A STUDY OF 'TARKASAṂGRAHA' AS A COMPROMISE BETWEEN THE NYĀYA AND VAIŚEṢIKA SCHOOLS OF PHILOSOPHY

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I hereby declare that, this thesis "A study of 'Tarkasaṃgraha' as a compromise between the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika schools of philosophy" has not previously formed the basis for the award of any degree, diploma, associateship, fellowship or other similar title or recognition.

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PREFACE

There are many manuals in Indian Logic co-ordinating the systems of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika. Tarkasaṃgraha enjoys a prominent place among such works. It is the most popular introductory work on the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika systems of Indian philosophy, which is famous for its simple and lucid narration of the doctrines. Tarkasaṃgraha deals with the 'padārthas' mentioned in the Vaiśeṣika philosophy and the 'pramāṇas' in the Nyāya philosophy. Annambhaṭṭa the author of Tarkasaṃgraha tries to combine the principles of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, which are allied systems of Indian philosophy.

In this study, an effort is done to discuss how the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrines in the Tarkasaṃgraha are in a compromise. The entire study has been divided into five chapters.

The first chapter describes the origin and development of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika systems. The second chapter discusses the important concepts of Vaiśeṣika philosophy. The third chapter deals with the important concepts of Nyāya philosophy. The fourth chapter is on Tarkasaṃgraha a Manual of Logic. The inclusion of the doctrines of

both Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika in Tarkasaṃgraha and other Manuals of Logic is the theme of the fifth chapter.

I take this opportunity to express my sincere thanks to Dr. T. Arya Devi (Reader and H. O. D., Faculty of Indian Logic, Sree Sankaracharya University of Sanskrit, Kalady) my guide and supervising teacher in my research work. I express my gratitude to Prof. M. R. Vasavan (Principal, Govt. Sanskrit College, Tripunithura) who provided all the facilities of this centre for my research work. I am also thankful to the teaching staff, non teaching staff and librarian, Govt. Sanskrit College, Tripunithura for their sincere and whole-hearted co-operation. My profound thanks are also due to all my friends and relatives for their kind help and valuable suggestions.

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Kum. Priya. M. P.

ABBREVIATIONS

H. I. L.	-	History of Indian Logic.
N. Bh.	-	Nyāyabhāṣya.
N. S.	-	Nyāyasūtra
N. S. M.	-	Nyāyasiddhānta Muktāvalī.
P. Bh.	-	Praśastapādabhāṣya.
S. M.	-	Siddhāntamuktāvalī.
T. Bh.	-	Tarkabhāṣa.
T. S.	-	Tarkasaṃgraha.
V. S.	-	Vaiśeṣikasūtra.

INTRODUCTION

Among the numerous systems of philosophy that have been evolved in India, the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika occupy a unique position. They represent the realistic branch of Indian philosophy. According to them the external world is real and it exists in its material form. The Nyāya system is systematized by Gautama in his *Nyāyasūtra* while Vaiśeṣika system of philosophy is systematized by Kaṇāda in his *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*. These two systems are called allied philosophies or samānatantras.

Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, like all other schools of Indian philosophy, aims at realizing the highest good, viz. Niḥśreyasa. In order to achieve this end, these systems have presented an analytical demonstration of the universe, and the means to comprehend the phenomenal world.

The Vaiśeṣika philosophy is pluralistic realism which emphasizes that diversity is the essence of the universe. It is regarded as helpful to the study of all systems. The main business of the Vaiśeṣika system is to deal with the categories and so it is called 'prameyaśāstra', the science of objects of knowledge. The Vaiśeṣika sūtra of Kaṇāda is the basis of

Vaiśeṣika philosophy. A category is called padārtha and Kaṇāda brings all objects of valid knowledge under six padārthas. The doctrine of atomism is its special feature. Vaiśeṣika is mainly a system of physics and metaphysics.

Nyāya system is a philosophy which gives more importance to logical realism. It accepts the reality of existence of a physical world more than the spiritual world. The study of epistemological and logical problem in Indian philosophy under the heading 'Nyāya' which aims at discussing the process of knowing and argumentation cannot be called logic in the strict sense of the term. Nyāya is the study of knowing and the means of testing. The tradition of dealing with the issue of pramāṇas commenced with the Nyāya system in philosophy. Therefore the Nyāya system is known as '*pramāṇaśāstra*' *the science of logic and* epistemology.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika systems were separate in their origin and early development, but were blended into a single syncretic system later because of logical and intellectual necessity.

Among the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika treatises the ' *Tarkasaṃgraha*' has a unique position. All the basic principles of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika systems are understood by the study of this work, *Tarkasaṃgraha*. In the case of padārthas the Vaiśeṣika concepts are altogether accepted and in the case of pramāṇas the Nyāya theories are altogether accepted. This is the main compromise between the doctrines of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika in *Tarkasaṃgraha*.

CHAPTER I

NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢIKA - ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT

The word 'logic' is etymologically connected with the Greek word 'logos', which denotes both 'thought' and 'word' or 'discourse'. In Western world 'logic' was connected with 'rhetoric' when it is used in the phrase 'Indian logic' – it is usually rendered by the Sanskrit equivalents – 'Ānvīkṣikī', 'Nyāyavistara', 'Nyāyadarśana', 'Tarkaśāstra' and 'pramāṇaśāstra'. It is also described as 'Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system'. All these phrases are significant and appropriate in one way or other and it is not merely a 'grammar of thinking", but an orthodox (āstika) system of philosophy of which methodical reasoning or investigation of knowledge got through observation or perception and trustworthy verbal testimony forms the central theme. It is described as 'Pramāṇaśāstra' or epistemological science, chiefly concerned with valid knowledge and its sources. The Indian logic is usually described as 'Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system' because at a very early stage in the history of

Indian logic the Vaiśeṣika stress on the inductive phase of inference came to be synthesized with its deductive phase in the Nyāya theory of syllogistic reasoning.

The story of India's quest for truth and the attempts to lay out suitable ways and approaches to truth is long and varied. In all these attempts one may discern, almost from the beginning, two tendencies – the intuitionistic and rationalistic and two chief aims – the achievement of Dharma and the realization of Brahma. These two tendencies came into exhibit themselves throughout the Vedic age. The concept of the nature of Soul and its destiny is the main theme of the last part of the Vedas (Upaniṣads). For example, the *Kaṭhopaniṣad* says – "it is not born, it does not die, it sprang from nothing and nothing sprang from it. It is eternal and everlasting and is not killed though the body is killed. The wise man who knows the Soul as bodiless within the body, as unchanging among changing things, as great and omnipresent, never grieves".[1]

This Soul theory is called Ātmavidyā which is the basic subject matter of all the schools of philosophy in India. At a later stage,

Ātmavidyā in its logical aspect has come to be called Ānvīkṣikī. According to Vidyābhuṣan the distinction between Ātmavidyā and Ānvīkṣikī lay in this, that while the former embodied certain dogmatic assertions about the nature of Soul, the later contained reasons supporting those assertions.[2]

Ānvīkṣikī in its course of development bifurcates into philosophy and logic. It describes two subjects viz. Ātma – theory of Soul and Hetu – theory of reason. The soul theory of Ānvīkṣikī was developed into philosophy called Darśana and the treatment of the theory of reasons was developed into logic. Ānvīkṣikī is also known as the science of inference which is not contradicted by perception and scripture. Ānvīksikī is the knowing over again of that which is already known by perception and scripture. प्रत्यक्षागमाश्रितमनुमानं सान्वीक्षा–प्रत्यक्षागमाभ्यामीक्षितस्या-न्वीक्षणमन्वीक्षा तया प्रवर्तते इत्यान्वीक्षिकी न्यायविद्या=न्यायशास्त्रम्। आन्वीक्षिकी=ईक्षितस्य ज्ञातस्य अनु=पश्चात् ईक्षणमन्वीक्षा तया=अन्वीक्षया=अनुमानेन प्रवर्तते इत्यान्वीक्षिकी न्यायविद्या=अनुमानप्रधानत्वात्।[3]

The combined workings of the intuitionistic and rationalistic tendencies in the direction of spiritual insight and knowledge of truth led

to the emergence of the Upaniṣadic philosophy of Ātman. Some of them eventually gives rise to the pluralistic rationalism of Kaṇāda's Vaiśeṣika system and its complementary Nyāya of Gautama. Though the very beginning of the Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya systems are misty in certain respects there exist a central doctrine in these systems.

According to the Upaniṣadic text – "the spirit should be realized heard, discussed and constantly contemplated upon", it is generally accepted that hearing or initial comprehension (śravaṇa) represents the inaugural stage, investigation and discussion with the help of reason (manana) represents the central stage, and constant contemplation (nididhyāsana) stands for the culminating stage. It is clear from this that even during the period of the Upaniṣads, some logical doctrines should have not only began to appear, but also progressed beyond the nebulous stage.

About the fifth century B.C. when the anti-Vedic movements of Buddhism rose and began to spread, the exponents of Vedic philosophy and religion keenly felt the need for showering greater accommodation to rationalistic modes of thought. The rationalistic resources available

for Vedic religion and philosophy had to be pooled together and kept fit for defensive and offensive use, as against the impact from collision with avaidika developments. On the one side, it was found easy to disentangle from its Vedistic environment the logical method (Nyāya) of Vedic exegetics; and on the other side, to bring the unfettered methods of reasoning and analysis known to the early Vaiśeṣika under the influence of the attempts for 'reapproachment' made by the Vaidika thinkers turned out to be an easy task, chiefly as a result of the disquieting nihilistic excesses of early Buddhism. Thus the Nyāya of the Vedic exegesis and the logic and metaphysics of the early anti-Vedic Vaiśeṣika came to be fraternize with each other and gave rise to two sister-schools of philosophical reasoning. The Vaiśeşika school mainly concerned with inductive observation and analysis and the Nyāya school chiefly concerned with the formulation and elucidation of the principles of ratiocination on the basis of inductive reasoning. These two schools should have appeared in a fairly definite form, with this characteristic methods of reasoning and metaphysics, by the middle of the fourth century

B.C., the chief doctrines of these schools came to be systematized and redacted in their basis sutras at a relatively later date.

The doctrines of these two schools were systematized and redacted in the form of the *Vaiśeṣikasūtras* and *Nyāyasūtras*. According to Randle, Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya were systematized between 200 B.C. and 200 A.D., the Vaiśeṣika being the earlier of two.

The Nyāya -Vaiśeṣika systems originated in the rationalistic tendency of the Upaniṣadic age. The original current of rationalistic thought came to be broken to two streams, the Vedic Nyāya and the anti-Vedic Vaiśeṣika. The Vaiśeṣika emphasis on the inductive side of reasoning, together with its realism and pluralism served as the basis for the development of the Nyāya theory of deductive reasoning through a well defined scheme of syllogistic expression. The Nyāyu -Vaiśeṣika is a self contained system of philosophy. Its roots strike deep into the pluralistic realism. Its scheme of external relation, its theory of truth and error and its creationistic view of causation constitute its main stay. It's thought measuring devices and precise formulas from its ever-spreading and never fading foliage.

Radhakrishnan says – 'there is no doubt that Gautama's logic sprang from the dialectical tournaments, the sound of which filled the durbars of kings and the schools of philosophy'.[4]

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE WORD VAIŚEṢIKA AND NYĀYA THE NATURE, AIM AND SCOPE OF THE TWO SYSTEMS.

Indian tradition is in favour of connecting the name 'Vaiśeṣika' with the doctrine of specialties (viśeṣa), viśeṣa being regarded as the distinctive category of the Vaiśeṣika scheme of categories. Gautama's Nyāya Darśana took its name from Nyāya which means 'the synthetic or deductive method of syllogistic demonstration'. Gautama's system lays particular stress on the synthetic method of syllogistic reasoning. The names Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika may be connected with the two aspects of sound reasoning – the 'analytic' or 'inductive' aspect which mounts up from particulars (viśeṣa) to the general or universal (sāmānya) and the 'synthetic' or 'deductive' aspect which moves on from the universal to the particular. In these logical notions, it would be in keeping with the history of Indian philosophical thought to recognize the basis of the

names, Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya rather than in the ontological doctrines of atomism and pluralistic realism.

This would account better for the way in which the interrelation of the Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya came to be conceived of as two sister systems in spite of their differences on the metaphysical side. Like other Indian systems, these two form self contained philosophical disciplines of a complex character with a distinctive central theme correlated to their special goal. The final cessation of all miseries is the goal of the Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya. With the Vaiśeṣika material suitably modified in minor details, the Nyāya builds up a complete system of epistemology and logic combined to some extent with psychology, ethics and religion.

THE WORKS OF VAIŚEṢIKA PHILOSOPHY

Kaṇāda, the propounder of Vaiśeṣika School of philosophy is also known as Kaṇabhuk, Ulūka and Kāśyapa. He was called Kaṇāda because he used to live as an ascetic on the grains picked up from the fields. Kaṇa also means a particle or a particular and the word Kaṇāda suggests one who lives on the philosophy of Kaṇa or Atom. The Vaiśeṣika system

is also called after him as Kāṇāda Darśana on the basis of Kaṇa and Aulūkya Darśana on the basis of the name Ulūka.

The *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* of Kaṇāda is the fundamental work of Vaiśeṣika philosophy. It is in ten chapters, each of which is divided into two sections called āhnikas (diurnal portions). The main purpose of the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* is the description of the nature of padārtha. The first āhnika of the first chapter refers to the definition of substance (dravya), quality (guṇa), and action (karma). The second āhnika deals with the division and definition of generality (sāmānya). Second and third chapters refer to the nine substances and the first āhnika of the fourth chapter refers to the atomism (paramāṇuvāda). Second āhnika of the fourth chapter deals with the divisions of the eternal substances. The fifth chapter refers to the action or karma. The sixth chapter deals with the validity of Vedas and discusses merit and demerit (धर्माधर्मविचारः). The seventh and eighth chapters deal with some of the special qualities. The ninth chapter deals with abhāva and Buddhi. The similarity and dissimilarity of sukha (pleasure) and duḥkha (pain) and the three types of causes are dealt with in the tenth chapter.

The work now we get after Kaṇāda's *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* is *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha* otherwise known as *Praśastapādabhāṣya of Praśastapāda* (400 A.D.). The particularity of *Praśastapādabhāṣya* is that it does not follow the order of the sutras but as an independent work based on their contents. It is an important work in the field of Vaiśeṣika philosophy. It deals with all the six positive categories and aims at the attainment of the Supreme goal called Niḥśreyasa, through accurate knowledge of the common and specific characteristic they possess.

Praśastapāda is referred to by various names by different authors. He is mentioned as Praśastapāda, Praśastadeva, Praśastadevapāda, Praśastacaraṇa, Praśastakara, Praśastadevakara, Praśastamati and Praśasta. *Vākyabhāṣyaṭīka* is other work of Praśastapāda. This work is also known as *Praśastamatiṭīka*. It is probable that *Vakyabhāṣyaṭīka* is the earliest work and owing to its elaborate nature Praśastapāda prepared an abridgement in *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha*. This is evident from the remnants of *Vākyabhāṣyaṭīka* which is almost lost and which did not enjoy common approval for the very reason that it was elaborate.[5]

According to some scholars there are two other commentaries on the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* viz. *Rāvaṇabhāṣya* and *Bhāradvājavṛtti* which come before *Praśastapādabhāṣya*. But now they are not available.

Praśastapāda has been expounded by several writers of whom Vyomaśiva, Śrīdhara and Udayana are the most important. Their works are *Vyomavatī, Nyāyakandalī* and *Kiranāvalī* respectively.

Līlāvatī of Śrīvatsācārya, *Bhāṣyasūkti* of Jagadīśa Bhaṭṭācārya and *Kaṇādarahasya* of Śaṅkara Miśra are some other commentaries on *Praśastapādabhāṣya*.

Śaṅkara Miśra also wrote a commentary on the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* called *Upaskāra*. *Saptapadārthi* of Śivāditya Miśra is another work on Vaiśeṣika philosophy.

THE WORKS OF NYĀYA PHILOSOPHY

In the course of the development of Nyāyaśāstra there are three stages, called Ancient School (Pracīna-Nyāya), Modern School (Navya-Nyāya) and Syncretic School (Prakaraṇa Paddhati).

Ancient school (Pracīna-Nyāya)

The *Nyāyasūtra* of Gautama is the basic text of ancient school. It is the developed form of the teaching of the *Nyāyaśāstra.*

GAUTAMA

Gautama is considered as the founder of Nyāyaśāstra, who flourished at Mithila in 2nd century A.D. He is also known as Gotama. But according to Vidyābhūṣan Akṣapāda is the real author of *Nyāyasūtra* and Gautama is the founder of Ānvīkṣikīvidyā on 550 B.C.

Nyāyasūtra, the first systematic work on Nyāyasūtra is divided into five chapters, each containing two sections called āhnikas (diurnal portions). The first chapter deals with the enunciation and definition of the sixteen categories while the remaining four chapters are concerned with a critical examination of the categories. These categories deals mainly with the logical theories called 'vāda-margas'.

COMMENTARIES ON THE NYĀYASŪTRA

Commentaries are the store-houses of valuable information on philosophy and logic. The *Nyāyasūtra* was not followed by a commentary for several hundred years and there was no other original treatises on

Nyāya also. Vātsyāyana of the fourth century A.D. was the first commentator on *Nyāyasūtra*. His work *Nyāyabhāṣya* is a classical work on Nyāya philosophy and it gives us a clear-cut picture of the principles of *Nyāyasūtra*. In it there are references to previous logicians designated as eke (some), kecit (certain) and anye (others), who were perhaps authors of commentaries which have not down to us.

Uddyotakara whose date is attributed to the close of the sixth century A.D. wrote a commentary on *Nyāyabhāṣya* called *Nyāyavārtika*. The main object which prompted Uddyotakara to write his sub commentary was to oppose Diṅnāga, Nāgārjuna and other Buddhist Logicians that preceded him. This is evident from the opening lines of the *Nyāyavārtika* in which he says: 'Akṣapāda the foremost of sages propounded a śāstra (body of doctrines) for the peace of the world; and I shall write an expository treatise on it to remove the veil of error cast by quibblers.'[6]

Vacaspati Miśra, a versatile scholar, wrote *Nyāyavārtikatātparyaṭīka*, which is a commentary on *Nyāyavārtika* of Uddyotakara. Vacaspati belonged to the ninth century A.D. He was an

all-rounder in the field of Indian philosophical thought, called Sarvatantrasvatantra -- master of all schools of philosophy. He wrote commentaries on all the orthodox systems of Indian philosophy. His commentary on the Vedāntabhāṣya called Bhamatīṭīka and that on the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* called *Sāṃkhyatatvakaumudī* occupy most important place in the philosophical literature in India.

In *Nyāyavārtikatātparyaṭīka* Vācaspati mentions four schools of Buddhism viz. Mādhyamika, Vaijñānika, Sautrāntika and Vaibhāṣika and he criticizes Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti.[7]

Udayanācārya's *Nyāyavārtikatatparyaṭīkapariśuddhi* is a commentary of Vacaspati Miśra's work *Nyāyavārtikatātparyaṭīkā*. He belonged to the tenth century A.D. He was also the writer of Vaiśeṣika philosophy. Udayana wrote several other works such as *Kusumāñjalī*- a Classic of Indian theism, *Ātmatatvaviveka, Kiraṇāvalī and Nyāyapariśiṣṭa.*

These basic works, *Nyāyabhāṣya, Nyāyavārtika, Nyāyavārtikatātparyaṭīka* and *Nyāyavārtikatātparya-ṭīkāpariśuddhi* are

called *Nyāyacaturgranthika* and these works provided a logical foundation to Indian philosophical thinking.

Besides these there were a large number of independent treatises dealing with the same subjects. According to D.N Śāstri this period is the brightest time, not only in the history of Nyāya school., but also of Indian philosophy in general.[8]

MODERN SCHOOL (NAVYANYĀYA)

Gaṅgeśopādhyāya, the author of *Tattvacintāmaṇi* is generally accepted as the founder of modern school. He flourished to the last quarter of the 12th century A.D. in a village named Karion on the banks of the river Kamala, twelve miles south-east of Durbhaṅga.[9]

Tattvacintāmaṇi or *Pramāṇacintāmaṇi* is the monumental work of Gaṅgeśa. It introduces a new era in the development of logic in India. The study of this work developed to an enormous extent the discursive faculty in the reader and enables him to argue with hair-splitting distinctions and subtleties. In this work Gaṅgeśa utilized all the constructive, expository, critical and polemical material in the earlier

works on Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika and gave the final shape and turn to the logic and metaphysics of Nyāya .

Tattvacintāmaṇi is divided into four books dealing respectively with (1) Perception (Pratyakṣa), (2) Inference (Anumāna), (3) Comparison (Upamāna) and Verbal testimony (Śabda), which are the four means of deriving valid knowledge. This work has got so many commentaries and sub-commentaries which proved its popularity.

Vardhamāna Upādhyāya (1250 A.D.), the Son of Gaṅgeśopadhyāya, surnamed Mahopādhyāya or Mahāmahopādhyāya, wrote a commentary on *Tattvacintāmaṇi*called *Tattvacintāmaṇiprakāśa*. His other works are following:

1. *Nyāyanibandhaprakāśa*, a commentary on *Nyāyavārtikatatātparyaṭīkāpariśuddhi*.
2. *Nyāyapariśiṣṭaprakāśa*, a commentary on *Udayanācārya's Nyāyapariśiṣṭa*.
3. *Pramcyanibandhaprakāśa*.
4. *Kiraṇāvaliprakāśa*.
5. *Nyāyakusumāñjaliprakāśa*.
6. *Nyāyalīlāvatiprakāśa*.
7. *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍaprakāśa*.

Tattvacintāmaṇyāloka of Pakṣadhara Miśra (13th Cen. A.D.), *Tattvacintāmaṇidīdhiti* of Reghunātha Śiromaṇi (16th Cen. A.D.), *Tattvacintāmaṇirahasya* of Madhurānātha Tarkavāgīśa (16th Cen. A.D.), *Tattvacintāmaṇidīdhitiprakāśika*, familiarly known as *Jagadīśi* of Jagadīśa Tarkālaṅkāra (17th Cen. A.D.) and *Tattvacintāmaṇivyākhya* of Gadādharabhaṭṭācārya (17th Cen. A.D.) are the other important commentaries on *Tattvacintāmaṇi*.

SYNCRETIC SCHOOL (PRAKARAṆAPADDHATI)

The syncretic school occupies a unique position in the development of the Indian philosophical thought. Among the syncretic works *Tarkasaṃgraha* has an important place. *Nyāyasāra* of Bhāsarvajña, *Saptapadārthi* of Śivāditya Miśra, *Tārkikarakṣa* of Varadarāja, *Tarkabhaṣa* of Keśava Miśra, *Nyāyalīlāvatī* of Vallabhācāryu, *Bhāṣāpariccheda* of Viśvanātha Nyāyapañcānana, *Tarkāmṛta* of Jagadīśa Tarkālaṅkāra are other important works.

REFERENCES

1. 'न जायते म्रियते वा विपश्चिन्नायं कुतश्चिन्न बभूव कश्चित्।
   अजो नित्यः शाश्वतोऽयं पुराणो न हन्यते हन्यमाने शरीरे।।
   अशरीरं शरीरेष्वनवस्थेष्ववस्थितम्।
   महान्तं विभुमात्मानं मत्वा धीरो न शोचति।।'
   कठोपनिषत्, प्रथमाध्यायः द्वितीयवल्ली, मन्त्रः 18,22.
2. HIL, p. 5.
3. N. Bh., pp. 6,7.
4. *Indian Philosophy*, vol. II, p. 34.
5. *Praśastapādabhāṣya*, introduction, p. 32.
6. यदक्षपादः प्रवरो मुनीनां
   शमाय शास्त्रं जगतो जगाद।
   कुतर्किकाज्ञाननिवृत्तिहेतुः
   करिष्यते तस्य मया निबन्धः।।
   Nyāyavārtika, opening lines, quoted from HIL., p. 125.
7. *Nyāyavārtikatātparyaṭīka*, 1.1.1, 1.1.4-6, 1.1.8, 5.2.5, etc.
8. *The Philosophy of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and its conflict with the Buddhist Diiināga school*, p. 12.
9. HIL, p. 405.

CHAPTER II

THE IMPORTANT CONCEPTS OF VAIŚEṢIKA PHILOSOPHY

Kaṇāda in his *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* has enumerated the six categories such as substance (dravya), quality (guṇa), action (karma), generality (sāmānya), particularity (viśeṣa) and inherence (samavāya). Thus, he has attempted to make a complete analysis of all the existing things in the universe. In his view the true knowledge of these categories as possessed of similarities and dissimilarities among themselves, is means for niḥśreyasa – final release. This true knowledge, according to him, is caused by a specific kind of merit.[1]

There is a view among the modern critics that Kaṇāda originally meant only three categories viz., dravya, guṇa, and karma and the other categories were added later. In support of their view, they quote the Vaiśeṣikasūtra 'अर्थ इति द्रव्यगुणकर्मसु' (V.S. VIII.II.3) which according to them states that dravya, guṇa and karma are the categories, implying thereby the others are not the categories. But the traditional view does

not accept it. Traditional commentators interpret the sutra in a different manner. According to them Artha means Dharmin that which prominently grasped by a cognition. Since only the three viz. dravya, guṇa and karma are prominently grasped by a cognition they are technically designated as 'Artha'.

Kaṇāda did not mention negation (abhāva) in the categories. The later Vaiśeṣika added the seventh category of abhāva.

Padārtha literally means 'the meaning of a word'. It is an object of valid knowledge and capable of being named. It is knowable and nameable. All objects of knowledge come under Padārtha. The Vaiśeṣika divides all existent reals into two classes – bhāva or being and abhāva or non-being. The first six categories come under bhāva and the seventh is abhāva. The bhāvapadārthas have existence, nameability and knowability. They are objects of positive notion of being. The three categories of substance, quality and action are related to beinghood (sattā) which subsists in them. The three categories of generality, particularity and inherence are related to themselves. They are neither causes nor effects. They are eternal and incapable of being expressed by the word

object. They are non-spatial and timeless ontological entities. Substance, quality and action are causes capable of producing effects and liable to destruction. They exist in time and space.[2]

SUBSTANCE (DRAVYA)

Kaṇāda defines substance as the basis of qualities and actions which is the inherent cause of an effect.[3] A book is a substance. Its colour, extension, solidity, dimension and the like are its qualities. Its motion is its action. Its qualities and action subsist in it. Substance signifies the self-subsistence, the absolute and independent nature of things. It is the substratum of qualities and actions. Without substance, we cannot have qualities and actions for they cannot hang loose in the air, but must be contained somewhere.

Substance has the genus of substance which inheres in it. Substances are eternal and non eternal. Ultimate substances are eternal, independent and individual and are either infinite or infinitesimal. All compound substances which are made of parts and arise out of the simple ultimate substances are necessarily transient and impermanent and subject to production and destruction. But simple ultimate substances like the

atoms of earth, water, fire and air are the material cause of the compound substances are eternal and not subject to production and destruction. They are self-existent, independent and endowed with particularities.

The substance which is of nine kinds includes physical as well as spiritual substances. They are (1) earth (pṛthivī), (2) water (ap), (3) fire (tejas), (4) air (vāyu), (5) ether (ākāśa), (6) time (kāla), (7) space (dik), (8) spirit (ātman) and (9) mind (manas).[4]

Earth

Earth has the genus of earth, it has fourteen qualities. They are colour, taste, smell, touch, number, dimension, severalty, conjunction, disjunction, priority, posteriority, weight, acquired fluidity and velocity.[5] Visvanātha defines earth as the inherent cause of smell.[6]

Earth is of two kinds viz. eternal and non-eternal. The form of eternal earth is atomic and non-eternal form is compound. There are three types of compound earth viz. body, sense organ and object.[7]

The body is the receptacle of the experiences of the conscious agent or the Soul.[8] Earthen body is of two fold viz. embryonic (yonija) and non-embryonic (ayonija). The embryonic body is produced out of

the union of the semen of the father and the ovule of the mother.[9] This kind of body is further divided into two viz. viviparous (jarāyuja) and oviparous (aṇḍaja). The example of the former is man and animals and that of the latter is birds and reptiles. The non-embryonic variety of the body is born independently of the semen and the ovule. This category of body belongs to the Gods and Sages.

The word sense organ referred here is olfactory organ which grasp odour and it abides at the tip of the nose. The earthen objects are of three fold viz. soil, stone and plant. The example of the above mentioned types of objects are pot, diamond and trees respectively.

The colour of earth is of seven kinds viz. white, blue, yellow, red, green, tawny and variegated. Actually colour belongs to earth, water and fire. But the seven colours are the distinctive feature of the earth.

The taste of earth is of six kinds viz. sweet, sour, saline, pungent, astringent, and bitter. Taste resides in earth and water only and the earth has all its varieties and water has only one viz. sweet.

Smell belongs to earth alone.[10] It is the specific distinctive feature of earth. Smell is of two kinds viz. fragrant and foul.

The touch of earth is neither hot nor cold and is brought about by heat. Artificial fluidity (naimittikadravatva) is associated with earth. Certain factors of earth like ghee, lac, wax, etc. will melt in contact of fire.

Water

The second substance, water is defined as aptvābhisambandhādāpaḥ, i.e. water is that which belongs to the genus of water.[11] The genus of aptva can be proved to be the determinant of the intimate causality of viscidity.[12] Viscidity is the quality of water only. Water is endowed with fourteen qualities viz. colour, taste, touch, fluidity, viscidity, number, dimension, severalty, conjunction, disjunction, priority, posteriority, weight and velocity.[13]

The colour, taste and touch of water are: pale-white, light-sweet and cold. Viscidity and unconditional fluidity are the special qualities of water.

Like earth, water is also two kinds, viz. Eternal and non-eternal. The former is the form of atom and the later is the form of product. The product of water is also of three kinds, viz. the body, sense organ and

object. The aqueous body belongs to the non-embryonic (ayonija) type and is well-known in the world of Varuṇa (God of sea). The sense organ of water is tongue, which gives perception of taste to all living-beings. The watery objects are rivers, oceans, snow, hails, etc.[14]

Tejas

The genus of Tejas inheres in Tejas which has colour, touch, number, dimension, severalty, conjunction, disjunction, priority, posteriority, fluidity and velocity.[15] The colour of Tejas is glittering white. Colour is its special quality.

Like earth and water, Tejas is also of two kinds: eternal and non-eternal. The atoms of Tejas are eternal. The composite fiery substances are non-eternal. The product of Tejas is of three kinds: the body, sense organ and object.

The body of Tejas is non-embryonic and it is well-known in the regions of the Sun. The sense organ of the Tejas is eye and perceives colour. The visual organ is composed of light and it possesses unmanifested colour and touch. So they are not perceptible. Blazing

fire and rays of the Sun have manifest colour and touch, which are perceptible.

There are four kinds of fiery objects: earthy (bhauma), heavenly (divya), stomachic (udarya) and mineral (ākaraja).[16]

The Tejas produced from earthy things which is characterized by the nature of flaming upwards and capable of functioning in cooking, burning, sweating, softening, etc. are called earthy or bhauma.

The Tejas generated in the sky by watery fuel and Sun rays etc. are called heavenly.

The stomachic or udarya is the tejas used for the digestion of food in the stomach.

The example of the last form of Tejas viz. produced from mines called mineral or ākaraja are the gold etc.[17]

Air

The genus of air inheres in air, which has touch, number, dimension, severalty, conjunction, disjunction, priority, posteriority and velocity.[18] Annaṃbhaṭṭa defines air as that which possesses touch without colour.[19] The air belongs to the class of vāyutva and the very nature

vāyutva provides the property of being lukewarm. Touch is the special quality of air.

Air is eternal and non-eternal. Eternal is the form of atom and non-eternal is the form of product. The products of air and body, sense organ and object. The body is non-embryonic and it belongs to the world of wind-god (marut). The tactual organ, which pervades the body is composed of air and perceives touch. Arieal objects are possessed of touch. There is one vital force in the body. But it is said to be manifold according to its functions – prāṇa, apāna, etc.

The atoms of earth, water, fire and air are eternal. They can neither be created nor be destroyed. They are combined into composite substances and the composite substances are produced and destroyed.

Ether

The fifth substance is ether, which is characterized by the distinctive quality of sound.[20] Ether is one ubiquitous, eternal and imperceptible substance, Kaṇāda proves the existence of ether as the substrate of sound.

The quality of an effect is observed to be pre-existent in the quality of the cause. The special qualities of the products of earth water, fire and

air are produced by the qualities of their material causes. But sound is a special quality; it is not produced by the quality of its material cause. It is a special quality, because it has the genus of sound and it is perceived through one external organ viz. ear only.

Sound is not a quality of tangible things, since there appears no other effect.[21] It is not a special quality of Soul, because it is perceived through an external sense-organ. It is not a special quality of mind, since mind being atomic its qualities are imperceptible. Nor it is a quality of space and time, because their qualities are imperceptible, while sound is perceptible. Hence sound is a special quality of ether.

Ether is one, individual and has no genus. It is eternal, because it is ubiquitous. It is not the cause of all effects, though it is their invariable antecedent, because it is an accidental antecedent. It is the necessary, invariable antecedent of sound, and its material cause. Though ether is ubiquitous and eternal, it is the substrate and material cause of sound.

Ether has the qualities sound, number, dimension, severalty, conjunction and disjunction.[22]

The earth, water, fire, air and ether are called elements (bhūta) and are physical. Each of them possesses a peculiar quality which distinguishes it from the rest. The peculiar qualities of earth, water, fire, air and ether are smell, taste, colour, touch and sound respectively which are sensed by the five external senses. The external senses are constituted by respective elements whose specific qualities are sensed by them. The sense of smell is constituted by the element of earth and so on. The elements are substrata of these qualities.

Time

The sixth substance time, is the cause of our cognitions of past, present and future and of younger and older. Every person is followed by it. It is characterized in different ways. With regard to time, there is such a distinction as subjective time and objective time. It is also recognized as standard time which varies from place to place.

Time is one, ubiquitous, eternal substance. It is an individual and has no genus. It has five qualities, viz. number, dimension, severalty conjunction and disjunction. Time has no special quality.

The notions of posteriority in relation to posteriority of simultaneity of slowness and quickness are marks of the existence of time.[23] The following arguments are advanced for the existence of time. First, time is inferred from temporal remoteness or oldness and temporal proximity or newness, which subsists in old and new created substances. Temporal remoteness or oldness is produced in an old substance after the lapse of a large number of motions of the Sun from its production. Its non-inherent cause is conjunction of the old substance determined by the motions of the Sun with a ubiquitous substance, viz. time. Time is the locus of the conjunction. Temporal remoteness and proximity, or oldness and newness, reside in an individual substance, and not in time. So time is not their locus. A substance itself is the inherent cause of its temporal remoteness or proximity. Its conjunction with time is their non-inherent cause. Time is their efficient cause.[24]

Time is inferred from the cognitions simultaneously, succession, slowness, quickness oldness and youth, which are its mark. The self is the inherent cause of these cognitions. Time is inferred as the efficient

cause of the cognitions of these temporal marks, which differ form the cognitions of substances, qualities and the like.[25]

Time is the cause of moments, hours, days, months, years and the like. Day, night, fortnight, month season, year and the like - are the artificial divisions of time. Time is the cause of the notions of these different divisions of time.

The system of calculating time in ancient India is as follows:

100 Truṭi-s	-	I Tatpara
30 Tatpara-s	-	1 Nimeṣa
15 Nimeṣas	-	1 Kāṣṭha (3.2 seconds)
30 Kāṣṭhas	-	1 Kala
30 Kalas	-	1 Muhūrta ((48 Minutes)
30 Muhūrtas	-	1 Day-night
30 Day-nights	-	1 Month
6 Months	-	1 Ayana (Dakṣiṇāyana is the night of the Gods and Uttarāyana is the day of gods)
2 Ayana-s	-	1 Year (A day and night of the Gods)
12,000 God-years	-	1 Caturyuga (1200 years = Satyayuga, 2400 years = Treta, 3600 years = Dvāpara, 4800 years = Kaliyuga)

1000 Caturyugas	-	1 Day of Brahma (the life of Brahma is 100 years)
1000 Caturyugas	-	14 Manu-s.[26]

Space

Space is one, ubiquitous, eternal, part less substance. It is an individual, which has no genus of space. It is the cause of our cognitions of east and west, here and there, near and far and is different from ether which is the substratum of the quality of sound. All material things exist in space and maintain their relative positions in it. If there were no space, they would interpenetrate one another. It has no special quality. But it has number, dimension, severalty, conjunction and disjunction.[27]

Space is inferred from the cognitions of different directions.[28] Taking a corporeal substance of limited magnitude as a limit, we perceive other corporeal substances as to the east, west, north, south, upward and downward. Space is the efficient cause of these cognitions of directions, because they cannot be produced by any other cause.

Soul

The concept of the Soul is the most prominent principle discussed in Indian philosophy. Soul is the substratum of the quality of

consciousness. It is of two kinds, viz. the Supreme Soul and the Individual Soul. Of these, the Supreme Soul is omnipotent and omniscient and one only. The Individual Soul is different in each body, is all-pervading and eternal.[29] Soul is the substance which is comprised in the class ātmatva or the genus of Soul.

Udayana defines the Soul as that which is endowed with cognition. Visvanātha defines Soul as the guide of the sense-organ, etc.[30]

Soul is an object of inference. The individual Soul is inferred from the perception of sound and other sensible qualities as its substratum. Perception is produced by the intercourse of the external sense-organs with certain external objects. Different sensible qualities are perceived through the different sense-organs, which are the instruments of knowledge. Knowledge as an effect must have a material cause. The Soul is its material cause in which it inheres.[31]

The activity of the sense-organs requires an agent who uses them in order to know objects because an instrument requires an agent to use it. The body, the sense-organs and the mind cannot be the agent, since they are unconscious. They themselves are the instruments of experience.

They require the individual Soul as the agent who uses them as organs of experience.[32]

The vital acts of inspiration and expiration, the opening and closing of the eyes, the growth of the body, self-recuperation of wounds, the movement of the mind and the impression of the sense-organs prove the existence of Soul.

Pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition, etc. are qualities of Soul. They are not perceived by the external sense-organs. The fact that the self is the substratum of these qualities is directly known through expressions: 'I know', 'I am happy', etc. This ego consciousness refers to Soul. The pleasure and pain are felt in connection with different parts of the body. 'I feel pleasure in the foot', 'I feel pain in the head', etc. So these pleasure and pain are not special qualities of body and sense-organs, but are special qualities of a substance which pervades the entire body of it. The special qualities of Soul are perceived through the mind. So they are not special qualities of the body. They are the qualities of the Soul.

Just like the movements of a chariot are guided by a charioteer the voluntary action of a body, which realize good and avoid evil, prove the existence of a conscious self which directs the body. A self has knowledge of good and evil. It consciously and voluntarily directs its body to execute the movements, which are helpful to the realization of the good and the avoidance of evil. The voluntary movements are the outward expressions of the volitions of the Soul. Then we infer the existence of other individual souls on the analogy of our own souls.[33]

The Vaiśeṣika recognizes the plurality of individual Souls. It is inferred from the variety of experiences and conditions of different Souls. Some are happy while others are not. Some are bound while others are liberated. Theses differences in the status of individuals prove the existences of many Souls. The plurality of individual souls is confirmed by the Vedas also.

The Upaniṣadic texts emphasizing the identity of the individual Soul with the Supreme Soul is intended to convey similarity but not identity between them. If there were only one Soul, the bondage of one would lead to the bondage of others, and the liberation of one would lead

to the liberation of others. Each Soul reaps the consequences of its own actions. It continues its identity in the midst of all its experiences. It transmigrates from one body to another to exhaust its own merits and demerits. Even in the state of liberation the Soul retains its integrity, and is not merged in God. Each Soul has its particularity by virtue of which it is distinguished from the other souls and God. Each Soul is eternal and its particularity is eternal.

Knowledge, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition, merit, demerit and disposition or impression are the special qualities of the individual Soul. Number, dimension, severalty, conjunction and disjunction are its generic qualities.[34]

Mind

Mind is the organ which is the instrument in obtaining the knowledge of pleasure, etc. It, being linked up with each human Soul, is innumerable, atomic and eternal.[35]

The existence of mind is proved by some arguments. First, though the self, the sense-organs and the object are present, perceptions of external objects are not occurring. Therefore the existence of mind is inferred

from the non-production of perceptions at particular times. The mind controls the external sense-organs.[36]

When there is the self has the intercourse with the mind and mind has that with the sense-organs and the sense-organs has with its objects, perception occurs. That is when the mind has contact there will be perception. When it hasn't contact there won't be perception. The conjunction of the self with mind, of the mind with the sense-organs, and of the sense-organs with the objects are necessary conditions of perception. The internal organ is necessary for perception of external objects. It is controlled by the self, and it controls the sense-organs. It is directed by the self to be disjoined from one sense-organ and conjoined with another sense-organ. The self has perception of external objects through the external sense-organs controlled by the internal organ.

Another argument is that the recollections of colours, sounds, tastes, smells and touches are produced, even when the external sense-organs do not function. Therefore we can infer that they are produced by the internal organ.

Cognitions, volitions and the other perceptible qualities of the self are always successive. They are never simultaneous. Their non-simultaneity proves the existence of one mind in each body. If there were many internal organs, they would come into conjunction with the different sense organs, and produce different kinds of perceptions simultaneously. But colours, odours, tastes, sounds and temperatures are never perceived simultaneously. So there is a single mind in each body.

The mind is atomic in nature. If it were a large magnitude it would come into conjunction with all sense-organs at the same time, and produce perceptions of colours, smells, tastes, sound and temperatures simultaneously. But they are not perceived simultaneously. Non-simultaneity of perceptions proves the atomic magnitude of mind.[37]

Mind is a corporeal substance because it is capable of movement. If it were inactive and motionless; it could not supervise the external sense-organs. It has no special quality. It has the general qualities of number, dimension, distinctness, conjunction, disjunction, remoteness, proximity and velocity.[38]

QUALITY (GUNA)

The second category is guṇa or quality. Kaṇāda defines a quality as an entity inhering in a substance, and devoid of a quality, which is not an unconditional cause of conjunction and disjunction.[39]

Praśastapāda defines quality as an entity related to the genus of quality, abiding in a substance and devoid of quality and action.[40]

Quality is an independent reality because it can be conceived, thought and named independently of a substance where it inheres. The qualities are therefore called objective entities. They are not necessarily eternal. They include both physical and spiritual qualities.

Kaṇāda mentions seventeen qualities, viz. colour, taste, smell, touch, number, magnitude, distinctness, conjunction, disjunction, remoteness, nearness, cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion and volition.[41] Praśastapāda adds seven more qualities, viz. heaviness, fluidity, viscidity, faculty, merit, demerit and sound.[42] Thus there are Twenty four qualities.

Qualities are divided into general and special. General qualities are those which abide in two or more substances jointly. Number,

magnitude, distinctness, conjunction, disjunction, remoteness, nearness, derived fluidity, gravity and velocity are general qualities.[43]

Special qualities are those which abide in one substance only at the same time and not in two or more substances jointly. Colour, taste, smell, touch, viscidity, natural fluidity, cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition, merit, demerit, faculty and sound are special qualities.[44] Qualities are further divided into three kinds:

1. Those which are perceptible through one external sense-organ, sound, touch, colour, taste and odour come under this head.[45]
2. Qualities those are perceptible through two external senseorgans, viz. eyes and the skin, number, magnitude, distinctness, conjunction, disjunction, remoteness, nearness, fluidity, viscidity and velocity come under this category.[46]
3. Qualities those are imperceptible through the external senseorgans, gravity, merit, demerit and faculty (bhavana) come under this head.[47] Cognition, pleasure, pain, desire aversion and volition are perceptible through the mind.[48]

Qualities can be divided into eternal and non-eternal also. The qualities of eternal substances are eternal and non-eternal substances are

non-eternal. Colour, taste, odour, touch, remoteness, nearness, gravity, fluidity, viscidity and velocity are qualities of corporeal substances.

Cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition, impression, merit, demerit and sound are qualities of incorporeal substances.

Colour – Rūpa

Colour is a special quality, which is perceived by the visual organ only. It is again of seven kinds due to its division into white, blue, yellow, red, green, brown and variegated. All these varieties reside in earth. Colour is changed in earthy substances by the application of heat. So their colour is transient. The colours of the atoms of water and fire are eternal. Colour subsists in earth, water and fire. The colour of water is pale-white and that of Tejas is bright-white. The colours of water and Tejas are not due to the application of heat. Annaṃbhaṭṭa defines colour as the quality apprehended only by the eye.[49] The colours of all produced substances are produced by those of their material causes.

Taste – Rasa

Taste is also a special quality, which is perceived by gustatory organ only.[50] It resides in earth and water. Taste is of six varieties: sweet,

acid, saline, pungent, astringent and bitter. Of these, earth has all the six varieties while water has only the sweet. The tastes of earthy substances are changed due to the application of heat. The taste of water is not changed due to the application of heat. Taste of the atoms of water are eternal. Taste becomes cause of sustaining life developing the body, producing strength and bringing about health.

Odour – Gandha

Odour is also a special quality. It is perceived by the olfactory organ.[51] It resides in earth only. All odours are transient. There are two kinds of odour, agreeable and disagreeable. The odours of produced substances are produced by the odours of their material cause. They are destroyed when their substrates are destroyed. The odours in the atoms of earth are changed by the application of heat.

Touch – Sparsa

Touch is a special quality, which is perceived by the tactual organ only[52] It resides in earth, water, fire and air. There are three kinds of touch, viz. cold, hot and neither cold nor hot i.e. lukewarm. The touch of water is cold and that of fire is hot. Earth and air are neither cold nor hot.

Touch of the atoms of water, fire and air are eternal. That of their composite products are non-eternal.

Theory of Pāka

The colour, taste, smell and touch of the atoms of earth have the character of being produced by heat. This character is defined as that which is born of heat or pāka,[53] and is called pākaja.[54] The process of pāka is as follows: when an unbaked jar, etc., come into contact with fire, by means of striking or impulsion, there arise motion among the atoms. The motion thus caused paves the way for disjunctions among the atoms. By these disjunctions, there conjunctions are destroyed, this again causes the destruction of the product form of the substance. The dark colour, etc. in the separated atoms change owing to the heat arising from the contact of fire. Further, by the contact of fire with the atoms, there originate attributes such as colour, etc. Then again owing to the contact of souls and atoms, guided by adṛṣṭa or destiny, there arise motions in the atoms, in which colour, etc. are produced by heat. From their conjunctions in the order of dyad etc., the substances in the form of

products come into being. The colour, etc. are produced in the same order.[55]

Number – Saṅkhya

According to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, numbers are objective entities. It is a generic quality. It is the cause of mathematical enumeration. Number is the cause of common usage of expressions like one, two, etc.[56] It is found in all the nine substances. It starts from one and ends with Parārtha. Oneness is eternal and non-eternal, i.e. eternal in atoms and non-eternal in products. Number two and higher numbers are only non-eternals everywhere.

Dimension – Parimāṇa

Dimension is the special cause of measurement.[57] It is found in all the nine substances. There are four kinds of dimension: atomic, large, long and short. The dimension of atom and mind is atomic and is eternal. The dimension of ether, time, space and soul is the largest. It is eternal, since they are eternal substances. A composite substance like a jar has medium largeness. The dimensions of a dyad and a triad are non-eternal, since they are composite products.

Separateness or Distinctness - Pṛthaktvam

Separateness is the basis in dealing with the distinctness of things.[58] Annaṃbhaṭṭa defines distinctness as the special cause of conventional expressions such as this is distinct from that.[59] Separateness inheres in all substances. Perception is the general means to realize it. According to Raghunāthaśiromaṇi, one of the modern Naiyāyikas, Pṛdhaktva is not a separate quality since its purpose is served by Anyonyābhāva (reciprocal non-existence).[60] It is eternal and non-eternal. Distinctness of atom is eternal, because it is eternal and distinctness of products is non-eternal

Conjunction – Samyoga

Conjunction is a quality, which is the cause of the knowledge of conjoined substances. It exists in all the substances. It is the union of two substances which exist separately. It is of three kinds: 1. Conjunction due to the movement of one of the substances conjoined, 2. Conjunction due to the movement of two substances conjoined and 3. Conjunction due to another conjunction.[61] The example of the first kind is the perching of a flying bird on a fixed pole. The contact of two wrestlers fighting with each other is the example of the second kind. The example of the

third type is the contact of a body with a tree due to the contact of a hand with a tree. Conjunction is a partial contact of two substances, and not total interpenetration.

Disjunction - Vibhāga

Disjunction is a quality, which is the cause of the knowledge of divided substances. It is separation of the two substances, which were conjoined. It subsists in the two substances which are disjoined. It is of three kinds: 1. disjunction due to the movement of one of the two substances disjoined, 2. disjunction due to the movement of the two substances disjoined, and 3. disjunction due to another disjunction.[62] Disjunction resides in all the nine substances.

Remoteness – Paratva and Proximity – Aparatva

Remoteness and Proximity are the special causes of common usage of words expressing 'far' and 'near'. They reside in earth, water, light, air and mind. Each of them is of two kinds: spatial and temporal. In things existing at a distance, spatial remoteness is found; in things near, spatial proximity is found; in an elderly person, temporal remoteness is found; in a younger person, temporal proximity is found.[63] Remoteness

and proximity are relative to each other. They depend upon the relating activity of thought.

Heaviness – Gurutva

Heaviness is a quality of earth and water, by virtue of which they tend to fall to the ground. Falling is due to gravity when conjunction, velocity and effort are absent. It is eternal in atoms of earth and water. It is non-eternal in the composite earthy and watery substances.

Fluidity – Dravatva

Fluidity is the non-intimate cause of the first flow. It resides in earth, water and light. It is of two kinds: natural and artificial. Natural fluidity is a quality of water. Artificial fluidity is the quality of earth and light. In earth artificial fluidity is generated through the contact of fire with ghee. Artificial fluidity is found in gold, etc. which are belonging to light.

Viscidity – Sneha

Viscidity is the specific attribute of water.[64] It is the quality which causes the agglutination of powder etc. it is oiliness.

Sound – Śabda

Sound is the quality apprehended by the organ of hearing. It subsists in ether alone. It is of two kinds: 1. in the form of letters and 2. in the form of noise in general. The former is the shape of 'a' and other letters, and the latter in the shape of the noise produced by the blowing of the conch and such things.

Cognition – Buddhi

In the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system, the term buddhi (cognition), Upalabdhi (intellect), Jñāna (knowledge) and Pratyaya (apprehension) are used synonymously.[65] Cognition is the quality which is the cause of all kinds of communications; and it is knowledge. It is of two fold remembrance and apprehension.[66]

Udayana defines Buddhi in his Lakṣaṇāvali as that which leads to knowledge of objects.[67]

According to Praśastapāda buddhi is of two kinds: vidyā (right knowledge) and avidyā (false knowledge).[68]

Again he divides avidyā into four kinds: samśaya (doubt), viparyaya (misconception), anadhyavasāya (uncertain cognition) and svapna (dream).[69]

Doubt arises from perception of a general, non-perception of a particular and remembrance of particularity.[70]

Praśastapāda says that doubt arises when two objects of well-known distinct specific characteristics are seen and we perceive only the similarities between them and consequently we recollect the particularities of the objects. It is also caused by a certain demerit of the perceiver. It is effected in our mind as a ponder in the form of 'whether it is this or that'.[71]

Doubt is of two kinds: 1. antaḥ (internal) and 2. bahiḥ (external).

Viparyaya or Misconception

Viparyaya is distinct from samśaya and anadhyavasāya. It can also be comprehended by means of perception as well as inference. Sivāditya defines Viparyaya as false cognition of determinate character.[72]

Anadhyavasāya or Indefinite cognition

Anadhyavasāya appears in the form of indistinct cognition preceded by the desire for ascertainment. It also manifests itself with regard to perceptible and inferable objects.[73] Vyomaśiva defines it as in the form of unascertained cognition.[74]

Svapna or Dream

Svapna or Dream is the fourth kind of false cognition. Praśastapāda defines svapna as, when the sense-organs cease to function, and the mind retires, there occur certain mental cognitions as if through the external sense-organs.[75]

According to Praśastapāda, vidyā or right knowledge also is of four kinds. They are Pratyakṣa (perceptive knowledge), laiṅgika (inferential knowledge), smṛti (recollective knowledge) and Ārṣajñāna (superhuman knowledge).[76]

They are defined as follows: the cognition which appears due to the contact of the sense-organs is called perceptive knowledge. That which occurs from the comprehension of inferential reason is called inferential knowledge. Recollection or remembrance is designated

recollective knowledge and knowledge of the sages called superhuman knowledge.[77]

The Vaiśeṣikas recognize two pramāṇas called Pratyakṣa and Anumāna (perception and inference).

Perception

Praśastapāda defines perception as the cognition which precedes the contact of each sense-organ.[78] The sense-organs are six kinds: the nose, the tongue, the eye, the skin, the ear and the mind.[79] Perceptive knowledge is concerned with substance and other categories. In the case of substance, it occurs with regard to the gross form of earth, water and light.

It is characterized as a mere form of perception (स्वरूपालोचनमात्रम्). It appears due to 1. having many parts, 2. manifested colour and 3. light.

Inference

Praśastapāda defines inferential knowledge as which occurs from the comprehension of inferential reason.[80] Praśastapāda presents three peculiar features of inferential reason: 1. it is related to the object to be inferred, 2. it is also present in similar objects and 3. it does not exist in

objects alien to it. Inference is of two kinds svārtha and parārtha. Svārtha is further divided into two dṛṣṭa and sāmānyatodṛṣṭa.

The Naiyāyikas accept four pramanas, viz. pratyakṣa, anumāna, upamāna and śabda. Praśastapāda brings in śabda and other means of valid knowledge under Anumāna, since their functioning is similar to that of inference.

Avayava – syllogism

Parārthānumāna is technically called Nyāya (Syllogism).[81] The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system accept the five members of a syllogism. Praśastapāda calls these members are 1. pratijñā (proposition), 2. apadeśa (reason), 3. nidarśana (example), 4. anusandhāna (application) and 5. pratyāmnāya (conclusion).[82]

Hetvābhāsa or Fallacious reason

The Vaiśeṣikas accept only four hetvābhāsas. They are asiddha (not proved), viruddha (contrary), sandigdha (dubious) and anadhyavasita (unascertained).[83] The Naiyāyikas accept five kinds of hetvābhāsas, viz. savyabhicāra (inconclusive), Viruddha (contradictory), Prakaraṇasama (counterbalanced), Sādhyasama (unproved) and Kālātīta (mistimed).[84]

Asiddha is fourfold 1. ubhayāsiddha, 2. anyatarāsiddha, 3. tadbhāvāsiddha, and 4. anumeyāsiddha.

Smṛti or Remembrance

Smṛti is brought forth by the contact of the soul and the mind and the faculty caused by strong desire. It occurs as a result of the perception of inferential reason, desire, as well as the subsequent recollection. Annaṃbhaṭṭa says that recollection is of two kinds: true and erroneous. The one arising from valid cognition is the true one; that arising from false cognition is the erroneous one.[85]

Ārṣajñāna or superhuman knowledge

In the case of the sages, who are the composers of the Vedas, there occurs intuitional cognition called pratibha or ārṣajñāna (sagic cognition). It is concerned with the objects of the past, the future and the present, such as merit and demerit, space or time, as well as those that are either mentioned or not mentioned in the Vedas. It emerges from the contact of the Soul and the mind, aided by a peculiar virtue. This kind of real cognition generally belongs to the divine sages. But in rare cases it

belongs to ordinary human beings also. For instance, a little girl says 'my heart tell me that my brother will come tomorrow'.[86]

Pleasure – Sukha

That which is experienced by all with agreeable feelings is pleasure.[87] It is a quality of Soul. Śivāditya divides pleasure into two, viz. worldly and heavenly.[88]

Pain – Duḥkha

That which is experienced by all with disagreeable feelings is pain.[89] The absence of pleasure is not pain. It is caused by the contact of sense-organs and objects as well as that of the Soul and the mind aided by demerit, etc. It is a quality of the Soul.

Desire – Iccha

Desire or iccha is the wishing for attaining an unattained object for one's own benefit or for the benefit of someone else.[90] Śivāditya divides desire into two, viz. Sādhyaviṣaya and Sādhanaviṣaya.[91] It is a quality of the Soul.

Aversion – Dveṣa

Aversion or dveṣa is a quality of the Soul. It occurs in the form of heart-burning springing from hostility.[92] It proceeds from the contact of the soul and the mind. It is called forth by the pain one suffers and also by memory. It is the cause of volition, remembrance, merit and demerit.

Volition – Prayatna

Volition or Prayatna is a quality of the soul. It is twofold: 1. Jīvanapūrvaka and 2. Icchādveṣapūrvaka. Jīvanapūrvaka is associated with a man in sleep. Icchādveṣapūrvaka is the cause of activities which are capable of attaining the desired objects, avoiding the undesirable.

Merit or Dharma

Merit or Dharma is a quality of the Soul. It is the particular cause of pleasure. Merit is that which is born of enjoined actions.[93]

Demerit or Adharma

Demerit is that which is born of prohibited actions.[94] It is an attribute of the soul. It is the particular cause of pain.

Impression – Samskāra

Impression is of three kinds: velocity, reminiscent impression and elasticity. Velocity resides in five substances, viz. earth, water, light, air and the mind. That which is born of experience and which causes recollection is reminiscent impression. It resides in the soul only. Elasticity is the force that brings a thing back to its normal shape whenever it is distorted. It resides in mat etc. which are the transformations of earth.[95]

ACTION (KARMA)

The third kind of category is Karma or action. Kaṇāda defines action as an entity, which inheres in one substance, which is devoid of a quality, and which is an unconditional cause of conjunction and disjunction.[96] The quality is of a static and permanent feature of a substance, but an action is a dynamic and transient feature of it. Action is a physical motion.

Conjunction, which is a quality, resides in many substances. But an action abides in one substance only. Conjunction of a book with a table resides in the two substances. But the motion of a fan resides in it

only. An action is like a quality resides in the substance and is devoid of a quality. But is an unconditional cause of conjunction and disjunction, where as a quality is not their cause. Action has the genus of action which inheres in it.

Action is of five kinds: 1. upward motion, 2. downward motion, 3. contraction, 4. expansion and 5. locomotion.[97] Motion resides in a corporal substance of limited dimension. It is non-eternal and resides in a non-eternal substance. An incorporeal, ubiquitous substance like ether, time, space or soul, is incapable of motion.[98] Motion is produced by heaviness, fluidity, effort and conjunction.

Upward motion brings a body into contact with a higher region, e.g. throwing a stone upward. Downward motion brings a body into contact with a lower region, e.g. throwing a stone downward from a tree to the ground.

Contraction brings the parts of a body closer to one another, e.g. the rolling of a cloth. Expansion makes the parts of a body farther from one another, e.g. the unfolding of a cloth. All other kinds of motion are

comprised in locomotion. Walking, evacuation, flow, flaming up and slanting motion are different kinds of locomotion.[99]

GENERALITY (SĀMĀNYA)

The fourth kind of category is Sāmānya or generality. It is class-concept, class-essence or universal. It is the common character of the things which fall under the same class. The definition of generality is that which is eternal, one and resides in many things.[100]

Kaṇāda says, 'generality and particularity depend upon the intellect to indicate their existence'. They are not conceptual constructs but ontological entities. Generality is the cause of assimilation. There is one community in many individuals. There is the genus of cow in many cows, which is one and not different in different individual cows. Community inheres in many individuals. It is natural and not accidental.

Generality inheres in all its proper individuals of the same class. The genus of cow exist in all individual cows and it does not exist in other individuals - goats, sheep and the like. Though the community is not limited to a particular place, it exists in all its proper individuals, which are produced by their causes and collocations of conditions.[101]

There are two kinds of generality, viz. more comprehensive (para) and less comprehensive (apara).[102] Being (sattā) is the highest generality or more comprehensive. Substances, qualities and actions exist through relation to Being. Being is common to them. But it is different from them. Substances, qualities and actions are different from one another. But sattā is identical in them. It has no special distinguishing marks. So Being is one.

PARTICULARITY (VI ŚEṢA)

Particularity or viśeṣa is a category, which according to the Vaiśeṣikas, differentiates the eternal substances from each other. Kaṇāda defines particularity as the ultimate distinguishing feature of an eternal substance, which is known by its discrimination from the other eternal substances. It depends upon the intellect to indicate its existence.[103]

The atoms of earth, water, light and air and the ubiquitous substances viz. ether, time, space, soul and mind are the eternal substances. The eternal substances are beyond the reach of the senses. The reason as to why particularity should be recognized independently is not hard to understand. Two constituent substances, for instance, two jars may be

easily differentiated because their constituent elements are different and thus, their separateness (pṛthaktva) is very clear. But the case of the eternal substances, for example, between two atoms, the difference can not be discerned because their separateness does not come under the purview of sense-perception. Eternal substances are the partless infinite substances. Thus, to solve the problem of the recognizance of their separateness, the Vaiśeṣikas recognize particularity which is supposed to differentiate the eternal substances from each other.

Each eternal substance is different from any other eternal substance, because otherwise they should be alike, and consequently the creation of variously different composite substances might be impossible. The eternal substances are ultimate and they have no further constituent elements. Therefore, naturally, the features of the ultimate substances too must be of ultimate characters and such an ultimate character is, according to Kaṇāda, called viśeṣa or the distinguishing feature.

Composite substances are distinguished from one another by their parts. They do not require particularities to distinguish them from one another. Actually the principle in the acceptance of the category

'particularity' or viśeṣa is everything in this universe is different from one another. Even an ordinary person can understand this difference between unlike things. But there is difference between like things. This difference can be proved by the difference of parts. But where there is no parts, by which we can prove this difference? Here comes the need of particularity. The composite substances are distinguished by their constituent elements and the eternal substances by their particularities.[104] Eternal substances are infinite in number and their particularities are also innumerable.

INHERENCE (SAMAVĀYA)

The sixth category is Samavāya or inherence. It is one of the most important doctrines of Vaiśeṣika philosophy. It is an inseparable and eternal relation. Kaṇāda defines it as the relation between a material cause and its effect, which is the cause of the notion this subsists in this abode.[105]

Praśastapāda gives a more comprehensive definition: the relationship subsisting among things that are inseparable, standing to

one another. In the relation of the container and contained, and being the basis of the idea, 'this is in that'.[106]

Inherence is one, because it has the same distinguishing feature. It is the relation between the whole and the parts, genus and individual substance and quality, substance and action and eternal substances and particularity.[107]

Inherence is eternal because its production would involve infinite regress. It is imperceptible and is inferred from the inseparable relation of two things. It is different from conjunction, which is a temporary relation. Conjunction is a separable relation, while inherence is an inseparable relation. Conjunction is produced but inherence is uncaused. Conjunction is a relation between two independent substances but inherence is a relation between inseparable things.

Inherence is different from substance, quality, action, generality and particularity because it is a relation between substance and other categories. It is different from non-existence. So it is a distinct category.

NON-EXISTENCE (ABHĀVA)

The seventh category is abhāva or non-existence. Kaṇāda does not mention abhāva as a separate category. It is added afterwards: Udayana divides the categories into existence and non-existence. He divides the former into substance, quality, action, generality, particularity and inherence; and the latter into prior non-existence, posterior non-existence, absolute non-existence and mutual non-existence. Śrīdhara and Śivāditya also recognize these four kinds of non-existences. In some manuals of syncretic Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school divide non-existence into two kinds, viz. Samsargābhāva and anyonyābhāva. Samsargābhāva means the absence of something else. Anyonyābhāva means the fact that one thing is not another thing. Samsargābhāva is of three kinds, viz. *prāgabhāva, pradhvaṃsābhāva and atyantābhāva.*[108]

1. Prāgabhāva (prior non-existence)

It is the non-existence of an effect in its material cause before its production, e.g. the non-existence of the cloth in the threads before its production. It had no beginning, but has an end. It was brought to an end, when the cloth came into existence. Thus prior non-existence is not

produced but destroyed. If it is not destroyed the effect cannot be produced.

2. Pradhvamsābhāva (posterior non-existence)

Posterior non-existence is with a beginning but without an end; it occurs after the production of an effect. It is produced by the destruction of an effect, but can never be destroyed. When a jar is destroyed by the stroke of a club, it has posterior non-existence in its fragments, which is produced by an efficient cause.[109]

3. Atyantābhāva (absolute non-existence)

The absolute non-existence is the absence of a relation between two things in the past, the present and the future. There is absolute non-existence of colour in air. There is absolute non-existence of the genus of earth in water and of the genus of water in earth. Absolute non-existence does not refer to production or destruction. It does not refer to the past or the future. It is neither produced nor destroyed. It is eternal in nature.

4. Anyonyābhāva (Mutual non-existence)

The mutual non-existence is the absence of a thing as another thing which is different from it. The non-existence of a cow in a horse and the non-existence of a horse in a cow are mutual non-existence. It is different from absolute non-existence. Absolute non-existence is the denial of an absolutely non-existent entity in all times and in all places. But mutual nonexistence is the denial of identity between two things, which have specific natures.

THE ATOMIC THEORY

The Vaiśeṣika theory of atomism believes in the doctrine of Asatkāryavāda, which means that the effect does not pre-exist in its cause. This assumption is that effect is a new creation and it presupposes of cause lays the foundation for the doctrine to be called as Ārambhavāda or Paramāṇukāraṇavāda. According to this philosophy, the material objects of the world are composed of parts that can be divided into smaller parts until it reaches an indivisible part less and eternal particles of matter called atom or paramāṇu.

Every visible thing is composed of parts. It is the three dimensions that make them so. Length, breadth and thickness presuppose smaller parts. A line is a succession of several points. A series of lines placed lengthwise and sidewise constitute a surface. Hence these are visible. On the contrary a mathematical point is not at all visible. It does not have any dimension at all. Truly speaking it is only a notion. It is possible thus to deduct that every visible thing is made up of parts. Such thinking might have served initially to ponder over the composite nature of products in the universe whether visible or invisible.

The thought of dividing composite products might have been the successive step. It is based on the fact that things made up of parts should naturally be subject to division. When the process of division is pursued further it will stop at a particular point. The part that marks the limit is the atom.

The Vaiśeṣikas begin their analysis with the smallest mote visible in the sunbeam. It is called triad (tryaṇuka), the tertiary atom. This also is having parts. Each of the three parts which compose, it is known as dyad (dvyaṇuka) or binary. The dyads are also divisible since they

produce large magnitude in the tryaṇuka. The components of dyads are atoms. Thus a triad consists of six atoms. The dyad of two atoms is conceived as an intermediary stage for sastraic purpose. Aṇutva is opposed to mahatva and as such aṇu cannot give rise to mahatva directly. When three dyads are postulated as composing a triad it can safely be said that the number of dyad provides mahatva in triad and not their aṇutva. In dyad the number does intensify, the volume (pariṇāma) of each part. An atom is thus described as the sixth part of the little mote seen in the sunbeam that peeps through the window.

जालसूर्यमरीचिस्थं यत्सूक्ष्मं दृश्यते रजः।

तस्य षष्ठतमो भागः परमाणुस्स उच्यते।।

Creation means the combinations of atoms in different proportions and destruction means dissolution of that combination.

The atoms are of four kinds of earth, water, fire and air and these atoms differ from one another in quality. They are usually recognized as spherical or globular (parimaṇḍala) particles that are co-eternal with the souls and hence are the material cause of the world. Atoms are eternal in nature and are inactive and motionless in themselves. It is only during

atomic combinations or destructions that they become active. In such case the motion is imparted by an unseen power (adṛṣṭa) of merit and demerit which resides in the individual souls leading to the form of enjoyment of suffering. Thus the Vaiśeṣika atomism is not materialistic as it admits the reality of the spiritual substances and law of Karma.

The Vaiśeṣika maintains that a dyad (dvyaṇuka) is produced by the conjunction of two atoms. The motion of the atom is produced by the will of God. The two atoms are its inherent cause; their conjunction is their non-inherent cause; the unseen agencies, merits and demerits of individual souls are its efficient cause. When there is an activity among three dyads, they come into conjunction with one another and produce a triad (tryaṇuka). A quartrad (caturaṇuka) is produced by the conjunction of four triads. The quartrads are combined into larger and larger composite substances. The qualities of the composite products are produced by those of the components, which are their inherent cause.[110]

The existence of atoms is proved as, there are different degrees of dimensions, which have the highest limit in the largest magnitude of ether and which have the lowest limit in the minutest dimension of an

atom. There are the larger and larger magnitudes, which culminate in the largest magnitude of ether. There are smaller and smaller magnitudes which end in the minutest magnitude of an atom. An atom is the minutest part, which is indivisible.[111] We accept 'paramāṇu' as the minutest because; we have to accept something as the last part. Otherwise there will be infinite regress. If we accepted the idea that parts enable divided endlessly then we will not be able to establish difference of dimension in Meru and Mustard.

The theory of particularity is directly connected with the Vaiśeṣika view of atoms. It is particularity that distinguishes the atoms of earth, etc. from those of water and others.

The reality of the world

Almost all the schools of Indian philosophy recognize the reality of the world. The Cārvāka admits the reality of the world composed of the gross elements of earth, water, fire and air. The Buddhist realists maintain that the world is composed of atoms combined into gross impermanent objects. The Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika recognize the reality of

the world in time and space which composed of heterogeneous atoms, governed by the law of causality and subservient to the law of Karma.

The Mīmāmsa also regards the world as formed out of atoms under the guidance of the law of karma. The Sāmkhya, Yoga and Vedānta regard the world as evolved out of prakṛti consisting of sattva, rajas and tamas. Sattva is the principle of manifestation. Rajas is the principle of energy. Tamas is the principle of obstruction.

Vedānta regards prakṛti as the power of God. The Yoga regards prakṛti as independent of God. The Sāmkhya does not believe in Go **GOD.**

The founder of the Vaiśeṣika system, Kaṇāda does not openly refer to God. The aphorism – 'the authority of the Veda is due to the utterance of him or them',[112] has been interpreted in the sense that Veda is the word of God. But his expression 'tadvacana' may also mean that Veda is the word of seers. Kaṇāda accepts the authority of the Vedas. Moreover he believes in spiritualism and makes the physical universe subservient to the moral order. Atoms and souls are co-present and co-eternal with him. He cannot create them. He simply gives motion to the

atoms. He is responsible for the first push and then the atoms go on combining.

Praśastapāda is undoubtedly a theist. He opens his work *Praśastapādabhāṣya* by paying homage to Īśvara, the cause of the world. He then goes on to say that the knowledge of the six categories is the cause of liberation, this knowledge itself, however results from dharma which is prescribed by God. Praśastapāda teaches that the periodic process of creation and dissolution is caused by the desire of God. In this description of creation the great Egg is said to be brought into existence by the mere thought of the Supreme Lord.[113]

Further when treating of the quality dimension Praśastapāda explains that largeness and length are produced in the molecules by plurality, just as minuteness and shortness in the binary atoms is produced by duality. But this duality and plurality depends for their existence on the knowledge of God. This cosmological function of God's intellect was developed by Udayana into an argument to prove the existence of God.

The Vaiśeṣika gives another argument for the existence of God. He is the author of the Vedas. Their authority is due to their being the utterances of God. The validity of spiritual testimony is due to the authority of God, who is free from error, inadvertence, deficiency of the sense organs, fraudulence and the like. He is eternal, omniscient and faultless.

The cosmological arguments prove the existence of one-God. If there were many Gods, they would be non-omniscient like us and so incapable of producing the world out of the atoms. If they were omniscient one of them would be competent to produce the world and the others would become useless. If they were equal to one another, they would have no unity of purpose. It they had same purpose one of them would be the sovereign Lord and the others would not be Lords. So God is one.

God is the promulgator of the moral law. Whatever is enjoined by him is right: whatever is prohibited by Him is wrong. The command of God is the standard of right and wrong. The Divine Law is the moral standard.[114]

Bondage and liberation

The Vaiśeṣika school of thought talks about two concepts - Bondage and Liberation. While describing it, they say that the soul due to ignorance performs actions and these actions lead to merits and demerits according to the actions conformity with the Vedas injunctions or prohibitions respectively. As long as the soul continues its actions, it will be bound. So to get rid of bondage, the soul must stop actions.

As to the second concept 'Liberation' the Vaiśeṣika believes that liberation of the soul comes through knowledge, which helps the soul to be separated from the fetters of the mind and the body, realizing its own pure nature. Thus liberation means the absolute cessation of pain, all life, all consciousness, all bliss, together with all qualities. It is the quality less, indeterminate pure nature of the individual soul as pure substance devoid of all qualities. The liberated soul remains as it is - knowing nothing, feeling nothing, doing nothing.

Liberation is attained when merits due to the performance of duties are destroyed. Only true knowledge can lead to release, but it is aided by the purity of mind brought about by the performance of duties. Spiritual insights are the direct cause of liberation.

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79. अक्षाणीन्द्रियाणि घ्राणरसनचक्षुस्त्वक्श्रोत्रमनांसि षट्। *P. Bh.*, pp. 153-154.

80. लिङ्गदर्शनात् सञ्जायमानं लैङ्गिकम्।

81. तच्चानुमानं परार्थं न्यायसाध्यमिति न्यायस्तदवयवाश्च प्रतिज्ञाहेतूदाहरणोपनयनिगमनानि निरूप्यन्ते। *Avayavaprakaraṇa*, p. 1.

82. अवयवाः पुनः प्रतिज्ञापदेशनिदर्शनानुसन्धानप्रत्याम्नायः। *P. Bh.*, p. 186.

83. एतेनासिद्धविरुद्धसन्दिग्धानध्यवसितवचनानामनपदेशत्वमुक्तम्भवति। *P. Bh.*, p. 189.

84. सव्यभिचारविरुद्धप्रकरणसमसाध्यसमकालातीता हेत्वाभासाः। *N. S.*, I.II.4.

85. स्मृतिरपि द्विविधा। यथार्था अयथार्था च। प्रमाजन्या यथार्था। अप्रमाजन्या अयथार्था। *T. S.*, p. 47.

86. आम्नायविधातृणामृषीणामतीतानागतवर्तमानेष्वतीन्द्रियेषु अर्थेषु धर्मादिषु ग्रन्थोपनिबुद्धेष्वनुपनिबद्धेषु चात्ममनसोः संयोगात् धर्मविशेषाच्च यत्प्रातिभं यथार्थनिवेदनं ज्ञानमुत्पद्यते तदार्षमित्युच्यते। तत्तु प्रस्तारेण देवर्षीणाम्। काचिदेव लौकिकानां यथा कन्यका ब्रवीति श्वो मे भ्राताऽगन्तेति हृदयं मे कथयतीति। *P. Bh.*, pp. 208-209.

87. सर्वेषामनुकूलतया वेदनीयं सुखम्। *T. S.*, p. 47.

88. सुखं सांसारिकं स्वर्गश्च। *Saptapadārthī*, p. 33.

89. सर्वेषां प्रतिकूलतया वेदनीयं दुःखम्। *T. S.*, p. 47.

90. स्वार्थं परार्थं वाऽप्राप्तप्रार्थनेच्छा। *P. Bh.*, p. 213.

91. इच्छापि द्विविधा साध्यविषया साधनविषया च। *Saptapadārthī*, p. 34.

92. प्रज्ज्वलनात्मको द्वेषः। *P. Bh.*, p. 215.

93. विहितकर्मजन्यो धर्मः। *T. S.*, p. 47.

94. निषिद्धकर्मजन्यस्त्वधर्मः। *ibid.*

95. संस्कारस्त्रिविधः। वेगो भावना स्थितिस्थापकश्चेति। वेगः पृथिव्यादिचतुष्टय-मनोवृत्तिः। अनुभवजन्या स्मृतिहेतुर्भावना। आत्ममात्रवृत्तिः। अन्यथाकृतस्य पुनस्तदवस्थापकः स्थितिस्थापकः कटादिपृथिवीवृत्तिः। *T. S.*, p. 48.

96. एकद्रव्यमगुणं संयोगविभागेष्वनपेक्षकारणमिति कर्मलक्षणम्। *V. S.*, I.I.17.

97. उत्क्षेपणापक्षेपणाकुञ्जनप्रसारणगमनानि पञ्च कर्माणि। *T. S.*, p. 6.

98. *T. Bh.*, p. 28.

99. ऊर्ध्वदेशसंयोगहेतुरुत्क्षेपणम्। अधोदेशसंयोगहेतुरपक्षेपणम्। शरीरस्य सन्निकृष्टसंयोगहेतुराकुञ्जनम्। विप्रकृष्टसंयोगहेतुः प्रसारणम्। अन्यत्सर्वं गमनम्। *T. S.*, p. 48, *T. Bh.*, p. 28.

100. तल्लक्षणं तु नित्यत्वे सत्यनेकसमवेतत्वम्। *N. S. M.*, p. 44.

101. यद्यप्यपरिच्छिन्नदेशानि सामान्यानि भवन्ति तथाप्युपलक्षणनियमात् कारणसामग्रीनियमाच्च स्वविषयसर्वगतानि। *P. Bh.*, p. 282.

102. सामान्यं द्विविधं परमपरञ्च। *P. Bh.*, p. 76.

103. सामान्यविशेष इति बुद्ध्यपेक्षम्। *V. S.*, I.II.3.

अन्यत्रान्त्येभ्यो विशेषेभ्यः। *V. S.*, p. I.II.6.

104. अवयवभेदात् अवयविभेदः। *P. Bh.*, pp. 321-322.

105. इहेदमिति यतः कार्यकारणयोः स समवायः। *V. S.*, VII.II.26.

106. अयुतसिद्धानामाधार्याधारभूतानां यः सम्बन्ध इह प्रत्ययहेतुः सः समवायः। *P. Bh.*, p. 289.

107. अवयवावयविनोर्जातिव्यक्त्योर्गुणगुणिनोः क्रियाक्रियावतोर्नित्यद्रव्यविशेषयोश्च यः सम्बन्धः सः समवायः। *N. S. M.*, p. 53.

108. अभावस्तु द्विधा संसर्गान्योन्याभावभेदतः।
प्रागभावस्तथा ध्वंसोऽप्यत्यन्ताभाव एव च।
एवं त्रैविध्यमापन्नः संसर्गाभाव इष्यते। कारिकावली, कारिका 12-13.

109. *T. Bh.*, p. 20.

110. *T. Bh.*, p. 21.

111. *Saptapadārthi*, p. 51.

112. तद्वचनादाम्नायस्य प्रामाण्यम्। *V. S.*, I.I.3.

113. महेश्वरस्याभिध्यानमात्रात्। *P. Bh.*, p. 34.

114. *V. S. V.*, I.I.3, X. 2. 8-9, *P. Bh.*, *N. K.*, pp. 7-8.

CHAPTER III

THE IMPORTANT CONCEPTS OF NYĀYA PHILOSOPHY

The study of epistemological and logical problem in Indian philosophy under the heading 'Nyāya', which aims at discussing the process of knowing and argumentation cannot be called logic in the strict sense of the term. Gautama or Akṣapāda was the founder of the Nyāya philosophy. In his *Nyāyasūtra*, Gautama mentions sixteen categories, viz.

1. Pramāṇa (means or instrument of right knowledge).
2. Prameya (object of right knowledge).
3. Samśaya (doubt).
4. Prayojana (the objective or purpose).
5. Dṛṣṭānta (familiar instance).
6. Siddhānta (established tenet).
7. Avayava (member).
8. Tarka (disputation).
9. Nirṇaya (ascertainment).
10. Vāda (discussion).

11. Jalpa (rejoinder).

12. Vitaṇḍā (cavil).

13. Hetvābhāsa (fallacious reason).

14. chala (quibble).

15. Jāti (legitimate objection). and

16. Nigrahasthāna (deficiency).

The real knowledge of these sixteen categories leads to the attainment of the highest good called Niḥśreyasa.[1]

PRAMĀṆA

Among the sixteen categories of *Nyāyasūtra*, pramāṇa occupies the first and foremost position. The theory of knowledge is a favorite topic of discussion in all systems of Indian philosophy. There are many opinions regarding the sources or means of cognition in Indian philosophical thought. Different schools recognize different number and kinds of pramāṇa and their position is as follows.

The Cārvakas recognize one pramāṇa - perception (pratyakṣa). The Vaiśeṣikas and the Buddhists admit two – perception and inference (anumāna). The Saṅkhyas and a branch of Naiyāyikas add one to these two-word or verbal testimony (śabda). The Naiyāyikas have four

pramāṇas: analogy (upamāna), together with the above three. The Pūrva Mīmāmsa School of Prābhākara recognizes five pramāṇas: implication (arthāpatti), in addition to the above four. The Pūrva Mīmāmsa school of Kumarila Bhaṭṭa and the Vedānta admit six pramāṇas: absence or negation (abhāva), together with the above five. The Paurāṇikas recognize eight pramāṇas: possibility or inclusion (sambhava) and historical tradition (aitihya), together with the above six.[2]

Every system formulates their own theory in accordance with their accepted metaphysics. The primary aim of all philosophy is recognized as the true knowledge of the nature of reality. Epistemology provides a method of metaphysical enquiry and criticism. All philosophical criticism is usually based upon the epistemological ground.

Gautama does not give any definition for pramāṇa. He mentions only the classification of different forms coming under them. Vātsyāyana, the commentator of *Nyāyasūtra* explains pramāṇa on the basis of its etymology. The word pramāṇa is derived by adding the suffix 'lyuṭ' in the instrumental (karaṇa) to the root 'ma' with the prefix 'pra' (pra + ma + lyuṭ). The root 'ma' with the prefix 'pra' (i.e. pra + ma) means 'to

know rightly'. The suffix 'lyuṭ' being in the instrumental, the word pramāṇa means the instrument by which something is rightly known, i.e. the instrument of valid knowledge. The instrument (karaṇa) is a form of cause (kāraṇa). But any and every cause is not an instrument, only the 'most efficacious' (sādhakatama) of the causes is called the karaṇa. Pramāṇa is the most effective cause of pramā.

Vātsyāyana firstly makes it clear that there can be no cognition of a thing except through a pramāṇa. First of all a cognizer apprehend a thing by means of pramāṇa, then he desires either to accept or reject the thing. The activity of the cognizer stimulated by the desire to accept or reject the thing is known as pravṛtti. This activity is said to be 'fruitful' when it becomes related to its fruit (phalānubandha). This activity is of two kinds viz. effective or not effective. When a man acts after having apprehended his object by means of the pramāṇas his activity is called samartha or fruitful. But when he acts apprehending his object by means of the false pramāṇa, his activity is asamartha or not fruitful.[3] So it becomes that when the instrument of knowledge is correct, then the knowledge is correct and the activity becomes fruitful. For instance: we

know the piece of shell as silver. Here the cognition will be proved wrong as the shell is known as silver. When we consider the piece of shell in front of us as silver, a desire originates in us to take it and we proceed to take it. When we pick it up, we realize that it is a shell and not the silver. Here the activity is fruitless.

The difference between these two is that the first is invalid cognition of silver and the second is valid cognition of shell. The cognition of silver present in the observer – 'this white substance is silver' possesses two factors – the general one and particular one. Here the general one is the bright white substance, and the particular one is silverness. Here general factor is common in both.

There are four factors involved in any knowledge situation: (1) the subject who knows (pramāta), (2) the object of knowledge (prameya), (3) the means of valid knowledge (pramāṇa) and (4) the resultant of valid knowledge (pramā).[4]

As early stated viz. perception (pratyakṣa), inference (anumāna), comparison (upamāna) and verbal testimony (śabda) are the four means of valid knowledge accepted by the Naiyāyikas.

Perception

The definition of perception is given first because without perception no other means of valid knowledge is possible. Perception is the foundation of all cognition. It is the most important and ultimate test for the source of valid knowledge and it is the surest and superior to all of them. Perception is admitted by all philosophical schools to be the most basic source of knowledge. The classical definition of perception given by Gautama is 'perception is the knowledge which is produced from the sense object contact and which is not due to words, invariably related to the object and well defined'.[5]

Gautamas definition is accepted by all the later logicians and they interpreted the perception by the way of Gautama. Bhāsarvajña defines valid perception as correct immediate experience.[6] This is reflected in Varadarāja's definition which is 'pervaded by immediacy and validity'.[7] But immediacy (aparokṣa) and validity should be gained if it is comprehended directly by the sense organs. The attractiveness in these definitions is that they reflect the primary experience as the criterion for truth.

Perception is produced by the intercourse of a present object with the external sense organs with which the mind connected with the soul is joined. The sense organs are directed by the mind which is directed by the self. The self and conjunction of the mind with the self are the general causes of perception. The contact of sense organs with their respective objects is the special cause of perception. Perception is the immediate knowledge of a present object.

There are two kinds of perception viz. indeterminate (nirvikalpaka) and determinate (savikalpaka). Of these, the knowledge of a thing without any attribute is known as the indeterminate apprehension; such as, this is something. Attributive knowledge is determinative apprehension. Apprehensions like, he is Ḍittha, he is a Brāhmaṇa, he is black, he is a cook are examples of determinate apprehension.[8] The ancient Nyāya regards the indeterminate perception as the apprehension of an object as qualified by a substance, quality, action and genus, but devoid of a name, and the determinate perception as the apprehension of it as qualified by these qualifications but associated with a name. But the modern Nyāya regards the former as immediate, simple, non-relational apprehension of

an object and its generic nature as unrelated to each other, and the latter as mediate, relational, synthetic apprehension of an object and its generic nature as related to each other.

According to Gaṅgeśa the definition of perception is 'immediate knowledge which is not derived through the medium of any other knowledge'.[9] This definition is applicable to all kinds of perception and excludes other pramāṇas.

According to the earlier Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, perception depends upon the intercourse (sannikarṣa) of the sense organs with their objects. Sannikarṣa is of the function of the sense organs by means of which they enter into a particular relation with their appropriate objects and bring about the perception of the objects. This intercourse between the sense organs and their objects is of six kinds[10] so far as our ordinary perception is concerned viz.

(1) Union (samyoga)

(2) United inherence (samyuktasamavāya)

(3) United inherent inherence (samyuktasamavetasamavāya)

(4) Inherence (samavāya)

(5) Inherent inherence (samavetasamavāya)

(6) The relation of qualification and qualified (viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāva)

Union is the contact, producing perception of the substances by the sense organs. The united inherence with the conjoint is the contact in producing the perception of the attributes, action and genus inherent in substances, as attributes, etc. are inherently united with the substances which are in contact with the sense organs. United inherent inherence is the contact in producing the perception of the universal genus residing in attributes and action, as they are inherently united with the attributes etc. which reside in substances that are conjoint with the sense organ. Inherence is the contact in the perception of word by the organ of hearing, as the organ of hearing is the ether in the cavity of the ear in as much as sound is the quality of ether and the quality and the qualified are inherently united. Inherent inherence is the contact in cognizing soundness, as the genus soundness is inherently united with sound which is inherently united with the auditory sense. The connection of the qualifier and the qualified is the contact in the perception of negation, as in the cognition: this spot

of earth is with the negation of Jar. Here, the negation of a jar is an attribute of a place in contact with the eye.

In addition to the above six kinds of intercourse, which are called ordinary intercourse (laukikasannikarṣa), the Navya Naiyāyikas recognize three kinds of extraordinary intercourse (alaukikasannikarṣa) viz. sāmānyalakṣaṇa, jñānalakṣaṇa and yogaja.[11] Ordinary sensuous perception depends upon one of the six kinds of ordinary intercourse between an external or internal sense organ and its object. But super sensuous perception is not produced by any of these six kinds of ordinary intercourse. It is produced by an extraordinary intercourse.

We perceive a smoke, through ordinary intercourse. But when we perceive a smoke, we perceive all smokes through the perception of its generic character due to sāmānyalakṣaṇa-sannikarṣa. All individual smokes are not perceived through the sense organs, but they are indirectly perceived through the knowledge of their generic character. jñānalakṣaṇa-sannikarṣa is the extraordinary intercourse through the knowledge of an object revived from a past perception of it. Visual perception of a fragrant sandal is due to the intercourse of the visual

organ with the sandal and the recollection of its fragrance perceived in the past through the olfactory organ owing to association. The idea of fragrance revived in memory brings about the acquired visual perception of fragrant sandal.

Yogic perception is produced by an extraordinary contact brought about by meditation. There are two kind of yogic perception – yukta and yuñjāna.[12] The former is the intuition without effort of a yogin, who perceives all things ever. The latter is the intuition of a yogin who puts forth effort of will to perceive all objects.

Inference

The concept of inference is the central doctrine in the Nyāya system especially in Navya Nyāya. It is the second pramāṇa in Gautama's list. The term 'anumāna' means literally after-knowledge, that is, knowledge that follows other knowledge. Inferential knowledge thus is a knowledge that results through the instrumentation of some other knowledge (jñānakaraṇaka-jñānam). Anumāna is the most important method of knowledge in Nyāya system. Its nature, form and content have been

discussed by all schools except Cārvāka. The basic documents for all this discussion was the Nyāya theory of inference.

Inference is knowledge which is preceded by perception, and is of three kinds, viz. 'a priori', 'a posteriori' and commonly seen.[13]

Gautama defines inference as 'Atha tatpūrvakam trividhamanumānam, pūrvavat, śeṣavat, sāmānyato dṛṣṭam ca'.[14] Vātsyāyana interprets the word 'tat' as perception and explains the word 'tatpūrvakam' as the perception of the relation between the proban (hetu) and the probandum (liṅgaliṅginoḥ sambandhadarśanam) as well as the perception of proban (liṅgadarśanam). The proban or liṅga means the 'real reason' (hetu) as actually employed in the inferential process. The probandum or liṅgi is the object actually inferred through the proban. Wherever there is the proban there is the probandum. The proban is the pervaded (vyāpya) and the probandum is its pervader (vyāpaka). Therefore, the relation between the proban and the probandum is the relation of 'the pervaded and the pervader' (vyāpyavyāpakabhāva) i.e. called vyāpti. The perception of the relation between the proban and the probandum is understood by previous perceptions.

The typical example is the inference of fire from smoke. When one sees smoke on the mountain and recollects the invariable concomitance between smoke and fire since he had seen it jointly in many places like kitchen and he confirms that the smoke which he is seeing in the locus is also such a smoke (parāmarśa) and finally infers that there is fire (anumiti).

Vātsyāyana interprets each of the three kinds of inference into two ways.

(1) Pūrvavat inference – It is the inference of an unperceived effect from a perceived cause. E.g. when we see the clouds we infer the future rain. Here we perceive the antecedent and infer the consequent.

(2) Śeṣavat inference – It is the inference of an unperceived cause from a perceived effect. E.g. In the perception of a river in floods, we infer that it should have rained in some part of the country drained by the river.

(3) A sāmānyatodṛṣṭa inference. It is the inference of an imperceptible object from a perceived mark, which is known to be

uniformly related to it. The movement of the sun is inferred from its different positions in the sky, which are perceived, even as the movement of a person is inferred from his different positions on earth.[15]

The other interpretation of Vātsyāyana:

The Pūrvavat inference is that in which, out of two things perceived on some former occasion, the one that is not perceived at the time of inference, is inferred from the perception of the other, e.g. when fire is inferred from smoke.

A śeṣavat inference is inference by elimination. Sound is not a substance because it is inhered in one substance, viz. ether. It is not an action, since it is a cause of another sound. It is not a community, a particularity or inherence. So it is a quality.

Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa inference - When the relation between the proban and the probandum being imperceptible, the probandum is known from a proban having the same nature with any other object, e.g. self from desire etc. Desire etc. are qualities. Qualities reside in substances. Earth etc. are not the substratum of the qualities like desire etc. therefore that which is the substratum of these is the self.

Uddyotakara's interpretations:

(1) Anvayī – when that which subsists in the subject of the inference and in the objects which are homogeneous, and which is absent from the objects which are heterogeneous, we have the positive inference. For example, the reasoning of the philosopher who regards all things to be non-eternal. 'Sound is non-eternal because it is a product'.

Vyatirekī – when that which subsists in the subject of the inference in the case of which there is no object of heterogeneous class, and which does not subsist in the subject when the probandum is absent, we have the negative inference. An example of this type of inference is 'the living body is not soulless because it would be lifeless'.

Anvayavyatirekī – when that which (i.e. hetu) subsists in the subject of the inference and the homogeneous objects, and does not subsist in the heterogeneous objects, we have the positive-cum-negative inference. E.g. sound is non-eternal because, though it has both the generic and specific character, it is perceived by the external organ of ordinary human beings, like the jar.[16]

(2) Pūrvavat – in the word 'Pūrvavat' 'pūrva' is related to the probandum; 'Pūrvavat' therefore means that which is concomitant with the probandum.

śeṣavat – in the word 'śeṣavat' the word 'śeṣa' stands for the objects which belong to the same class as the probandum. 'śeṣavat' therefore means that which is related to that class of objects.

Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa – The word 'sāmānyatodṛṣṭa ' means that which is related to objects which are not perceptible.

Inference is of two kinds: (1) inference for oneself (svārthānumāna) and (2) inference for others (parārthānumāna). By the svārthānumāna person gets convinced in his own mind. For example, after ascertaining vyāpti between smoke and fire in the kitchen, one happens to go near a mountain and sees an unbroken line of smoke from the mountain, reaching the sky. Then he doubts 'whether there is fire on the mountain' and immediately he recollects the vyāpti. Here the sight of the smoke is the reason or hetu to infer the fire. Finally he concludes in his mind that as there is smoke, then the hill is possessing fire also i.e. mountain is fiery.[17]

The parārthānumāna is intended for convincing others. It is a demonstrative inference which consists of five members called syllogism. The five members of syllogism are pratijñā, hetu, udāharaṇa, upanaya and nigamana.[18]

The proposition of pratijñā is the thesis to be established which makes a statement. The reason states the reason for the statement. The exemplification is the universal proposition which shows the invariable concomitance between the reason and the inferable predicate supported by an example. The upanaya is the application of the universal proposition to a particular instance. The nigamana is the conclusion drawn from the preceding members.

(1) The hill is fiery (pratijñā)

(2) Because it is smoky (hetu)

(3) Whatever is smoky is fiery, for example, a kitchen (udāharaṇa)

(4) The hill has smoke which is invariably accompanied by fire (upanaya)

(5) The hill is fiery (nigamana)[19]

Inference is mediate knowledge, while perception is immediate knowledge. Perception apprehends present and near objects, while inference apprehends past, future and remote objects as well as present and near objects.

Comparison

The third pramāṇa recognized by Gautama is upamāna or comparison. According to him, comparison is 'the means of proving that which is to be proved from a well-known similarity'.[20] Two factors are involved in comparison, first the knowledge of similarity of the object to the well known object, second is the perception of the similarity in the object to be known. The usual example is 'as the cow so the gavaya'

A townsman does not know what gavaya (a wild cow) means. He learns from a forester that gavaya is an animal similar to the cow. Then the townsman goes to the forest and sees an animal which is cow-like. He recalls the information regarding this animal he had received from the forester. And, he now knows that this is the animal called gavaya. Here, the knowledge of similarity between the two animals is the pramāṇa : the resultant knowledge is the signification of the word gavaya.

Comparison is neither perception, nor inference, nor a verbal testimony. A wild cow and its similarity with a cow are perceived. But that which bears the name 'gavaya' is not perceived. Comparison is not inference. Since there is no knowledge of invariable concomitance between a name and an object in it. Nor is it verbal testimony, since the knowledge of the verbal statement of the forester is testimony which cannot yield the knowledge 'this animal bears the name 'gavaya' before it is perceived'. The perception of similarity with or without the knowledge of the verbal statement is not comparison. Nor is testimony without the perception of similarity comparison. It is an independent means of valid knowledge.

Verbal Testimony

The fourth source of valid knowledge in Nyāya system is verbal testimony. Gautama defines testimony as the instruction of a trustworthy person.[71] A trustworthy person is the speaker who has the direct knowledge of an object and is motivated by the desire of communicating the object as directly known by him. According to Vātsyāyana an āpta is one who employs direct knowledge of an object and this definition is

equally applicable to the ṛṣi, noble and barbarians (mleccha – a person without Vedic practices)[22]

A person is trustworthy if he knows the truth and conveys it correctly. The value of śabda as a means of valid knowledge depends on the excellence of its source the trustworthiness and competence of the speaker. The mere listening to words is not enough for the knowledge of what they signify; one must understand the meanings of words. Every word has a capacity for signifying a certain meaning. This capacity is determined, according to the Naiyāyika, by God's will.[23] It is God that wills 'from this word, this meaning should be known'. Thus when we hear the words uttered by a trustworthy person and when we grasp the meaning conveyed by the capacity of those words, we have valid knowledge through testimony.

Testimony is of two kinds, testimony about perceptible things and imperceptible things.[24] The modern Naiyāyikas divided testimony into two kinds: Vedic and Secular. The texts of Veda are all statements of God, and therefore their testimony is infallible. The Secular testimony of trustworthy persons only is valid.

Śābdabodha

Communication is possible through the medium of language. Ideas can be expressed in various ways but for human beings, language or speech is the most efficient mode of communication and these two are referred to as 'śabda'. Śabda helps us to communicate the most complicated and subtlest thoughts, concept and ideas. When an appropriate śabda is used by speaker to communicate ideas, the hearer hears the sound and receives the idea. On hearing a śabda, i.e. speech having meaningful constituents the knowledge that is produced in the hearer is referred to as śābdabodha. When a person hears an explosion, various thoughts regarding its cause or the consequence of the event rushes to his mind. Śābdabodha is directly conveyed message of śabdas or words of any language.

Śābdabodha has a prominent place in the traditional Sanskrit lore. This is due to the scientific analysis of language by great grammarians, logicians and Mīmāmsakas. Those who have excelled in this field are the logicians, who are called Tārkikas or Naiyāyikas. The others merely follow them. Following an example for śābdabodha.

Dravya-guṇa-karma-sāmānya-viśeṣa-samavāya-abhāvaḥ sapta padārthaḥ.

The literal meaning of this sentence is that substance, quality, action, generality, specialty, inherent relation and absence are seven categories. However, when the śābdabodha has to be stated, the exact meaning of each expression and its relation with the other constituents of the sentence will have to be specified. It is stated as follows:-

'द्रव्येत्यादेः लक्षणया द्रव्यत्वाद्यन्यतमवन्तः इत्यर्थः। तेषामभेदसम्बन्धेन पदार्थेष्वन्वयः सप्तपदस्य लक्षणया सप्तविभाजकोपाध्यन्यतमवन्त इत्यर्थः। तेषामभेदसम्बन्धेन पदार्थेष्वन्वयः। तथा च द्रव्यत्वाद्यन्यतमवदभिन्नाः सप्तविभाजकोपाध्यन्यतमवदभिन्नाः पदार्थाः।'

Here the word dravya is taken to mean dravyatvavat. Since the word dravyaguṇa.....etc., is a dvandva compound, each of the terms, (or their meanings) has equal importance. Hence, the meaning of the compound is taken to be dravyatvādyanyatamavantaḥ. When two nouns are used in opposition, their relation has to be abheda (identify) according to the dictum –'नामार्थयोरभेदसम्बन्धेनान्वयः'

THE OBJECTS OF RIGHT KNOWLEDGE - PRAMEYA

The soul (ātman), body (śarīra), senses (indriya), objects of senses (artha), intellect (buddhi), mind (manas), activity (pravṛtti), defect (doṣa), transmigration (pretyabhāva), fruit (phala), pain (duḥkha) and emancipation (apavarga) are the objects of right knowledge.[25]

The soul (Ātman)

Soul is the first object of cognition in Gautama's list of prameya. According to Gautama, the marks or characteristic of the soul are: desire, aversion, volition, pleasure, pain and cognition.[26] Desire, etc. are the signs which proves the existence of soul. Vātsyāyana says that the soul is the seer, experiencer, knower and indicator of every thing.[27]

The soul is the substratum of knowledge. It is of two-fold: the supreme soul and the individual soul. Of these the supreme soul is omnipotent and omniscient and one only. The individual soul is different in each body, is all-pervading and eternal.[28]

The soul is an eternal entity which is from time to time connected with a body suitable to its desert. The connection of the soul with a body is its birth, while their mutual separation is its death.

According to Gautama, self is different from the sense-organs, because we can apprehend an object through both sight and touch.[29] The explanation of Vātsyāyana is that everybody has the comprehension that we touch the jar which had been previously seen. Such cognition will be impossible if the cogniser is not different from the eye which cannot touch. In other words the cogniser or soul is distinct from senses.

The soul is different from mind. The mind cannot be the agent as it is atomic in nature. An atomic agent cannot perform such diverse acts as seeing, hearing, knowing, feeling, etc. The soul is a non-composite, partless, pervasive and eternal substance. There is an infinite number of souls.

Nyāya arguments for the existence of the soul are similar to the Vaiśeṣika's view. They like Vaiśeṣika believes in teleological creation. That is the material cause of this universe are the eternal atoms of earth, water, fire and air and its efficient cause is God. They too believe in the presence of an unseen power that impart motion to an atom. The individual soul is regarded by them as the substratum of the quality of consciousness which is not its essence but only an accidental property.

Thus the soul is a real knower, a real enjoyer, a real active agent and an eternal substance. While describing the soul they too have touched the ideas of liberation and bondage.

The body (Śarīra)

Body is the second object of cognition. Gautama defines it as the site of gestures, senses and sentiments.[30] Body is the sight of gestures in as much as it strives to reach what is desirable and to avoid what is hateful. It is also the site of senses for the latter act well, or ill, according to the former is in good or bad order. Sentiments which comprise pleasure and pain are also located in the body which experiences them.[31]

Our body is earthy because of it possesses the special quality of earth. In other worlds there are beings whose bodies are watery, fiery, airy and ethereal. Though our body is composed of all the five elements we call it earthy owing to the preponderance of earth in it.

Senses (Indriya)

The sense organs are five in number, viz. nose, tongue, eye, skin and ear. They are the products of five elements such as earth, water fire, air and ether respectively.[32]

Some say that the senses are not many as all of them are dependent on touch. The eye, ear, nose and tongue are said to be mere modifications of skin which pervades them, that is there is only one sense, viz. skin, all other being merely its forms.

Gautama rejects this argument. If there had been only one sense, viz. skin then it could have seen colour, heard sound and so on. But a blind man possessing the sense of touch cannot see colour. Hence it is concluded that senses are many.

Objects of senses (Artha)

Odour, taste, colour, touch, and sound which are qualities of the earth etc are the objects of senses.[33] Smell which is the remarkable quality of earth is the object of the nose, taste, the remarkable quality water is the object of the tongue, colour, the remarkable quality of light is the object of eye, touch, the remarkable quality of air is the object of the skin and sound the particular quality of ether is the object the ear.

Intellect (Buddhi)

Intellect is the same as apprehension or knowledge; these three are not different things.[34] According to Sāṃkhya the intellect is eternal

because it possesses the capacity of recognizing objects. Such a cognition is possible only for an eternal object. But the Naiyāyikas reject the argument and asserts that the intellect does not recognize objects, but it is the soul that does so. Knowledge cannot be attributed to an unconscious instrument, the intellect, but it must be admitted to be a quality of conscious agent the soul. Hence the intellect is not permanent.

Mind (Manas)

Mind is the sixth object of cognition. It is eternal and atomic in nature. It is innumerable, each soul has a mind. It is the internal organ. When the mind becomes one with the sense organs it gets knowledge. If the mind had been possessed of magnitude, it could have come in contact with many senses at a time so that many cognitions could have taken place simultaneously. Since this has been found to be impossible we come to the conclusion that the mind is atomic in nature.[35]

Activity (pravṛtti)

The seventh object of cognition, activity is defined by Gautama as that which makes to voice, mind and body begin their action.[36] According to Vātsyāyana the activity mentioned by Gautama means the

results of activity in the form of merit and demerit. Activity is good when it leads to merit; it is bad when it leads to demerit. Activity under the influence of defects, leads to deeds pertaining the body, speech and the mind. These deeds are good or bad.

Bad deeds

a. Body: killing

b. speech: lying, rude talking, incoherent bubbling.

c. mind: malice, heresy (nāstikya), desire for things belonging to others.

Good deeds

a. Body: charity, protecting, service.

b. speech: telling the truth, saying what is beneficial, study (of the Veda).

c. mind: mercy, faith, entertaining no desire for things belonging to the other people.[37]

Defect (Doṣa)

Defect, the eighth object of cognition is intimately connected with the seventh object of cognition, namely; activity. Defects are those which cause activity.[38] The defects can be divided into three groups, as all of

them are included under attachment, aversion and misconception.[39] Vātsyāyana lists the following defects under each group.

a. attachment: lust, jealousy, avarice, avidity and covetousness.

b. aversion: anger, envy, malice hatred and resentment.

c. misconception: wrong apprehension, suspicion, pride and negligence.[40]

State after death - Transmigration (pretyabhāva)

According to Gautama, the ninth object, state after death means rebirth.[41] It is a series of births and deaths. Birth is the connection of the soul with a body which includes the sense organs, mind, intellect and sentients. Death is the soul's separation from them. Transmigration belongs to the soul and not to the body. The series of births and deaths are possible only if the soul is eternal.[42]

Transmigration of the soul is a corollary of the law of karma. Merits and demerits produced by right and wrong actions determine the kinds of birth. The excessive merits transport the souls to heaven, and make them celestial beings. Excessive demerits make them assume the bodies

of beasts, birds and insects. Well balanced merits and demerits make them transmigrate into human bodies. The souls are eternal.[43]

According to Uddyotakara the process of samsāra is an unceasing causal operation among pain, birth, activity, defects and wrong apprehension. This process is without beginning. It has no definite order of sequence, because we cannot say which comes first and which next.

If pain came first, it would not be right, for without birth there can be no pain. If birth came first, this would not be right. For there is no birth without merit and demerit. If merit and demerit came first, this would be wrong; for these are not possible without attachment and aversion. If attachment and aversion came first, this would be wrong; for without wrong apprehension they can never appear. If wrong apprehension came first, this would not be right; for without the psycho-somatic equipment there can be no wrong apprehension. Thus there is no order of sequence in this entire process.[44]

Fruit (phala)

The tenth object of cognition, fruit is the thing produced by activity and defects.[45] It is the enjoyment of pleasure or suffering of pain. Activity

leads to pleasure and pain. According to Gautama there is no doubt regarding the fruit because it appears immediately as well as after a long interval.

Pain (Duḥkha)

The eleventh object of cognition, pain is the characteristic of distress.[46] The worldly life is full of pain. Birth is pain because it consists of our connection with the body, the senses and the intellect which bring us various distresses. When a person realizes that every form of life is beset with distress he is confirmed in his belief that pleasure and the means obtaining it, such as the body, the sense organs, cognitions, deserve to regarded as pain.

Emancipation (Apavarga)

Emancipation is the twelfth and the last object of cognition in Gautamas list. Gautama defines it as the absolute deliverance from pain.[47] Mokṣa or final emancipation from the earthly bondage of man is the main purpose of every systems of philosophy in India. Gautama the propounder of Nyāya Philosophy also declares liberation as the ultimate

goal realized from the real knowledge of the sixteen categories of the *Nyāyasūtra*.[48]

The opponent's question is that whether the correct knowledge of the sixteen categories mentioned by Gautama directly leads to liberation. Now Vātsyāyana explains that Gautama intended that only the knowledge of prameya directly leads mokṣa. The knowledge of other categories are greatly helpful for the knowledge of prameyas. In short the knowledge of only prameya is the direct cause of liberation and the knowledge of other categories are an indirect cause of liberations.

According to Uddyotakara there are two forms of liberation, viz. mediate (para) and immediate (apara). Immediate liberation is also called jīvanmukti or liberation during life time. It is the result that occurs immediately after attaining real knowledge or tattvajñāna.

The body, the sense organs and the mind are the causes of pain. At the time of dissolution, the soul becomes free from pain. Liberation is the state of free from pleasure and pain. Apavarga is the complete extinction of the special qualities of the soul, viz. cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition, merit, demerit and impression.

Gautama gives a sequential order to the attainment of liberation, i.e. 'दुःखजन्मप्रवृत्तिदोषमिथ्याज्ञानानामुत्तरोत्तरापाये तदनन्तरापायादपवर्गः'[49]

The origin of true knowledge removes the false knowledge. With the removal of false knowledge desire, aversion, etc. are destroyed and with the removal of desire and aversion activities are removed. Here activity is used in the sense of Dharma and Adharma. By the removal of activity the occurrence of birth is removed and by the removal of birth all sorrows are removed. This removal of all sorrows for ever is mokṣa or emancipation. The soul has no consciousness in the state of liberation. It is free from the chain of death and birth.

The practice of yoga, austerities, the performance of duties and abstention from sins are subsidiary to the acquisition. Release can be achieved by intuition of the self. It destroys false knowledge with its potencies and stops rebirth.

The Vedas have devised a scheme of values called puruṣārthas which are necessary for all-round fulfillment. Human birth is of great significance and it marks a turning point in the long process of transmigration that a soul undergoes. While the fourth puruṣārtha mokṣa

is the goal to be realized, the other three, viz. Dharma (righteousness), artha (material aspirations), and kāma (desires) represent the values that are important in day-to-day life.

Nyāya doctrine of liberation is based on the concept of abhāva. There is no positive pleasure in the state of mokṣa, annihilation of all kinds of pleasure and pain.

Nature of god.

Nyāya accepts the metaphysics of the Vaiśeṣika school. The categories, the doctrine of asatkāryavāda, the account of creation and destruction, the nature of atoms and soul, the account of bondage and liberation, the authorship of Veda, the nature and function of God the unseen power- all are accepted by Nyāya.

Gautama himself gave a casual idea about God in his ***Nyāyasūtra***. He devotes three short sutras to the view that God is the cause of the world. These sutras are ईश्वरः कारणम् - पुरुषकर्माफल्यदर्शनात्। न पुरुषकर्माभावे फनानिष्पत्तेः। तत्कारितत्वादहेतुः।[50] These sūtras were the starting point of the theism in Nyāya philosophy. It is not proposed that God produces the world without the help of unseen power which is the fruit of the actions

of individual souls. Actually God blesses of directs which merits of individuals.

Vātsyāyana describes God as a special Soul and thus incorporates theism in to the system, God as a distinct Soul is endowed with certain qualities as a being of the same kind as Soul. He cannot be put under any other category.[51] Nyāya accepts the Vedas and deduces their authority from the trust-worthiness of the reliable exposition. This trust worthiness is due the trustworthiness of the reliable expositor who must have as his qualifications. 1. Superior knowledge, 2. compassion, 3. the desire to describe things as they are. From the trustworthiness of one part of the Vedas dealing with visible things, we infer that those parts which deal with visible things are also trustworthy. Finally dealing with the Mīmāmsaka objection, Vātsyāyana says that all that can be meant by eternal Vedas is 'continuity of tradition' and 'activity according to them through out the ages'. Throughout the long discussion God is not even mentioned.

Vācaspati is the first Naiyāyika who tells us explicitly that the merciful maker of the universe has revealed the Vedas for the benefit of

living beings, and that they are therefore authoritative. But even he does not use the word Īśvara in his exposition. Vācaspati enumerates four epithets proper to the maker of the world 1. capable of making the body, 2. knowing the nature of all things, 3. untouched by hindrance, karma, fruition of karma and impressions and 4. most merciful.[52]

Udayana's argument for the existence of God have become classical for theism and can be summarized as-

1. The world is an effect and hence it must have an efficient cause. This intelligent agent is God. The Order, design, co-ordination between different phenomena comes from God.
2. The atoms being essentially inactive cannot form the different combinations unless God gives motion to them. The unseen power, the Adṛṣṭa, requires the intelligence of God. Without God it cannot supply motion to the atoms.
3. The world is sustained by God's will. Unintelligent adṛṣṭa cannot do this. And the world is destroyed by God's will.
4. A word has a meaning and signifies an object. The power of words to signify their objects comes from the God.
5. God is the author of the infallible Veda.

6. The Veda testifies to the existence of God.

7. The Vedic sentences deal with moral injunctions and prohibitions. The Vedic commands are the Divine Commands. God is the creator and promulgator of the moral laws.

8. According to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika the magnitude of a dyad is not produced by the infinitesimal magnitude of the two atoms each, but by the number of the two atoms. Number 'one' is directly perceived, but other numbers are conceptual creations. Numerical conception is related to the mind of the perceiver. At the time of creation, the Souls are unconscious. And the atoms and the unseen power and space, time, minds are all unconscious. Hence the numerical conception depends upon the divine consciousness. So God must exist.

9. We reap the fruits of our own actions. Merit and demerit accrue from our actions and the stock of merit and demerit is called adṛṣṭa the unseen power. But this unseen power, being unintelligent, needs theguidance of a supremely intelligent God.[53]

The Navya Naiyāyika is very much theistic in his outlook. The entire machinery of the Navya Nyāya dialectic is directed towards the

establishment of God as the supreme reality. An atheist does not believe in the existence of God, but simply by this, God does not became non-existent for a believer orthodox. If a blind cannot see the light of sun this is not the fault of sun. it is the visionary defect of eye.

Theory of Causation

The Nyāya theory of Causation defines a cause as an unconditional and invariable antecedent of an effect and an effect is defined as an unconditional and invariable consequent of a cause. The effect cannot exist separately from its material cause, though the cause can exist independently of its effect. According to Annaṃbhaṭṭa, a cause co-exist with the prior-non-existence of its effect and so it must be its antecedent.[54]

The first essential character of a cause is its antecedence i.e. it should precede the effect (pūrvavṛtti). The second essential factor is its invariability; that it must invariably precede the effect (niyatapūrvavṛtti). The third is its unconditionality or necessity that it must unconditionally precede the effect (ananyathāsiddha).

There are three kinds of causes - samavāyi, asamavāyi and nimitta.[55] Samavāyikāraṇa or the inherent cause or upādānakāraṇa or the material cause is the substance out of which the effect is produced. Asamavāyi or the non-inherent cause inheres in the material cause and helps the production of the effect. The third kind of cause is nimitta or efficient. It is the power which helps the material cause to produce the effect. The efficient cause may be a substance, a quality or an action. The modern Nyāya regards this efficient cause as the real instrumental cause. The Nyāya theory describes an effect as the 'counter-entity' of its own prior non-existence (prāgabhāvapratiyogi). It supports asatkāryavāda or ārambhavāda by saying that the effect did not pre-exist in its cause it is a fresh creation, brought into existence by the operation of cause.

The law of Karma

All schools of Indian philosophy except Cārvāka, believe in the law of Karma. A right action produces a good consequence. A wrong action produces a bad consequence. Performance of duty produces a merit (puṇya) in the Soul. Violation of a duty produces a demerit (pāpa)

in it. Merit produces happiness and demerit produces misery. There is no escape from the consequences of actions. Their fruits must be reaped in the present life or in a future life.

Samsāra

Samsāra is a beginningless series of births and deaths. It is bondage to embodied life in the spatio-temporal world. It is imprisonment of the eternal pure spirit in a destructible impure body. It is due to ignorance. Attachment, aversion and delusion are faults which are the springs of action. They are due to false knowledge of painful and transitory objects as pleasant and eternal. So bondage is due to false knowledge. The Nyāya describes the cause of bondage thus: pain is due to birth; birth is due to action; actions are due to faults; false are due to false knowledge.[56]

Other categories

Doubt (Samśaya)

Doubt is the third category in Gautama's list. The definition of doubt is that which is a conflicting judgment about the precise character of an object, arises from the recognition of properties common to many objects, or of properties not common to any of the objects, from conflicting testimony, and from irregularity of perception and non-perception.[57]

According to Vātsyāyana doubt is really included under the prameya. However, it has been given independent status because it is the basis of all reasoning.

Doubt is of five kinds -

1. Recognition of common properties - e.g. seeing in the twilight a tall object we cannot decide whether it is a man or a post, for the property of tallness belongs to both.

2. Recognition of properties not common - e.g. hearing a sound, one questions whether it is eternal or not, for the property of soundness abides neither in man, beast, etc., that are non-eternal, nor in atoms which are eternal.

3. Conflicting testimony - e.g. merely by study one cannot decide whether the soul exists, for one system of philosophy affirms that it does, while another system states that it does not.

4. Irregularity of perception - e.g. we perceive water in the tank where it really exist, but water appears also to exist in a mirage where is really does not exist. A question arises, whether water is perceived only when it actually exists or even when it does not exist.

5. Irregularity of non-perception - e.g. we neither perceive water in the radish where it really exist, nor on dry land where it does not exist. A question arises, whether water is not perceived only when it does not exist or also when it does exist.[58]

According to Uddyotakara doubt is not of five kinds but only of three kinds. He does not accept the fourth and fifth kinds of doubt.

Purpose (prayojana)

Purpose, which is the fourth category, is defined by Gautama as 'that which operates with reference to an object'.[59] The purpose inspires all living beings in their actions and their pursuits of learning; it is the basis of all Nyāya, i.e. the investigation of things by means of pramāṇas.

Example (Dṛṣṭānta)

Example is the fifth category in Gautama's list. The definition of example is that 'an example is the thing about which an ordinary man and an expert entertain the same opinion'.[60] With regard the general proposition 'wherever there is smoke there is fire, the example is a kitchen in which fire and smoke abide together, to the satisfaction of an ordinary man as well as an acute investigator.

An established tenet (Siddhānta)

An established tenet is a dogma resting on the authority of a certain school, hypothesis or implication.[61] According to Gautama the tenet is four kinds owing to the distinction between 'a dogma of all the schools' (sarvatantra), 'a dogma peculiar to some school' (pratitantra), 'a hypothetical dogma' (adhikaraṇa) and 'an implied dogma' (abhyupagama).[62]

A dogma of all the schools is a tenet which is not opposed by any school and is claimed by at least one school.[63] The existence of five elements or five objects of senses is a tenet which is accepted by all the school.[64]

A dogma peculiar to some school is a tenet which is accepted by similar school, but rejected by opposite schools.[65] 'A thing cannot come into existence out of nothing' - this is a peculiar dogma of the Samkhyas.[66]

A hypothetical dogma is a tenet, which is accepted lead to the acceptance to another tenet.[67] 'There is a soul apart from the senses, because it can recognize one and the same object by seeing and touching'. If you accept this tenet you must also have accepted the following:-

1. That the senses are more than one, 2. that each of the senses has its particular object, 3. that the soul derives its knowledge through the channels of the senses and 4. that a substance which is distinct from its qualities is the abode of them etc.[68]

An implied dogma is a tenet which is not explicitly declared as such, but which follows from the examination of particulars concerning it,[69] e.g. the discussion whether sound is eternal or non-eternal presupposes that it is a substance.[70]

Members of syllogism (Avayava)

Avayava or member is the seventh category. Gautama does not give any definition of this category, but he has given the list of five members and defined each of them. The members are proposition, reason, example, application and conclusion.[71]

The proposition is the declaration of what is to be proved.[72]

The reason is the means of establishing the thing what is to be proved on the basis of similarity to (a) homogenous or (b) heterogenous example.[73]

An example is a familiar instance which, through its (a) homogeneity or (b) its heterogeneity to the probandum, has or has not the same quality as what is to be proved.[74]

The application is in the form of a resume of what is to be proved on the strength of the example: 'this is so' or 'this is not so'.[75]

The conclusion is the re-stating of the proposition with reference to the reason.[76]

According to Vātsyāyana, some of the Naiyāyikas add five members to those mentioned by Gautama. They are: (1) desire to know (jijñāsa), (2) doubt (samśaya), (3) efficacy (śakyaprāpti), (4) objective (prayojana), (5) removal of doubt (samśayavyudāsa).[77] But Vātsyāyana rejects these additional members.

Confutation (Tarka)

Confutation, which is carried on for ascertaining the real character of a thing that of which is not known, by reasoning which reveals the character by showing the absurdity of all contrary characters.[78]

In the Nyāya system the knowledge is of two types: definite knowledge and the knowledge in the form of doubt. The doubt of

deviation may arise in some cases from the doubt of an adventitious condition (upādhi) and sometimes from the knowledge of the common attributes (of hetu and sāddhya) like coexistence etc. along with the absence of the knowledge of specific characteristic features of them. That is, the absence of the knowledge of specific characteristic feature as well as the knowledge of common attributes (like coexistence etc.) give rise to the doubt of deviation. Such doubt can be removed by Tarka which counters the opposite standpoint.[79]

Ascertainment (Nirṇaya)

Ascertainment, which is the ninth category, is defined by Gautama as 'determination is an apprehension after deliberation over a view and a counter-view'.[80]

Vātsyāyana explains the category; Ascertainment and operates with reference to the object of disputation. It constitutes that knowledge of the true nature of a thing which is the fruit of pramāṇas; it is the culmination of all discussion which is conducted with the help of rejoinder and cavil. Disputation and ascertainment are the two categories involved in the conduct of all worldly business. And it is for this reason that

though ascertainment is really included under the category of the object of cognition (prameya), Gautama has given it an independent category status.[81]

Discourse (kathā)

The tenth, eleventh and twelfth categories in Gautamas list discussion (vāda), rejoinder (jalpa) and cavil (vitaṇḍa), are called discourse (kathā). The definition of them is as follows:

Discussion is the adoption of pakṣa and pratipakṣa, among these what is adopted is analyzed in the form of five members, and defended by the aid of any of the means of right knowledge, while its opposite is assailed by confutation, without deviation from the established tenets.

Rejoinder, which aims at gaining victory, is the defense or attack of a proposition in the manner aforesaid, by quibbles futilities, and other processes which deserve rebuke.[82]

Cavil is a kind of rejoinder, which consists in mere attacks on the opposite side.[83]

According to Vātsyāyana, these three categories are three kinds of discourse (kathā). Gautama has mentioned discussion as a separate

category in order to indicate its distinctive features: so that when discussion is conducted in accordance with these features, it leads to the ascertainment of the true nature of things. Rejoinder and cavil are mentioned separately because they protect the knowledge of the nature of things acquired through discussion.[84]

Hetvābhāsa - Fallacies of the reason

In Indian logic fallacy is called hetvābhāsa. The fallacies are faculty reasons. It means that the middle term appears to be a reason but it is not a valid reason. The Naiyāyikas recognize five kinds of fallacies: (1) savyabhicāra (inconclusive), (2) viruddha (contradictory), (3) prakaraṇasama (counterbalanced), (4) sādhyasama (unproved) and (5) kālātīta (mistimed)[85]

Savyabhicāra (inconclusive)

This is the fallacy of the irregular middle. Viśvanātha divides savyabhicāra into three kinds: 1. sādhāraṇa (common), 2. asādhāraṇa (uncommon) and anupasamhari (non-exclusive).[86]

Sādhāraṇa (common)

Here the middle term is too wide. It is present in both the sapakṣa (positive) and the vipakṣa (negative) instances and violates the rule that the middle term should not be present in the negative instances (vipakṣasatva); e.g. the hill is fiery because it is knowable. Here knowable is present in fiery as well as non-fiery objects.[87]

Asādhāraṇa (uncommon)

Here the middle term is too narrow. It is that which is found only in the subject while not being present in any similar and contrary instances; e.g. sound is eternal because of soundness. Here soundness belongs to sound only and is absent in all eternal and non-eternal things.[88]

Anupasamhari (non-exclusive)

Here the middle term is non-exclusive. It is that which has neither positive nor negative instances, as in the argument; e.g. everything is non-eternal because it is knowable. Here, since everything is treated as the subject no example is available to support the inference.[89]

Viruddha (contradictory reason)

It is the contradictory middle. The middle term, instead of being pervaded by the presence of the major term, is pervaded by the absence of the major term. Instead of proving the existence of the major term in the minor term, it proves its non-existence there in; e.g. sound is eternal because it is produced. Here, producibility is pervasive of non-eternality which is of the nature of the negation of eternality.[90]

Prakaraṇasama (counterbalanced reason)

The reason which is counterbalanced by another reason, and cannot resolve the controversy as to the real character of an object, is counterbalanced (prakaraṇasama). Two reasons of equal strength, proving the presence and the absence of the predicate in two arguments are counterbalanced by each other. Two inferences cannot be of equal strength, one proving the existence of the predicate, and the other proving its non-existence; e.g. sound is eternal, because it is audible, like soundness; and sound is non-eternal, because it is a product like a jar.[91]

Sādhyasama (unproved reason)

Gautama defines an unproved reason (sādhyasama) as one that requires to be proved like the predicate. But it should not be require any proof. Annambhaṭṭa call it unestablished reason (asiddha). It is of three kinds: āśrayāsiddha, svarūpāsiddha and vyāpyatvāsiddha.[92]

Āśrayāsiddha

The reason with non-existent substratum is found in the argument: e.g. 'sky-lotus' is fragrant because it is a lotus, like a lotus in a lake. In this argument, sky-lotus is the subject but it never exists.[93]

Svarūpāsiddha

Svarūpāsiddha is the absence of a reason in the subject; e.g. sound is a quality because it is visible; here visibility does not exist in sound, as in sound only audibility exists.[94]

Vyāpyātvāsiddha

Is the absence of invariable coexistence of a reason and the predicate in the same locus. The hill has a fire, because it has golden smoke. Goldenness does not exist in smoke. 'the hill has golden fire, because it has smoke'. Goldenness does not exist in a fire.[95]

Vyāpti is the unconditional uniform relation of the reason to the predicate. It is free from conditions (upādhi). Smoke has unconditional relation to fire; it is pervaded by fire; wherever there is smoke there is fire. But fire has no unconditional relation to smoke; there is fire where there is no smoke; for example, red hot iron ball is smokeless. The relation of fire to smoke is conditional; it depends upon the presence of wet fuel as a condition. 'The hill is smoky, because it is fiery'. Wet fuel is a condition which pervades the predicate, but does not pervade the reason.[96]

Kālātīta (mistimed reason)

According to Gautama the fallacy of the mistimed reason occurs when the reason is adduced at the time when it is not relevant.[97] E.g. sound is eternal because it is manifested by a conjunction to the drum and the stick, like colour. The colour that is manifested by the conjunction of light with the jar is one that was in existence before, as well as after, its manifestation: similarly, the sound also that is manifested by the conjunction of the drum and the stick, or by the conjunction of the wood and the axe, is one that is in existence before and after its manifestation;

so that, being manifested by conjunction, sound must be regarded as eternal.

Vātsyāyana says that this is not correct hetu, because when adduced, it is mistimed. At the time of the manifestation of sound the hetu is not existed. In the case of colour, the time at which the manifesting conjunction appears does not go beyond the time at which the manifested colour exists: for it is only during the time at which the conjunction of the light and the jar is present that the colour is perceived; but the colour is not perceived when the conjunction has ceased to exist.

Quibble (chala)

The fourteenth category quibble (chala) is defined by Gautama as 'opposition to a statement based on the assumption of an alternative meaning'.[98] According to Gautama there are three kinds of quibble: quibble concerning a word, quibble concerning a universal and quibble concerning a metaphor.[99]

Legitimate objection (jāti)

Legitimate objection is the fifteenth category. Gautama's definition of jāti is that opposition which is based on mere similarity or dissimilarity.[100]

A disputant says: 'the soul is inactive because it is all pervading as ether'.

His opponent replies: 'if the soul is inactive because it bears similarity to ether as being all pervading, why is not active because it bears similarity to a pot as being a seat of union'?

The reason of the opponent is futile, because it bears only a far-fetched analogy to that of the disputant.

Deficiency (nigrahasthāna)

The last and sixteenth category of *Nyāyasūtra* is deficiency. According to Gautama, deficiency consists in misapprehension and non apprehension.[101] Gautama divides deficiency into twenty two kinds. Those are:-

1. Hurting the proposition, (प्रतिज्ञाहानिः) 2. shifting the proposition (प्रतिज्ञान्तरं), 3. opposing the proposition (प्रतिज्ञाविरोधः), 4. renouncing the

proposition (प्रतिज्ञासंन्यासः), 5. shifting the reason (हेत्वन्तरं), 6. shifting the topic (अर्थान्तरं), 7. the meaningless (निरर्थकं), 8. the unintelligible (अविज्ञातार्थं), 9. the incoherent (अपार्थकं), 10. the inopportune (अप्राप्तकालं), 11. saying too little (न्यूनं), 12. saying too much (अधिकं), 13. repetition (पुनरुक्तं), 14. silence (अननुभाषणं), 15. ignorance (अज्ञानं), 16. non-ingenuity (अप्रतिभा), 17. evasion (विक्षेपः), 18. admission of an opinion (मतानुज्ञा), 19. overlooking the censurable (पर्यनुयोज्योपेक्षणं), 20. censuring the non-censurable (निरनुयोज्यानुयोगः), 21. deviating from a tenet (अपसिद्धान्तः), and 22. the semblance of a reason (हेत्वाभासः).[102]

Among the sixteen categories of *Nyāyasūtra*, the pramāṇa occupies the first and foremost position. It is the lamp of all sciences because it manifests or makes known things. Except pramāṇa and prameya, all the remaining fourteen categories appear merely various headings of chapters in a treatise of logic. These are the sixteen topics which one may study in order to master the details of Nyāya dialectics.

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   षट्कं पौराणिकास्त्वष्टकमभिदधिरे संभवैतिह्ययोगात्।।
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79. ज्ञानं निश्चयः संशयः च। स च क्वचिदुपाधिसन्देहात् क्वचित् विशेषदर्शनसहितसाधारणधर्मदर्शनात्। यद्विरहश्च क्वचित् विपक्षाबाधकतर्कात्। *Tattvacintamani, (vyaptigrahopaya).*

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81. निर्णयः - तत्त्वज्ञानं प्रमाणानां फलं तदवसानो वादस्तस्य पालनार्थं जल्पवितण्डे। तावेतौ तर्कनिर्णयौ लोकयात्रां वहत इति।सोऽयं निर्णयः प्रमेयान्तर्भूत एवमर्थं पृथगुद्दिष्ट इति। *N. Bh.*, I.I.1.

82. यथोक्तोपपन्नश्छलजातिनिग्रहस्थानसाधनोपालम्भो जल्पः। *N. S.*, I.2.2.

83. स प्रतिपक्षस्थापनाहीनो वितण्डा। *N. S.*, I.2.3.

84. *N. Bh.*, I.I.1.

85. सव्यभिचार-विरुद्ध-प्रकरणसम-साध्यसम-कालातीता हेत्वाभासाः।*N. S.*, I.2.4.

86. *N. S. M.*, pp. 263-264.

87. *T. S.*, p. 35.

88. *T. S.*, p. 36.

89. ibid.

90. *N. Bh.*, I.2.6.

91. *N. Bh.*, I.2.7.

92. *T. S.*, p. 37.

93. ibid.

94. *T.S.* p.38.

95. *N. Bh.* I.2.49. *S. M.*, pp. 338-339.

96. *N. K. S.,* III. p. 30.

97. कालात्ययापदिष्टः कालातीतः। *N. S.,* I.2.9.

98. वचनविघातोऽर्थविकल्पोपपत्या छलम्। *N. S.,* I.2.10.

99. तत् त्रिविधम् - वाग्छलं सामान्यच्छलमुपचारच्छलं चेति। *N. S.,* I.II.11.

100. साधर्म्यवैधर्म्याभ्यां प्रत्यवस्थानं जातिः। *N. S.,* I.I.18.

101. विप्रतिपत्तिरप्रतिपत्तिश्च निग्रहस्थानम्। *N. S.,* I.2.19.

102. *N. S.,* 5.2.1.

CHAPTER IV

PRAKARAṆA WORKS
TARKASAṂGRAHA – A PRAKARAṆA WORK

The decline of Buddhism began in Deccan in the seventh century A.D. and by 1200 A.D. almost every Buddhist were wiped off from North India. The Brāhmaṇas took advantage of this situation and made efforts to revert back their members from Buddhism and to establish a secure society. New admissions to the society was also prevented. Accordingly the Brāhmaṇic legislators of different provinces brought stringent laws to their newly formed society. This paved way for different schools of thought and culture which was different to the old school which has a single unique thought and culture. The advent of Muhammadans in India brought about a more pronounced social exclusiveness in Hindu society in this period.

Composition of the Prakaraṇa Works

With the demise of Buddhism, the Brāhmaṇic writers under in influence of local landholders began to study and teach the logic in a new way. The logic was based on ideas from works of mediaeval school

and subject of ancient school. The works of this period was called Prakaraṇas or Manuals of Logic. In the Parāśara Upapurāṇa, the Prakaraṇa is referred to as a book which deals with some topics of śāstra and of others not included in sastra.[1] The topics that have been explained elaborately in the works of ancient school is not given much importance while topics that were neglected in earlier works are given more importance and are explained. This might be due to the intervention of Jaina and Buddhist. In respect of their styles also the ancient works differed considerably from the manuals: while the style of the former was mostly aphoristic, the style of the latter was expository. The Prakaraṇas (manuals) are in fact remarkable for their accuracy and lucidity as well as for their direct handling of various topics in their serial orders.[2]

Vidyābhūṣan categorizes Prakaraṇa works into four types. They are:- (1) The Nyāya works treating only of the pramāṇa to which the remaining fifteen categories were subordinated; (2) the works which embody in them the categories of the Vaiśeṣika Philosophy; (3) the works which treat of six or seven Vaiśeṣika categories assimilating in them the

Nyāya category of pramāṇa, and (4) the works which treat certain topics of the Nyāya and certain topics of the Vaiśeṣika.[3]

Tarkasaṃgraha

Tarkasaṃgraha, the excellent work of Annaṃbhaṭṭa belongs to the third category of Prakaraṇa works by Vidyābhūṣan's classification. According to Athalye the *Tarkasaṃgraha* is a model work, because it combines in a remarkable degree the three essential qualities of a good manual viz. brevity, accuracy and lucidity.[4] It is the most popular introductory work on the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophies. At present *Tarkasaṃgraha* and *Dīpikā*, the commentary on *Tarkasaṃgraha*, became very popular and have been in use as elementary text books in all parts of India. In *Tarkasaṃgraha* Annaṃbhaṭṭa simplify the doctrines of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika systems by pruning all superfluous technicalities out of them and bringing them within comprehension of beginners.

Annaṃbhaṭṭa, has a unique place in the field of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophies. His father was Melgiri Tirumalarāya. A native of Andhra, Annaṃbhaṭṭa is said to have flourished in the latter part of the 17th century A.D. He seems to have been an all-round scholar in the field of Indian

philosophical thought, for he has left works on at least four sciences viz. Nyāya, Vyākaraṇa, Vedanta and Pūrva Mīmāmsa. Of all these works of Annaṃbhaṭṭa, only the *Tarkasaṃgraha* and *Dīpikā* seem to have obtained only wide celebrity.

Annaṃbhaṭṭa's other works are Ranakojjivani– commentary on Bhaṭṭa Someśwara's *Nyāyasudhā*, *Brahmasūtravyākhyā* – a commentary on Bādarāyaṇa's *Brahmasūtra*, *Aṣṭādhyāyīṭīka* – a commentary on Paṇini's *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, *Udyotanāṭika* – a commentary on *Kayyaṭapradīpa* and *Siddhāñjanaṭīka*– a commentary on *Maṇyāloka* of Jayadeva.

Commentaries on Tarkasaṃgraha

Vidyābhūṣan mentions thirty five commentaries on *Tarkasaṃgraha*. Of these commentaries the *Dīpikā* of Annaṃbhaṭṭa is the most popular. The commentaries are –

1. *Tarkasaṃgrahadīpikā* or *Tarkadīpikā* by Annaṃbhaṭṭa.
2. *Tarkasaṃgrahaṭīkā* by Anantha Nārāyaṇa.
3. *Siddhāntacandrodaya* by Srīkṛṣṇa Dhūrjaṭi Dīkṣita.
4. *Tarkaphakkikā* by Kṣamākalyāṇa.

5. *Nyāyabodhinī* by Govardhana Miśra.

6. *Nyāyārthalaghubodhinī* by Govardhana Raṇgācārya.

7. *Tarkasaṃgrahaṭīkā* by Gaurīkānta.

8. *Padakṛtya* by Candraja Simha.

9. *Tarkasaṃgrahatattvaprakāśa* by Nīlakaṇṭha.

10. *Nirukti* by Jagannātha Śāstrin.

11. *Nirukti* by Paṭṭābhirāma.

12. *Tarkasaṃgrahavākyārthanirukti* by Madhava Padābhirāma.

13. *Tarkasaṃgrahacandrikā* by Mukunda Bhaṭṭa Gadgil.

14. *Tarkasaṃgrahopanyāsa* by Meru Śāstri Godbole.

15. *Nyāyabodhinī* by Śuklaratnanātha.

16. *Tarkasaṃgrahaṭīkā* by Ramānatha.

17. *Tarkasaṃgrahataraṅgiṇī* by Vindhyeśvari Prasāda.

18. *Tarkasaṃgrahaṭīkā* by Viśvanātha.

19. *Tarkacandrikā* (prabhā) by Vaidyanātha Gadgil.

20. *Tarkasaṃgrahaṭīkā* (Hanumanti) by Hanumat.

21. *Tarkasaṃgrahavyākhyā* by Murāri.

22. *Tarkasaṃgrahaṭīkā*, author unknown.

23. *Tarkasaṃgrahaśaṃku*, author unknown.

24. *Nyāyacandrikā*, "

25. *Tarkasaṃgrahopanyāsa*, "

26. *Tarkasaṃgrahadīpikāprakāśa* by Nīlakaṇṭhaśāstrin.

27. *Suratakalpataru* by Srīnivāsa.

28. *Ṭīkā* by Gangādharabhaṭṭa.

29. *Ṭīkā* by Jagadīśabhaṭṭa.

30. *Ṭīkā* by Rāmarudra Bhaṭṭa.

31. *Tattvārthadīpikā* by Vādhulaveṅkaṭa Guru.

32. *Tarkasaṃgrahadīpikāprakāśa* by Nīlakaṇṭha.

33. *Nīlakaṇṭhīṭīka*, a gloss on *Tarkadīpikā* by Nīlakaṇṭha.

34. *Bhāṣyavṛtti* on *Tarkasaṃgraha* by Meru Śāstri.

35. *Tarkasaṃgrahacandrikā* by Mukunda Bhaṭṭa.[5]

Content of Tarkasaṃgraha

Annaṃbhaṭṭa opens his *Tarkasaṃgraha* with a Salutation to Siva thus:- Devotedly meditating on the Lord of the universe in my heart, and offering my salutations to the preceptor, I proceed to compile the book the Tarkasaṃgraha for the easy comprehension of the beginners.[6]

The work deals with seven categories viz. (1) substance (dravya), (2) quality (guṇa), (3) action (karma), (4) generality (sāmānya), (5) particularity (viśeṣa), (6) inherence (samavāya), and (7) non-existence (abhāva).

Of the seven categories, the substances are only nine viz. earth, water, light, air, ether, time, space, soul and mind.

Quality is of twenty-four kinds viz. colour, taste, odour, touch, number, magnitude, separateness, conjunction, disjunction, remoteness, proximity, weight, fluidity, viscidity, sound, intellect, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition, merit, demerit and tendency.

Action is of five kinds; they are: upward motion, downward motion, contraction, expansion and motion from one place to another.

Generality is of two kinds; the more comprehensive and the less comprehensive.

Particularities abiding in eternal substances are innumerable indeed.

Inherence is only one.

Negation is four-fold: antecedent negation, destructive negation, absolute negation and mutual negation.

After that Annaṃbhaṭṭa describes the characteristics of each substance specifically.

Earth

Of the substances, earth is that which has odour quality. It is of two varieties; eternal and non-eternal. Eternal is the atomic and non-eternal is the product. Again, it is three-fold: body, organ and object. Body is that like ours; that which grasps odour is the olfactory organ and it abides at the tip of the nose. The earthy objects are like clay, stone and such other things.

Water

Water is that which has cold-touch. It is of two kinds: eternals and non-eternals; eternals are of the nature of atoms and non-eternals are of the nature of products; it is again of three varieties: body, organ and object. Its body is in the region of varuṇa; organ is the gustatory sense by which one perceives savour, and it is located at the tip of the tongue. Objects are rivers, oceans and the like.

Light

Light is that which has hot touch. And, that is of two kinds: eternal and non-eternal. Eternal is of the nature of atom and the non-eternal is of the nature of the product. It is again of three kinds: body, organ and object. The body is well known in the solar region. The organ is the eye which perceives colour and it has for its seat the forepart of the dark pupil of the eye. The object is of four kinds: earthy, heavenly, gastric and mineral. The earthy variety is the common fire and the like; lightning produced from watery fuel is the heavenly variety; the gastric variety is that which causes digestion of food eaten; lustrous metals like gold etc. belong to the mineral variety.

Air

Air is that which possesses touch but is without colour. It is of two-fold: eternal and non-eternal. The eternal is of the nature of atom; the non-eternal is of the nature of product. Again, it is three-fold; owing to its classification into body, organ and object. Body is found in the world of wind-God; organ is the tactile organ, by which one apprehends touch, and it is spread over the whole body; object is the cause of tremor

of trees etc. The air that circulates within the body of the vital breath. Though one, it is denoted variously as prāṇa, apāna, etc. owing to different situations.

Ether

Ether is that which is characterized by the distinctive quality of sound. And it is one, all-pervading and eternal.

Time

Time is the special cause of conventional expression of words like past etc. and it is one, all-pervading and eternal.

Space

Space is the cause of conventional expressions like east etc. and is one, all-pervading and eternal.

Soul

The Soul is the substratum of knowledge. It is two-fold: the Supreme soul and the individual soul. Of these, the Supreme Soul is omnipotent and omniscient and one only. The Individual Soul is different in each body, is all-pervading and eternal.

Mind

Mind is the internal organ which is the instrument in obtaining the knowledge of pleasure etc. It, being linked up with each human soul, is innumerable, atomic and eternal.

Then Annaṃbhaṭṭa describes the different kinds of qualities.

Colour

Colour is the quality apprehended only by the eye. It is again of seven kinds due to its division into white, blue, yellow, red, green, brown and variegated. It exists in earth, water and light. Of these, all the seven varieties exist in earth. In water, pale-white variety is found; and in light, bright-white variety resides.

Taste

Taste is the quality apprehended by the gustatory organ; it is of six varieties; sweet, acid, saline, pungent, astringent and bitter. Taste subsists in earth and water. Of these, earth has all the six varieties while water has only the sweet variety.

Odour

Odour is the quality perceived by the olfactory organ. It is two-fold; fragrant and foul. It subsists in earth alone.

Touch

Touch is the quality perceived by the tactile organ alone. It is three-fold: cool, hot and lukewarm. It resides in water, earth, light and air. Of these, cool touch resides in water, hot touch in light and lukewarm in earth and air.

The theory of pāka

The four qualities beginning with colour are produced in earth through the application of heat, and are non-eternal. In other substances they are not produced by the application of heat and are eternal and also non-eternal; in eternals they are eternal; and in non-eternals they are non-eternal.

Number

Number is the cause of common usage of expressions like one, two, etc. It is found in all the nine substances. It starts from one and ends with parārtha. Oneness is eternal and non-eternal; eternal in eternal

substances and non-eternal in non-eternals. Number two and higher numbers are only non-eternals everywhere.

Dimension

Dimension is the special cause of the common usage of words pertaining to measurement. It is found in all the nine substances. And, it is of four varieties: atomic, large, long and short.

Distinctness

Distinctness is the special cause of conventional expressions such as this is distinct from that. It is found in all the nine substances.

Conjunction

Conjunction is the special cause of conventional expressions of contact between two objects. It exists in all the substances.

Disjunction

Disjunction is the quality which destroys conjunction. It resides in all the nine substances.

Remoteness-paratva and Proximity-aparatva.

Remoteness and proximity are the special causes of common usage of words expressing remoteness and proximity. They reside in four

substances beginning with earth and also in mind. Each of them is of two varieties: spatial and temporal. In things existing at a distance, spatial remoteness is found; in things near, spatial proximity is found; in an elderly person, temporal remoteness is found; in a younger person, temporal proximity is found.

Heaviness

Heaviness is the non-intimate cause of the first down-ward motion in a falling substance. It resides in earth and water.

Fluidity

Fluidity is the non-intimate cause of the first flow. It resides in earth, water and light. It is of two varieties; natural; and artificial. In water, natural fluidity is found. In earth and light, artificial fluidity is found. In earth artificial fluidity is generated through the contact of fire with ghee etc. Artificial fluidity is found in gold etc. belonging to light.

Viscidity

Viscidity is the quality which causes the agglutination of powder etc. It exists in water only.

Sound

Sound is the quality apprehended by the organ of hearing. It subsists in ether alone. It is two-fold: of the nature of inarticulate sound and of the nature of the alphabetic sound. Inarticulate sound is found in the sound produced by drum etc. The alphabetic sound is found in the form of languages like Sanskrit etc.

Cognition

Cognition is the quality which is the cause of all kinds of communications; and it is knowledge. It is two-fold: remembrance and apprehension.

Remembrance

Remembrance is the knowledge born of mental impressions alone.

Apprehension

Knowledge other than recollection is apprehension. It is two-fold: conformable to the object and not conformable to the object.

Valid apprehension

A valid apprehension is that in which an object is known as possessing attributes which it really possesses. E.g. the apprehension of

silver arising in an object where there is silverness. This is also known as valid knowledge of a thing.

Erroneous apprehension

That is a non-valid apprehension in which an object is known as having an attribute which it does not have in reality. For example, the apprehension of silver arising in a piece of mother-of-pearl. This indeed is called the false cognition.

Valid apprehension is four-fold due to the division into perception, inference, comparative knowledge and verbal testimony.

Their instruments too are four-fold due to division into the instrument of perception, instrument of inference, instrument of comparative knowledge and the instrument of verbal testimony.

Definition of special cause:- the uncommon cause is the special cause.

Definition of cause:- that which invariably precedes its effect is its cause.

Definition of effect:- effect is the counter-correlative of its own antecedent non-existence.

Cause is of three kinds:- inherent, non-inherent and occasioning.

The inherent cause is that in which the effect is produced in inseparable union, as the yarns are of the cloth and the cloth is of the colour in it.

The non-inherent cause is one which is inseparably united in the same object either with the effect, or with the cause, as the conjunction of yarns in relation to the cloth or the colour of the yarns in relation to the colour of the cloth.

The cause which is different from both these causes is the occasioning cause, such as the shuttle, loom, etc. in the case of a piece of cloth.

That alone which is the uncommon cause among the three varieties of causes mentioned above, is the special cause.

Perception

Among them, perception is the special cause of perceptive knowledge.

Perception is the apprehension born of the contact of the organ with an object. It is of two kinds: indeterminate and determinate. Of these, the knowledge of a thing without any attribute is known as the

indeterminate apprehension; such as, this is something. Attributive knowledge is determinative apprehension. Apprehensions like, he is Dittha, he is a Brāhmaṇa, he is black, he is a cook are examples of determinate apprehension.

The conjunction of organs with objects which causes perception is of six kinds: (a) conjunction, (b) inherent union with what has come into contact, (c) inherent union with what is intimately united with a thing which has come in contact; (d) inherent union, (e) inherent union with the intimately united; and (f) the connection of the attribute with the substantive.

Conjunction is the contact, producing perception of the jar by the eye.

The inherent union with the conjoint is the contact in producing the perception of the colour of a jar, as the colour is inherently united with the jar which is in contact with the eye.

Inherent union with the intimately united which has come in contact is the contact in producing the perception of the universal genus colourness, as colour is inherently united with the jar that is conjoint

with the ocular organ, and the genus colourness is inherently united therewith.

Inherent union is the contact in the perception of word by the organ of hearing, as the organ of hearing is the ether in the cavity of the ear in as much as sound is the quality of ether and the quality and the qualified are inherently united.

Inherent union with the inherently united is the contact in cognizing soundness, as the genus soundness is inherently united with sound which is inherently united with the auditory sense.

The connection of the qualifier and the qualified is the contact in the perception of negation, as in the cognition: this spot of earth is with the negation of jar. Here, the negation of a jar is an attribute of a place in contact with the eye.

Perception is thus the cognition caused by the six-fold contact, and the organ is its cause. Therefore, organ is the proof of perception.

Inference

Inference is the special cause of inferential knowledge.

Inferential knowledge is the knowledge born of subsumptive reflection.

Subsumptive reflection is the knowledge of reason existing in the subject accompanied by invariable concomitance, e.g. the knowledge: this mountain has smoke which is invariably pervaded by fire. The cognition that results from it and takes the form: the mountain is fiery is the inferential knowledge.

Invariable concomitance

Invariable concomitance is the certainty of co-existence like, 'wherever there is smoke there is fire'.

Pakṣadharmata – the special feature of a subject

The presence of an invariably concomitant thing in an object like a mountain makes it the characteristic of a receptacle or subject.

Inference is of two kinds: for a person himself and for another.

Inference for oneself

Of them, inference for oneself is the cause of one's own inferential knowledge. For instance, one, having repeatedly seen in the hearth, etc. the invariable concomitance of smoke with fire, arrives at the universal

generalization: wherever there is smoke there is fire, and goes near a mountain. On suspecting fire on the mountain, and seeing smoke thereon, he remembers the universal concomitance: wherever there is smoke there is fire. After this, there downs in him the knowledge this mountain is smoky, pervaded by fire. This is known as subsumptive reflection arising from a mark. From the above knowledge, the inferential knowledge, 'mountain has fire in it' arises. This is one's own inference.

Inference for others

But when, one, having inferred for oneself fire from smoke, employs the five-membered syllogism to make others understand the same, it is known as 'inference for others', e.g. the mountain is fiery, because there is smoke; whichever is smoky is fiery, as a hearth, and this is such, and therefore it is so. From this five-membered syllogism, others also apprehend fire.

The five members of syllogism are: the proposition set down; the reason adduced therein; the example; the subsumptive correlative; and the conclusion. The proposition set down is, 'the mountain is fiery', the reason adduced therein; the example; the subsumptive correlative; and

the conclusion. The proposition set down is 'the mountain is fiery', the reason adduced in support of the above proposition is, 'due to smokiness'; the example cited is 'whichever is smoky is fiery', as a hearth; subsumptive correlative is 'so this mountain'; 'therefore it is such' is the conclusion.

The special condition for anumiti

Consideration of the mark alone is the special cause of inferential knowledge for oneself as well as for others. Therefore, consideration of the mark is inference.

Liṅga is three-fold

Liṅga is three-fold: that which is (a) positive and negative; (b) purely positive, (c) purely negative. That which pervades both positively and negatively is the positive-negative; e.g. smokiness when fire is the thing to be proved. The proposition, where there is smoke, there is fire, as in a hearth is the positive concomitance. The proposition where there is the absence of fire, there is the absence of smoke, as in a lake, is the negative concomitance.

Kevalānvayi liṅga

Purely positive liṅga is that which has only positive concomitance, e.g. jar is nameable because it is knowable, like a cloth. Here, there is no negative concomitance of knowability or nameability, as all things are both knowable and nameable.

Kevalavyatireki liṅga

The purely negative reason is that which has a negative concomitance only, e.g. earth differs from the rest because it has smell. Whichever does not differ from the rest has no smell in it, e.g. water. But this earth is not so. Therefore, it is not so. Here, there is no positive example like whichever has smell is different from others, because the whole earth constitutes the subject here.

Subject (Pakṣa)

Subject is that on which the thing to be proved is suspected, e.g. a mountain when smokiness or smoke is the reason.

Similar instance (Sapakṣa)

The subject in which the existence of the thing to be proved is known for certain is the similar instance; e.g. a hearth in the same case.

Contrary instance (Vipakṣa)

The subject in which the non-existence of the thing to be proved is determined is the contrary instance; e.g. a lake in the same inference.

Defective reason (Hetvābhāsa)

The defective reasons are five: (a) straying (savyabhicāra), (b) adverse (viruddha), (c) antithetical (satpratipakṣa), (d) unestablished (asiddha), and (e) stultified (bādhita).

The Strayer reason (Savyabhicāra hetu)

Savyabhicāra reason is three-fold: the straying reason is one that is known also as the deviating. It is of three kinds due to its division into common, uncommon and non-exclusive.

Of these, the reason which is present in a place where there is the absence of the thing to be proved is the common strayer reason; e.g. the argument mountain is fiery, because, it is knowable; here knowability exists in a lake also where there is the absence of fire.

The uncommon strayer reason is that which is found only in the subject while not being present in any similar and contrary instances;

e.g. sound is eternal because of soundness. Soundness exists only in sound and is absent in all eternal and non-eternal things.

The non-exclusive strayer reason is that which has neither positive instance nor negative instance, as in the argument, everything is non-eternal because it is knowable. Here, since everything is treated as the subject, no example is available to support the inference.

Adverse reason (Viruddha hetu)

The self-contradicting reason is that which is pervaded by the negation of the thing to be proved e.g. the argument, sound is eternal because it is produce. Here, producibility is pervasive of non-eternality which is of the nature of the negation of eternality.

Antithetical reason (satpratipaksa hetu)

The antithetical reason is that of which there exists another reason capable of proving the negation of the thing to be proved, as in the argument, sound is eternal, because it is audible, like soundness; and sound is non-eternal, because it is a product, like a jar.

The Unestablished reason (Asiddha)

The unestablished reason (asiddha) is of three kinds: (a) unestablished in respect of its substratum; (b) unestablished in respect of itself; and (c) unestablished in respect of its concomitance.

(i) The reason with non-existent substratum is found in the argument: sky-lotus is fragrant because it is a lotus like a lotus in a lake. In this argument, sky-lotus is the subject but it never exists.

(ii) The reason that is unestablished in respect of itself is found in the argument: sound is a quality because it is visible; here visibility does not exist in sound, as in sound only audibility exists.

(iii) The reason associated with an adventitious condition is known as unestablished in respect of its own pervasion adventitious condition is that which pervades the thing to be proved but is not pervasive of the reason. Not having counter-correlative of its absolute negation while co-existing with the thing to be proved is being pervasive of the thing to be proved. Having the counter-entity of absolute negation co-existing with reason is being non-pervasive of reason. In the argument: Mountain is smoky, because it has fire, contact with wet fuel is the upādhi. It is

pervasive of the thing to be proved, because of the concomitance, wherever there is smoke there is contact with wet fuel. But there is no contact with wet fuel wherever there is fire; for example, in a red hot iron-ball there is fire, though contact with wet fuel is not there. Thus the adventitious condition is non-pervasive of the reason. In like manner, contact with wet fuel is the adventitious condition in the present instance because it is pervasive of the thing to be proved while not being pervasive of the reason. Therefore, fire which is the reason in the argument under reference is unestablished in relation to its own pervasiveness owing to its association with adventitious condition.

Contradicted reason (Bādhita hetu)

The contradicted reason is one where the negation of the thing to be proved is established by another proof, e.g. fire is not hot, because it is a substance, like water. Here, non-hotness is the thing to be proved. But hotness, the negation of non-hotness, is cognized through tactile perception. Therefore, the above reason is known as the contradicted reason.

Analogy (Upamāna)

Analogy is the instrument of assimilative knowledge. It is the knowledge of the relation existing between a name and the object denoted by it. The knowledge of similarity is its immediate special cause; the remembrance of the meaning of a former direction conveying similarity between two objects, is the intermediary operation; this may be exemplified thus: a person who is ignorant of the object denoted by the word 'gavaya' learns from a certain forester that the 'gavaya' is similar to a cow. Subsequently, going to the forest, he sees the strange animal similar to a cow, and remembers the declaration. Then arises in him the knowledge: this is the animal denoted by the word gavaya.

Verbal testimony (Śabda)

Valid verbal testimony is a sentence spoken by a trustworthy person. A trustworthy person is one who speaks of things as they exist in reality. Sentence is a group of words, like: 'Bring a cow'. Word is that which has significative potency. Significative potency is the desire of God that a certain concept be understood from a certain word.

Verbal expectancy, compatibility and juxtaposition are the causes of the knowledge of the meaning of a sentence. Verbal expectancy consists in the inability of a word to convey the meaning of a sentence due to the absence of some other word. Compatibility is non-contradiction of the sense. Juxtaposition is the utterance of words in quick succession.

Verbal expectancy

A sentence devoid of verbal expectancy etc. is unauthoritative; e.g. the words; a cow, a horse, a man, an elephant, etc. are not authoritative as they are devoid of verbal expectancy. The sentence, 'sprinkle with fire' is not authoritative owing to the absence of compatibility. Words like bring.....a.....cow etc. pronounced at long intervals are not authoritative owing to want of juxtaposition.

Sentence is of two kinds: sacred and secular. The sacred being the pronouncements of God, are all authoritative. But the secular pronouncement made by trustworthy persons only are authoritative; all pronouncements made by others are unauthoritative.

Meaning of a sentence

The apprehension arising from valid testimony is the knowledge of the meaning of a sentence. Its special cause is the word.

Erroneous apprehension

Erroneous apprehension is of three types: doubt, misapprehension and false assumption.

Doubt

The cognition that apprehends several mutually contradictory attributes in the same attributive thing is doubt, like: is it a post or a man?

Misapprehension

Misapprehension is erroneous knowledge, like the knowledge: 'this is silver' in a piece of oyster shell.

False assumption

False assumption is the deduction of a more extensive thing by the hypothetical assumption of a less extensive one, as in the example: if there were no fire, then there would be no smoke.

Recollection

Recollection also is of two kinds: true and erroneous. The one arising from the valid cognition is the true one; that arising from false cognition is the erroneous one.

Pleasure

That which is experienced by all with agreeable feelings is pleasure.

Pain

That which is experienced by all with disagreeable feelings is pain.

Desire, etc.

Wish is desire; ill-feeling is anger; volitional effort is the will-to-do; merit is that which is born of enjoined actions; but demerit is that which is born of prohibited actions.

Eight qualities beginning with Buddhi

The eight qualities beginning with buddhi are the specific qualities of the soul only. Cognition, desire and effort are of two kinds: eternal and non-eternal. Eternals belong to Īśvara; non-eternals belong to the human soul.

Impression - Samskāra

Impression is of three kinds: velocity, reminiscent impression and elasticity. Velocity resides in four substances beginning with earth and in mind. That which is born of experience and which causes recollection is reminiscent impression. It resides in the Soul only. Elasticity is the force that brings a thing back to its normal shape whenever it is distorted. It resides in mat etc. which are the transformation of earth.

Action

Action is of the nature of motion. That which causes connection with regions upward is tossing; that which causes connection with regions downwards is dropping; that which causes connection nearer the body is contraction; that which causes connection with distant regions is expansion. All other varieties of motion is gamana. It resides in the four substances beginning with earth and in mind.

Generality

That which is eternal, one, and which resides in many things is the universal. It resides in substance, quality and action. It is two-fold due to its division into the more extensive and the less extensive. Existence

(sattā) is the more extensive, and substanceness etc. are the less extensive variety.

Particularity

Particulars are the differentiating features residing in eternal substances.

Inherence

Inherence is the eternal relation; it exists in an inseparable pair; when, between two things, one thing, as long as it is not destroyed, exists in the other thing only, they are known as inseparable pairs; for example, parts and the whole; quality and the qualified; motion and the moving object; genus and the individual; and particulars and the eternal substances.

Antecedent negation

Antecedent negation is without a beginning but with an end; it exists prior to the production of an effect.

Destruction

Destruction has a beginning but is without an end; it occurs after the production of an effect.

Absolute negation

Absolute negation exists in all the three times, having that which ascertains or reflects counter correlative delimited by relation or connection, as in the statement: there is no jar on this ground.

Reciprocal negation

That which ascertains or reflects counter correlative as delimited by the relation of identity is reciprocal negation, e.g. the statement: jar is not cloth.

Conclusion

Since all categories are included severally in those enumerated above, it is proved that categories are only seven.

The Jaina and Buddhist writers who were the founders of Mediaeval school of Indian Logic confirmed only one category, i.e. pramāṇa, the means of valid knowledge. Thereby some Brāhmaṇic writers also dealt with only one category as done by Jaina and Buddhist writers but it included the remaining fifteen categories of ancient school. Some categories such as Prameya (objects of knowledge), Jalpa

(wrangling), Vitaṇḍa (cavil), Jāti (analogue) and Nigrahasthāna (the point of defeat) were not included while other were considered as subdivisions.

Other writers of Prakaraṇa works

Bhāsarvajña (about 950 AD)[7]

Bhāsarvajña, the well known author of *Nyāyasara* was the first Brāhmaṇic writer who tried to assimilate the sixteen categories into one.

There is not much knowledge about the age in which he became a celebrated writer or about his birth. He might have been a native of Kāśmīra. His unusual name shows similarity to the names of two people who lived in Kāśmīra about 775AD. and 1025 AD. they were Sarvajña Mitra and Sarvajna Deva respectively.[8]

Varadarāja (about 1150 AD)[9]

It is believed that, Varadarāja born in Andhra or Teliṅgāna, in the Madras presidency. He wrote a work on Logic called *Tārkikarakṣa* or protection of Logicians. He might have lived in the 12th centry AD. Most probably his date of living may be around 1150 AD., shortly after which Jñāna Pūrṇa or Jñāna Deva, a disciple of Viṣṇu Svāmin, wrote a commentary on the *Tārkikarakṣā* called *Laghudīpikā*.

Keśava Miśra (about 1275 AD) [10]

Keśava Miśra, the author of *Tarkabhāṣā*, a Nyāya treatise, was a native of Mithilā and a preceptor of Govardhana Miśra who wrote a commentary on *Tarkabhāṣa,* called *Tarkabhāṣāprakāśa.* Padmanābha Miśra, author of *Kiraṇāvalī Bhāskara* and *Kanādarahasya Muktahara* was an elder brother of Govardhana. So Keśava Miśra, Padmanābha and Govardhana were contemporaries. Padmanābha lived between the beginning of the 13th century and end of the 14th century AD. Probably he lived at the end of the 13th century AD.[11]

Vallabhācārya

We cannot put an exact date to the birth and life of Vallabhācārya. He might have flourished in the second half of the 13th century. But Vallabhāçārya of Vaiṣṇava sect was different from this Vallabhācārya. Vallabhācārya's work is *Nyāyalīlāvatī.*

Viswanātha Nyāyapañcānana

Pancanāna was the author of a Vaiśeṣika treatise called *Bhāṣāpariccheda* and of a commentary on the same called *Siddhāntamuktāvali.* He was a native of Navadvīpa and an adherent of

the Nyāya school of Raghunātha Śiromaṇi.[12] Viśwanātha himself composed the *Gautamasūtravṛtti* at Vṛndāvan in the year 1634 A.D.[13] Viśwanātha also wrote another work called *Māmsātattvaviveka*. The work was written as the result of a controversy with the paṇḍitas of Mahārāṣṭra with a view to vindicating the custom of meat-eating among the Brahmins of Northern India.

Jagadīśa Tarkālaṇkara

Another important treatise on Vaiśeṣika philosophy was written by Jagadīśa Tarkālaṇkara known as '*Tarkāmṛta*'.

REFERENCE

1. 'नन्वेवं शास्त्रप्रकरणयोः को भेद इति चेत् -

   शास्त्रैकदेशसम्बद्धं शास्त्रकार्यान्तरे स्थितम्।

   आहुः प्रकरणं नाम ग्रन्थभेदं विपश्चितः.स।।' *Quoted from H.I.L., p.* 356.
2. *ibid.*
3. *ibid.*
4. *Tarkasaṃgraha of* Annaṃbhaṭṭa, Y.V. Athalye, P.L. VIII.
5. *H.I.L., pp.* 390-391.
6. 'निधाय हृदि विश्वेशं विधाय गुरुवन्दनम्।

   बालानां सुखबोधाय क्रियते तर्कसङ्ग्रहः।।' *T.S. opening lines*
7. *H.I.L., p.* 357
8. *ibid.*
9. *H.I.L., p.* 373
10. *ibid., p.* 381.
11. *ibid.*
12. *ibid., p.* 392.
13. *ibid.*

CHAPTER V

THE INCLUSION OF THE DOCTRINES OF BOTH NYĀYA AND VAIŚEṢIKA IN TARKASAṂGRAHA AND OTHER MANUALS OF LOGIC

Nyāya philosophy gives more importance to epistemology and Vaiśeṣika philosophy gives more importance to ontology. In *Tarkasaṃgraha* Annaṃbhaṭṭa adopted the epistemology of Nyāya system and accepted the ontological structure of the Vaiśeṣika system. The combination of these two branches viz. epistemology and ontology helps us attain the highest values. *Tarkasaṃgraha* deals with the 'padārthas' (objects of right knowledge) mentioned in the Vaiśeṣika philosophy and the 'pramāṇas' (means of right knowledge) in the Nyāya philosophy. Annaṃbhaṭṭa gives equal stress on epistemology and ontology in *Tarkasaṃgraha*. But the fusion of the two systems is not felt. In Annaṃbhaṭṭa's hand both systems have mingled into one.

Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, like all other schools of Indian philosophy, aims at realizing the highest good. In order to achieve this end, these systems have presented an analytical demonstration of the universe, and also the

means to comprehend the phenomenal world. As such, Nyāya has classified the positive objects of the universe into sixteen categories, and is pre-eminently concerned with epistemology and Logic. Vaiśeṣika on the contrary, is mainly a system of physics and metaphysics. Its doctrine has seven categories and embraces all reality. These two systems were separate in their origin and early development, but were, blended into a single syncretic system later on because of logical and intellectual necessity.

Nyāya, in the course of its development took a considerable help from Vaiśeṣika. In the ancient and mediaeval period, both the philosophies contributed each other for their development. Hence Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika were treated as samānatantra or allied systems. And in due course of time, both the systems merged together to a great extent. The six or seven categories of Vaiśeṣika became the part of Nyāya philosophy. Likewise Nyāya category of pramāṇa in its developed form, actually was absorbed in the treatise on Vaiśeṣika philosophy.

We can cite the cases of *Tārkikarakṣa* by Varadarāja and *Tarkabhāṣa* by Keśava Miśra for Nyāya's absorption of Vaiśeṣika

categories. Varadarāja, an exponent of Nyāya, takes into his account not only the sixteen categories, but also the six categories of Vaiśeṣika such as dravya, etc. in the second category of prameya under Nyāya. Likewise Keśava Miśra also brings six categories of Vaiśeṣika under 'artha' which is one of the twelve objects included in the second Nyāya category, prameya.

Let us have an overview of both of the works. Nyāya, the science of reasoning, demonstration, debate and critical study, stresses predominantly intellectual and analytical methods. Vaiśeṣika is poorer in its epistemological interest as it is pre-eminently a metaphysical system. The system is so designated because, according to it, diversity and not unity is at the root of the universe.

The seven categories of the Vaiśeṣika and the sixteen categories of the Naiyāyika are basically the same. According to Annaṃbhaṭṭa and Visvanātha the sixteen categories mentioned in the Nyāya-sutra are included in the seven categories of the Vaiśeṣika philosophy.[1]

The inclusion of the sixteen categories in the seven categories as follows:-

1. Means of right knowledge – pramāṇa

(a) Perception (pratyakṣa) - is included in substance

(b) Inference (anumāna)
(c) Comparison (upamāna) — are included in quality.
(d) Verbal testimony (śabda)

2. The objects of right knowledge – prameya

(a) Soul (ātma)
(b) Body (śarīra) — are included in substance
(c) Senses (indriya)

(d) Objects of senses (artha)
(e) Intellect (buddhi) —are included in quality
(f) Mind (manas) - is included in substance.

(g) Activity (pravūtti)
(h) Fault (doṣa)
(i) Transmigration (pretyabhāva) — are included in quality
(j) Fruit (phala)

(k) Pain (duḥkha)

(l) Emancipation (apavarga) - is included in negation

3. Doubt (samśaya) - is included in quality.

4. Purpose (prayojana)
5. Example (dūṣṭānta) —are included in substance, quality, etc.
6. Tenent (siddhānta)

7. Members of syllogism (avayava)
8. Confutation (tarka)
9. Ascertainment (nirṇaya) —— are included in quality
10. Discussion (vāda)
11. Wrangling (jalpa)
12. Cavil (Vitaṇḍā)

13. Fallacy (hetvābhasā) - is included in substance, quality, etc.
14. Quibble (chala)
15. Analogue (jati) —— are included in quality
16. A point of defeat (nigrahasthāna) - is included in substance, quality, etc.[2]

Tarkasaṃgraha

In *Tarkasaṃgraha* Annaṃbhaṭṭa accepts all the seven categories of the Vaiśeṣika philosophy without any change. Substance, quality, action, generality, particularity, inherence and negation are the seven categories. Quality is of twenty-four kinds, of which buddhi (knowledge) is one. Buddhi is of two kinds, experience (anubhava) and smṛti (recollection). Anubhava or experience may be right or wrong. The right experience is of four kinds, viz. (1) perceptual knowledge

(pratyakṣa), (2) inferential knowledge (anumiti), (3) comparative knowledge (upamiti) and verbal knowledge (śābda). The means by which these four kinds of knowledge are derived are called respectively (1) perception (pratyakṣa), (2) inference (anumāna), (3) comparison (upamāna) and verbal testimony (śabda).

The scheme of incorporation is shown below:-



In *Vaiśeṣikasūtra,* Kaṇāda have keenly described seventeen qualities.[4] But the commentators have described twenty four qualities[5] which has been accepted by Annaṃbhaṭṭa also.

The Vaiśeṣikas have classified the sāmānya into two kinds viz. para and apara. Para means sattā. But according to Navya Naiyāyikas this classification is incorrect.[6] However both para and apara classification is accepted in *Tarkasaṃgraha.*

According to Navya Naiyāyikas particularity is not a separate category.[7] But Annaṃbhaṭṭa accepts it as a separate category.

The Vaiśeṣikas say that there is only one inherence. But according to Navya there are a number of inherence.[8] Annaṃbhaṭṭa accepts the Vaiśeṣika view.

Negation is two-fold: samsargābhāva and anyonyābhāva. Again samsargābhāva is three-fold: antecedent negation, destructive negation and absolute negation.[9] In *Tarkasaṃgraha,* Annaṃbhaṭṭa does not divide negation as samsargābhāva and anyonyābhāva. He simply mentions negation is four-fold.

Praśastapāda classifies the non-eternal air into four kinds viz. body, organ, object and prāṇa.[10] Where as Annaṃbhaṭṭa classifies it into three viz. body, organ and object.

According to Vaiśeṣika, ākāsa is that which is characterized by the distinctive quality of sound. Navya Naiyāyikas say that God is the cause of sound not ākāsa.[11] But Annaṃbhaṭṭa accepts the view of Vaiśeṣika.

The theory of Pāka

The Vaiśeṣika theorists are known as Pīlupākavādins. They say that when a pot or ghaṭa is baked at first the pot is destroyed into atoms and then once again the atoms joined together produce a new one.

The atoms of the pot become red colour because of the contact with the heat. The new pot is entirely different from the former one. This transformation is imperceptible, because the destruction and the reformation of the pot happen in a very short duration of time. This theory of Vaiśeṣika is known as pīlupāka.

The Naiyāyikas differ in this aspect and object this theory of Vaiśeṣika. They establish the theory of Piṭharapāka. According to them,

the change in the colour, etc. of the atoms and in the product, come into existence at the same time. Due to the speed of the fire the atoms of fire enter the different particles in the ghaṭa and destroy the colour etc. and the new colour etc. are produced. There is no need of accepting the destruction of whole. If the first pot is destroyed and new one substituted we shall not be able to identify it as the old pot. We see the same pot as before except for the difference in colour etc.

In *Tarkasaṃgraha* neither pīlupāka nor piṭharapāka is described. Annaṃbhaṭṭa says that the four qualities beginning with colour are produced in earth through the application of heat, and are non-eternal. In other substances (i.e. water, light and air) they are not produced by the application of heat (i.e. natural) and so are eternal and also non-eternal; in eternals (i.e. in atoms) they are eternal; and in non-eternals (i.e. in products) they are non-eternal.[12]

The Navya Naiyāyikas say that pṛthaktva is mutual negation and not a separate quality.[13] But Annaṃbhaṭṭa accepts pṛthaktva as a distinct quality.

Inference is of two kinds: for the knower himself and for others. This type of classification is not accepted by the pracīna Naiyāyikas. Annaṃbhaṭṭa accepts this type of classification.

In *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* and *Praśastapādabhāṣya* the number of fallacies are three[14] and four[15] respectively. Five fallacies are included in *Nyāya-sūtra*[16] and *Nyāyabhāṣya*. Like in Nyāya Annaṃbhaṭṭa also accepts five fallacies of reason.

Both the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika systems recognize the reality of God, individual souls and minds, physical things, atoms of earth, water, light and air, space, time and ether. They hold the same view of the nature of the individual soul and its liberation. They both propound realism and pluralism. They advocate the similar deistic view of God. But these systems differ from each other in certain respects. First, Nyāya recognizes four means of valid knowledge viz. perception, inference, comparison and verbal testimony. Nyāya gives a vivid description of the criteria of truth, validity of knowledge and different kinds of inference and fallacies. It treats the problems of logic and epistemology in the most comprehensive manner. Vaiśeṣika, on other hand, admits perception

and inference only as pramāṇas and deals with these pramāṇas in peripheral way.

Secondly, these systems differ in their treatment of categories. Nyāya recognizes sixteen categories which mostly refer to the basic points of a theory of knowledge. The Vaiśeṣika on the other hand, divides the whole reality into seven padārthas which present an analytical demonstration of this phenomenal world.

Bhāsarvajña's Nyāyasāra

Nyāyasāra, the essence of logic was a highly acclaimed logical treatise of Bhāsarvajña. It had a distinct status in the history of Indian Logic. He gave importance to pramāṇa which was the current subject at that time. It was divided into three types viz. perception (pratyakṣa), inference (anumāna) and verbal testimony (āgama). It was in contradiction to Akṣapāda where in a fourth type named comparison (upamāna) was mentioned. This lead Bhāsarvajña's work to be similar to that of Sāṃkhyas and Jainas who also divided pramāṇa into three kinds. This is different from that of Buddhists who classified it into only two viz. perception and inference. He divided inference into two – that

for one's self (svārthānumāna) and that for the sake of others (parārthānumāna). Salvation (mokṣa) was described by him as the soul's attainment to eternal pleasure. Quibble, analogue, etc. which had been prominent topics in the *Nyāyasūtra*, were not altogether overlooked by Bhāsarvajña who dealt with them in connection with an inference for the sake of others.

The scheme laid down in the *Nyāyasāra*, for the reduction of sixteen categories into one, may be exhibited in the tabular form thus:-



Varadarāja's Tārkikarakṣa

Tārkikarakṣa was mainly divided into three chapters. Among them the initial one deals with the fourteen categories of Nyāya such as (1) Pramāṇa, (2) Prameya, (3) Samśaya, (4). Prayojana, (5) Dṛṣṭānta, (6) Siddhānta, (7) Avayava, (8) Tarka, (9) Nirṇaya, (10) Vāda, (11) Jalpa, (12) vitaṇḍa), (13) Hetvābhāsa and (14) Chala. The second chapter covers the fifteenth category such as jati, while the last chapter deals with the sixteenth category viz. nigrahasthāna.

Prameya according to *Nyāyasūtra* refers to atman, śarīra, indriya, artha, buddhi, manas, pravṛtti, doṣa, pretyabhāva, phala, duḥkha and apavarga,[18] but Varadarāja includes the six predicaments of the Vaiśeṣika philosophy also. They are substance, quality, action, generality, particularity and inherence.

The categories of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika are thus combined together, but the combination is far from being satisfactory. It is evident that the categories of the Vaiśeṣika and objects coming under prameya of the Nyāya overlap each other. Moreover there is hardly any truth in the statement[19] that the knowledge of the sixteen categories of Nyāya is the

direct means of our attaining emancipation. Whereas that of the seven categories of the Vaiśeṣika is only an indirect means, because atman (the soul), manas (the mind), buddhi (intellect or knowledge), duḥkha (pain), etc. are included both the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika systems.

Scheme of representation of Varadarāja's incorporation of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika systems:-



Valid knowledge (Pramāṇa)

Varadarāja in his *Tārkikarakṣa* introduces some unique discussions. For example, the Buddhists define valid knowledge (pramāṇa) as that which is not non-correspondent with our practical activity,[21] e.g. my knowledge of a cup of water is valid if the activity prompted by it is fruitful. Varadarāja criticizes this definition by saying that it is too narrow. We can test the validity of our knowledge only of a thing that exists in the present time. With regard to a past or future thing[22] we can draw an inference, but cannot judge the validity of the inference in as much as there is no practical activity prompted.

Inference (anumāna)

Varadarāja opines that 'inference is the knowledge of a thing derived through its invariable concomitance with another thing'.[23] Invariable concomitance (vyāpti) also called inseparableness (avinābhāva), is that relation which is devoid of condition (upādhi).

Naiyāyikas say that the invariable concomitance of one thing with another thing is base on their uniform agreement in presence and absence, for example smoke is in invariable concomitance with fire, because where there is smoke there is fire and where there is no fire there is no smoke.

But the Buddhists say that the invariable concomitance of one thing with the other thing is really based on their mutual relation of cause and effect or identity in essence, e.g. there is rain, because there was cloud.

Varadarāja strongly criticized the Buddhist view by saying that, we infer the form of an apple from its taste, though between the taste and form there is neither the causal relation nor the relation of identity in essence.

Kesava Misra's Tarkabhasa

Keśava Miśra starts his work thus – 'in order that even dull people may get admittance into the science of Logic, I bring out this *Tarkabhāṣa* (Technicality of Logic) replete with concise arguments'.[24]

Tarkabhāṣa incorporates the Vaiśeṣika categories

Tarkabhāṣa deals with the sixteen categories of the Nyāyasūtra viz. (1) Pramāṇa, (2) Prameya, (3) Samśaya, (4) Prayojana, (5) Dṛṣṭānta, (6) Siddhānta, (7) Avayava, (8) Tarka, (9) Nirṇaya, (10) Vāda, (11) Jalpa, (12) Vitaṇḍa, (13) Hetvābhāsa, (14) Chala, (15) Jati and (16) Nigrahasthāna. The second category viz. prameya, includes (1) Ātman, (2) Śarīra, (3) Indriya, (4) Artha, (5) Buddhi, (6) Manas, (7) Pravṛtti, (8) Doṣa, (9) Pretyabhāva, (10) Phala, (11) Duḥkha and (12) Apavarga.

In Nyāya the word artha is signified five objects of sense viz. gandha (smell), rasa (taste), rūpa (colour), sparśa (touch) and śabda (sound). In order to bring the Nyāya categories with Vaiśeṣika, Keśava Miśra explained artha as dravya, guṇa, karma, sāmānya, viśeṣa and samavāya.

The scheme of combination of the categories Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika in *Tarkabhāṣa* is shown below:-

(1) Pramana, (2) Prameya, (3), Samśaya,(4) Prayojana,(5) Dṛṣṭānta, (6) Siddhānta, (7) Avayava, (8) Tarka, (9) Nirṇaya, (10) Vāda, (11) Jalpa, (12) Vitaṇḍa, (13) Hetvābhāsa, (14) Chala, (15) Jāti, (16) Nigrahasthāna

(1) Ātman, (2) Śarira, (3) Indriya, (4) Artha, (5) Buddhi, (6) Manas, (7) Pravṛtti, (8) Doṣa, (9) Ptretyabhāva, 10) Phala, (11) Duḥkha, (12) apavarga.

(1) Dravya, (2) Guṇa, (3) Karma, (4) Sāmānya, (5) Viśeṣa, (6) Samavāya[25]

Nyāyalīlavatī of Vallabhācārya

While a large number of treatises in which the Nyāya category of pramāṇa was included in the Vaiśeṣika category of guṇa, others bring it under atman. Some writers keep aloof from Nyāya in the description of Vaiśeṣika. But Vallabhācārya incorporates Nyāya category of pramāṇa on the Vaiśeṣika category of guṇa.

Nyāyalilavatī deals with six categories viz. (1) Substance (dravya), (2) Quality (guṇa), (3) action (karma), (4) Generality (sāmānya), (5) Particularity (viśeṣa) and (6) Inherence (samavāya). Under the category of guṇa there comes buddhi which is again subdivided as vidyā and avidyā. The way to get right knowledge (buddhi) are perception (pratyakṣa), inference (anumāna), comparison (upamāna) and verbal testimony (śabda).

The scheme of amalgamation of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika in *Nyāyalīlavatī* is shown below:-



Viśwanātha Nyāyapañcānana's Bhāṣāpariccheda

Viśwanātha opens his *Bhāṣāpariccheda* with a salutation to Srīkṛṣṇa[27] and his *Siddhāntamuktāvali,* which is a commentary of *Bhāṣāpariccheda* opens with a salutation to Lord Siva.[28] Viśwanātha's work, *Bhāṣāpariccheda* deals with seven categories viz. dravya, guṇa, karma, sāmānya, viśeṣa, samavāya and abhāva. Dravya is subdivided into kṣiti (earth) ap (water), tejas (light), marut (air), vyoma (ether), kāla (time), dik (space), dehi (soul) and manas (mind). Visvanātha opines that ātman (soul) was the seat of intellect which may of two types viz. apprehension (anubhūti) and remembrance (smṛti). Apprehension includes perception, inference, comparison and verbal testimony.

The Nyāya doctrine of pramāṇa, as represented by perception, inference, comparison and verbal testimony, is incorporated in the

categories of the Vaiśeṣika philosophy. The scheme of incorporation is shown below:-



Tarkāmṛta of Jagadīśa Tarkālaṅkāra

Tarkāmṛta starts with a salutation to God Viṣṇu.[30] According to his view if a man wants to get emancipation should possess the true knowledge of soul.

In the first part of *Tarkāmṛta*, that is known as viṣayakāṇḍa, he divides things into two kinds positive (bhāva) and negative (abhāva). The positive things are substance, quality, action, generality, particularity and inherence. The negative things are of two kinds, viz. (1) relative non-existence (samsargābhāva) and (2) reciprocal non-existence (anyonyābhāva). The first kind is subdivided as: (1) antecedent non-existence (prāgabhāva), (2) subsequent non-existence (pradhvamsābhāva) and (3) absolute non-existence (atyantābhāva).

The second part of *Tarkāmṛta* that is known as Jñānakāṇḍa, section of knowledge, treats of right knowledge (pramā) which is derived through four means called respectively, perception, inference, comparison and verbal testimony.

The manner in which the seven categories of the Vaiśeṣika and the four pramāṇas of the Nyāya have been combined, is ingenious and reasonable.

The scheme of combination of the Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya categories:



Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika some comparison

Concept of God

The concept of God is almost the same to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas. They believe in God as eternal, omniscient and omnipotent. Kaṇada does not refer to God in the Vaiśeṣikasūtra. He probably traces authority of the Vedas to the seers, who perceive supersensible objects like merit, demerit, etc. But Praśastapāda regards God as the efficient cause of the world and atoms as its material cause. They also believe that God is the author of the Vedas, who is free from error, inadvertence and deficiency of the sense-organs. He is the promulgator of the moral law.

The atoms of earth, water, fire and air are the material cause of the world. Their conjunction is its non-material cause. Merits and demerits of the individual souls are its auxiliary cause. Knowledge of the six categories is the cause of liberation. It depends on virtue which is enjoyed by God. Duality and plurality are produced by discriminative intellect. Large magnitude and length are produced in triads by plurality of dyads, which is due to the discriminative intellect of God.

Vātsyāyana regards God as a particular soul endowed with merit, knowledge, intuition and sovereignty. He is devoid of demerit, false knowledge and inadvertence. He has eight kinds of supernatural powers due to his merit and intuition.[32]

God transcends the atoms, time, space and ether which are coeternal with Him. He creates the world out of the atoms in time and space by conjoining them with one another, and destroys it by disjoining them from one another. He creates it through His immediate knowledge of the atoms and the souls, merits and demerits, desire to create and volition without a body.

God is the moral guide of the individual souls and the dispenser of the fruits of their actions. He cannot override the law of Karma. He lays down moral injunctions and prohibitions for the good of mankind and favour their free actions with their fruits. Without His favour free human actions are ineffective.[33]

Individual self (Atman)

The Nyāya arguments for the existence of the soul are similar to the Vaiśeṣika-view. The Naiyāyikas accept sixteen categories viz.

pramāṇa, prameya, etc.[34] They include the soul in the second category viz. prameya. According to Vaiśeṣikas there are seven categories. They considered the self as a substance - the first category.

The self is too subtle to be perceived. It cannot be perceived through the external sense-organs. It is an object of inference.

Self is the first object of cognition in Gautama's list of prameyas. It is, says Vātsyāyana the seer, experiencer, knower and indicator of everything.[35] Our knowledge of the self is a product of two pramāṇas, word and inference. But Vātsyāyana then goes on to add that the self can be considered as perceived but not in an ordinary sense. It is perceived by a yogin through a special kind of mind-self contact. This perception is the product of yogic Samadhi.[36]

According to Gautama, the marks of the self are: desire, aversion, effort, pleasure, pain and cognition.[37] In the state of liberation the soul retains its integrity and is not merged in God. Thus, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika concept of the soul is the same. They recognize the plurality of individual souls, which is inferred from the variety of experiences and conditions of different souls. Some are happy while others are miserable. Some are

bound while others are liberated. These differences in the status of individuals prove the existence of many souls. The plurality of individual souls is confirmed by the Vedas also.

Liberation

All the philosophical systems try to explain the idea of liberation from their own point of view. For example, the Cārvāka philosophy has a materialistic conception of liberation. They say that liberation is the destruction of the body.[38] In the Buddhist philosophy Nirvana is at least the arrest of the stream of consciousness leading to the cessation of the possibilities of future. In Jaina philosophy liberation is the total deliverance of the soul from all karmic-matter which has entered into the soul. Nirvana is attained by realization of the true nature of the soul.

According to Nyāya liberation is absolute cessation of pain. The body, the sense-organs and mind are the causes of pain. Pleasure is invariably accompanied by pain. At the time of dissolution the soul becomes free from pain. Its merits and demerits remain dormant during dissolution at the will of God and are active again the time of creation,

when it assumes a body fit for their maturation and consequent enjoyments and sufferings. So during dissolution the soul has relative freedom from pain and possibility of its recurrence and rebirth. But liberation is the soul's absolute freedom from pain.

The Nyāya view of liberation is the same as the Vaiśeṣika view. According to them liberation is the complete extinction of the special qualities of the soul viz. cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition, merit, demerit and impression. In the state of liberation the soul is free from all these qualities.

Mind

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view of mind is similar in many ways. According to them mind is distinct from the self and it is a subtle matter. They maintain that mind is the internal organ which is the instrument of directly knowing pleasure, pain, etc. It is one in each body. It is an immaterial, corporeal, part less, atomic, unconscious, eternal substance, which is capable of action or movement. The existence of mind is inferred

from the non-production and production of perception at particular times. Here, when the mind is present there is perception. The conjunctions of the self with the mind, of the mind with the sense-organs and of the sense-organs with the objects are necessary conditions of perceptions. Recollections of colours, sounds, tastes, smells and touches are produced, even when the external sense-organs do not function. Therefore they must be produced by the internal organ. The mind is the internal organ, through which the self recollects, infers doubts and dreams.

The non-simultaneity of the qualities proves that the mind is one in each body. It has no specific qualities. The non-appearance of simultaneous cognitions from the different senses indicates the existence of mind. The Naiyāyikas include the mind in the second category - prameya,[39] while the Vaiśeṣikas consider it as a substance.[40] In Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view of mind is an external substance.

Atomic theory

Kaṇāda the founder of Vaiśeṣika system gave the idea of atom to the world for the first time. The Indian philosophies like Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Saṃkhya, Jaina and Bauddha admitted the theory of atom. Atoms are

the non-spatial, indivisible and eternal units of physical substance. They are spherical and supersensible. They can be perceived by Yogins and God.

According to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, earth, water, fire and air are eternal as atoms and non-eternal as composite products.[41] The world is created by the atoms.

The existence of atom is inferred from experience that finite wholes like a jar can be split up into smaller parts. This process of division cannot be carried on indefinitely, for then it will be impossible to account for the observed differences in their magnitude as all of them, small or big, would consist of an infinite number of atoms. If we assume a limit to the division, the differences in magnitude found in objects like 'a mountain and a mustard seed'[42] may be explained by the difference in the number of atoms going to make them up of two things, the smaller in size will contain fewer ultimate parts than the bigger. It is the final constituent of material objects in this process of division and sub-division that is termed an atom.

CONCLUSION

From the opening verse itself it is clear that the *Tarkasaṃgraha* is very simple and can be easily studied by the beginners. The way of presentation and lucid manner are very notable. The treatment of subject matter is by way of enunciation (uddeśa) definition (lakṣaṇa) and examination (parīkṣa). Enunciation is the mere mention of the categories by name; definition consists in setting forth that character of a category which differentiates it from other categories; and examination is the settlement, by reasoning, of the question whether the definition of a certain category is really applicable to it.

The combination of the principles of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika systems are in a unique manner. They are allied and nobody can feel it as of the different systems of Indian philosophy. In other prakaraṇagranthas the fusion of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika doctrines are projected as two different systems. For example, in Tarkabhāṣa, Keśava Miśra treats of two sects of categories separately: i.e. the sixteen categories of *Nyāyasūtra* viz. pramāṇa (means of right knowledge), prameya (object of right knowledge), samśaya (doubt), prayojana (the objective or purpose),

dṛṣṭānta (familiar instance), siddhānta (established tenet), avayava (member), tarka (disputation), nirṇaya (ascertainment), vāda (discussion), jalpa (rejoinder), vitaṇḍa (cavil), hetvābhāsa (fallacy of the reason), chala (quibble), jāti (legitimate objection) and nigrahasthāna (deficiency) and the six categories of *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*, viz. dravya (substance), guṇa (quality), karma (action), sāmānya (generality), viśeṣa (particularity) and samavāya (inherence).

A notable difference in the concepts of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika systems is seen while dealing with the theory of 'pāka'. According to Vaiśeṣika system pāka occurs in the parts (atoms) but in Nyāya system it occurs in whole as well as in the parts simultaneously. In the classification of categories Annaṃbhaṭṭa deals with the seven categories as the base. But we can see that he includes the sixteen categories of the Nyāyasūtra and the six categories of the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* in these seven categories including the abhāva. Annaṃbhaṭṭa accepts the six categories that are mentioned in the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* without any modification or change. In the concluding part of *Tarkasaṃgraha* Annaṃbhaṭṭa states that all the padārthas in the universe are included in the seven categories.

In the presentation of pramāṇas also Annaṃbhaṭṭa joins the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika principles. In the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* we see only two pramāṇas viz. perception and inference. In Tarkasaṃgraha Annaṃbhaṭṭa accepts Nyāya view i.e. he deals with the four pramāṇas (perception, inference, comparison and verbal testimony) separately. Annaṃbhaṭṭa explains the pramāṇas while discussing qualities. Buddhi, a kind of quality which is divided into valid and invalid. The valid knowledge is acquired by these pramāṇas.

In presenting some subjects the author includes different opinions of ancient and modern logic. For example in *Dīpika* while discussing the theory of sṛṣṭi and praḷaya there is a mention of the principle of ancient Nyāya that the dissolution of things is always caused by the decay of samavāyikāraṇa. According to modern Nyāya it is due to the decay of asamavāyikāraṇa.

Tarkasaṃgraha gives equal importance to the principles of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika. Although Nyāya gives prominence to pramāṇas and Vaiśeṣika to prameyas, Annaṃbhaṭṭa gives equal importance to both.

The treatment of ontology and metaphysics of Vaiśeṣika are agreeable to Nyāya.

The ultimate aim of both these systems is liberation (niḥśreyasa) but in *Tarkasaṃgraha* the author never mentions the term liberation.

Tarkasaṃgraha is the most popular work among the prakaraṇagranthas. It contains the essence of the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika systems. All the Universities and Colleges provide *Tarkasaṃgraha* as the primary book for the beginners to study Logic. *Tarkaśāstra* is believed to be the science of sciences. It helps to study how to think properly.

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1. 'सर्वेषां पदार्थानां यथायथमुक्तेष्वन्तर्भावात् सप्तैव पदार्था इति सिद्धम्।'

   T. S. p.52

   'एते च पदार्थाः वैशेषिकनये प्रसिद्धाः नैयायिकानामप्यविदुद्धाः।'

   N. S. M., pp. 25-26

2. *S. M., Dinakari,* pp.42-46.

3. *H.I.L.*, p.389.

4. 'रूपरसगन्धस्पर्शाः सङ्ख्याः परिमाणानि पृथक्त्वं संयोगविभागौ परत्वापरत्वे बुद्धयः सुखदुःखे इच्छाद्वेषौ प्रयत्नाश्च गुणाः।' *V.S.* I.I.6.

5. 'गुणाश्च रूपरसगन्धस्पर्शसङ्ख्यापरिमाणपृथक्त्वसंयोगविभागपरत्वापरत्वबुद्धिसुख-दुःखेच्छाद्वेषप्रयत्नाश्चेति कण्ठोक्ताः सप्तदश। चशब्दसमुच्चिताश्च गुरुत्वद्रवत्वस्नेहसं-स्कारादृष्टशब्दाः सप्तैवेत्येव चतुर्विंशति गुणाः।' *P. Bh.*, p.3.

6. 'अत्र नव्याः परमपरं द्विविधं सामान्यं परं सत्ता इति वैशेषिकविभागः अनादेयः इत्याहुः।' *Dinakari,* p.80.

7. 'नवीनास्तु विशेषे अतिरिक्ते मानाभावः।' *Dinakari,* p.85.

8. 'समवायस्य नानात्वमिति नवीनाः।' *Dinakari,* p.89.

9. 'अभावस्तु द्विधा संसर्गान्योन्याभावभेदतः।

   प्रागभावस्तथा ध्वंसोऽप्यत्यन्ताभाव एव च।।' *N. S. M., Karika* – 12.

10. 'तत्र कार्यलक्षणः चतुर्विधः शरीरम्, इन्द्रियं विषयः, प्राणः इति।'

    P. Bh., p. 26.

11. 'नव्यास्तु ईश्वरः एव शब्दकारणम्, न आकाश इति वदन्ति।'

    Dinakari, p.194.

12. 'रूपादिचतुष्टयं पृथिव्यां पाकजमनित्यं च। अन्यत्र अपाकजं नित्यमनित्यञ्च। नित्यगतं नित्यम् अनित्यगतमनित्यम्।' *T. S.*, p. 15.

13. 'अत्र नव्याः अन्योन्याभाव एव पृथक्त्वम्। न तु गुणान्तरम्।' *Dinakari,* p. 470.

14. 'अप्रसिद्धोऽनपदेशोऽसन् सन्दिग्धश्चानपदेशः।' *V.S.*, 3.1.15.

15. 'एतेनासिद्धविरुद्धसन्दिग्धानध्यवसितवचनानामनपदेशत्वमुक्तं भवति।' *P. Bh.*, p. 189.

16. 'प्रतिज्ञाहेतूदाहरणोपनयनिगमनानि अवयवाः।' *N.S.*, 1.1.32.

17. *H.I.L., p.* 359.

18. *N.S.*, 1.1.9.

19. 'मोक्षे साक्षादनङ्गत्वादक्षपादैर्न लक्षितम्।
तन्त्रान्तरानुसारेण षट्कं द्रव्यादि लक्ष्यते।।' *Quoted form H.I.L.*, p. 375.

20. *ibid.*

21. 'अविसंवादिविज्ञानं प्रमाणमिति सौगताः।' *ibid.*

22. 'अविसंवादनमिति तदसत्। भूतभविष्यद्विषयेषु अनुमानेषु अव्याप्तेः।' *ibid.* p. 376.

23. 'व्याप्तिग्रहणसापेक्षं प्रमितेः साधनं विदुः। अनुमानमिति।' *ibid.*

24. 'बालोऽपि यो न्यायनये प्रवेशमल्पेन वाञ्छत्यलसः श्रुतेन।
संक्षिप्य युक्त्यन्विततर्कभाषा विरच्यते तस्य कृते मयैषा।।'
Tarkabhāṣā, opening lines.

25. *H.I.L.*, p.382.

26. *H.I.L., p.*387.

27. 'नूतनजलधररुचये गोपवधूटीदुकूलचौराय।
तस्मै कृष्णाय नमः संसारमहीरुहस्य बीजाय।।'

28. 'चूडामणीकृतविधुर्वलयीकृतवासुकिः।
भवो भवतु भव्याय लीलाताण्डवपण्डितः।।'

29. *H.I.L.*, p. 393.

30. 'श्रीविष्णोश्चरणाम्बुजं भवभयध्वंसैकबीजं परम्।
हृत्पद्मे विनिधाय तन्निरूपकतर्कामृतं तन्वते।।'

31. *H.I.L.*, p. 394.

32. 'गुणविशिष्टमात्मान्तरमीश्वरः' *N. Bh.*, 4.1.21.

अणिमा महिमा चैव लखिमा गरिमा तथा।
ईशित्वञ्च वशित्वञ्च प्रकाम्यं प्राप्तिरेव च।।'

33. 'पुरुषकारमीश्वरोऽनुगृह्णाति फलाय पुरुषस्य यतमानस्येश्वरः फलं सम्पादयतीति यदा न सम्पादयति तदा पुरुषकर्मांफलं भवतीति।' *N. Bh.*, 4.1.21.

34. *N.S.*, 1.1.1.

35. 'तत्रात्मा सर्वस्य द्रष्टा सर्वस्य भोक्ता सर्वज्ञः सर्वानुभवी।' *N. Bh.*, 1.1.9.

36. 'प्रत्यक्षं युञ्जानस्य योगसमाधिजम् आत्ममनसोः संयोगविशेषादात्मा प्रत्यक्ष इति।' *N. Bh.*, 1.1.3.

37. 'इच्छाद्वेषप्रयत्नसुखदुःखज्ञानान्यात्मनो लिङ्गमिति।' *N.S.*, 1.1.10.

38. 'देहोच्छेदो मोक्षः।'

39. 'आत्मशरीरेन्द्रियार्थबुद्धिमनःप्रवृत्तिदोषप्रेत्यभावफलदुःखापवर्गास्तु प्रमेयम्।' *N.S.*, 1.1.9.

40. 'पृथिव्यापस्तेजोवायुराकाशं कालो दिगात्मा मन इति द्रव्याणि।' V.*S.*, 1.1.10.

41. *T. S.*, pp. 7-10.

42. 'मेरुसर्षपयोरपि साम्यप्रसङ्गः।' *N. S. M.*, p. 118.

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