality. This is so because they defy all forms of objective location in space and time.... the aim of research is no longer an understanding of atoms and their movements ‘in themselves’.... Thus even in science *the object of research is no longer nature itself, but man’s investigation of nature.*”

<sup>326</sup> *Bestellbar*.

<sup>327</sup> The first claim is uncontroversial. Indeed, Heisenberg himself notes that “in the exact sciences the word ‘final’ means that there are always self-contained, mathematically representable, systems of concepts and laws applicable to certain realms of experience.... It is only in this limited sense that quantum-theoretical concepts and laws can be considered as final, and only in this limited sense can it ever happen that scientific knowledge is finally formulated in mathematical or, for that matter, in any other language.” But it is doubtful that the second holds. “Remain orderable” is Heidegger’s addition.

<sup>328</sup> This sentence and the previous one reveal Heidegger hard at work “saving the theory.” Their background is Heisenberg’s essay, which in crucial ways undermines the argument Heidegger is making. From a quantum theoretical perspective, nature is neither an object of knowledge nor an object of technological manipulation. Indeed, Heisenberg notes, “When we speak of the picture of nature in the exact science of our age, we do not mean a picture of nature so much as a *picture of our relationships with nature*. The old division of the world into objective processes in space and time and the mind in which these processes are mirrored—in other words, the Cartesian difference between *res cogitans* and *res extensa*—is no longer a suitable starting point for our understanding of modern science.” Heidegger is attempting to account for this change, on the one hand, by acknowledging that the Aristotelian doctrine of causality is no longer exhaustive and, on the other, by nonetheless asserting some notion of causality in the quantum realm (“presumably, causality shrinks to a forced reporting of multiple quanta....”). A historical account of technology that began with an analysis of the former is clearly being strained to the

shrinks to a forced reporting of multiple quanta<sup>329</sup> that are to be secured either simultaneously or successively. The process of increasing resignation,<sup>330</sup> which Heisenberg’s article (W. Heisenberg, “Das Naturbild in der heutigen Physik,” in *Die Künste im technischen Zeitalter* [Munich: Oldenbourg, 1954], 43 ff.)<sup>331</sup> so effectively describes, would correspond to this.<sup>332</sup>

Because its essence lies in the ap-prehendage, modern technology must use the exact natural sciences.<sup>333</sup> This gives rise to the false impression<sup>334</sup> that modern technology is applied natural sciences.<sup>335</sup> This impression<sup>336</sup> can assert itself only as long as we do not adequately interrogate<sup>337</sup> either the essential provenance of modern science or the essence of modern technology.<sup>338</sup>

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limit. Nonetheless, Heidegger attempts to resuscitate it by mapping his theory of “quantification” on to the latter. The idea of “a forced reporting of multiple quanta that are to be secured either simultaneously or successively” is a confused evocation of Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle: Heidegger is insisting that the same principles—that nature should report to us and that it should show up as the quantified—apply at the quantum as at the classical level. The alternative—that quantum theory marks a critical inflection in our understanding of being—would annul the singular history Heidegger wishes to relate, a history that leads from the Greeks to the apocalyptic present of modern technology. This would vitiate the very point of the essay, particularly its sense of living in the end of days.

<sup>329</sup> *Bestände*.

<sup>330</sup> The reference is to Heisenberg’s observation, “When we speak of the picture of nature in the exact science of our age, we do not mean a picture of nature so much as a *picture of our relationships with nature*. The old division of the world into objective processes in space and time and the mind in which these processes are mirrored—in other words, the Cartesian difference between *res cogitans* and *res extensa*—is no longer a suitable starting point for our understanding of modern science.”

<sup>331</sup> Heidegger’s essay on technology originally appeared in the same volume. He first presented the lecture at the Bayerische Akademie der Schönen Künste (the Bavarian Academy of the Fine Arts) in 1953. Heisenberg’s essay is translated in W. Heisenberg, *The Physicist’s Conception of Nature*, trans. Arnold J. Pomerans (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1958).

<sup>332</sup> Heidegger is attempting to claim Heisenberg’s views as nonetheless bearing out his understanding of the history of being. See n. 328

<sup>333</sup> That is to say, the apprehendage compels us to use the the exact natural sciences. This is another way in which we are apprehended (*gestellt*). Even the turn to the exact natural sciences is not of our making. Heidegger is closing off all avenues of human freedom, except the one he considers—that we become receptive to the claim of being.

<sup>334</sup> *Trügerischer Schein*. Lovitt: “deceptive illusion.” But when is an illusion not deceptive?

<sup>335</sup> Heidegger is not denying that modern technology applies the natural sciences, which would contradict the previous sentence. He is denying that it *is* applied natural sciences.

<sup>336</sup> Lovitt again translates “illusion” and adds “can maintain itself only as long...” This is too strong in my view. It obscures the nuanced point Heidegger is making (see n. 335).

<sup>337</sup> *Erfragt werden*. Lovitt’s “adequately found out through questioning” is unnecessary.

<sup>338</sup> When we do so, we, of course, discover that both are manifestations of the “dispensation of disclosure.”

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We are inquiring into technology in order to bring our relation to its essence to light. The essence of modern technology reveals itself in what we called the ap-prehendage. However, this cue is by no means the answer to the question of technology,<sup>339</sup> if to answer means to acquiesce<sup>340</sup> in the essence of what we are inquiring into.<sup>341</sup>

Where do we find ourselves brought when we think a step further about what the ap-prehendage as such is? It is nothing technological, nothing machinelike.<sup>342</sup> It is the manner in which the real discloses itself as the quantified. Once more, we must ask: does this disclosure occur beyond all human activity? No. But it also does not occur only *in* man nor decisively *through* him.<sup>343</sup>

The ap-prehendage is the unifying element<sup>344</sup> of that apprehending which apprehends<sup>345</sup> man to disclose the real in the manner of ordering into the quantified.<sup>346</sup> As the

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<sup>339</sup> The claim is puzzling, since to all appearances the “essence of modern technology” has been sufficiently clarified. But Heidegger is not looking to establish a factual state of affairs. Rather, as was noted at the outset, the essay’s aim is to “foster a free relationship” to technology. Moreover, once the essence of “essence” has been clarified as not something we determine (*feststellen*), that is, as neither the “idea,” nor “form,” nor “whatness,” but the way in which disclosure *west*, the only appropriate response is openness or acquiescence. We are moving from the register of *επιστήμη* to that “other thinking,” which Heidegger considers it his mission to foster.

<sup>340</sup> *Entsprechen*. Lovitt’s “respond, in the sense of correspond” is a circumlocution, and does not convey the sense. How can we “correspond” to an essence? What would a “response” consist in? We are not speaking of a verbal response. Scientific investigation is also excluded as a possible response (see n. 339). This only leaves the attitude Heidegger variously describes as openness (*offen sein*), hearing (*hören*), listening (*hören*), et cetera. But here it is “acquiesce.”

<sup>341</sup> *Wonach gefragt wird*. Lovitt: “what is being asked about.”

<sup>342</sup> An interpretation of the ap-prehendage as a thing or entity must be averted, particularly because Heidegger contrasts the entitative thinking of the Greeks, which climaxes in modern technology, with his “other” thinking.

<sup>343</sup> According to Heidegger, disclosure needs man for its occurrence (see n. 404). But it is also not simply man’s doing. This is where the idea of man being addressed (*angesprochen*), subject to a claim (*in Anspruch genommen*), et cetera enters.

<sup>344</sup> *Das Versammelnde*. Lovitt translates “gathering together.”

<sup>345</sup> *Jenes Stellens das den Menschen stellt*. Lovitt translates “setting-upon which sets upon man.”

<sup>346</sup> This is the second definition of “ap-prehendage.” The first occurs immediately after Heidegger introduces and justifies his neologism (see n. 243). Their first parts are nearly identical. A more extensive definition occurs in “Das Gestell,” the 1949 precursor to this essay: “The ap-prehendage apprehends. It rends everything as one into orderability. It rapes everything that presences into orderability and is thus the unification of this raping. The ap-prehendage is: rape-age. But this raping never just accumulates the quantified. Rather, it relentlessly rapes what is ordered away into the circuit of orderability. Within it,

one thus instigated, man stands in the essential domain<sup>347</sup> of the ap-prehendage. He cannot subsequently adopt a relationship to it.<sup>348</sup> Hence, the question of how we are to attain a

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one thing apprehends the other. One thing drives the other onward, but onward into the away [*der Hinweg* is the path or way *to* some place, but Heidegger is here substantivizing the adverb *hinweg*. The effect is as odd in German as it is in English] of ordering. The self-collected apprehending of the ap-prehendage is the unification of the driving circling within itself. The a-aprehendage is drive-age. The rape-age rapes, specifically away into the drive-age of operation. The ap-prehendage prevails as the rape-age of drive-age, which orders the constant orderability of the total quantum” (GA 79, 32–33). Mitchell translates *raffen* and *Geraff* with “reap” and “plundering,” respectively. “Reap” is “to cut and (usually) gather a grain or similar crop, originally (and typically) using a sickle or scythe”; transitively, it means “to cut, gather (esp. a grain) in this way. Hence: to gather (any plant) as a crop.” “Plunder,” by contrast, can be either “1. a. *transitive*. To rob (a place or person) of goods or valuables forcibly, typically in a time of war or civil disorder or in the course of a hostile incursion; to pillage, ransack; to rob systematically; to despoil” or “2. *intransitive*. To commit an act or acts of pillage or depredation. Also in extended use.” *Raffen*, however, means “to hastily seize and hold on to something, particularly several piecemeal items; to snap up something or someone for oneself; [pejoratively] to rapaciously appropriate something, particularly gold, property, profit for oneself” (*etw., besonders mehrere einzelne Teile zugleich hastig ergreifen und festhalten, etw., jmdn. an sich reißen; [abwertend] (etw. rafften) sich etw., besonders Geld, Besitz, Gewinn, habgierig aneignen*). The etymology of “plunder” (“either < German *plündern* (Middle High German *plundern*) or its equivalents Dutch *plunderen* ... ‘to pillage, sack’, literally ‘to rob of household furnishings’”) reveals a borrowing from German. The German verb “**plündern** (früher auch *blündern*) Vb. ‘ausrauben, rücksichtslos alles wegnehmen’, mhd. *plundern* ‘Plunder nehmen, Hausgerät aus dem Haus nehmen, retten’ (woraus obd. ‘umziehen’), dann besonders ‘Hausrat als Beute, Raub gewaltsam wegnehmen, sich aneignen’ (14. Jh.),” however, itself derives from the noun “**Plunder** m. älter auch n., ‘unbrauchbarer Kram, billige, wertlose, unnütze Dinge’, spätmhd. *blunder, plunder* ‘Kleider, Wäsche, Bettzeug, Hausgerät’ (14. Jh.), frühnhd. *plunder, blunder* ‘Kleider, Gepäck, allerlei Gerät, wertlose Sachen’). The contrast with *raffen* (“‘hastig und gierig ergreifen, an sich reißen, schriftlich Fixiertes in knappere Form bringen, Stoff locker zusammenschieben, hochnehmen’) could not be greater. *Raffen/Geraff* is thus neither “reaping” nor “plundering”; rather, it describes the *quality* of the action of *Ge-stell*. It clarifies that the apprehension of *Ge-stell* is not just any apprehending, but a *rapacious* apprehending. English “rape” in the sense of “to take or seize (something) by force” comes closest to this sense. Even if “the relationship, if any, with Middle Dutch *rāpen* to pick up, to seize, to abduct, to rob (Dutch *rapen*), Middle Low German *rāpen* to seize, to grab is not clear,” the etymology of this word, “probably < classical Latin *rapere* to seize, take by force, to carry off, snatch away, to violate, to sack, plunder” suggests it is the closest analogue to German *raffen*. As with *Ge-stell*, Heidegger is building a collective noun from the verb. Although “rapaciousness” and “rapacity” are more natural translations of the substantivized verb and the collective noun, I retain the forms “raping” and “rape-age.” These word-plays are obviously important to Heidegger. For the same reason, I render *Getrieb* with “drive-age” rather than its (simplex) meaning “drive” or “gearbox.”

<sup>347</sup> *Wesensbereich*. Presumably, Heidegger does not wish *Wesen* to be read in its traditional meaning. Lovitt’s “realm” corresponds to *Reich*.

<sup>348</sup> This is the idea that man is always already addressed by something beyond him. He can choose to either respond or not respond to it, but being addressed is not a choice. Indeed, for Heidegger, it constitutes the essence of being human.

relationship to the essence of technology always comes too late,<sup>349</sup> when it is asked in this form. But the question of whether we expressly experience ourselves as the ones whose every action<sup>350</sup> is everywhere, betimes openly and betimes obscurely,<sup>351</sup> instigated by<sup>1</sup> the ap-prehendage never comes too late.<sup>352</sup> Above all, the question of whether and how we are to open ourselves up to that wherein the ap-prehendage itself prevails<sup>353</sup> never comes too late.<sup>354</sup>

The essence of modern technology brings man onto the path of that disclosure through which the real everywhere, more or less evidently, becomes quantified. In our speech, to bring something onto a path<sup>355</sup> is, to send it. We shall call that unifying sending,<sup>356</sup> which originally

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<sup>349</sup> “Too late” because the address has not been heard as such, when we ask this question, and this means we have already gone astray (since being addressed constitutes the essence of being human). See n. 348. Potentially, “too late” is also to be understood historically: if we do not experience our essential relationship with the essence of technology, then we are necessarily placed on a course leading to modern technology. Whether this is avoidable or necessary (for being to unfold its history) remains unresolved in Heidegger’s thought.

<sup>350</sup> Literally, *Tun und Lassen* means what one “does and leaves (aside).” The idea seems to be that we are determined by the apprehendage as much in what we do not do as in what we do. This corresponds to the idea that the apprehendage instigates us “betimes openly and betimes obscurely.” See n. 351. In other words, we never escape the “dispensation of disclosure.”

<sup>351</sup> *Überall, bald offenkundig, bald versteckt*. Lovitt takes the adverbial phrase to refer to man’s actions. This may explain why he translates “activities everywhere, public and private.” But the idea is not that some of man’s actions are covert; it is that the dispensation of apprehendage reigns in mysterious ways.

<sup>1</sup> In

<sup>352</sup> The contrast is instructive. If the former question comes “too late,” why not this one? The answer seems to be that whereas we can never subsequently take up a relationship to disclosure (since we are always already in a relationship with it), it is never too late to become conscious of this fact, indeed, of the fact that disclosure (through the apprehendage) has been directing us even when we did not know of its existence and even in the choices we did not make. The question thus marks an inflection in man’s relationship to disclosure. It is structurally never too late for it, but it is also never too late for it in the sense that we can gain from this insight at any time.

<sup>353</sup> *Das Ge-stell selber west*.

<sup>354</sup> This is the final step: becoming receptive for disclosure. It follows from the previous step (see n. 352) that it likewise “never comes too late.”

<sup>355</sup> *Auf einen Weg bringen*. Lovitt’s “start upon a way” is excessive.

<sup>356</sup> *Jenes versammelnde Schicken*. Lovitt’s “that sending-that-gathers” is distinctly worse.

brings man onto the path of disclosure, the *dispensation*.<sup>m357</sup> The essence of all history<sup>358</sup> is determined thence. History is neither simply the object of historical inquiry<sup>359</sup> nor simply the

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<sup>m</sup> 1962: cf. *Zeit und Sein* [planned for GA vol. 14]

[Comm.: Although Heidegger does not clarify the reference, it is most likely to the following passage in GA 14, 27:

Denn, indem wir dem Sein selbst nachdenken und seinem Eigenen folgen, erweist es sich als die durch das Reichen von Zeit gewährte Gabe des Geschickes von Anwesenheit. Die Gabe von Anwesen ist Eigentum des Ereignens. Sein verschwindet im Ereignis. In der Wendung: »Sein als das Ereignis« meint das »als« jetzt: Sein, Anwesenlassen geschickt im Ereignen, Zeit gereicht im Ereignen. Zeit und Sein ereignet im Ereignis.... Das Schicken im Geschick des Seins wurde gekennzeichnet als ein Geben, wobei das Schickende selbst an sich hält und im Ansiehalten sich der Entbergung entzieht.

Stambaugh translates: “For as we think Being itself and follow what is its own, Being proves to be destiny’s gift of presence, the gift granted by the giving of time. The gift of presence is the property of Appropriating. Being vanishes in Appropriation. In the phrase ‘Being as Appropriation,’ the word ‘as’ now means: Being, letting-presence sent in Appropriating, time extended in Appropriating. Time and Being appropriated in Appropriation.... The sending in the destiny of Being has been characterized as a giving in which the sending source keeps itself back and, thus, withdraws from unconcealment.”

My translation follows: “For insofar as our thoughts track being itself and attend to what is proper to it, it [being] turns out to be the gift of the dispensation of presence, a gift that has been granted by the handing of time. The gift of presence is the property of the event. Being disappears in the event. In the phrase ‘being as the event’ the [word] »as« now means: being, letting presence sent in eventuation, time handed in eventuation. Time and being eventuate in the event.... The sending [implicit] in the dispensation of being was characterized as a giving in which that which sends cleaves to itself and in cleaving to itself withdraws itself from unconcealment.”]

<sup>357</sup> *Geschick*. This word has given translators a lot of trouble. Lilly, for example, writes: “Because of its great importance in Heidegger’s text, coupled with the extreme difficulty of translating it into English, I have decided to leave only one word untranslated: *Geschick*. There are three common translations of *Geschick*—the rather theological rendering of it as ‘destiny,’ and the more neutral ‘sending’ and ‘mittence.’ In the case of the former, Heidegger explicitly states that *Geschick* should not be understood in its ordinary German sense of ‘destiny.’ Although what Heidegger means by *Geschick* certainly has some bearing on the notion of destiny, Heidegger states that destiny is a derivative notion of *Geschick*.... The translation of *Geschick* as ‘sending’ does have its merit, for *schicken* means ‘to send, dispatch.’ Heidegger often uses the prefix *Ge-* in a very specific manner: *Ge-* is a way in which a collective or totality can be signified in German, such as *Gebirge* (mountain range), which is built from the root *Berg* (mountain), or *das Gewährte*, which means ‘all that has lasted’ or ‘been vouchsafed.’ *Ge-* also is the prefix used to form the past participle of many German verbs, such as *geschickt* (‘sent’) from *schicken*. Thus *Geschick* can be understood to mean ‘all that has been sent.’ Though this, like ‘destiny,’ is not an altogether incorrect translation, ‘sending’ conveys little of the richness of *Geschick*, as well as having some unfortunate connotations that do not hold for what Heidegger means by *Geschick*. For instance, sending implies that one sends something from one place to another, hence that there is some means of conveyance as well as a sender and receiver. It also implies a process, and Heidegger explicitly proscribes this sense from *Geschick* as well as *Geschichte* (history).” Reginald Lilly, “Translator’s Introduction” in Martin Heidegger, *The Principle of Reason*, trans. Reginald Lilly (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1991), xiv. But the word need not give us so much trouble. A look at its etymology reveals that *Geschick* has two meanings, “the ability to do something in the proper manner, fate” (‘Fähigkeit, etw. in

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rechter Weise zu tun, Schicksal’). Only the first stands under the influence of the past participle: *geschickt* (skilled) → *Geschick* (skill). It also reveals that *Geschick* has an older meaning, Mittelhochdeutsch “occurrence, order, ordinance, battle-formation, endowment, conduct” (Mhd. *geschicke* ‘Begebenheit, Ordnung, Anordnung, Aufstellung zum Kampf, Vermächtnis, Benehmen’). In Neuhochdeutsch its meaning then narrows to “what is sent, inflicted, imposed on man by higher powers, fate” (‘was dem Menschen von höheren Mächten geschickt, zugefügt, verhängt wird, Schicksal’ (seit dem 15. Jh.)). The word *Schicksal*, “the totality of what befalls an individual, providence, lot, fate” (‘Gesamtheit dessen, was dem Menschen widerfährt, Fügung, Los, Geschick’), is itself a “borrowal from older Dutch *schicksel* (for Latin *apparātus, ōrdo, dispositio, fātum*)”; “in 1644 it is characterized as Dutch by the south German M. Zeiller and regarded as a synonym for German *Geschick*.” The two words continue in parallel, though occurrences of *Schicksal* typically outweigh *Geschick* 5:1. Lexically, *Geschick* is glossed with *Schicksal*, “fate, inevitable course of life” (*Schicksal, unabänderlicher Verlauf des Lebens*), but it also has the meaning of “ordering of life, of personal circumstances” (*Gestaltung des Lebens, der Lebensumstände*). Given that Heidegger explicitly rejects the translation of *Geschick* with destiny, as Lilly notes (see also n. 390 in the present text), and given his penchant for returning to archaic meanings, the likeliest translation of *Geschick* is *Ordnung*, a word we might translate with “ordinance” (if we wished to emphasize its etymology—both words are derived from from Latin *ordināre*) or “dispensation” (if we wished to emphasize its morphology: although “dispensation” does not contain the same root, it retains the sense of “mete out, deal out, distribute; bestow in portions or from a general stock”). As Heidegger often sets aside a word’s etymological meaning for its morphology (compare *Ge-stell* in this essay) and he uses *Geschick* in this essay in a series with other words such as *geschicklich*, *Schickung*, *Geschichte*, all of which derive from *schicken* and thus emphasize the verbal sense of “sending” (**schicken** Vb. ‘senden’, reflexiv ‘sich fügen, einrichten, abfinden, geziemen’), “dispensation” seems the most plausible translation of *Geschick*. One way of thinking about their difference is that whereas *Schicksal* is always individual, *Geschick* is collective. Indeed, in Heidegger’s thought, it is *ontological*: *Seinsgeschick* is the “ontological dispensation.”

<sup>358</sup> *Geschichte*. German has two words for history, *Geschichte* and *Historie*. Heidegger consciously alternates between the two here. *Geschichte* originally signified “event, narration, science of the development of society (in an expanded sense also of nature) in the past” (‘Ereignis, Erzählung, Wissenschaft von der Entwicklung der Gesellschaft (im weiteren Sinne auch von der Natur) in der Vergangenheit’). By the eighteenth century, it had displaced *Historie* (‘Geschichte, Geschichtswissenschaft, Begebenheit, Erzählung, Bericht, Kunde’) in all of its meanings. The latter is now archaic and only survives in *Historiker*, a term that “like Greek *historéin* (*ἱστορεῖν*) ‘erforschen, beobachten, das Erforschte oder Erfahrene berichten’” belongs to “Greek *hístōr* (*ἱστωρ*) ‘wissend, kundig; Wissender, Kundiger.’” Heidegger is reviving the archaic term. He particularly plays on its association with knowledge or inquiry. As Soffer observes, “Heidegger develops his account of scientific history in the spirit of the Nietzschean concern that history be relevant to ‘life.’ A familiar centerpiece of this account is his distinction in *Being and Time* between *Historie* and *Geschichte*. *Geschichte* is the lived, existential phenomenological historicity of man, grounded in care, Being towards-death, and the fore-structures of the understanding. *Geschichte* appropriates the past out of the ‘destining’ (*Geschick*) of cares and concerns rooted in lived temporality and community, and with an eye towards transformation of the present into the future. By contrast, *Historie* is a reflective, scientific objectification of *Geschichte*. In its usual, inauthentic form, it reduces the past to an object of idle curiosity or aesthetic contemplation, robbing history of its transformative, future-oriented destining power.” Gail Soffer, “Heidegger, Humanism, and the Destruction of History,” *The Review of Metaphysics* 49, no. 3 (1996): 566–67. In

enactment of human activity. Rather, the latter becomes historical<sup>360</sup> only insofar as it is concordant<sup>361</sup> [with the dispensation]<sup>362</sup> (cf. *On the Essence of Truth*, 1930; first edition printed in 1943, p. 16f.). And it is only the dispensation into objectifying representation that makes the historical<sup>363</sup> accessible to historical inquiry,<sup>364</sup> that is, a science, as an object, thereby enabling the commonplace identification of the [genuinely] historical<sup>365</sup> with the object of historical inquiry.<sup>366</sup>

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this translation, I render *Geschichte* and *geschichtlich* consistently with “history” and “historical,” reserving “historical inquiry” for *Historie*.

<sup>359</sup> *Historie*. The German term *Historie* is “borrowed from Latin *historia*, Greek *historía* (*ἱστορία*)” and signifies “historical presentation, history, in particular knowledge, acquaintance, science, narration (of something that occurred or was heard)” (‘geschichtliche Darstellung, Geschichte’, besonders ‘Kunde, Kenntnis, Wissenschaft, Erzählung (von etw. Geschehenem oder Gehörtem)’). Lovitt’s “object of written chronicle” is not only unhelpful; it is mistaken. The “object of written chronicle” would be *historisch*. I render *Historie* with “historical inquiry,” though “historicist inquiry” is even better in some respects. But we then lose the play between the two senses of “historical.”

<sup>360</sup> *Geschichtlich* has three senses: “historical, concerning history” (*historisch, die Geschichte betreffend*), “attested by sources” (*durch Quellen beglaubigt*), and “significant for history” (*für die Geschichte bedeutungsvoll*). Heidegger means it in the first and third meanings with a particular emphasis on the third. The first meaning overlaps with *historisch* and provides their common terminus. The second meaning is relegated primarily to *historisch* by Heidegger.

<sup>361</sup> *Geschicklich* is no longer found in standard lexica, though Grimm’s historical dictionary notes that it is “equivalent to the simple *schicklich*, the way something is befitting or proper (*wie es sich schickt oder gebührt*). *Schicklich* itself is formal and/or archaic and has the following meanings:

1. passend, einer Sache zukommend, angemessen, gebührend
2. <etw. ist schicklich> etw. entspricht den gültigen Umgangsformen in einer Gesellschaft, etw. ist Brauch und Sitte, ziemt, gehört sich.

Lovitt’s “that activity first becomes history as something destined” completely misses the mark. He has not understood the meaning of the word. His translation projects a meaning on to Heidegger that is simply not there in the original. What Heidegger means is that human activity only becomes historical (*geschichtlich*) in the true sense (see n. 358) if it accords with the dispensation.

<sup>362</sup> Heidegger’s text apparently leaves *geschicklich* hanging, but *geschicklich* contains *Geschick*. This may explain why he prefers it over the more current *schicklich*. The text in square brackets is an insertion but not an addition: it is implied in the word play.

<sup>363</sup> *Das Geschichtliche*.

<sup>364</sup> *Historie*. Lovitt’s “historiography” would be *Historiographie*.

<sup>365</sup> *Des Geschichtlichen*. The addition of “genuinely” is required to make the intended contrast clear.

<sup>366</sup> *Dem Historischen*. The adjective *historisch*, “concerning history, historical, (textually) transmitted, attested by sources” (‘die Historie betreffend, geschichtlich, (schriftlich) überliefert, durch Quellen beglaubigt’), is attested in the sixteenth century. The idea is not simply that people equate the genuinely historical (*geschichtlich*) with the historical in an extrinsic sense (*historisch*), but that they reduce the former to the latter and thus fail to see its true dimension, that it is concordant with the dispensation.

As the instigation [of man] to ordering, the ap-prehendage sends [us] into a mode of disclosure. Like every other kind of disclosure, the ap-prehendage, too, is a destining<sup>367</sup> of [that is, by]<sup>368</sup> the dispensation. Bringing forth, *ποίησις* is also a dispensation in the sense we just noted.

The unconcealment of what is<sup>369</sup> always follows a [specific] path<sup>370</sup> of disclosure. The dispensation of disclosure always governs<sup>371</sup> man. But it is never the misfortune of a coercion.<sup>372</sup> For man first becomes free<sup>373</sup> when he belongs in the domain of the dispensation and hence becomes the one who hears [the claim],<sup>374</sup> though he is not a bondsman.<sup>375</sup>

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<sup>367</sup> *Schickung*. Here where “destining” is actually warranted, Lovitt translates “ordaining.” This loses the etymological connection (*Geschick*, *geschicklich*, and *Schickung* are all formed from *schicken*; *Geschichte* shares a common root with it). It also emphasizes the meaning of “the divine providence or ordination (die göttliche fügung oder anordnung) over the “the act of sending, also mission, thing sent, missio” (die handlung des schickens, auch gesandtschaft, sendung, missio). However, technology is not something that arrives all at once, but the final stage in a long process. It is a destining in the sense that Western thought has been headed towards it ever since its origin in Greek rationality (compare the adjective “destined = fixed or appointed to go to a particular destination; bound”). Lovitt’s translation loses the notion of history (*Geschichte*) as that which ensues between the act of sending (*schicken*) and the destination (*Schickung*). All three are aspects of the dispensation (*Geschick*).

<sup>368</sup> The insertion clarifies the sense in which the genitive must be taken.

<sup>369</sup> *Dessen, was ist*. We could also have translated “of that which is.”

<sup>370</sup> Here and throughout in the preceding paragraph, Lovitt’s “goes upon a way of revealing” is quite meaningless. The idea is that disclosure brings man on a *specific* path. The verb is explicitly *bringen*.

<sup>371</sup> *Durchwaltet*. There is no word corresponding to “complete” in Lovitt’s “holds complete sway.” Perhaps he felt the need for it to convey the prefix.

<sup>372</sup> *Verhängnis eines Zwanges*. Lovitt’s “fate that compels” is completely inadequate.

<sup>373</sup> *Wird ... frei*. Heidegger is returning to themes broached at the beginning of the essay. There, it was noted that we hope to “foster” a “free relationship” to technology. Heidegger also noted that, “the relationship is free if it opens up our existence to the ‘essence’ of technology.” An external notion of freedom, consisting in repudiating technology, was also denied as still being “unfree.” Having introduced the notion of “dispensation” and, more important, having connected it to “history,” Heidegger now returns to how exactly man “becomes free”: not by resisting modern technology, but by appreciating its deeper significance as the final iteration of Greek ontology and hence of the destiny of Western thought itself.

<sup>374</sup> *Ein Hörender wird*. Lovitt’s “hears and listens” is unwarranted. It is sufficient to hear the claim, though of course, it must not be heard as the “misfortune of a coercion,” that is, an external constraint. This is why Lovitt’s “constrained to obey” (see n. 375) is so wrong.

<sup>375</sup> Heidegger is echoing Luther’s *Von der Freiheit eines Christenmenschen* (1520) here: “The Christian individual is a completely free lord of all, subject to none. The Christian individual is a completely dutiful servant of all, subject to all” (Wengert trans.). The word, however, is not *Knecht*, but *Höriger*, which Lovitt translates “constrained to obey.” But this misrepresents Heidegger: a *Höriger* is not “constrained,” but someone who “subjects himself to the will of another” (*sich dem Willen eines anderen*

The essence of freedom is *originally* not coordinated<sup>376</sup> with the will or, indeed, solely<sup>377</sup> with the causality of human desire.

Freedom directs<sup>378</sup> the free<sup>379</sup> in the sense of the cleared,<sup>380</sup> that is, in the sense of the disclosed.<sup>381</sup> Freedom stands in the closest and most intimate kinship to the occurrence of disclosure, that is, of the truth.<sup>382</sup> All disclosure belongs within a harboring and concealment.

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*unterwerfend*). This is the precise sense found in Luther: a Christian is a “free lord,” who nonetheless “is ... subject to all.”

<sup>376</sup> English “coordinate” (“place or arrange (things) in proper position relatively to each other and to the system of which they form parts; to bring into proper combined order as parts of a whole”) corresponds literally to German *zugeordnet*, “<ordain something or someone to some thing> accommodate something or someone in a particular place in a previously existing order, to integrate something into a system” (<etw., jmdn. einer Sache zuordnen> etw., jmdn. an einer bestimmten Stelle einer bereits vorhandenen Ordnung unterbringen, etw. in ein System einordnen).

<sup>377</sup> *Oder gar nur*. The restriction may be significant. Whereas “the essence of freedom” is not coordinated with the will at all, it appears to be coordinated to some extent with the causality of human desire, albeit not exclusively. Alternatively, Heidegger could be arguing emphatically against the position that the essence of freedom is coordinated exclusively with the causality of human desire. This reading is particularly suggested by his critique of humanism.

<sup>378</sup> *Verwaltet*. Both the word and what Heidegger means by it are obscure. Lovitt’s “governs” attempts to make the best of the lexical meaning “be responsible, care for the direction, regulation, orderly execution of all affairs in a specific area of tasks or matters” (*für die Lenkung, Regelung, ordnungsgemäße Abwicklung aller Angelegenheiten in einem bestimmten Aufgabenbereich, Sachbereich zuständig sein, sorgen*). Perhaps Heidegger chooses the word because it suggests *walten*. If Heidegger intends this connection, historical etymology may offer a clue as to his meaning. *Verwalten* = ‘etw. regeln, für etw. (sorgend) zuständig sein’, mhd. *verwalten* ‘in Gewalt haben, sorgen für’, reflexiv ‘Gewalt, Kraft haben, in Gewalt haben, können’. The sentence could mean “freedom holds power over the free in the sense of the cleared.”

<sup>379</sup> The substantivized adjective *das Freie* develops from *frei* in the sense of “not enclosed, open, unlimited” (*nicht eingeschlossen, offen, unbegrenzt*). It idiomatically means “in nature” or “the outdoors.” Lovitt’s translation, “the open,” seeks to preserve the lexical meaning of the term, as he explains in a note. But this does not illumine Heidegger’s meaning in any way. As Heidegger uses the term, it refers neither to “the outdoors” nor, metaphorically, to “the open,” but quite literally to the free space of what Heidegger calls *das Gelichtete* (see n. 381).

<sup>380</sup> *Des Gelichteten*. This is the substantivized past participle of the verb *lichten* with the meanings:

1. <sich lichten> weniger dicht werden, mit weiten Zwischenräumen, Lücken gefügt sein [bildlich]
2. <einen Wald lichten> einen Wald von (unnötigen) Bäumen befreien, ausholzen [gehoben, bildlich]
3. [gehoben] <sich lichten> heller werden, sich aufhellen

It has been commented that Heidegger intends both senses of the term, that is, “thin,” particularly in the context of forestry (“thin out a forest”; English “clear” is excessive) and “illumine, let something become brighter.” Here only the transitive meaning (the second meaning) is possible.

<sup>381</sup> *Des Entborgenen*. *Das Freie*, *das Gelichtete*, and *das Entborgene* are thus all synonyms.

<sup>382</sup> Literally, “The occurrence of disclosure, that is, of the truth is that to which freedom stands in the closest and most intimate kinship.”

But that which is concealed and always conceals itself is that which liberates<sup>383</sup> [that is, redeems], the mystery.<sup>384</sup> All disclosure comes out of the free, heads into the free, and brings

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<sup>383</sup> *Das Befreiende. Befreien*, “free someone, something, or oneself (by overcoming resistances)” (*jmdn., etw., sich (durch Überwinden von Widerständen) frei machen*), in a metaphorical sense is “redeem someone” (*jmdn. erlösen*). The reason I do not straightforwardly translate “redemptive” is, this word must be reserved for *erlösend*. Nonetheless, the meaning is implied. Heidegger is carefully navigating here between formulating his thoughts in conceptual terms his audience would understand and not merely repeating dogmatic theology, in which case the claim to novelty would be lost.

<sup>384</sup> *Das Geheimnis*. Heidegger’s *Geheimnis* and *geheimnisvoll* often fox his readers. When the latter is not used in its ordinary sense of “baffling, impenetrable” (*rätselhaft, unergründlich*), it is justifiably obscure: one can hardly comprehend the meaning of “mystery” if one does not know the mystery referred to. It helps to look at the NT background of this term. Thayer’s entry for *μυστήριον* follows:

**μυστήριον**, *μυστηριου*, τό (*μύστης* (one initiated; from *μύω*, which see)), in classical Greek **a hidden thing, secret, mystery**: *μυστήριον σου μή κατεπιγης τῷ φίλῳ*, Menander; plural generally **mysteries, religious secrets**, confided only to the initiated and not to be communicated by them to ordinary mortals; (cf. K. F. Hermann, *Gottesdienstl. Alterthümer der Griechen*, § 32). In the Scriptures:

**1. a hidden or secret thing, not obvious to the understanding**: 1 Corinthians 13:2; 1 Corinthians 14:2; (of the secret rites of the Gentiles, Wis. 14:15, 23).

**2. a hidden purpose or counsel; secret will**: of men, *τοῦ βασιλέως*, Tobit 12:7, 11; *τῆς βουλῆς αὐτοῦ*, Judith 2:2; of God: *μυστήρια Θεοῦ*, the secret counsels which govern God in dealing with the righteous, which are hidden from ungodly and wicked men but plain to the godly, Wis. 2:22. In the N. T., God’s plan of providing salvation for men through Christ, which was once hidden but now is revealed: Romans 16:25; 1 Corinthians 2:7 (on this see *ἐν*, I. 5 f.); Ephesians 3:9; Colossians 1:26f; with *τοῦ θελήματος αὐτοῦ* added, Ephesians 1:9; *τοῦ Θεοῦ*, which God formed, Colossians 2:2; (1 Corinthians 2:1 WH text); *τοῦ Χριστοῦ*, respecting Christ, Colossians 4:3; *τοῦ εὐαγγελίου*, which is contained and announced in the gospel, Ephesians 6:19; *ἐτετέλεσθη τό μυστήριον τοῦ Θεοῦ*, said of the consummation of this purpose, to be looked for when Christ returns, Revelation 10:7; *τά μυστήρια τῆς βασιλείας τῶν οὐρανῶν* or *τοῦ Θεοῦ*, the secret purposes relative to the kingdom of God, Matthew 13:11; Mark 4:11; Luke 8:10; used of certain single events decreed by God having reference to his kingdom or the salvation of men, Romans 11:25; 1 Corinthians 15:51; of God’s purpose to bless the Gentiles also with salvation through Christ (cf. Lightfoot on Colossians 1:26), Ephesians 3:3, cf. Ephesians 3:5; with *τοῦ Χριστοῦ* added, Ephesians 3:4; *οἰκονόμοι μυστηρίων Θεοῦ*, the stewards of God’s mysteries, i. e. those intrusted with the announcement of God’s secret purposes to men, 1 Corinthians 4:1; used generally, of Christian truth as hidden from ungodly men: with the addition of *τῆς πίστεως*, *τῆς εὐσεβείας*, which faith and godliness embrace and keep, 1 Timothy 3:9, 16; *τό μυστήριον τῆς ἀνομίας* **the mystery of lawlessness**, the secret purpose formed by lawlessness, seems to be a tacit antithesis to God’s saving purpose, 2 Thessalonians 2:7.

**3. Like מֵיִן and מֵיִן in rabbinic writers, it denotes the mystic or hidden sense**: of an O. T. saying, Ephesians 5:32; of a name, Revelation 17:5; of an image or form seen in a vision, Revelation 1:20; Revelation 17:5; of a dream, (Theod.) Daniel 2:18f, 27–30, where the Sept. so renders מֵיִן. (The Vulg. translates the word *sacramentum* in Daniel 2:18; Daniel 4:6; Tobit 12:7; Wis. 2:22; Ephesians 1:9; Ephesians 3:3, 9; Ephesians 5:32; 1 Timothy 3:16; Revelation 1:20.) (On the distinctive N. T. use of the word cf. Campbell, *Dissertations on the Gospels*. diss. ix. part i.; Kendrick in B. D. American edition under the word; Lightfoot on Colossians 1:26.)

[man] into the free.<sup>385</sup> The freedom of the free<sup>386</sup> consists neither in the unboundedness [characteristic] of caprice nor in being bound to mere laws.<sup>387</sup> Freedom<sup>388</sup> is that which conceals, while simultaneously clearing. It is that in whose clearing the veil that veils the presencing of all truth undulates, thereby letting the veil appear as that which veils. Freedom is the domain of the dispensation, which brings disclosure onto its [specific] path at any given time.

The essence of modern technology lies in the ap-prehendage. The latter belongs to the dispensation of disclosure.<sup>389</sup> These sentences say something different than the oft-repeated

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Heidegger’s equation of the mystery with “that which liberates” (*das Befreiende*) hints that the mystery referred to here is indeed “God’s plan of providing salvation for men through Christ,” though it is not described in traditional theological terms. The structure of the argument is eschatological and salvific, the “mystery” being revealed at the end of history.

<sup>385</sup> *Kommt aus dem Freien, geht ins Freie, und bringt ins Freie*. The sentence is among the most obscure in the essay.

<sup>386</sup> *Die Freiheit des Freien*. Heidegger is glossing the concept of *das Freie* here. This would make no sense if *das Freie* did not denote a particular kind of freedom. We could also have translated: “the freedom of this particular concept of freedom.”

<sup>387</sup> *Durch bloße Gesetze*. The juridico-political concept of freedom is rejected here.

<sup>388</sup> *Freiheit*. We might expect Heidegger to say *das Freie ist das lichtende Verbergen*, but the expression “the free in the sense of the cleared” (*das Freie im Sinne des Gelichteten*) militates against this. Freedom (*Freiheit*) is that which clears (*lichtet*), whereas the free (*das Freie*) is that which has been cleared (*das Gelichtete*). The detour via the latter concept, however, has allowed Heidegger to establish an “ontological” sense of freedom, one that takes priority over the juridico-political concept of freedom, that is, either “unboundedness of caprice [or] being bound to mere laws.”

<sup>389</sup> There is a double movement here. On the one hand, man turns toward technology; on the other, this turning is only possible because technology is itself a dispensation of disclosure. In traditional terms, Heidegger is expressing the relationship of the *aversio hominis a Deo* to the *aversio Dei ab homine*: “Das Wesen der Erbsünde liegt somit im Abgewandtsein des Menschen von Gott, das durch die freie Abwendung Adams (*aversio hominis a Deo*) begründet und von Gott belassen (*aversio Dei ab homine*) wurde. ‘Wir waren von Natur Kinder des Zorns wie die anderen auch’ (Eph 2,3; vgl. D 1511 [788]). Dieses Abgewandtsein kann auch Verlust des übernatürl. Lebens und der gnadenhaften Gottebenbildlichkeit genannt werden (D 1512 [789]). Das Wesentliche der verlorenen Gottesgemeinschaft kann der Mensch durch die Taufe wiedererlangen (Joh 3,5; D 1513 1515 [790 792]). Mit der gnadenhaften Gottverbundenheit hat der Mensch auch deren Auswirkungen in seinem natürl. Sein verloren: Er ist der Begierlichkeit (Gen 2,25; 3,7.10), dem Leiden (Gen 3,16–19), dem Tod (Gen 3,19; Sir 25,24; Weish 2,24; Röm 5,12.14.19) als katastrophalen Sündenfolgen ausgeliefert (D 371 f 1512 1521 [174 f 789 793]). Diese Verschlechterung der Natur (Augustinus, *De nupt. et concup.* II 34,57; PL 44,470 f; D 371 1511 [174 788]) wird nicht schon durch die Taufe gutgemacht (D 1515 [792]), sondern erst in der Verklärung.” Karl Hörmann, ed., *Lexikon der christlichen Moral* (Innsbruck: Tyrolia Verlagsanstalt, 1969), cols. 300–03.

assertion that technology is the fate of our age,<sup>390</sup> where fate means that which is unavoidable in an immutable process.

But if we reflect on the essence of technology, we experience the ap-prehendage as a dispensation of disclosure. We thus already linger<sup>391</sup> in the free [space] of the dispensation,<sup>392</sup> a dispensation that does not in any way imprison<sup>393</sup> us in the dreary coercion<sup>394</sup> of blindly having to operate<sup>395</sup> technology or, what comes out to the same, of helplessly rebelling against it and condemning<sup>396</sup> it as the devil’s work. On the contrary, when we expressly open ourselves<sup>397</sup> to

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<sup>390</sup> *Das Schicksal unseres Zeitalters*. The expression references the title of the conference “Die Künste im technischen Zeitalter.” Heidegger does not deny that technology is the fate of our age; he merely wishes us to understand “fate” not as “that which is unavoidable in an immutable process,” but as the “dispensation of disclosure” (*das Geschick der Entbergung*).

<sup>391</sup> This is potentially the most interesting claim in the essay as it reveals that freedom is unrelated to escaping or overcoming technology. Rather, everything turns on experiencing technology as “a dispensation of disclosure.” The transformation is thus completely internal. It corresponds to the ἐπιστροφή, the “**conversion** (of Gentiles from idolatry to the true God” noted at Acts 15:3; “idolatry” here implies the Greek obsession with *things*. The *schon* emphasizes the “always already” of (Christian) salvation: we only have to become receptive for it.

<sup>392</sup> *Im Freien des Geschickes*. I already explained that *das Freie* refers to a particular notion of freedom. To translate it as “open space” as Lovitt does is not to come to terms with the metaphor; we might as well translate “in the outdoors of the dispensation.”

<sup>393</sup> Apprehendage only appears coercive when we view it as something external, a manmade machinelike thing. However, once we realize that it is a “dispensation,” we immediately experience freedom, a freedom Luther calls “the freedom of a Christian.” This source is clearly in the background of Heidegger’s discussion (see n. 375). The argument will be incomprehensible as long as one ignores the peculiar conception of freedom operating here.

<sup>394</sup> *Dumpfen Zwang*. Lovitt’s “stultified compulsion” obscures the sense.

<sup>395</sup> *Blindlings zu betreiben*. I am unclear why Lovitt translates “push on with technology.” The meaning is straightforward.

<sup>396</sup> *Verdammen*. Lovitt’s “curse” is acceptable, but the more basic “pronounce a very harsh, negative judgment about someone or something” (*über jmdn., etw. ein sehr scharfes, negatives Urteil sprechen*) is likelier. Like English “damn,” *verdammen* in a religious context means “exclude someone from a share in divine grace” (*jmdm. die Teilhabe an der göttlichen Gnade absprechen*). Though Heidegger does not mean this here, concepts of sin, grace, and damnation are never far in the essay.

<sup>397</sup> The idea of becoming open to the essence of technology, which was introduced in the first paragraph (see n. 4), returns here. The careful structure of Heidegger’s argument has become clearer in the meantime. When we become receptive for the essence of technology as a dispensation of disclosure, modern technology, which formerly appeared as an apprehendage, appears in a new light. It no longer oppresses us, because we see that, as the final expression of Greek rationality, it is simultaneously its overcoming. This makes modern technology both revelatory and apocalyptic; it is revelatory as the “last thing” and apocalyptic as the fulfillment of the “mystery” that was hidden to Greek thought.

the *essence*<sup>398</sup> of technology, we find that, unhoped for, we have been admitted into a liberating [that is, redemptive]<sup>399</sup> claim.

The essence of technology lies in ap-prehendage. Its reign belongs in dispensation. Because dispensation brings man, each time, onto a path of disclosure, man, who is thus underway,<sup>400</sup> ceaselessly approaches the utmost possibility;<sup>401</sup> namely, that he will pursue and operate nothing but what has been disclosed in ordering<sup>402</sup> and that he will draw his entire orientation from it. Thereby, that other possibility—that man lets himself<sup>403</sup> ever more originally into the essence of the unconcealed and its unconcealment so as to experience his necessary belonging<sup>404</sup> to disclosure as his essence<sup>405</sup>—closes itself off.

Brought between these possibilities,<sup>406</sup> man is endangered from out of the dispensation. The dispensation of disclosure is as such, in all of its modes, and hence necessarily, *danger*.<sup>407</sup>

Irrespective of how the dispensation of disclosure reigns, the unconcealment in which everything that manifests at any given time harbors the danger that man may overlook himself

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<sup>398</sup> *Wesen* der Technik. This is apprehendage in its character of dispensation.

<sup>399</sup> *Befreienden Anspruch*. See n. 383 for why I gloss this term with “redemptive.” The liberating claim does not physically frees us from the apprehendage of technology, the other meaning of *befreien* (*jmdn., etw. aus der Gefangenschaft, aus einer bedrängten Lage in Freiheit setzen*). Indeed, it cannot, because technology is a dispensation. Moreover, the claim would then no longer be a claim, but an *action*. *Befreiender Anspruch* is also not a second claim alongside *herausfordernder Anspruch*: it is the same claim, though now seen as liberating. The transformation consists in *our* becoming receptive for the claim (see n. 4); we realize that what formerly appeared coercive, is actually liberating provided we understand it as the “dispensation of disclosure.”

<sup>400</sup> The text has *also unterwegs*. This is possibly a typographical error for *als so unterwegs*.

<sup>401</sup> *Am Rande der Möglichkeit*.

<sup>402</sup> This is the quantified.

<sup>403</sup> No one word conveys the several meanings of *sich einlassen*. I provide a literal rendition.

<sup>404</sup> *Gebrauchte Zugehörigkeit*. The idea is that man belongs to disclosure and disclosure simultaneously needs man.

<sup>405</sup> That is, man’s essence lies in simultaneously belonging to and being necessary for disclosure (see n. 404). Heidegger seems to be using the standard meaning of “essence” here.

<sup>406</sup> That is, the possibility that man experience his essence and its contrary, that he “no longer encounters ... his essence anywhere.”

<sup>407</sup> Heidegger’s emphasis on danger is striking, given that dispensation and disclosure are positive terms for him. But as it turns out, the danger does not really emerge from dispensation; rather, as Heidegger clarifies, it is man who fatally misinterprets it when he interprets everything, and even *God*, “in light of the cause-effect relationship.” This suggests that Heidegger’s *Entbergung* is essentially a synonym for *God* or, rather, a metonym employing his attribute of disclosure (*Entbergen*). But insofar as *entbergen* conceals or contains *bergen* it appears not just any concept of *God*, but specifically the Lutheran *Deus absconditus* is implied.

in regard to the unconcealed<sup>408</sup> and [hence] misinterpret it. When everything that presences<sup>409</sup> presents itself in light of the cause-effect relationship, even God can lose everything that is holy and noble,<sup>410</sup> what is mysterious about his distance,<sup>411</sup> for representation.<sup>412</sup> In the light of causality, God can become degraded<sup>413</sup> to a cause, the *causa efficiens*.<sup>414</sup> Indeed, in theology, he then becomes the God of the philosophers,<sup>415</sup> namely, those who determine the unconcealed and concealed according to the causality of production,<sup>416</sup> without ever reflecting on the essential provenance<sup>417</sup> of this [concept of] causality.

Likewise, the unconcealment according to which nature presents itself as a calculable system of the effect of forces can, admittedly, permit correct determinations, but, precisely due to this success, the danger remains that the true withdraws in the midst of everything correct.

In itself, the dispensation of disclosure is not just any danger, but *the* danger.<sup>n419</sup>

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<sup>408</sup> *Der Mensch am Unverborgenem versieht*. I am uncertain why Lovitt translates “quails at the unconcealed.”

<sup>409</sup> *Alles Anwesende*.

<sup>410</sup> *Alles Heilige und Hohe*. Lovitt’s “everything exalted and holy” is more poetic.

<sup>411</sup> *Das Geheimnisvolle seiner Ferne*. Lovitt translates “the mysteriousness of his distance.”

<sup>412</sup> *Das Vorstellen*. Lovitt’s “representational thinking” is a gloss.

<sup>413</sup> *Herabsinken*. Lovitt’s “sink” is possible, but unusual. The metaphorical meaning of declining to a lower level, socially, morally, or artistically (*auf ein bestimmtes, gesellschaftlich, moralisch, künstlerisch als niedrig erachtetes Niveau absinken*) seems intended.

<sup>414</sup> The reason for introducing the Aristotelian doctrine of four causes is now perspicuous. Heidegger tries to link Greek ontology to Catholic Christian theology, a tradition he later summarizes in the term “onto-theology.” He blames the Greek focus on production (*ποίησις*) as being at the root of a false concept of both man and God in Christian theology and Western philosophy. The criticism is the same as in the early text *Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle: Indication of the Hermeneutical Situation*.

<sup>415</sup> The criticism is as old as Paul (cf. 1 Cor. 1:19–20 and 3:19–20).

<sup>416</sup> The argument is not Paul’s, but Heidegger’s. Heidegger’s links Paul’s criticism (see n. 415) with Greek ontology, specifically its understanding of being as “being-produced” (*Hergestelltsein*), in *Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle: Indication of the Hermeneutical Situation*.

<sup>417</sup> *Wesensherkunft*.

<sup>n</sup> 1962: cf. A Glimpse [of What Is] 1949 *fahr nachstellen* [in GA vol. 79]

[Comm.: *Fahr* is possibly an error for *Gefahr*. The fragment may mean something like “pursue the danger.” But as the meaning is unclear to me, I have left it untranslated.]

<sup>419</sup> It is unclear why the dispensation of danger should be “not just any danger, but *the* danger” unless Heidegger is operating in a theological register.

But if dispensation reigns in the manner of the ap-prehendage, this is the greatest danger.<sup>420</sup> It announces itself to us in two respects. As soon as the unconcealed no longer concerns man even as an object but exclusively as the quantified and, standing amidst that which has voided itself of the object,<sup>421</sup> he becomes merely the one who orders the quantified,<sup>422</sup> man arrives at the brink of a dramatic fall,<sup>423</sup> namely, that he himself will now be considered<sup>424</sup> only as the quantified. And yet, man, imperiled thus, aggrandizes himself as lord of the earth.<sup>425</sup> As a result, the impression circulates<sup>426</sup> that everything that he encounters exists only insofar as it is something made by man. This impression is responsible for one final illusion, namely, that man, seemingly, everywhere encounters only himself. Heisenberg has rightly pointed out that, today, the real must present itself to man thus<sup>427</sup> (op. cit. p. 60ff.). *But, in truth, man today no longer encounters himself; that is, his essence anywhere.* Man stands so utterly in thrall<sup>428</sup> to the

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<sup>420</sup> *The danger* (see n. 419) appears to differ from “the highest danger” or the latter may be a subset of the former.

<sup>421</sup> *Des Gegenstandlosen*. *Gegenstandlos* is potentially a typographical error for *gegenstandslos*. If the latter, it may mean “abstract, unfounded, or redundant” (*abstrakt, unbegründet, binfällig*). But if Heidegger intends *Gegenstandlos* as a neologism, it would mean something like “without an object” or “lacking an object.” The cognate English suffix *-less* provides a close equivalent, but “objectless” means something else. A straightforward translation, “without an object” is also liable to be misunderstood. It is not the quantified that lacks an object; at most, man can lack an object. Rather, the idea is that the quantified has freed itself from the object (“-los ist seit alter Zeit (vgl. Ahd. Asächs. -lōs, aengl. -lēas, anord. -laus, got. -laus) Grundwort in Adjektivkomposita im Sinne von ‘frei von, mangelnd’; der Kompositionstyp bleibt bis in die Gegenwart produktiv, und -los nimmt dadurch den Charakter eines Kompositionssuffixes an”).

<sup>422</sup> *Der Besteller des Bestandes*. Literally, “the orderer of the quantified.”

<sup>423</sup> *Am äußersten Rand des Absturzes*. *Absturz* is a “fall from a great height” (*Sturz aus großer Höhe*). Lovitt’s “precipitous fall” or “steep fall” is equally acceptable. But as the fall is purely metaphorical, “dramatic fall” seemed best. Note that while the translation may evoke the fall of Adam, this is not intended here. The German expression for the latter is *Sündenfall*.

<sup>424</sup> *Genommen werden soll*. Lovitt’s “taken” is overly literal. The meaning “consider, hold something or someone for something or someone; to grasp, interpret something in a particular way” (*etw., jmdn. für etw., jmdn. ansehen, halten; etw. in einer bestimmten Art auffassen, auslegen*) is quite standard.

<sup>425</sup> Literally, it is “in the form of the lord of the earth” here.

<sup>426</sup> *Macht sich der Anschein breit*.

<sup>427</sup> That is, such that man only encounters himself. Heidegger is referring to Heisenberg’s observation, “for the first time in the course of history modern man on this earth now confronts himself alone.” See n. 331.

<sup>428</sup> *Steht ... im Gefolge*. Heidegger’s use is idiosyncratic. *Gefolge* can mean Lovitt’s “attendance,” but *im Gefolge* simply means “as a consequence” (*als Folge*). But Heidegger clearly means something like following or being beholden to something; I think he simply means *steht ... im Bann*.

instigation<sup>429</sup> of the apprehendage that he no longer perceives it as a claim;<sup>430</sup> he overlooks<sup>431</sup> himself as the one within the apprehendage who is addressed by it,<sup>432</sup> and hence also fails to hear<sup>433</sup> in what way he, in his essence, ek-sists<sup>434</sup> in the realm of a bestowal<sup>435</sup> and hence *can never* encounter only himself.

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<sup>429</sup> *Herausforderung*.

<sup>430</sup> *Anspruch*. See n. 216. Previously, apprehendage was defined as “that instigating claim, which unifies man such that he orders what discloses itself into the quantified.” Now, however, there is a suggestion that instigation and claim are distinct, even though the claim instigates us to “order what discloses itself into the quantified.” Progressively, the argument turns on recognizing the claim *as* a claim, a recognition that is the first step in transforming it into a bestowal (*Zuspruch*).

<sup>431</sup> *Übersieht*.

<sup>432</sup> *Als den im Ge-stell von diesem Angesprochenen*. The sequence of terms is replicating the order of the previous passage (see nn. 202, 203, and 206). The antecedent of *diesem* is unclear. It could be either *Ge-stell* or, more specifically, the *Anspruch* latent in *Ge-stell*. In that case, the sentence would read: “he overlooks himself as the one ... who is addressed by this claim.” The overlooking, however, is attendant on not hearing (see n. 433).

<sup>433</sup> *Überhört*. The reason for the shift from seeing (see n. 431) to hearing is not perspicuous at first. Man overlooks himself as the one addressed by a claim, but then why should he not also fail to *see* “in what way he ... ek-sists in the realm of a bestowal”? The answer can only be, if this knowledge is not obtained by seeing; if it is only something he can know from *hearing* about it. Moreover, what he is supposed to know is identical with the hearing of it, namely, that he “ek-sists in the realm of a bestowal.” The hearing of it alone suffices, because hearing is itself the good news.

<sup>434</sup> *Ek-sistiert*. The German form is *existieren*; Heidegger is combining Latin and German forms (Lat. *existere* ‘heraustreten, vorhanden sein, stattfinden’) to highlight the prefix *ex* (to Latin lat. *sistere* ‘(fest)stehen machen, (ein)stellen, hemmen’). Compare English “exist”: “(i) Middle French *exister* (late 14th cent.), or its etymon (ii) classical Latin *existere, existere*, to appear, to rise from the dead, to come forward, present oneself, to prove to be (of a given character), to come into being, arise, in post-classical Latin also to be (4th cent.) < *ex-* EX- prefix<sup>1</sup> + *sistere* SIST v.”

<sup>435</sup> *Zuspruch*. Lovitt’s “exhortation or address” reveals his uncertainty. Not only is this translation lexically impossible; it also vitiates the structure of Heidegger’s argument. If the *Zuspruch* is an address, then nothing has been achieved by hearing it, whereas Heidegger’s argument is precisely that once we hear the *Anspruch*, once we realize that we are addressed by it, it *turns* into a *Zuspruch*. Hearing in the sense of being open for the claim is itself the condition for that claim manifesting as a bestowal. Heidegger’s argument is lost if one translates loosely; he is actually exploring the dynamic of faith, which is demanded of us, and grace, which is bestowed on us.